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THE ROLE OF GOVERNANCE IN THE
BUILDING OF ARENAS FOR POPULAR
MUSIC IN FRANCE AND ENGLAND 1980-
2019

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements of Leeds Beckett University
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

The thesis investigates the evolution of arenas for popular culture since 1980 in Europe, and specifically in France and England. Using a qualitative research strategy and a thematic and comparative approach the research focuses on arena developing in France and England, using two case studies, the cities of Bordeaux and Leeds. The timeframe for the research is c1980s to 2019, a period which saw the emergence of the 'dedicated' indoor music arenas. The thesis explores the development of arenas through a governance perspective exploring, decision-making, cultural attitudes, and urban spaces for new consumerism.

The research highlights the decision-making processes within different political and administrative systems, both nationally, and locally in Bordeaux and Leeds. It identifies similarities and contrasts in process. The research suggests that in both cases the actual decision-making was indecisive, with neither city having a defined vision for the development of arenas. The research findings suggest that the time scale for the development of the arenas was exacerbated by internal political conflicts in both cities – between the mayors in Bordeaux, whilst in Leeds, the external pressures of a neighbouring authority. The thesis also explores issues of arena ownership and the relationship between public and private investments in cultural infrastructure. The thesis similarly considers the impact of local cultural policy on decision-making related to the provision of local cultural infrastructure.

The thesis is situated within a literature focused on the development of venues for popular music, and more specifically presents a comparative analysis of how these develop in specific places. The thesis highlights how, within contrasting political and administrative systems, decision-making related to major cultural infrastructure projects is often faced with similar challenges. The thesis extends the discussion and understanding of decision-making in a comparative context and adds to an understanding of the response to the accommodation of popular culture since the 1980s. In so doing it contributes to knowledge through its exploration and analysis of the governance and politics of cultural infrastructure provision.

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INTRODUCTION

The thesis investigates the evolution of arenas for popular culture since 1980 in Europe with specific reference to France and England. Research concerning arena development is limited and restricted to specific aspects. More particularly it makes little reference to the overarching systems of governance which permits development to take place, the decision-making processes of development itself and the impacts of such development on both popular culture and the urban environment. The current research addresses these issues and as a consequence it explores new ground and so makes a major contribution to the literature. Equally it adds further significance as it develops the research in a framework of governance and in an internationally comparative context.

Using a qualitative research strategy and a thematic and comparative approach the research focuses on arena development in France and England, using two case studies, the cities of Bordeaux and Leeds. The timeframe for the research is from 1980 to 2019, a period which saw the emergence of the dedicated indoor music arena across Europe. The thesis explores the development of arenas through a governance perspective exploring within the three themes; governance decision-making, cultural attitudes and urban spaces for new consumerism. In doing so the thesis has drawn on the work of Cole and John (2001), Bache and Flinders (2004), Mayntz (1993), Brookes and Cullinane (2006) and Ferreira de Cruz and Gray (2015) to establish the framework of governance which aligns specifically with the key activities and responsibility for decision-making at the two levels, national and local, within the three themes (Table 1.1, chapter 1). The thesis demonstrates its originality by using the two levels of governance to underpin the three themes, and in so doing establishes new thinking surrounding the decision-making process at state/central level and significantly at the local authority level in France and England in developing cultural infrastructure.

There is little literature which considers the development of venues for popular music particularly within a governance framework, and more specifically little research which presents a comparative analysis of how these develop in specific places.

Authors have however, usefully explored the intersection between music and place, live music ecologies, (van der Hoeven and Hitters, 2019) musical memory and local identity (Cohen, 2012) and music, space and place (Whiteley et al., 2004). The contribution of this literature has furthered the discussion about the links between music, personal and group experiences and how these have played a part in shaping the urban environment and cultural policy.

This research also provides some linkages between recognised global artists, where they originated and, heritage. For example, in researching the impact of the Liverpool European City of Culture 2008 Cohen offers the view that ‘popular music contributes to cultural memory in distinctive and multifaceted ways, and therefore has a specific significance for cultural policy and the new Europe’ (Cohen, 2013, p. 590). This places an importance on the link between music and urban culture a theme further expanded by Behr et al. (2016) who focussed on the cultural value of live music, along with van der Hoeven and Hitters (2020) who discuss the spatial value of live music and its contribution to the narrating of urban spaces. The literature places an emphasis on the discussion of the value of music in terms of urban culture. The thesis adds to this discussion by focussing on the commercialisation of venues and the required financial return evidenced in the case studies by the contract between the operator and local authorities which lessens the opportunity for heritage and legacy (chapters 5 and 7).

There is a vast literature on urban and cultural-led regeneration such as Bianchini and Parkinson (1993), Evans (2005), Booth et al. (2007), Bazin and Geppert (2002), which provides the basis for further discussions on how cities have used redundant infrastructure to transform their cultural offer through regeneration. Waterfront development is particularly key for the thesis as its popularity during the 1980s and 1990s provided opportunities for city regeneration schemes to transform former canal and riverside wasteland into areas of retail, housing and cultural activities (Bunce and Desfor, 2007). However there is little discussion of the link between waterfront and cultural infrastructure in terms of arena development. Authors such as Strange (1996) Collard (1996, 2004) and Looseley (2007, 2013, 2018) have written widely on the challenges of developing cultural policy and popular culture, with Collard and Looseley highlighting the French attitudes towards popular culture and power of leadership on cultural flagship policy.

From a political perspective McKay (1982), Knapp and Wright (2006) provide a comparative narrative on the different political structures in France and England and their influence on decision-making. Published literature from professional organisations for example, Sound Diplomacy a global consultancy that specialise in music and culture and Pollstar that provide data in particular on ticket sales and touring artists offer a commercial perspective on the growth of music and use of venues in cities. Published reports such as World Cities Culture Reports offer an insight of how local governments are responding to the changing demands of culture in cities (chapter 1).

The literature provides very useful insights into the thinking on the political landscape, cultural policy and urban regeneration. However the specific question of the approach adopted by cities in developing cultural infrastructure and specifically arenas for popular culture remains under-researched. The thesis whilst drawing on the literature as an aid to progress the narrative on decision-making has extended the discussion and in doing so has made a contribution to the understanding of the governance and decision-making in the development of cultural infrastructure and more specifically arenas.

The development of the cultural infrastructure and the rise of popular music demanded large spaces. This is illustrated by the Beatles concert on 15 August 1965 in Shea Stadium, USA. This demand is informed by Robert Kronenburg who has extensively researched architecture that houses live music across the globe highlighting how these innovative designs of buildings fit within the urban environment along with audience experiences of the venues. As part of Kronenburg's research a typology of the trends for popular music venues distinguishes existing spaces used for music in order to understand how these have developed with changing demands from artists, promoters and audiences (Kronenburg, 2011). His distinction of the existing adopted, adapted, dedicated and mobile venue is a useful guide on which the thesis identifies the growth of the new dedicated popular music venue as discussed in chapter 1 and annex 1. Significant to the thesis is the prevalence of the 'large international promoters like AEG Live and Live Nation Entertainment taking a much greater share of the business [live music] at all levels' (Kronenburg, 2019, p. 14). This greater involvement is important context for the thesis as it demonstrates the growing relationships between local authorities and the music industry in the decision-making and development of arenas. The public/private partnership however,

creates a disjoint from culture policy and cultural value as the arenas are seen as commercial enterprises for mass consumption with a significant drive for financial return. These issues are further explored in the case studies.

The transitioning of cities gave rise to increased economic and urban competition in terms of status (Grasland and Jensen-Butler, 1997). The significance of status saw many cities look towards the development of cultural infrastructure and engagement with cultural industries to enhance their image and diversify their economies at a time when the pressures from popular music were growing. Additionally there was a shift from the loss of heavy industry to cities moving towards the service and financial sectors, influencing a level of gentrification and city living.

The development of state and central government cultural policy from the 1950s remained focussed on high culture with many of the buildings such as symphony and concert halls often referred to as the 'highest and most lasting forms of artists' expression' rather than embracing popular culture in all its forms (Devlin and Hoyle, 2000, p. 11). Capital cities have the resources to enhance their cultural offerings exemplified through Mitterrand's *Grands Projets* in Paris (Brown, 2011). Although there is some discussion in the literature which considers the significance of cultural buildings to the cityscape, it is mainly focussed on high culture.

Through a lens of two countries (France and England) and two cities (Bordeaux and Leeds) the thesis provides a comparative perspective on the governance and related cultural infrastructure development and comments on the implications seen in the transition period within the three themes. This adds significantly to the research as direct comparative research particularly in urban analysis has been limited (Booth, 2011; Le Galès and Mawson, 1995; Trache and Green, 2001). The three themes are a) governance decision-making which investigates the factors that have influenced and shaped the state/central and local government structures and administration and governance b) attitudes of the state and central government towards popular music in the development of cultural policy and c) urban spaces for new consumerism through cultural-led regeneration in an attempt to make cities attractive and competitive. These themes allow the research to draw together several interlinking threads.

The three themes are integral to the thesis as they allow a holistic view to be taken within the political, cultural and urban dimension, which is original. The thesis argues that the 1980s political reforms, shifts in governance, key influential individuals and increased competition between cities that led to cultural and urban projects, have provided the circumstances which saw Bordeaux and Leeds through Communauté Urbaine de Bordeaux (CUB)¹ and Leeds City Council (LCC) develop an arena for popular culture. Whilst France and England have been exposed to similar economic, social and cultural forces within the timeframe of this research, their responses have led to distinct patterns of urban and cultural development along with networks of governance at different levels of influences (McKay, 1996).

The research issue: how do different countries respond to accommodating popular music

Across the EU there are many arenas that are mainly built for sport and have resident teams, or were commissioned for large sporting events. These types of venues are common with the majority based on an interior oval shaped design, often seen in the USA. Whilst many have been adapted to accommodate popular music they remain heavily biased towards sport in terms of the number of events, identity and revenue. From the 1980s there was an emergence of a multi-purpose arena that emphasised popular music as the primary use rather than sport. These arenas had a fan-shaped or super-theatre interior design with a frontal stage rather than the common oval shape seen previously. The thesis aligns itself with Kronenburg's 'dedicated' categorisation to describe these new arenas (Kronenburg, 2011). In doing so asks the question what makes a city decided to build a 'dedicated' arena.

The emergence of a dedicated arena coincides with significant changes in the political, governance, social and cultural landscapes of France and England leading to inter-relationships between the cultural-led regeneration and urban planning through governmental, regional and local policies and approaches. The thesis focuses on the inter-relationships at national and local levels in considering the political decision-making process surrounding the construction of the commercial dedicated multi-purpose arenas in France and England. In

¹ Communauté Urbaine de Bordeaux (CUB) became Bordeaux Métropole in 2015. The thesis uses terminology CUB/Bordeaux Métropole throughout.

doing so an understanding of how government reforms, shifts in governance and administration created the environment of competition which led to cities enhancing their cultural infrastructures, and specifically the development of popular music arenas. Bordeaux and Leeds are studied in-depth to understanding the governance and the challenges faced by the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC that led to the development of the Arkea Arena, Bordeaux and First Direct Arena, Leeds.

The research questions

The following research questions have been posed in order explore the justification by the two cities for the development of an arena, the choice of design and investment and the role of cultural policy in the decision-making process along with the influence on the urban landscape.

Question 1: In what ways did national policy in France and England shape local level decision-making related to cultural infrastructure provision for popular music?

In posing this question the research goes beyond the existing literature and through a critical analysis of the national political reforms, in particular decentralisation and centralisation, demonstrate the impact on local government and governance. The external factors of globalisation and the strengthening of the EU culminated into the increased competition between cities and set a trend for using cultural-led regeneration to enhance their images and attractiveness. The relationship between political attitudes towards popular music is explored particularly the influence on cultural policy development and in this context the impact on the growth of new music venues.

Question 2: What was the role of local urban planning and cultural policy in shaping the development of music arenas in Bordeaux and Leeds?

Following on from the national perspective, local government in the midst of political administrative and structural change took on increased governance and became influential in developing cultural infrastructure. This question allows the exploration of the tensions and challenges witnessed within a specific development process by Bordeaux and Leeds. It investigates the influences of

national and local cultural policy along with the role of urban regeneration and the rationale for building a new music arena.

Question 3: What were the contrasting and comparable experiences of Bordeaux and Leeds in creating spaces for popular music?

Within a comparative lens this question analyses how the decision-making approach taken by Bordeaux and Leeds resulted in the development of a new music arena. It critically reviews the attitudes of the local authorities and the measures put in place in order to be competitive nationally and internationally. Taking into account also the position and type of arena building across the EU, it sought to understand the rationale for the decision to build the specific music orientated venue.

Question 4: What lessons can be learned from the cases of Bordeaux and Leeds and the future provision of local cultural infrastructure?

This final question will provide key findings from the research and reflect on how these will improve the decision-making process for other local authorities. The links between state/central and local governance and policymaking will be reflected in how the decision-making process was experienced. From these experiences several key findings are developed leading to the key outcome that without clear strategic planning the development of major cultural infrastructure will always present greater challenges for local authorities.

The research approach

The research study adopted a qualitative research strategy with an inductive and intensive approach, which is fully explained in chapter 2. The intensive approach places the importance on understanding the environment and opinions in real-life and through the analysis of the responses from interviewees.

Structure of the thesis

Part 1: Chapters 1-3

Part 1 provides the context for the thesis by examining the literature within the framework of the three themes, the methodology, a comparison of the national

and political climates in France and England which influenced local government decision-making followed by an in-depth analysis on France and England.

Chapter 1: Building [for] Culture: Themes in the Evolution of Cultural Buildings

The chapter through a thematic approach outlines the context for the thesis. The thesis uses an overarching framework of governance and three themes: governance decision-making, cultural attitudes and urban spaces for new consumerism. Within these themes the thesis explores the shifts in government reforms, governance and external factors that led to an emphasis on cities to increase economic growth within a competitive environment.

Chapter 2: Methodology

This chapter sets out the strategy used to conduct the research and poses the research questions. The framework for this particular study uses a qualitative research strategy to investigate a) the themes and context in which political, cultural and urban planning in England and France has evolved from the 1980s, b) historical and current inter-relationships between the cultural and urban planning through governmental, regional and local decision making c) the new buildings designed and built for popular music in cities and d) the impact of these buildings on regeneration of cities within the timeframe of 1980s to 2019. The use of comparison is essential to the study, as well as contributing to a limited literature, as it attempts to answer what approaches have been taken towards the creation of new buildings for popular music in the different countries (Azarian, 2011).

Chapter 3: France and England: Two Countries, Two Approaches, Politics, Administration, Urban policy and Culture Policy

This chapter explores how France and England have followed distinct paths of development despite experiencing similar economic, urban and social change. The period under investigation begins in 1980, but references several key points in history that have influenced the economic, social and political structures. These structures can be traced through the evolution of regions and what McKay refers to as the 'civic community' (McKay, 1996, p. 1). This is of interest to the research as it provides a systematic look at how each country's central and local political governance and administration is structured. The political

factors and institutional structures are central to explain the different approaches taken in building the multi-purpose music venues.

Part 2: Chapters 4-7

Part 2 provides the empirical evidence for Bordeaux and Leeds followed by the analysis on the decision-making by the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC for the development of an arena.

Chapter 4: Bordeaux: Awakening of the sleeping city

In chapter four the evidence relating to the growth of urban and cultural development in the Bordeaux Métropole is presented as an introduction to the primary research case study of the Arkea Arena, Floirac, Bordeaux. The period 1980 to 2019 is used, as it is representative of the key political and administrative changes experienced in France and resulted in a strengthening of regional and local authority responsibilities. The critical review of the influences from the political, cultural and urban dimension contextualises the case study to answer the research questions and in particular question 2, (What was the role of local urban planning and cultural policy in shaping the development of music arenas in Bordeaux and Leeds?) from the French point of view.

Chapter 5: Developing an Arena, Le projet d'une région: Bordeaux

Chapter 5 identifies the key stakeholders within the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole who are the major decision-makers for the development of the Arkea Arena. In using significant official committee papers presented to the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and the subsequent discussions along with the contributions from semi-structured interviews it argues that the major urban project was far from straightforward. It exposes the positioning of the political parties and the continued underlying tensions between the Left and Right Bank as the powerful mayors of Bordeaux and Bruges tried to dismiss the already approved dedicated urban regeneration programme, ZAC des Quais in favour of relocating the arena for the benefit of their own communes. The political tensions gave rise to further conflict on location, type of venue such as an arena or a Zénith and the use of public and or public and private investment. The chapter argues that instead of using the agreed plan for the major arena project within the ZAC des Quais it became a political battleground for several years. These tensions and subsequent financial crisis saw the arena take 18 years to fulfil.

Chapter 6: Going up a League as a City? Leeds

Chapter 6 explores the changing urban regeneration and culture profile of the city of Leeds. It pays particularly particular attention as Leeds moves from under the influence of neo-liberalism during the 1980s, to a corporate city in the 1990s to then a more civic emphasis of the 2000s. The chapter provides a critical review of the political, cultural and urban dimension and contextualises the case study to answer the research questions and in particular question 2, (What was the role of local urban planning and cultural policy in shaping the development of music arenas in Bordeaux and Leeds?) from the English point of view.

Chapter 7: Developing an Arena: An Inspiring Venue for a Vibrant City? Leeds

Chapter 7 identifies the key stakeholders within the LCC that are the major decision-makers in the development of the First Direct Arena. Through the use of official council papers and the subsequent discussions along with the contribution from semi-structured interviews it argues that there was no structured framework for the development of the arena. The drive for Leeds to become a major European and global city led to the realisation by LCC that without an arena the city was lacking in its cultural infrastructure. This chapter argues that the decision to build the arena was based predominantly on the potential economic benefit rather than cultural contribution to the city. The journey to build the arena spans periods of budget constraints, changes to local political parties, private sector involvement, court cases and challenges all of which create a complex history to its development.

Part 3: Chapter 8 and Conclusion

Part 3 brings together the evidence and analysis from earlier chapters in a comparative context identifying the key issues and discussions followed by a conclusion which responds to the research questions.

Chapter 8: A tale of two cities: analysing the approaches and decision-making in the development of an arena

This chapter compares and contrasts the outcomes of the two case studies in terms of what can be learned from the comparative approach between France and England and the specific city case studies. It explores the manner in which the interplay of governance and the three themes influenced the decision-

making process in the development of the dedicated arenas in Bordeaux and Leeds. The political reforms along with the influences of new governance from the 1980s created an environment in which developing networks shaped the decision-making within the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC. The outcomes pointed to a governing process where key political individuals were able to steer the decision-making process, and through using urban and cultural-led regeneration heighten the attractiveness of the cultural infrastructure of the city in order to compete nationally and internationally.

Conclusion

This chapter identifies the contribution to knowledge and extends the literature on governance through a political, cultural and urban dimension. Through the comparative lens, the thematic approach divided into decision-making, cultural attitudes of the state and central government in relation to popular music and urban spaces for new consumerism the thesis was led by four research questions. These questions were used to challenge the influences of governance within these themes that resulted in the decision-making process for the development of the arenas. The thesis argues that the two national level reforms of decentralisation and privatisation along with the external affects of globalisation and EU integration were major influences on the administrative structures and thinking of local government. These influences resulted in Bordeaux and Leeds using cultural-led regeneration as a means to become both nationally competitive and at the same time derive economic benefit and marketing opportunity. The thesis reflected on cultural policy but the evidence from the case studies indicated that this was of less importance than the ability to exploit the arena as a commercial concern with the engagement of global music organisations and sponsorship. Within the new governance the increased number of stakeholders within the decision-making process allowed greater engagement from different actors. However the findings pointed to key individuals in both cases that were influential in using political power to steer and at times hindered the development of the arena process.

PART 1

CHAPTER 1: BUILDINGS [FOR] CULTURE: THEMES IN THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURAL BUILDINGS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter sets out the context for the thesis. It outlines governance and how it relates to decision-making with a particular focus on the development of cultural infrastructure in cities. In so doing, it provides an overarching governance framework which identifies the central and sub-central governance structures, how these interplay with each other and other non-governmental organisations and the private sector. A discussion of the cultural and urban dimension of governance is explored and in particular how local authorities have used this to shape the future focus of the city. The scale and how governance is embedded in local authority decision-making provides a broader view of the cultural and urban challenges for popular music, through an exploration of the attitudes and behaviours of those in power. And, finally it examines the emergence of venues for popular music in light of the role of branding and marketing and their use as flagship projects or wider regeneration schemes.

The thesis explores and compares the process of decision making in two cities in France and England in developing a major cultural infrastructure project and more specifically a multi-purpose arena for popular music. To understand how, why and by whom these decisions were made a thematic approach was adopted within an overarching theoretical framework of governance that provided the basis on which to explore the different levels of decision-making within the selected themes (Table 1.1). Limited attention has been given in the literature to the decision making process surrounding the development of major cultural infrastructures, in particular, the dedicated indoor music arena. The chapter begins with a justification for the use of an overarching framework of governance in relation to government decision-making processes. It then provides a discussion of governance related to the three themes; governance decision-making, cultural attitudes and urban spaces for new consumerism and focuses on how these interrelated themes have steered the development of the arena throughout Europe. The chapter positions the thesis by demonstrating the importance of the interplay between governance, the decision-making at state/central and local government level as the demands to accommodate

popular music emerge. The use of comparison allows for an understanding of the governance of the two countries in respect of political structures and policy development (Looseley, 2011; Booth 2011; Wolman 1993).

Governance as an overarching framework

The emergence of an understanding of the role of governance as a potential framework that allowed the development of cultural infrastructure to achieve enhanced facilities and economic, social and cultural objectives is integral to the thesis (Raco, 2020). It builds a framework around the dominant (state/central) and sub-dominant (local level) of government and governance. This allowed the exploration of the interplay between these levels and how this has impacted on national and local relationships and policy. The literature provides several different definitions of governance. According to Brookes and Cullinane it 'is a topic fraught with debate' (Brookes and Cullinane, 2006, p. 405), a view also supported by Cole and John who argue that 'governance is highly abstract and elusive' (Cole and John, 2001, p.5). Despite the difficulty of defining governance the thesis has taken a clear path which focuses on understanding the relationships and behaviours between different stakeholders in relation to developing visions for cities through cultural policy and urban regeneration schemes. The thesis therefore aligns itself with the idea of approaching governance from the state/central government as the dominant source and local government as subordinate (Brookes and Cullinane, 2006). The theoretical framework for the current research explores governance and is reflective of the two levels of government, state/central and local (Table 1.1). As a multi-level phenomenon the framework has been developed to structure the discourse on political and cultural and urban policy changes (Anheier and Isar, 2012).

In taking account of these various definitions a framework of governance was developed based on the works of several writers Bache and Flinders (2004), Mayntz (1993), Brookes and Cullinane (2006) and Ferreira de Cruz and Gray (2015). Table 1.1 presents the broad structure of the framework outlining the different dimensions of governance relating to central and local governments and hence provides a theoretical basis for the three themes.

Table 1.1: Two levels of Governance

Central Governance	
a	Process of public policy discussions and implementation
b	Different government groups and different non-governmental organisations
c	Developing policy in economic, cultural and social context
Sub-Central Government Governance	
d	Local authorities
e	Networks – private – public – voluntary sectors
f	Developing policy for economic, cultural and social activities

Table 1.1 identifies that there are several layers of governance, the national and local levels but also a myriad of governmental bodies and non-governmental bodies which interact with governance. It is important to the thesis to unpick this top-level governance and how it informs decision-making in relation to cultural and urban development in France and England.

State/Central government roles in governance

Central Governance

a) The thesis explores the way in which state/central government level imposes urban governance and how the implementation of political reforms restructured administrative roles and responsibilities. The power to make decisions are two fold, a) technical in relation to processes that shape and reshaped political, cultural and urban environments, and b) bureaucratic the dominant authorities which influence and steer these changes (Raco, 2020). At this level the state/central government departments and the various committees of the respective government are involved in the development of policy tend to articulate and enact national policy in terms of building identity and protection of the nation (Anheier and Isar, 2012). These goal-directed policies are often developed as part of governance rules systems and for the public good (Mayntz, 1993; Bache and Flinders, 2004). Notwithstanding the different constitutional models, both countries have their parliaments and national assemblies which make final decisions about policy. In France this is the responsibility of the

Ministère de la Culture. In England the Department for Digital, Media, Culture and Sport (DCMS) considers matters of cultural policy.

b) The implementation of national policy is often undertaken through the auspices of the many quangos (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organization) which proliferate in both countries (The Economist, 2011). These organisations are often charged with building relationships between the state/central government and local government. In relation to the thesis the Regional Directorate of Cultural Affairs (DRAC), and the many sociétés d'économies mixtes (SEM) represent an organisational type particular to France and the Art Council England and English Heritage provide examples of these relationships in England.

c) In both countries, state/central governance responds to the ever changing global political and economic environments. The thesis identifies globalisation and Europeanisation as key influences particularly in adoption of new administrative structures leading to new governance and roles and responsibility for policy development at the local level. These changes ultimately impinged on the development of cultural and urban development activity and, important to the thesis, in the attitudes towards accommodation for popular music. These include for example, planning systems, regulations and approval, policies relating to land-purchase and licencing, and investment and financial support through grants.

Sub central Governance: Local level

New governance

d) The political reforms of 1980s emphasised the shifts in governance from state/central to local governance. The term 'new governance' is used to outline the focus on participation which was a move away from the traditional hierarchical structures for decision-making (Raco, 2020; Cole and John 2001). The effectiveness of this new governance was dependent on shared objectives driven by a network of stakeholders within changing political and international scenes (network governance). The thesis concentrates on the engagement by local authorities with network governance to explore how this works in practice and ultimately the decision-making process for the development of the two specific arenas (Arkea Arena, First Direct Arena). The innovative forms of

governance are based on new alliances and partnerships between state/central government, local authorities and public and private organisations (OECD², 2001).

e) As globalisation increased the pressure on local authorities in terms of governance, particularly network governance, created the need for greater engagement with local government, non-government, public/private sector and civil society leading to often complex relationships and interactions (Ferreira de Cruz and Gray, 2015). The political administrative structure for local authorities which are key to the discussions on cultural and urban policy are the communes, communautés urbaines, departments and regional councils in France and county councils, district councils, unitary authorities and metropolitan districts in England. Within the context of networks, various local agencies in France have very different structures to England. For example many of the organisations retain arms length structures such as the syndicat intercommunal à vocation unique (SIVU) (a group which has a single activity of inter-municipal interests) and syndicat intercommunal à vocation multiples (SIVOM) (a group which has multi-activities), but also the private or joint venture provision companies such as VEOLA or SNCM. By comparison in England there are the chambers of commerce (which collaborate with private firms to have them achieve aims and objectives), private utilities (to supply goods/services) and various voluntary organisations (working to create social impact).

f) Within a competitive environment local authorities and cities have become much more major players in the development of policies (OECD, 2001). New governance brought a wide range of responsibilities, both statutory and non-statutory, of local government and the broader activity which is the responsibility of all the above agencies, ranging from public health to waste collection. The specific responsibilities for these will vary between the different agencies in each of the countries.

The framework (Table 1.1) highlights that there are differences between the different levels but both governance and government are driven by sets of rules, which are influenced by external drivers and internally by power and authority in order to achieve their goals in developing policy and reforms (Bache and

² Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)

Flinders, 2004). This suggests a blurring of the definition and practice between government and governance. The thesis also makes a distinction between internal and external networks, alliances and partnerships. This is important as it provides clarity when discussing local authority governance decision-making. The internal networks are defined as those influences and interpretations on decision-making within the same committee, group or partnership. The external network is reflective of other agencies, authorities and the private sector influencing decision-making. The framework provides clarity of how the levels of government and governance interact and in using this as a base on which to explore the political, administrative structures, cultural and urban dimensions, the role of central and local governments in terms of decision-making and their respective impacts can be assessed.

Governance: political dimension of decision-making

The political decision-making process analyses the factors that have influenced and shaped the government structures and administration at state/central level as well as at local authority level. The thesis identifies three elements which have shaped governance, the constraints within a changing political environment, increased competition, and network governance. According to Peters and Pierre (2012) governance changed to reflect the shifting political environment over the past twenty years. Within this context the thesis explores the national level perspective particularly focused on the political reforms at the start of the 1980s of decentralisation (France) and centralisation (England). These national political reforms saw radical changes to state/central and local government political and administrative structures brought about through devolution. The political ideology of neoliberalism during the 1980s was emphasised by using the free market as a solution to economic and social problems combined with deregulation and a reduction of central government spending (Blanco et al., 2014). The results of these changes were signified by a decrease in the level of power and legitimacy of the state and central government towards a greater emphasis on local authority and non-elected organisations (Paquet, 1999; Ferreira de Cruz and Gray, 2015). However, the way in which this occurred, and the continued implementation of national policy and reforms were reliant on national government processes across a nation which can lead to fragmentation and complexities (Bache and Flinders, 2004). Therefore, whilst local authorities were charged with encompassing a broader

remit in terms of economic growth, which required a different way of governing by creating multi-layer governance, they did so within the constraints of national policy (Cole and John, 2001). The thesis uses the multi-level local governance as it provides clarity on decision-making and a distinction between the two levels as identified in table 1.1. In so doing it helps understand the incentives and challenges of these collaborative forms of governance and the interplay between the two levels.

Constraints within changing political environment

As globalisation accelerated along with Europeanisation, local authorities, cities and urban regions emerged as key players in the world economy in addition to making important contributions to national economies (OECD, 2001; Anheier and Isar, 2012; Sarikakis, 2012). This led to a dynamic shift in relationship and governance patterns. The traditional hierarchical pattern saw the state/central government as the major link between global impact and the local level. The shifts however now created a direct relationship between the global influences and local level allowing a greater autonomy in creating urban and cultural development policies (Anheier and Isar, 2012). However, whilst local authorities found themselves in this position they were constrained by the limited financial and resource support from state/central government.

The results of these changes are signified by a decrease in the level of power and legitimacy of the state and central government towards a greater emphasis on local authority and non-elected organisations (Paquet, 1999; Ferreira de Cruz and Gray, 2015). This local level governance differed greatly from the governance at state/central level. Local authorities and cities were embedded in constraints posed by national policies for economic and urban growth. As local authorities are subordinate to state/central government and with different countries having varied relationships, the abilities to impact change also differed. This difference was seen between France and England. Whilst France for example, had an administrative structure which allowed some local mayors of communes to have greater influences on national policy reform, English local governments were more at the mercy of central government political and administrative behaviours (Peters and Pierre, 2012). The fragmentation in how reforms and policies were implemented along with the interplay between national and local creates complexities in responsibilities and decision-making (Bache and Flinders, 2004). These differences are worthy of note as they offer a

view of how the different countries and local authorities worked within constraints yet were still able to implement schemes to enhance cities' cultural profiles. This multi-level local governance rather than complicating the research provides clarity for the thesis on decision-making at the two levels within the framework of governance, national and local.

Competition

The impact of globalisation led to what Wilks-Heeg et al. (2003) described as major cities in Europe increasingly measuring their own economic performance against their counterparts throughout the EU. This led to a growth of competition and combined with the political reforms reduced the dependence on state/central government. It created a situation whereby regions and cities increased their global profile and developed political leadership along with some policy choice directly affecting local communities (Salet et al., 2003; Wilks-Heeg et al., 2003). However, as argued by Peters and Pierre (2012) local authorities were still required to implement national policy which at times was at odds with their own visions. Therefore, local authorities had to combine their own visions for the city within at times a constrained environment. The resulting effect and the challenges to remain competitive saw local authorities pursuing policy objectives which focussed on improving their cultural and urban environment, promoting tourism, and quality of life for their communities to live, work and study. Furthermore the pursuit of competitiveness in and between urban regions has resulted in competition becoming a major objective in developing local and national policy (OECD, 2001). The scale of this competition was seen with local authorities interacting with the challenges and opportunities brought by globalisation and Europeanisation and as a direct consequence enhance cultural infrastructure and of particular interest to this thesis the creation of new arenas for popular music (Anheier and Isar, 2012; Grasland and Jensen-Bulter, 1997; Cole and John, 2001).

Local authorities have witnessed an environment of high level of competition between cities with an emphasis on changing the urban landscape with cultural infrastructure to enhance their image, attractiveness and boosterism. This led to local authorities becoming facilitators of networks to increase economic development for example in working with large international music operators and developers. This is reflective of Bordeaux and Leeds as both had the drive to become competitive and significant to the thesis, used the development of an

area to enhance cultural infrastructure. The shift in governance and increased competition presents a base for the research as it allows an exploration and analysis of how political institutions and elected officers particularly at local level play a dominant role in urban and cultural policies (Peters and Pierre, 2012).

Network Governance as a new form of governing

The emphasis on network governance in the 1980s provided flexibility resulting in governance becoming an organising framework which pointed to the need to collaborate with actors outside those areas traditionally explored by government (O'Brien, 2014). The impact of such a restructuring emphasised the need for increased network governance along with a greater engagement with intergovernmental relationships and agencies as seen in level 2 of the framework (Table 1.1) (Salet et al., 2003). This political entrepreneurship to build coalitions with partners such as private and public agencies became an important practice for local authorities in order to achieve visions and goals for cities (Peters and Pierre, 2012). This type of network governance became a widespread trend across European cities as they moved to become more 'entrepreneurial' in order to foster economic growth (Wilks-Heeg et al., 2003). By working closely with the private sector the development of creative industries and innovation business quarters also became popular in many cities. Cities and regions rather than state/central government became the main forces for competition, restructuring to enable increased global economy and working with a greater number of stakeholders private and voluntary (Singh, 2016).

Therefore, in order to adapt to the changes, local authorities found themselves encompassing a broader remit and increased engagement with stakeholders which required what Cole and John identify as 'an increasingly complex, indeterminate and multi-layered polity' (Cole and John, 2001, p. 5). This shift towards collaboration and networks created a new form of governance in which policy and decision-making was broadened out to meet a diversity of needs and thus rather than a top down approach, a horizontal approach was taken. These networks at times allowed cross-national sharing and reaching beyond the boundaries of different counties Rhodes (1997, quoted in O'Brien, 2014). The blended networks of the public and private sector organisations such as the SIVU, SIVOM (France) and Chamber of Commerce (England) which collectively administer political, cultural and urban policy created greater engagement with a variety of actors within each of the policy areas. These groups are seen in the

many urban regeneration and cultural schemes, for example European Capital of Culture (ECoC), where governance requires greater support and resources from a diversity of areas.

Within the backdrop of the transformation of governance and government along with the emphasis on the responsibilities of decision-making at the local authority level in order to increase a city's economic growth, social and cultural investment dominant individuals became key figures within the local administrative structures. These dominant individuals often holding political roles such as mayors and councillors now were working within an environment where the different actors and policy areas offered views and perspective. The result was potentially more cohesive decision-making. However, the increased numbers of actors in the decision-making process has the potential to create complexity and new tensions between the different interests along with the possibility to undermine the established administrative structures already in place (Raco et al., 2006). This tension is demonstrated in the political structures of the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC where the shift in governance and influences of competition saw increased independence in decision-making and responsibilities particularly in developing cultural and urban policy. This independence however brought with it a decrease in financial support from central governments, leaving local authorities having to turn to the private sector and rely on networks and partnerships in order to fulfil their public responsibilities and urban and cultural development. Therefore, the creation of 'network governance' is important in the development of the arenas.

Governance: the Cultural dimension, political attitudes and cultural value

The changes made through globalisation and the move from government to governance has emphasised the importance of the city and the development of major cultural infrastructure used, in part, as a form of competition between cities. In the current context cultural governance is concerned with attitudes and behaviours of those in power and who make decisions on cultural policy and its implementation. Whilst suggested by O'Brien 'it is widely accepted that culture is a difficult concept to identify and it remains complex and hard to pin down' (2014, p. 2). This thesis is concerned with cultural policy making for popular culture and seeks to understand the decision-making for the development of arenas particularly in light of urban regeneration and economic growth.

Therefore, the thesis expands the definition of cultural governance by Schmitt (2009) as it relates 'to the political negotiations about established cultural institutions or cultural forms, such as theatre, music or opera' to examine the effect of decentralisation, privatisation and partnership on the building of new cultural facilities (Schmitt, 2009, p. 105). Of particular relevance is the dualist system of government that was identified by the framework (Table 1.1) as it highlights the constitutional separation of the policy level and the executive administrative level (Čopič and Srakar, 2012). The separation between policy making and implementation was witnessed by both countries through the use of government and non-government bodies to promote and manage culture from a national and regional level for example, the DRACs, Maison de la Culture and the Arts Council and Regional Arts Associations. In keeping with the shifts in governance previously discussed there was a similar move to decrease state/central level management and development of culture to the local authorities.

As Sarikakis argues, cities have become 'nodes of global interconnections' which provide views and images for the world to see (Sarikakis, 2012, p. 17). This view has led to local authorities driving their cultural agendas to become a modern cultural and urban area across politics, social, cultural and economic levels. In developing cultural events and leisure activities and taking part in the wider European schemes such as ECoC cities were attempting to enhance their global profiles. However, this placed demands on local authorities and local governance decision-making particularly in the process of accommodating culture and understanding its consumption. The priorities and direction for cultural development in light of this global view and competition now rested with local authorities (Anheier and Isar, 2012). This was as Bianchini (1993) argues a complex situation as whilst culture contributed to the enhancement of the city image and economic development they also had to respond to the local demands and expectations of a new type of service sector workforce that lived and worked in the city.

Culture as an economic driver

DiGaetano and Strom (2003) argue that culture is an economic activity that has a market value and this has led to cultural policy being seen as the cultural offer for the city. The transformation of cities saw greater attention placed by local authorities on expanding economic sectors like leisure, tourism, the media and

other cultural industries as well as governing consumption and production (Binachini, 1993; DiGaetano and Strom, 2003). The result of which as Blanco et al., highlights is that cities became 'crucibles or cauldrons for economic growth and innovation, as well as for social and cultural interaction' (Blanco et al., 2014, p. 3132). This link between economic growth and engagement in the development of cultural facilities has become an important feature of urban and cultural-led regeneration rather than in the application of cultural policy. There is also a widening gap between museums and libraries and football stadiums and arenas all of which are impacting on the attitude towards cultural policy (Lobato, 2012). Lobato (2012) goes on to argue that cultural institutions such as museums and libraries are becoming overshadowed as attractive public spaces are being used for popular cultural engagement.

If we agree with Lobato's argument, then the role played by local authorities in shaping the type of cultural activities for the city becomes an important element particularly for popular music venues. In embracing the commercial cultural sector and giving access to urban space there is greater scope of public and private profit-making activities (Gugu and Dal Molin, 2016). In commercialising culture there is the opportunity to increase network governance leading to collaborative partnerships between local authorities and private sector towards economic gain. The thesis takes forward these discussions of the interactions between the relationships and how cultural policy invokes reactions from local governance and government alike.

Despite these networks there is a lack of clarity on the role of the partnerships between the local authorities and the cultural sector in terms of venues for popular music. What is evident are the growing relationships between local authorities and the music industry in pursuing financial benefits and investments through the development of arenas (Kronenburg, 2012). This is further explored in the thesis and is informed by Ponzini et al., who expands on the fact that these major cultural infrastructures 'are expected to attract crowds and significantly add to the attractiveness and liveliness of a place as well as to foster culture and tourism' (2020, p. 351). However, they require major public and private investment in order to build and maintain them. The level of public investment requires an understanding of the value of culture particularly when these are political projects often within policy challenges, financial constraints, media attention and demands from a diversity of groups (van der Hoeven and

Hitters, 2019). These challenges relate directly to the development of the arena particularly in the context of public and private investment and the linkage of economy with culture.

Attitudes towards cultural policy

From a starting point that the attitude of the state and central government to cultural policy demonstrates the top-down perspective, there is a tendency at policy level in relation to popular music 'to see it not as a cultural expression but to prioritise its importance as a commodified product' (Escher and Rempe, 2019, p. 3). This is reflective of the attitude that popular music is seen as a financial benefit for the local authorities rather than an integral part of a cultural policy. As discussed by Lobato (2012) the shaping of the cultural infrastructure and types of cultural activities in attractive spaces suggests that it is more to do with enhancing the city's image and appealing to target groups, rather than cultural policy per se.

To improve cultural governance, however, requires a change in attitude often by those in power to bring together communities and promote inclusion and participation (OECD, 2001). Yet the approach noted by local authorities towards cultural policy development has seen more focus on the national parameters of power which have embedded a type of attitudes towards culture as an economic activity (DiGaetano and Strom, 2003). These attitudes create a level of conflict when attempting to link culture to economic and social policy particularly in terms of investment (O'Brien, 2014). Whilst national policies included culture from the 1950s and 1960s, England maintained an arms length approach preferring to leave decisions of funding to non-government agencies such as the Arts Council. In contrast France with an elitist attitude towards culture saw a shift in 1981 of an acceptance of popular culture into state policy by the then cultural minister Jack Lang. The use of governmental agencies such as DRACs and Art Councils, English Heritage all have acted as intermediaries between national and local government with varying success. The transformation of local government structures and shifts in governance has increased the need for local authorities to establish cultural policies for their cities. However, the increased need to turn to the private sector for investment in cultural infrastructure has limited at times what can be built and for what purpose. Cultural policy therefore has become a strategy more aligned with regeneration and economic growth and how cities can enhance their global profile and reach. The type of cultural

strategy can be related directly to the growth of arenas where public/private partnerships were essential and where productivity, consumption and financial gain was a key factor rather than culture for the public good. How influential these policies as a strategy are will be further discussed in the case studies.

City Branding

According to Kong (2012) local authorities have engaged with the fast-growing practice of raising the profile of the city as a strategy for growth. This is entangled with the competition between cities to attract tourism, investment and resources which has intensified the need to use city branding. The drive to create unique and advertise cultural assets and facilities form part of this city branding drive. This city branding is seen through cultural facilities and major cultural projects which 'have been assigned a flagship role in planning and real-estate development schemes' (Ponzini et al., 2020, p. 348). This was particularly noted through the entrepreneurial urban policies following the political reforms of the 1980s (Ponzini et al., 2020). It is within this role that the rebranding and repositioning of a city has created a new commitment to cultural policy by local authorities. As noted, earlier schemes such as the ECoC have acted as a catalyst for cultural development and became an important factor in the development of cultural infrastructure for those cities applying and more significantly those who were successful. Another strategy for increasing cultural facilities and branding is by creating networks and franchises. This is highlighted by Ponzini et al. (2020) in terms of high-profile museums, which have exported their franchise in different countries as well as across regions. The brand value of an arena such as the Zénith³ in France can be interpreted in a similar way across the regions of France. The international renowned corporate operators and developers that operate or own several arenas across the world also have this power to use brand value to enhance their status as well as the cultural facility. The ability to attract sponsorship and naming rights creates for a local authority the opportunity to claim brand value in terms of boosterism for the city along with providing space for shaping experiences of communities, tourists and performers alike. This was a significant factor in the case studies of Bordeaux and Leeds.

³ Further discussions on the Zénith venue can be found in chapters 3, 4, 5.

From a position of economic decline local authorities have used cultural facilities as solutions to counteract job loss and poor image. According to Brown et al., 'the old industrial image was off-putting to inward investors, PR and marketing campaigns for towns and cities took off exponentially in the 1980s' (Brown et al., 2000, p. 439). Therefore, local authorities engaged with creative industries and cultural quarters to increase private sector investments and enhance economic growth for their cities. The cities and regions have become the catalyst for cultural growth in order to make themselves attractive for investment, transient tourism and boosterism. Cultural infrastructure 'should be mobilised in the image campaigns [and] if the facilities were not there then they needed to be built (Brown et al., 2000, p. 439). In this context the relationship between marketing of the city and building new cultural facilities to improve the image and attractiveness of the cities is of importance to the thesis

The development of the arenas adds to this tourism infrastructure and marketing campaigns, as they are places of consumption as well as adding to the iconography of the city. Whilst cultural policy may be a crucial component for the development of cultural facilities 'local authorities are very much attracted to the music industry and as a highly globalised industry it seems to sound the charge for new, forward-looking cities' (Brown et al., 2000, p. 447). The contribution of popular music therefore has the capacity to provide a city with potential marketing initiatives as well as financial revenues. This potential has not been lost on local authorities particularly with building networks across the music industries, operators, and hospitality sector to develop, build and maintain music arenas. The financial and commercial benefit of an arena can be more easily demonstrated within the global music scene and unlike high culture, there are internationally renowned organisations such as Pollstar⁴ that provide up-to-date data on ticket sales revenue, top global venues and artists tours.

In the implementation of cultural policy, the balance of importance between the two levels in the framework of governance have shifted. Notwithstanding the significant role of national governance and the work of Jack Lang in France, it is at the local level that the interrelated elements of governance are important in the decision-making to enhancing cultural infrastructure. However, the political attitudes towards popular culture are significant more in terms of the financial

⁴ Pollstar is a private company which provides the most up-to-date, relevant and useful data available for the global concert and live music industry.

contribution it can make rather than incorporating into cultural policy. This is of importance to the thesis and particularly reflective in the governance decision-making concerning the development of an arena in both case studies.

Governance: urban dimension

The global trends which contributed to the shifts in governance within the political and cultural dimensions previously discussed are also reflected in urban governance. According to DiGaetano and Strom (2003) there are two distinct factors involved in urban governance, these are networks and structural arrangements. The thesis uses these factors and defines urban governance as 'the process through which democratically elected local governments and the range of stakeholders in cities – such as business associations, unions, civil society, and citizens – make decisions about how to plan, finance, and manage the urban realm' (Slack and Côté, 2014, p. 5). This definition and factors are used by the thesis to focus on the processes of organisation and delivery of the vision for the urban development of towns and cities. The level of participation and inclusion of networks is of interest particularly in the governance decision-making and development of cultural facilities and infrastructure within a city.

Networks

The general move to incorporate wider networks in governance since the 1980s has been witnessed in the growth urban regeneration where local authorities have had to incorporate public and private partnerships to achieve the initiatives and objectives for the city (Therkildsen et al., 2009). As was seen in the Framework (Table 1.1) city leaders such as the mayors, presidents and leaders of councils however retain a significant level of authority. Therefore, whilst there is need for support from politicians and the public and private sectors in terms of the development of urban policy, the ideologies and visions of individuals often overshadow the collective group (Ferreira de Cruz et al., 2019). This is seen when deciding on development opportunities for their cities particularly in light of the coordination of urban policies, which have seen a shift from government to governance with one trend leading to the relationships between public-public and public-private partnerships (Salet et al., 2003). This implies that dominant individuals remain powerful in the decision-making process and this influence is noted in both cases.

Regeneration

According to Salet et al. (2003) cities across Europe have experienced significant change in their urban environment in recent years. The urban changes have demanded innovative approaches to land-use. Local authorities have sought to sell land assets to the private sector to increase revenues along with encouraging the development of new financial districts, cultural led regeneration, gentrification, spaces for mass consumerism such as shopping centres and arenas, and in particular the use of waterfronts development. This suggests that in developing these cultural facilities and activities local authorities are generally expecting them to trigger urban regeneration and economic development (Ponzini, 2012; Lloyd and Clark, 2002). These developments have also resulted in cities reviewing cultural infrastructure in light of competition in order to meet the demands of the influx of people returning to city living. The service-based economy and production along with a greater amount leisure time has according to Lloyd and Clark (2002) produced the need for cities to focus on their entertainment and cultural offer.

Noted above was how local authorities were selling land assets to the private sector thus reducing available publicly owned space for the development of cultural facilities. It is not just the reduction in appropriate space that needs to be considered in urban governance but the impact of locations, city centre or on the outskirts, on residents and the environment. According to Lloyd and Clark (2002), cities often use large-scale projects as a quick fix rather than responding to social and urban issues. The broader urban context therefore, is often overlooked when considering large cultural facility development. The thesis explores how the public space in which the dedicated music venues were located combines the function and the look of the built form within a city location as well as their impact on the environment and society (Couch, 2016).

Therefore, the building of an arena demands specific requirements to fulfil its purpose as music venue, at the same time it needs to provide an aesthetic that can be used to represent the city's image and vision. Singh describes 'two levels of governance where 'the architect straddles from the macro-level (city planning, urban design, landscape architecture) to the micro-level (construction detail, light ventilation and interiors)' (Singh, 2016, p. 19). It is within these two levels of governance where the decisions are made in terms of the shape, style, size and location of cultural buildings which also the influences the visual impact on the built environment. The two levels of decision-making proposed by Singh (2016)

focuses on the development and building rather than including the impact on residents close to locations of venues. Therefore, this will be explored further in the case studies. As 'public space has been reclaimed as a sphere of action and scrutiny by central and local government, academics and professional' (Roberts, 2009, p. 491) development of an arena as part of cultural infrastructure development is embodied in a complex decision-making process, an understanding of which allows us to unpick some of the complexities in the case studies relating to how public space was considered in urban governance.

The process of developing large cultural facilities and the subsequent governance decision-making in order to implement the vision of the city is of interest to the thesis. Healey (2007) argues that once a project is submitted the whole planning process should be seen as a governance project. The assumption, therefore, would be that all urban projects are suitably planned with local authorities and stakeholders having clear strategies and approaches. This is contradicted by Therkildsen et al. who explain that 'in response to an apparently limited range of predefined approaches in governing, it seems that new, more informal and often ad hoc-oriented practices for collective action have been gaining ground' (Therkildsen, et al., 2009, p. 928). This suggests a lack of a planned approach and as noted by Healey (2007) where dominant individuals with focussed ideologies can often steer the processes opening up the possibility of serendipity. The following of a planned approach or a matter of serendipity is evident and further discussed in the case studies.

In Table 1.1 the two-levels of government decision-making was identified. What has been established is the importance of the local authorities and their responsibilities to implement national reforms and policy as well as being the drivers for change in urban and cultural infrastructure. Network governance has assumed the role of decision-makers but dominant political individuals such as mayors and councillors retain a high level of influence. The use of policy to develop major cultural infrastructure whilst important, plays a lesser role in both cities leaning more towards urban renewal to impart boosterism and economic benefit. It is critical to investigate how governance discussed above within the three themes has related to the development of indoor music arenas. The framework will help to understand the interrelationships between the two levels of governance and how in the case studies these interrelationships shift through time, from a predominance of level one in the earlier period to level two in the

later period. It also highlights how these relationships shift differently between the two countries and case studies. The framework also helps to understand the changing relationship between the various agencies at both levels, their competences, and their significances in the final decisions taken.

CULTURE AND URBAN CHALLENGES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF VENUES FOR POPULAR CULTURE

The diversity of cultural offerings

The thesis takes the emergence of popular music since 1950s-1960s as a starting point for discussion as it provides context for how attitudes and governance at national and local authority changed to provide venues to accommodate it. The changing social attitudes and preferences seen after the Second World War reflected the influences of popular music from the USA, in the form of jazz, blues and rock and roll which impacted on bands and singers in the UK and France. According to Bennett 'without doubt, popular music is a primary, if not the primary, leisure resource in late modern society' (Bennett, 2001, p. 1). The sustainability of popular music came with the changing consumer and leisure activities aimed mostly but not exclusively at teenagers; the radio stations that played continuous 'pop' music, (Radio 1, and Radio Luxemburg for example), music magazines and the purchasing of recorded music (vinyl). In France however, the state-owned Office de Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française (ORTF) had a monopoly on radio and television programming.

It was this rigidity of the state's monopoly on culture although challenged to some extent by Lang which stifled the accessibility to foreign popular music. In so doing the state attempted to defend national identity and focus on influencing French culture and art against the commodification of culture from the USA (Martigny et al., 2021; Looseley, 2011). This led French audiences that wanted to listen to popular music, new artists from the UK and USA as well as 'French popular music production recorded by major labels' having to tune into the radio périphériques such as '(Europe no 1, Radio Luxemburg and Radio Monte Carlo)' (Guibert, 2018, p. 6). The contrast between France and England towards the accessibility of popular music and cultural attitude and governance was

different. Whilst France was much more resistant to pop culture, as, according to Guibert, 'from the 1960s to the 1980s was a kind of "great divide" between French variété and Anglo-American rock which was produced abroad and distributed in France' (Guibert, 2018, p. 7). This was a result of the adoption by the French state of a narrow conception of culture from 1945 which according to Looseley (2011) remained dominant until the 1980s.

Therefore, from an historic position in which the state continued to control radio and cultural governance and where attitudes at state level had a distinct lack of engagement, Lang demonstrated his attempts to address some of the reluctance shown toward popular culture. The opening up of international artists for popular culture however was still resisted. In his paper *Les politiques culturelles d'André Malraux à Jack Lang* (1996) Augustin Girard outlines the evolution of cultural policy in France in which he concludes for the period to 1981 when Jack Lang become minister 'les ministres sont oeuvre dans la meme sens, sous la double pression de l'intelligensia artistique, et de l'administration culture, qui lui est acquise' [the ministers are acting in the same way, heavily lobbied by both the artistic elite and the cultural administration as one would expect] (p.32). The remit of cultural policy however, widened with the appointment of Lang. Girard refers to this change as three 'ruptures'. The first of these ruptures was the widening of policy to include French popular music and the creative arts including performance space and the development of the Zènith model. The second of the ruptures was the opening up of France to international artists to head the major artistic institutions, such as the Paris Opera. The third was the acceptance that cultural activity was part of the national economy in which both public and private capital played a part. In England however, there appeared a general acceptance of popular music and its subsequent developing musical genres although from a commercial point of view. However, this acceptance was put to the test when in the 1970s punk rock provoked reactions from the political institutions and challenged the established order of society. This led to many local authorities banning the bands from playing at venues and their music receiving censorship on radio and television (Street et al., 2018).

The rapid development in the production of vinyl records reduced the popularity of the once popular dance halls in cities with their resident bands, which began to be replaced with recorded music played by DJs and pop groups. The amateur

music scene flourished creating a demand for venues to accommodate this style of music, starting the 'pub gigging circuit' (Brennan, 2010, p. 4). A suite of music venues such as the 'O2 Academy' owned since 2008 by Academy Music Group (AMG) in partnership with Live Nation accommodate many touring bands which are unable to fill large arenas. This mixture of recorded and live music continues today and according to Frith 'over the last fifty years popular music culture has been organised around the relationship of the recorded music and live music sectors' (Frith et al., 2010, p. 2). Local authorities had further challenges as the commercial bands and the growth of the 'stadium bands' scene during the 1970s and 1980s put pressure on available venues within a city. Stadiums used for football matches were used but the highly spectacular concerts with specific technology and equipment needs often found these multi-purpose large-scale venues inappropriate. The larger and more elaborate shows as well as the increases in audience size highlighted several problems with this type of venue design. The stadiums built for sport, often open-air, had problematic sightlines, seating which was a great distance from the stage along with poor acoustics and a lack of comfort (Kronenburg, 2019). These issues demonstrated that whilst stadiums attracted large audiences and hence profitable their suitability for the potential evolving music and mass consumerism demands was questionable. The music industry however was quick to realise the potential profits from live music and ticket sales from venues. The link between the music industry, global corporations and local authorities gave rise to public private partnerships leading to the creation of network governance (Ferreira de Cruz and Gray, 2015; Raco, 2020; O'Brien, 2014; Wilks-Heeg et al., 2003). This was particularly seen in the development of the arenas.

Reports such as the World City Cultural Reports (2012, 2015, 2018) provide examples of how individual cities are enhancing cultural infrastructure and engaging in cultural governance through discussions on how to improve culture facilities. The reports placed an emphasis on demonstrating the diversity of culture and reflect on how bringing together creative industries, entertainment and sporting facilities, green spaces and restaurants and bars provide a holistic approach to the city. In the data however, there is little detailed analysis of popular music or of where this type of culture fits in comparison with that of high culture and the associated structures in which it is housed. This is important to the discussion as it highlights the lack of detailed evidence of popular music venues and how these fit within the wider cultural offer of a city. Instead, the

reports indicated a significant number of live music venues, yet make no distinction between those held in concert halls and those in arenas. Similarly, the UNESCO Framework domains (2009), whilst covering a wide range of cultural activities, still lack specific data on music arenas and venues. There equally appears a lack of discussion of local governance towards popular music venues within these reports. The reports fail to provide some form of explanation of how cities could enhance their cultural infrastructure as well as learning from others. It appears that this is a missing link between governance and practice within these reports, leaving private sector global organisations such as Sound Diplomacy (established in 2013 in the UK), to support cities with toolkits in order to achieve a music city profile and making profits for the company. The value of music for a city is defined by Sound Diplomacy as a concept which uses music and culture in a deliberate and intentional way to deliver economic, social and culture growth in cities and to address competition (Sound Diplomacy, 2021). The use of entertainment and cultural facilities through major cultural and urban schemes has become a useful way to describe competition among cities (Lloyd and Clark, 2002). This is discussed in the thesis with the building of the arenas, although there is no evidence that Bordeaux or Leeds engaged with Sound Diplomacy or any similar organisation.

According van der Hoeven and Hitters (2020) the live music industry has increased its position within the urban environment of a city adding to the cultural profile. However, when attempting to value the economic worth of live music it remains ambiguous given that there is no comparable data unlike with recorded music (Osbourne and Laing, 2020). There is a need therefore to use private sector data which focuses on ticket sales to demonstrate the success of a venue and how this contributes to the competition between cities. This provides a different perspective from a key contributor to network governance and again highlights the importance of different types of stakeholders demonstrated in the Framework (Table 1.1). The success of the venue is an important element to the thesis particularly in the governance decision-making by the local authorities of Bordeaux and Leeds in developing the arena. The profit and success of venues within a global environment through collected and analysed data by international companies such as Pollstar who report on most popular global venues through ticket sales or Music by Numbers for commercial music and musicians is useful. This comparative data provides a global view and indicates that English venues have maintained a position within the top 200

(from available data from 2014-2019). The data provides a useful comparison between English arenas as it outlines the positioning of the First Direct Arena against the established venues. It also supports the view and decision-making by LCC and the feasibility studies that the market could sustain another arena in the region.

The emergence of new thinking towards popular culture and music

As popular music evolved the advances in technology allowed artists to push the boundaries by exploiting symbiotic relationships. There was a requirement on cities therefore to adapt existing venues or develop new venues to allow the evolving relationship between artists and technology. There was also a view held by state and central government that popular culture and music was not an art form which required financial support which instead could be supplied by the market (Looseley, 2011). The lack of state and central funding therefore made cultural industries and music corporations an attractive option for local authorities when looking to enhance their cultural facilities. This was seen in the attention paid by local authorities from the 1980s towards the new economic sectors such as leisure and tourism and cultural industries which created a shift in political attitudes and governance towards city image (Bianchini, 1993; Kong, 2012). Influenced by trends in the global economy cities became increasingly focussed on economic development in these sectors which meant a rethink of the city, its position in relation to other similar cities and its cultural infrastructure (Lloyd and Clark, 2002). According to Richards 'Creativity has become a more important issue on urban agendas as cities have developed and changed' (Richards, 2014, p. 120). The use of culture as a trigger for urban policies had become a major driver in the development of cities and their cultural infrastructure (Richards, 2014; Lloyd and Clark, 2002). These authors both indicate how local authorities had become increasingly aware of how cultural and urban regeneration relate to economic growth and enhancing city profiles. The changing perspectives in development of cultural facilities are representative of the contribution that new arenas for popular live music can make to a city.

City and the commercial music venue

In 1965 when the Beatles played Shea Stadium, New York to an audience of

56,000 fans (Image: 1.1) there appears to have been a shift in thinking about large scale popular concerts. According to Colin Fleming, journalist for Rolling Stone Magazine ‘there was no more famous gig in rock and roll history’ (Fleming, 2015, n.pag.). This was a critical point in popular music history as the ‘dramatic revelation of the commercial possibilities of popular music took place and changed the nature of the music business for ever’ (Kronenburg, 2012, p. 3). The commercialisation left local authorities ill equipped to accommodate live popular music with venues having poor acoustics, seating with impaired vision, lighting and ventilation. Although many local authorities had begun to undertake adaptations to existing venues to accommodate live music, dedicated venues were still relatively small in number.

Image: 1.1: Beatles at Shea Stadium



Source: Flemming, 2015, n.pag.

1965 was a key year in which local authorities, promoters and venues owners realised that money could be made from popular live music. The venues themselves however were not adequately adapted for this purpose. The modern indoor arena has developed as an element of urban and economic development specifically since the 1960s, creating the opportunities for city boosterism, production of music and consumption for audiences. It took however until the 1980s for commercial multi-purpose venues dedicated to popular music and events to be realised. Coinciding with this was a significant time of the state and central political reforms and shifts in governance that shaped local authority responsibilities and administrative structures. According to Kronenburg the

'commercial model for arena development in the UK was significantly influenced by the Manchester Arena' built in 1995 (Kronenburg, 2019, p. 117). It was one of the first enclosed European arenas to be built based on the US model, seating in multi-tiers, all round viewing and a vast open space. To broaden their use many of the existing venues have been renovated sometimes several times to meet the demands of the growing live popular music scene. Yet most still maintain their original purpose such as the Bullrings in Spain (Iradier Arena in 1941 and Leon Arena in 1948) and the many sporting arenas.

However, the realisation of the economic value of live popular music created a new impetus for local authorities to provide venues (van der Hoeven and Hitters 2020). This is seen in France and England. From the 1980s the French state developed its cultural governance which encompassed popular culture and in particular saw a new strategy for music venues focussed on French music called the Zénith. From 1980 there were 17 Zénith constructed, the first in Paris in 1983 and the last one in St Étienne in 2008 (Maillard, 2010). The intervening 20-year period (1980-2018) saw a significant development in France with the building of 28 Zeniths and multi-purpose Arenas (17 and 11 respectively with a capacity between 6,000-14,000). In comparison the same period saw 8 (capacity 7,000-16,000) multi-purpose arenas built in England⁵. It is recognised that during this period larger arenas with a 20,000+ capacity were also built 1 in France (Accord Hotels Arena Paris) and two in England (Manchester Arena and O2 London). In Europe except for the Zéniths, the 2000s witnessed the emergence of a small number of dedicated venues, such as 3Arena, Ireland (2008) and Palais 12, Belgium (2013). This was a significant move away from the venues that remained mainly adapted ones to a new cultural venue dedicated to live popular music. The case studies discuss in detail the decision-making process led by the local authorities to develop the dedicated type of venue as opposed to a sporting arena or large multi-purpose complex.

New emerging venue styles

The thesis identified a number of arenas built from the 1980s in France and England (Annex 1). These arenas all have flexible modular interiors that allow a diversity of programming from artists, variety shows and sporting events. The

⁵ Annex 1 provides an overview of the development of music venues in France and England within set criteria.

thesis is concerned with the significance of the new music venue style dedicated to live music as both local authorities of Bordeaux and Leeds decided to go ahead with this approach. The style of these venues created a new emphasis in terms of their design and hence to complexities of deciding on what should be built. To understand the difference from other venue styles Kronenburg's categorisation was used (Table 1.2).

Table 1.2: Categories of venues

Adopted	Spaces designed for other uses that have come into use informally for music performance.
Adapted	Spaces are those that have been significantly modified from previous uses.
Dedicated	Spaces are those that have been specially designed.
Mobile	Flexible spaces which can be either adapted and dedicated structures that are used for dedicated performances or to adapt existing buildings or open sites.

Source: Kronenburg, 2011, p. 140.

There is a distinct difference in the shape of the internal seating arrangement of these dedicated venues. The audiences are much closer to the stage creating a more intimate experience between them and the performers along with an uninterrupted view. These purpose-built venues using the most up-to-date technology and acoustics are superior to the existing venues which allowed them to overcome many of the issues presented in the adaption of existing buildings. This new type of venue allowed the thesis to categorise the First Direct Arena (2013) and subsequently in Arkea Arena (2018) as dedicated venues. Therefore, Bordeaux and Leeds were purposefully selected as examples of this dedicated building type. In doing so it allowed a further narrative for understanding of the governance of the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC in deciding to build this style of venue.

The City and identity through marketing and branding

Music venues and developing urban space have a role in how the city represents itself particularly in how local authorities use promotional materials to create favourable images of the city (Kong, 2012; van der Hoeven and Hitters, 2020). This is represented by the myriad of venue types available which is a

powerful factor for attracting target groups (Kong, 2012). The diversity of the evolving music genres saw a growth of music venues in cities with some having 'gained importance in terms of the development of distinct musical scenes that then expand into national and international recognition' such as the Beatles and Liverpool city (Kronenburg, 2011, p. 137) whilst others remained at the local level. These venues for example can be grassroots pub gigging circuits, small venues such as the O2 arenas to the larger arena and stadiums. The number and variety is problematic when attempting to map the facilities within a city or to access their impact and use (Cohen, 2012; Kronenburg, 2011). The diversity of venues along with the local, national and international recognition of a certain artist(s) and association with the space can have a dual purpose, a tourist attraction as well as a performance venue, both of which can add to the economic benefit and attractiveness to the city. The diversity of the city's live music scenes also has a role in the marketing of the city as it brings a unique brand and identity for the city as well as creating a narrative which connects tourists and local communities (Kong, 2012).

Heritage and sponsorship

With the emergence of dedicated buildings for popular music in cities such as Leeds, Bordeaux, Glasgow and Dublin, the question is, how do these venues fit within the urban governance of local authorities and urban environment and how do they link to individual politicians, parties or sponsors. Buildings designed for cultural activities have been important to the development of the city landscape for centuries with examples seen in the 1980s with the former French president François Mitterrand and his 'grands projets' (Brown, 2011). The role of a venue for popular culture is therefore highlighted whether these are important to heritage and legacy. In her narrative about music and memory in Vienna Cohen highlights the linkage of buildings with high culture rather than its commercial value. Therefore, in terms of the buildings for popular music the links between legacy, heritage and memory remain weak.

What constitutes heritage and memory in terms of popular music is less easily identified. According to O'Reilly et al. 'one thinks, perhaps, of celebrities being inducted into the Rock & Roll Hall of Fame, of The Cavern in Liverpool, museums exhibitions about popular music icons, such as David Bowie or Kylie Minogue' (2017, p.174) or 'the proliferation of monuments and plaque schemes, tours, trails and maps' (Cohen et al., 2015, p. 2) or indeed souvenirs such as

vinyl record collecting (Sonnischsen, 2017). These examples all rely on cultural consumption and a commercialisation of popular music through mass media (production) or marketing, which allows the extension of collective memory about certain events based on an individual's experience of the interactions between likeminded people, the music genre and the place it happened, rather than more simply the building.

The venue however can be significant particularly in developing marketing of spaces connected to local meaning and identity. Van der Hoeven (2014) highlights that 'music is always made, performed and consumed somewhere' (p. 25) cities therefore have the opportunity to reconcile the diversity of music genres and specific buildings to accommodate them. As cities are centres of live popular music providing mass entertainment, they often boast many different venues within their urban environment, from the grass-roots venues, medium sized arenas to stadiums (Holt and Wergin, 2013). Cohen noted in 'Live Music and urban landscape: mapping the beat in Liverpool' (2012) the difficulty in mapping all types of music venues across Liverpool. Therefore, there is a difficulty in capturing all venues. Kronenburg even goes so far as to say that 'the number and range of popular music venues is uncountable' (Kronenburg, 2012, p. 4). This highlights the complex ecosystem for music in cities, one which is not easily captured.

The array of venues has grown along with an importance of live music in all its forms to society (grassroots, local bands as well as global stars etc.) Cities can in some part exploit the local bands made famous such as the Beatles and Liverpool that brings a sense of music heritage that is marketable in terms of urban tourism. In winning the ECoC 2008, Liverpool also saw 'the opening of a new Beatles-themed hotel, a new performance arena on the city's docklands, and numerous projects aimed at refashioning the city by improving its arts and cultural spaces' (Lashua, et al., 2010, p. 129). The city's exploitation of home-grown local bands as a commodity provided a useful marketing tool along with merchandising and souvenirs resulted in the promotion of transient tourism, which as Sonnischsen alludes 'are predominant creators of memory' (Sonnischsen, 2017, p. 235).

Yet many cities do not have famous bands and music scenes or are not successful in programmes such as the ECoC that can create this commercial phenomenon. Even where cities such as Leeds may lay claim for example to Marc Almond from Soft Cell in the 1980s and more recently the Kaiser Chiefs in 2020 and Bordeaux 'Noir Desir' in the 1980s and 'Eiffel' in the 2000s, there appears little in the way of branding of these bands as a marketing tool for city heritage. Therefore, city heritage in terms of linking an arena with a specific artist or music genre appears less likely. According to Bottà (2008) however with popular culture becoming increasingly commercialised venue owners have focussed on developing sponsorship deals rather than creating a cultural heritage image. These naming rights deals are ways in which to increase the revenue for the owners of the arenas and the brand awareness for private sector organisations (Neils, 2012). The sponsorship deals also play an instrumental role in attracting large events to the arena which in turn increases the overall profile for the city (The Newsroom, 2017). Therefore, the ultimate goal of commercial global music arenas are related to it being economically viable for the owners and operators and with sponsorship deals create an environment for making money for the music industry and sponsors. The link between the arenas, owners and operators and sponsorship deals in Bordeaux and Leeds is discussed in the case studies.

Urban planning, location and architectural design

The adoption of cultural policies as strategies for urban regeneration raises an important question for the thesis (Bianchini, 1993). The argument Bianchini alludes to is that 'the use of cultural policy as an element of urban regeneration strategies [which] is increasingly an uncontested issue' which leads to an expectation that the development of the arenas sits within a specific programme (Bianchini, 1993, p. 199). Whilst this was true of Bordeaux, regardless of how it was used initially, there was no such link in the Leeds case. Urban governance has seen the development of an arena creating 'local dynamics and interests at stake as well, which concern the use of the site, the musical programme itself, and not the least, the socio-spatial restructuring of the city' (Escher and Rempe, 2019, p. 2). The linkages of local authority governance between cultural policy and urban regeneration, the significance of the architecture, the flagship building and its appeal in terms of tourism and how the location relates to urban planning are crucial to the case studies and thesis.

Kronenburg acknowledges that little emphasis has been placed on the architecture of the buildings themselves.

For too long, the popular music venue has been seen as something ephemeral and without cultural significance – it is time that it is recognized for what it is: in all its architectural diversity, a crucially important setting for perhaps the most significant art form of the last hundred years, and one without which that art form would never have existed

(Kronenburg, 2019, p. 146).

The creation of a significant art form of these arenas on the cityscape has seen many, but far from all, local authorities in France and England using famous architects in an attempt to add an iconic lens to the design. According to Ponzini (2012) famous architects explore how individual unique buildings can transform the urban landscape. This suggests that whilst the arena building itself is key, the surrounding public spaces is as important for urban regeneration. It is this expansion which has seen attention to the surrounding areas with the piazza, green spaces for people to congregate prior and after a performance, as well as restaurants and bars in the locality, adding to the night-time economy. Despite Kronenburg's argument that a greater importance should be placed on popular music venues, the thesis argues that arenas still lack the same level of significance found historically of venues relating to high culture internationally such as the Sydney Opera House, Australia, Palais Garnier, Paris and Royal Opera House, London. The assumption made here is that popular music remains commercially based and is not seen as a cultural art form. As Looseley (2011) suggests it has been left to the private sector to invest in rather than receiving state/central government funding.

Developing urban spaces

Cultural-led regeneration has provided cities the ability to use public spaces in a way, which increases the public image and sustainable cultural infrastructure. The architect has a role to play in the development of public space not only with a specific project design which influences regeneration but in the creation of a definite positive image that can communicate visually the vision of the city (Ponzini, 2012). However, shared learning can also play a role for local authorities to compare against other cities of similar status nationally and

internationally to understand how to remain distinctive when considering the development of an arena (Wolman, 1993). There is a possibility that cities could become a duplicate image of each other particularly as the growth of arena building is becoming overcrowded along with the use of multi-national retail and hospitality chains (Richards, 2014). Despite the possibility of duplicating an image and whilst there remains competition between cities, local authorities have looked at other countries for inspiration. This was true in the case of the First Direct Arena as the LCC visited 3Arena, Dublin to gain information of how the fan-shaped interior worked for audiences and performers.

The city and its urban environment

Cities represent a continuum of change, reflected by the architecture, fashions and the people. Kostoff suggests that it is a 'reflection of a vital contest that has taken place over time between socioeconomic forces of change and the remarkable persistence of the city's most enduring feature, its physical build' (Kostoff, 1991, p. 25). The changes have led to the city emphasising its cultural prominence through culture-led regeneration. The regeneration schemes focussed on old industrial and waterfront sites and city centres have been an attempt to enhance the city's culture profile in light of competition (Evans, 2005). Local authorities have therefore, increasingly used culture and urban governance to boost the environment and identity of cities. According to Krims, this has been seen through the transformation of city centres in order to enhance cultural entertainment and leisure consumption (Krims, 2012).

The boosting of city environments became further popularized in 1985 with the establishment of the ECoC competition. The aim and purpose of the initiative is to bring harmonization, richness and diversity of cultures together across Europe. According to the European Commission obtaining the title has provided excellent opportunities, raising a city's image to its inhabitants, strengthening its international profile, generating new impetus in terms of culture and boosting tourism (European Commission, 2014). Many of the manifestations of this European initiative are in the physical, new or renovated buildings, which help a city to reemphasize its culture in many forms. Building on the success of the ECoC, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) created a UK version. The UK City Culture Initiative's key aim 'is to encourage the use of culture and creativity as a catalyst for change' (DCMS, 2012). Hull (2013)

provides an example of building an arena (Bonus Arena opened 2018) as part of its successful application for City of Culture status.

Whilst there is a generally positive view of cultural-led regeneration and flagship projects 'many authors have considered the limited reach of this impact on local communities from a cultural or social perspective' (Comunian and Mould, 2014, p. 65). This is particularly true of waterfront development, which has attracted attention in urban regeneration schemes as a way of improving declining wastelands and turning them into public spaces. These areas were seen to be 'associated with social pathologies and the subject of much concern among urban residents and local, regional and national governments' (Bunce and Desfor, 2007, p. 250). This is particularly pertinent to Bordeaux where a large expanse of waterfront on both the Left and Right banks created tensions between the affluent and less affluent communes where the arena was located. The dilemma therefore in the development of the arenas is often seen in network governance when decisions on the location, city centre or in a satellite position on the periphery and the effects on the surrounding communities are made.

The focus by local authorities in either keeping or drawing the more affluent population with a greater disposable income into the city centre has created a level of gentrification (Krimm, 2012). Therefore, as cities turned to gentrification many city centres encouraged the growth of investment from the private sector with cultural quarters, cultural industries and creative production and consumption. The property values however have become higher leaving the disadvantaged inner-city dwellers further disadvantaged (Gibson and Homan, 2004). The gentrification of the city centre has also had a negative impact on some live music venues, with a clear imbalance between small independent venues and the larger commercially based venues within a city that have significant investment streams. It is particularly recognised in the urban context as many struggle to break even in a context of increasing licensing and noise regulations and higher rents (Topping, 2011; Wilson, 2018). These issues were identified in the Live Music Report (2019) produced by DCMS which also focused on the potential impact of Brexit on UK creative industries (DCMS, 2019, p. 4). The governance decision-making by local authorities reflects a need to create an image of a city to address competition and therefore encourage gentrification despite its impact on local communities and smaller venues alike.

These issues will be discussed in the case studies.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has provided the context for the thesis. It has critically reviewed governance in terms of political, cultural, and urban governance and in so doing, has identified a framework (Table 1.1) to guide the thesis. Through this framework two levels of governance, the state/central and local government roles and responsibilities were identified, and a particular emphasis was placed on network governance and the importance of public/private networks and non-government agencies in transforming cities. The 1980s provided the platform for major political reforms and along with globalisation and Europeanisation, local authorities were left to address the increasing issue of competition between cities. The interplay between governance and government played a significant role in the shift in responsibilities and decision-making. Without the constraints of state/central government influences local authorities were able to plan the trajectory of their cities and in doing so cultural and urban regeneration became an important tool. However, the greater responsibilities were not matched with increased investment leading to many local authorities developing network governance with the private and voluntary sectors.

Urban and cultural governance became important through waterfront redevelopment and city centre regeneration as local authorities planned to re-position and re-image their cities. The enhancement of cultural infrastructure was seen as key to address the competition between cities and as popular music began to evolve the demands for appropriate venues increased. What became evident was the growing relationships between local authorities and the music industry in pursuing financial benefits and investments through the development of arenas. However, these venues were still largely biased towards sport, leading to cities adapting rather than building new venues.

Whilst attitudes towards popular music have altered over the period of the thesis the state/central government investment in culture remains problematic.

However, the state-led initiative the Zénith venue that became popular across France was a very different approach to the more common arenas across the EU originally used mainly for sport and subsequently adapted for popular music.

Local authorities have seen the opportunities of using venues as flagship buildings in terms of marketing and branding of the city and how building new cultural facilities can improve the image and attractiveness of the cities. As commercial venues however, the involvement of the private sector and naming rights have lessened the ability for heritage and legacy.

The context developed in this chapter provides a critical guide for the thesis. Within the framework of governance and the interrelated themes and in light of the emergence of popular music and demands for venues the scene is now set for further investigations into the two levels of governance decision-making relating to the development of the cultural infrastructure.

CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the reasons for choosing the qualitative methodology, the comparison between France and England, and the cities of Bordeaux and Leeds. The researcher has a general interest in both countries and how they had responded to the political, economic and cultural changes implemented since the 1980s. However, the rationale for choosing France was also personal as it provided the opportunity to expand on previous research undertaken by the researcher at undergraduate and masters level⁶. In the case of England, a more pragmatic approach was taken given the geographical location of where the researcher lives and works which provided easy access to research and data collection. The justification for the choice of Bordeaux and Leeds relates to the fact that these two cities of similar city status had not enhanced their cultural infrastructure in terms of the development of an indoor arena until 2013 and 2018 respectively. This is particularly intriguing for the researcher and held a passion to understand the rationale of why this was the case particularly when many other cities of equal status had developed at least one arena. This under-explored question led to the decision to use Bordeaux and Leeds in the dual case study approach so that an in-depth understanding of the complexities relating to the development of the arena could be made.

Considering the arguments for the different approaches the research uses a qualitative research strategy which includes inductive and intensive approaches and desk research to support the dual case study design. The chapter begins with a brief review of the research issue followed by the rationale for using the chosen methodology. This is then followed by a framework that describes how the research strategy, design and approach were used throughout the thesis.

⁶ Les monuments dans l'histoire politique: une évaluation initiale (2006) BA (Hons) in Language Studies, Presidential power in Paris during the 5th Republic. François Mitterrand and 'Les grands projets' (2011) M.A. by Research.

The research issue: how do different countries respond to accommodating popular music

The research issue, as established thus far, is that across the EU many arenas were built for sport and have resident teams or were commissioned for large sporting events. These types of venues are popular, and the majority are based on the oval design. Whilst many have been adapted to accommodate popular music, they remain heavily biased towards sport. From the 1980s there was an emergence of a multi-purpose arena that emphasised popular music as the primary use rather than sport. These arenas had a fan-shaped or super-theatre interior design with a frontal stage rather than the common oval shape seen previously. To aid with the distinction between the arena types, the thesis is guided by Kronenburg's (2011) 'dedicated' categorisation and uses it to ask the question 'what makes a city decide to build a 'dedicated' arena'. This development coincided with significant changes in the political, social and cultural landscapes of France and England leading to inter-relationships between the cultural-led regeneration and urban planning through governmental, regional and local policies and approaches. Significant to the thesis is the appointment of French Cultural Minister Jack Lang who in 1981 recognised popular culture in state cultural policy. The implementation of a state-led innovative scheme saw the construction of 17 venues dedicated to popular music and events under the brand name the 'Zénith'. There is no other such state-led scheme in other EU countries.

Currently there is very little in the research literature that looks through a comparative lens at the development of venues for popular culture within a governance context. The three themes, a) governance decision-making which investigates the factors that have influenced and shaped the state/central and local government structures and administration and governance, b) attitudes of the state/central government towards popular music in the development of cultural policy and c) urban spaces for new mass consumerism through cultural-led regeneration. The thesis, therefore, compares England and France as both countries have experienced similar economic and political and administrative change at national and local levels but have responded in different ways. These responses provided the socio-political context to the thesis, which then led to an in-depth analysis of the decision-making in Bordeaux and Leeds in the building of an arena. The use of England rather than the UK is to prevent undue

complexity of the political and administrative systems of the devolved administrations.

The thesis is situated within a literature focused on the development of venues for popular music, and more specifically presents a comparative analysis of how these develop in specific places. The thesis highlights how, within contrasting political and administrative systems, decision-making related to major cultural infrastructure projects is often faced with similar challenges. The thesis extends the discussion and understanding of decision-making in a comparative context and adds to an understanding of the response to the accommodation of popular culture since the 1980s. In so doing it contributes to knowledge through its exploration and analysis of the governance and politics of cultural infrastructure provision. A key feature that is integral to this thesis is its comparative approach through a multi-layered investigation of the national level of France and England before focussing on the local authorities of Bordeaux and Leeds.

Research Strategies

To address the research issue and answer the research questions a qualitative research strategy was the most appropriate for the thesis. The thesis positions itself with the qualitative strategy rather than quantitative strategy which relates to a numerical approach, testing theories and large data sets. The rationale for this was the study needs to explore the underlying reasons, opinions and motivations within a governance framework relating to the decision-making processes for the development of a major cultural infrastructure project (Somekh and Lewin, 2005; Hay, 2010; Bryman, 2016; Philip, 1998). Therefore, by using a qualitative strategy, along with an intensive and inductive approach, desk research and dual case studies the researcher gained knowledge and greater scope to interpret the experience, meaning and perspective of the subject in the real world relating to the influences of the political, cultural and urban environment.

An intensive approach was used as it allows the examination of a series of events within a definable framework (Hay, 2010). With the importance placed on understanding the environment in which these events take place, the study can explore the behaviours of key people and stakeholders, the interplay, and connections between various level of government and the causal explanations

of the circumstances of how the events occurred. The events in this case are those which changed the political and administrative structures, the shifts in governance and the interplay between the various key mayors and councillors leading to measures put in place to address the lack of an arena. The intensive approach also allowed a much more intimate interrogation of the influences of political leadership, decision-making, cultural and urban regeneration policies and attitudes towards popular music and the development of venues.

The inductive approach allows the understanding from the early research to guide subsequent data collection (Bryman, 2016). In this case the initial context setting in chapter 1 creates the basis for the thesis to develop its argument. This is different to using purely a traditional literature review chapter as the approach also provides flexibility in identifying evolving themes throughout the thesis and engages with new literature to enhance the context setting. This is seen in comparing the challenges faced in France and England, the influences of new and network governance decision-making, differing cultural and urban policy developments and attitudes towards popular culture. Subsequent chapters, therefore, introduce new literature to explore the evolving research.

In undertaking desk research, the researcher gained valuable in depth understanding about the history, political and administrative structures, cultural policy and urban regeneration programmes. This was undertaken to support the case studies and important to the researcher the ability to position themselves with some authenticity when interviewing. The dual-case study design including semi-structured interviews within a comparative approach with two levels of purporting sampling, Bordeaux and Leeds and selected participants, official committee papers and minutes along with published reports both private and public.

Generalization of the qualitative research often poses problems for the researcher, not least how the findings relate to the wider environment. The sampling of the case studies and interviewees, whilst not representative of all cities and the population has sufficient similarities and differences to address the problem of generalisation. The choice of the two cities and of the interviewees provided recognisable features such as size, local authority structures and the lack of an arena in which comparisons can be drawn and thus replicated. Wolman (1993) notes that the development of policy addresses a causal event,

and that one department of government can learn from another. Therefore, the outcomes relating to the two cities generated an understanding of the complexities that are present in large-scale developments of this kind and how they have, or have not, responded to the cultural and regeneration agenda. The comparisons between France and England as well as Bordeaux and Leeds offer generalisable sets of conclusions, and this will be of use to other cities and local authorities considering developing an indoor arena.

Choosing the Research Design

The research design provides a framework for the generation of evidence that will answer the research question. The thesis has drawn on Baxter's idea that the case study approach is 'used to delve into under-explored and thus under-theorized phenomena' (Baxter, 2010, p. 89). This idea along with Bryman description that the 'case study design allows a detailed and intensive analysis of a specific issue, locations or event within a single case or several cases' is particularly relevant to the thesis (Bryman, 2016, p. 60). In drawing on these authors, the case study fits with the research as it is under-explored and is focussed on a specific event, the decision-making for the development of an arena. Whilst the single case provides a comprehensive study that allows a researcher greater exploration of, for example, a single occurrence, system or organization, multiple cases can exploit a greater range of data to help understand possible causation. The dual case study used by the thesis, therefore, provides a diverse range of data to understand the influences and impacts of governance and decision-making resulting in enhanced cultural infrastructure.

Dyer and Wilkins (1991) argue that multiple cases are more about comparisons rather than undertaking intensive critical research of a single case. Whilst it is important to acknowledge the sensitivities of such criticisms, the decision to use a dual case study design is based on the ability to critical analyse the data in many ways and how interactions between the levels of governance take place in the two countries and cities and then followed by cross nation comparison (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hay, 2010). The case studies provide a 'real-world context' to the research allowing the researcher to establish informed knowledge gathering exercise within a natural environment (Yin, 2012, p. 5). In addition, Bordeaux and Leeds are illustrative of similar circumstances which led to the decision to

build an indoor arena for popular music in the relatively recent past and therefore fit within the real-world context (Bryman 2016).

In undertaking the research, it was important to take into consideration any preconceived assumptions (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Hay, 2010; Hodkinson and Hodkinson, 2001). Therefore, having the confidence to adjust the research, as it develops to answer the research questions and not become fixed by what is expected was necessary. Hay (2010) points out there is a need to remain flexible in the interrogation and interpretation of the research without imposing a perceived or assumed interpretation. Thus, in order to maintain flexibility, the scope of the thesis brought together an in-depth and critical analysis of the dual-level government (state/central and local), the governance and themes and interplay between them. The diversity of findings therefore provided an understanding of the broader aspects of governance decision-making which could be interrogated and reflected on accurately to answer the research questions.

The flexibility of using broad governance themes was of importance to the thesis as the case studies facilitate the exploration of the unexpected and unusual (Hodkinson and Hodkinson, 2001). The two case studies are designed to understand the context of the changing political and administrative structures which shape the decision-making processes without making assumptions. The desk research covered the importance of the cities and how they were reimagining themselves, the evidence from the interviews and interpretation of the key official reports and subsequent discussions by the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC enhanced this understanding in the detail of the development of the two arenas.

The intimate knowledge of the two case studies, social structures and planning structures of the cities alongside the individual experiences of the key actors generated detailed information to provide meaning and understanding (Stenbacka, 2001). The case study approach whilst permitting some generalisation makes replication more difficult. The selection of themes and rationale for the countries and cities along with the interviewees and list of questions for the semi-structured interviews are useful for other researchers wishing to undertake similar studies. However, the difficulties are highlighted in the interpretation by the researcher of the interactions and nuances which

occurred between the researcher and interviewees during the interviews. These occurred in a real-life situation which evolved and the responses to questions was enhanced with additional conversation that was outside the semi-structured questions. Therefore, this would be difficult to replicate as it is the researchers own understanding of the comments and perceptions which are used. The interpretation following the critical analysis from the desk research, interviews and official documentation and reports made by the researcher may also be different to how others perceive the information.

The Comparative approach

This research design uses a comparative approach. Here 'the logic of comparison' which according to Bryman creates a better understanding of 'social phenomena when they are compared in relation to two or more meaningful contrasting cases or situations' (2016, p. 65), is employed. The comparative lens is essential to the thesis as it reflects the actions, challenges and tensions experienced by both countries (France and England) and cities (Bordeaux and Leeds) and how these influenced their approaches and attitudes to the decision-making processes behind the development of new buildings for popular music. In doing so it also provides the opportunity for explicit contrasting of two or more cases to explore parallels and differences (Azarian, 2011).

The research therefore requires an in-depth understanding of the structure and administration of the two levels of government, particularly the interplay between them in terms of governance and urban and cultural policy and policymaking (Le Galès and Mawson, 1995). In identifying the influences and challenges the decision-making process for major cultural infrastructure, the causation of the problems can be made and subsequently how they are addressed through policy-making and cultural and urban programmes (Wolman, 1993). Wolman's three traditional questions in comparing public policies, 'how they differ, why do they differ and what are the consequences of these differences?' (Wolman, 1993, p. 16) are explored in the thesis to answer the research questions. Whilst Wolman highlights the opportunity to transfer knowledge of policy and systems between countries the research also considers what Booth identifies as home learning (Booth, 2011). Home learning allows a process whereby 'in deepening an understanding of the 'home system of policy-making and implementation' individuals, groups or governments can reflect on and learn from their own

processes and policies (Booth, 2011, p.14). Rather than making the assumption that each country can learn from each other with policy transfer the research focuses on the individual policy learning function and a systems understanding function (Wolman, 1993; Booth 2011). This is reflective of the way in which each country had different administrative and political structures, and attitudes towards cultural infrastructure development specifically popular music venues. Therefore, the research took the view that home learning was the most likely outcome from the comparison between France and England and in particular Bordeaux and Leeds in terms of the decision-making and processes for developing an arena.

According to Gray (1996) a multi-dimensional approach is best suited when researching cultural policy. The multi-dimensional approach is used when making comparisons of cultural and urban policy from the 1980s looking at the following elements: the political structure and key decision-makers who influence the processes for developing a policy, the method of implementation and intended outcome and the economic landscape including levels of funding. It also includes how the cities have incorporated cultural policies in terms of the buildings for popular culture. The comparative approach also seeks to understand the nature of the problems and why policies are addressed at all to some problems in one country but not in others (Wolman, 1993).

The comparative lens assumes that there are possible differences and similarities in terms of cultural and urban policies, urban planning, the socio-cultural and financial landscape of a city and the approach adopted. The comparative approach is also useful when exploring the range of complex information from both countries and cities to answer the research questions (Pennings et al., 2006; Bryman, 2016). Therefore, the strengths of the comparative approach allowed an understanding of how the individual countries and cities addressed the need to create arenas to serve popular music and the approaches taken. It was acknowledged that cultural sensitivities were important and whilst both countries were part of the EU (UK left in 2021) they have their own national, regional, and local cultures. It is this cultural sensitivity that is reflected on when seeking to understand how policy was implemented or not and how processes worked to promote a deeper understanding of the challenges and tensions faced by the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC.

Framework of the qualitative research design

The thesis uses an interpretation of the ‘four-stage research design’ model by Trafford and Leshem (2008, p. 98). Table 2.1 highlights the timeline for the four stages, the actions taken along with where the research and outcomes appear in the thesis.

Table 2.1: Four-stage framework

Date	Stage	Action	Thesis structure
2015-2017	Stage 1: Context, and thematic approach	Literature Review Established Themes Comparison of France and England	Part 1: Chapters 1, 2 and 3
2017-2018	Stage 2: The case studies Bordeaux and Leeds	Empirical research on the cities of Bordeaux and Leeds (desk research)	Part 2: Chapter 4 and 6
2018-2021	Stage 3: Analysis and Interviews (Opinions and reflections) Ethical approval ⁷	Detailed analysis of decision making of the CUB and LCC in the development of the arenas in Bordeaux and Leeds. Semi-structured interviews of key stakeholders and a comprehensive review of official reports, papers and discussions	Chapter 5 and 7
2020-2022	Stage 4: Interpretation and Comparison of data	Bringing together the key issues and discussions in a comparative lens and a final conclusion in response to the research questions	Part 3: Chapter 8 and conclusion

The following section provides the rationale for the thesis structure, the research questions and the four-stage research design used to conduct the research.

Thesis structure

The thesis is structured into three distinct parts. Part 1 (chapters 1-3) sets the context for the thesis, part 2 (chapters 4-7) provides the empirical evidence for Bordeaux and Leeds and part 3 (chapter 8 and conclusion) brings together the evidence and analysis through a comparative lens and responds to the research questions (see Table 2.1). This division was used to understand better the

⁷ Ethical approval obtained 6 March 2018: Stage Two Ethical Approval (Risk Category 2).

research and provide a coherent discussion on the key themes that were identified from the grouping of chapters.

Research Questions

The thesis uses four research questions to shape and provide direction to the study. Each question has a natural hierarchy represented by the level at which the questions are asked, for example, the emphasis on state/central or local government.

- 1) In what ways did national policy in France and England shape local level decision-making related to cultural infrastructure provision for popular music?*
- 2) What was the role of local urban planning and cultural policy in shaping the development of music arenas in Bordeaux and Leeds?*
- 3) What were the contrasting and comparable experiences of Bordeaux and Leeds in creating spaces for popular music?*
- 4) What lessons can be learned from the cases of Bordeaux and Leeds and the future provision of local cultural infrastructure?*

A literature review comprising of published data is used to put into context the national political factors in France and England and how these have influenced the decision-making at the local level in terms of developing and building an arena answers question 1. The outcomes from the interviews also provided reflections and interpretations on how national policies influenced or not the decision-making processes at the local level. The literature search considered the wider issues surrounding the political and economic agendas of both countries associated with regeneration, culture, and planning at three levels, government, nation, regional and local. In answering questions 2, 3, and 4, the adoption of the dual case study offers the research tools, internal and external desk research, interviews, official committee papers, official reports published and unpublished to lead further the discussion on cultural policy and urban regeneration and how this has played a part in the decision-making for an arena. Data collection and analysis of trends allowed the in-depth review on the position of arena development across EU and more specially France and England. The dual case study offers in-depth insights to the key drivers, attitudes and influences on the political, cultural policy and urban regeneration and allows a direct comparison between governance, local authorities, and

stakeholders. Overall, the approach allows an evidence-based interpretation of findings within a comparative lens and discusses the major concerns and complexities of governance and decision-making process for the development of the arena. These findings answer the final question and in doing so can be applied more generally to assist other local authorities in the decision-making process for developing a flagship project such as an arena.

Stage 1: Thematic Approach

The thesis uses an overarching framework of governance and three themes. A framework of governance has been developed to outline the different dimensions of governance and the interrelationships between state/central and local governments and hence provides a theoretical basis for the three themes.

The three themes are as follows.

- a) Governance decision-making which investigates the factors that have influenced and shaped the state/central and local government structures and administration and governance
- b) Attitudes of the state and central government towards popular music in the development of cultural policy.
- c) Urban spaces for new consumerism through cultural-led regeneration in an attempt to make cities attractive and competitive are used to allow the research to draw together several interlinking threads.

The themes provide an understanding of current conditions, political, cultural, urban and social patterns in France and England. This approach had two purposes. Firstly it identifies the contextual factors that influenced the governance of decision-making and processes at national and local level and the external factors which increased the competition between cities. Secondly, it allows the attitudes of state, central and local government towards culture and cultural policies, urban spaces and popular music to be explored. The contextual factors were broad and complex including for example, key politicians such as Mitterrand and Thatcher and their political reforms of decentralisation and centralisation, the external pressures of globalisation and EU integration, emergence of popular culture and new venues. Therefore, the research had multi-dimensional fields of study and in order to maintain focus and a clear thread throughout, the themes were used to organise the structure of the thesis.

The literature provides useful insights into the thinking on the political, cultural and urban dimension. In considering the informative discussions within the literature enables the thesis to progress the narrative on the implications of the decision-making process of cultural infrastructure and more specifically arenas. Therefore, the thesis extends the discussion and establishes originality and contribution to knowledge through the bringing together of elements of the three themes and the interrelationship of governance to create new thinking on the political influences, cultural attitudes and urban design that have been integral in the development of the arenas in cities.

Stage 2: The case studies: Bordeaux and Leeds

These two cities have historically been major industrial and/or commercial shipping cities but following the decline of their traditional industries, they have had to redefine and develop different strategies for continued economic, urban and cultural growth. This is important to the thesis as the city profiles offer the opportunity to compare and contrast on several different governance levels, a) the political and administrative structures within the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC and how these influenced urban and cultural regeneration policy development b) the key political and cultural figures which were crucial in influencing governance decision-making, c) the challenges to the decision-making processes from internal influences such as the mayors and councillors and external pressures from the public and private sector. Most importantly these two cities have enhanced cultural infrastructure through the development of an arena during the 21st century and hence provides relatively easy access to those involved in the decision-making.

The case study of Bordeaux uses the political and administrative structure of Communauté urbaine de Bordeaux (CUB) and then Bordeaux Métropole from 2015 to investigate the decision-making process for the arena. The CUB/Bordeaux Métropole is made up of 28 communes and it is important to understand that this local government structure because internal politics affected and delayed the development in the relatively unpopular location of Floirac, one of the less affluent communes. Meanwhile LCC is the local authority and the decision-making body that covers the Leeds District, which includes 33 wards.

Table 2.2 Similarities and Differences

Similarities	Differences
Identified as major cities	Political and administrative structures: The CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC
Post Industrial: Both Bordeaux and Leeds had major industries that declined during the 1970s and 1980s leading to the need to reinvent the cities images and increase economy.	Major industries: Bordeaux shipping and Leeds heavy manufacturing
Large areas of derelict waste ground and warehouses in need of regeneration.	Geography: Left and Right Bank Bordeaux, City Centre Leeds
The drive to become a competitive European and Global city.	Planning systems and tools
A lack of medium sized arena for popular music and events.	Significant number of historic buildings along with UNESCO recognition (Bordeaux)
Both used cultural-led regeneration to improve the attractiveness for residents, students and visitors	

Whilst Bordeaux and Leeds have different industrial backgrounds, comparisons can be made in how they responded to the economic decline and drive towards becoming a European and global city. The scope was further widened to explore the development of cultural and urban policy in both local authorities and how these impacted on the decision to build an arena. The major cultural and regeneration policies of the different political parties during the period of research are taken into account and links to these made at city and regional level which will provide a further element for comparison to answer the research questions 1, 2 and 3. The research will look for patterns of change and how these have been implemented at an individual city level and then across the two cities and how these led to the development of an arena. Table 2.3 provides a brief overview of the geographical, political status and population figures.

Table 2.3: Brief overview of Bordeaux and Leeds

Bordeaux	A city situated on the Garonne River within the Gironde department in Southwest France. Bordeaux was given communauté urbaine (Communauté urbaine de Bordeaux CUB) status in the 1960s, become an Métropole in 2015. The CUB/Métropole which includes 28 communes had population of 774,929 (Comersis, 2019) and the city of Bordeaux 254,436 (INSEE, 2020).
Leeds	The city is a regional capital in the north of England, and has several surrounding areas, which makes up the Leeds City Region. Leeds is the third largest metropolitan in England and is situated in the Yorkshire and Humber Region and has a local government district (Metropolitan Borough of West Yorkshire). The Leeds District which includes 33 wards has a population of 798,786 (UK Office for National Statistics, 2021).

The case study approach has two levels of purposive sampling in that they are strategic in answering the study's research questions. These levels are 1), the particular cities, Bordeaux and Leeds and 2) the selected participants and official council reports, minutes. The case studies are investigated over a period of time from 1980 to 2019. This period reflects a period of significant political and administrative regional changes as well as a time of continued commitment towards cultural development. It also coincides with the development of the dedicated music venues, which used an amphitheatres style interior and a particularly in France where the Zénith was created. These political and administrative changes provide the basis for further intensive analysis.

The desk research is divided into internal and external research. Internal involved the critical analysis of official documents, committee minutes and unpublished reports specific to CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC whilst external reviewed published data, web-based official postings and national and local press and publically available archival material. The rationale for this was two-fold. Firstly, a full analysis of the cities provided information on the political and administrative structures, power of individuals, and key policies and regeneration schemes along with associated planning tools. This identified the key drivers for both cities in relations to becoming a competitive European and global city. Secondly, it provided key background information and knowledge for the researcher to inform the questions for the interviews and ultimately the case studies (chapter 4 and 6).

It is recognised that whilst both cities experienced similar political, economic and social challenges their responses were different. Hence the chapters 4 and 6 represent these differences in content. In chapter 4, the drivers for change were seen in the political tensions within the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and urban regeneration challenges between the Left and Right Banks in Bordeaux. This was relevant to the case study given that the location of the arena was in Floirac, a commune on the relatively less affluent Right Bank. In understanding the growth of the Leeds economy and how it intended to change its image, there is a greater emphasis on the city centre and the strategic documents Visions for Leeds. These documents are important to the case study as they demonstrated through two major public consultations the thinking behind a major cultural facility, which led to the arena.

Boundaries of the cities and research

It was important to establish a set of boundaries for the case studies so that a comparison can be achieved between them. Ragin suggests that 'the cases initially selected [need to be] alike enough to permit comparative analysis' (Ragin, 2000, p. 57). An exact match between the cities however, is impossible because of the different political and administrative structures, the demographic and economic and social profile. Bordeaux and Leeds, however, were selected as they have similar characteristics, as each experienced changing political and administrative structures since the 1980s onwards, the cities reinvented themselves, driven to become a competitive European and global city, their geographical area is surrounded by communes (Bordeaux) and wards (Leeds), have specific land-use policies for urban development and have established indoor music venues. Another component is the effect of the arena as a flagship building on the surrounding areas. Comparison was made on whether the arena was part of an existing urban regeneration programme as was the case in Bordeaux or a driver for additional regeneration, which happened in Leeds. With the changes in the political parties at the state and central government level and resulting policies, the effect on local authority decision-making in the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC provided the comparison and contrasts of the importance of cultural and urban planning policies and the use of planning tools.

Stage 3: Analysis and Interviews (Opinions and reflections)

Semi-structured Interviews

Interviews were used to gain a greater depth of understanding of the participants view in the context of their own roles and how they may have influenced the decision-making process relating to indoor music arenas (DeLyser and Sui, 2014; Gill et al., 2008; Barbour and Schostak, 2005). Given the comparative element of the research it was important to appreciate and be sensitive to the cultural backgrounds of the participants and adjust the appropriate method accordingly. This is to avoid any misunderstandings in the different cultural contexts and status of job roles. Therefore, particular attention was placed on the nuances of translation of the different languages and respect of the professional status of the participants (Flowerdew and Martin, 2005).

The internal and external desk research provided the researcher with vital background for the key drivers for change in both cities. Using this knowledge, the key people were identified and the relevant questions developed. The method of interview was through semi-structured interviews. This approach was chosen because the questions have a degree of pre-determined order but maintain flexibility thus allowing participants an opportunity to expand on their own experiences in their own way (Hay, 2010).

Interviewees were a specifically chosen sample. These are categorised by job roles that were directly related to cultural and planning policies (politicians, planners, civil servants, architects), those who have vested interests (owners, operators) and those involved in gathering news and publicity (cultural and entertainment managers, venue managers, journalists). The diversity of participants allowed for a range and depth of issues to be explored from different perspectives. An initial search of the local authority websites, architectural companies and operators for the arenas was undertaken to provide names and positions as indicated below:

<i>Public sector</i>
Mayors/Councillors (all political parties) Council officers Director of Services, Chief of Services Planning Officers Academics
<i>Private Sector</i>
Consultants Operators: Managers, Project Managers Architects, agency managers, technical design officers Journalists Music archivists

Three of those contacted via email suggested further potential interviewees that had been involved at some level with the development of the arena.

These particular participants could be described as 'elite' in that they are 'loosely defined as those with close proximity to power or policy making' (Lillecker, 2003, p. 207). This categorisation as discussed by Petkov and Kaoullas (2015) may cause issues with resistance or fully engaging with the interview questions. According to Petkov and Kaoullas (2015, p. 3) 'the extent to which an elite respondent cooperates and provides useful information at an interview depends on the researcher's *positionality*', meaning how the participants perceive the interviewer, whether there are any identifying shared traits and whether the researcher's identity and position threatens the participant. It is important for an interviewer to be reflective of their own identity and be sympathetic and respectful to those being interviewed. Flowerdrew and Martin (2005) highlight that in sharing a similar status as the interviewees can be helpful. Whilst the status will be different the researcher will use the experience and knowledge gained of the subject area throughout the desk research and case studies to create the positive attitude within the interview situation.

The thesis sought to interview 15 participants per case study. This was based on an initial search of the number of potential people that had had an active role in the decision-making or those with practical roles such as planners,

developers and operators and those in the media. The method was to initially email those identified as key people to interview. The email provided a short introduction to the research and included a PhD Information Sheet that outlined the research study and research questions, contact details of the researcher and supervisors as well as links to the University website to provide authenticity. A French version was also created. Additional information such as the specific reports which had been consulted was included to ensure the potential interviewees understood why they were being contacted. Copies of the PhD Information sheet, consent forms, examples of email correspondence and potential questions can be found in annexes 2, 3 and 4.

After a period of two weeks, a reminder email was sent, followed by a phone call, if there was no response. The Leeds case study was undertaken first as it is where the researcher lives and worked, hence the interviews and questions could be tested out in English. Once face-to-face meetings had been arranged, the interviewees were sent the research questions and consent form prior to the interview. The Leeds interviews were held during a period of six months starting in October 2018 to April 2019 with one held in August 2019. A total of 10 interviews were undertaken as several of those selected refused the invitation without any reasons given.

The preparation for the French interviews started in late 2019 with three potential interviews contacted and a phone interview completed by early 2020. A visit to Bordeaux was scheduled to take place in April/May 2020. This was intended to be a period where several interviews would take place. The effect of Covid-19 and the resulting lock-down forced a change to the way in which the interviews were conducted. The response to the pandemic made the research very difficult; there were lockdowns in both countries; additionally, the researcher had to work with even greater sensitivity than normal in contacting potential interviewees, since the complications of the context meant that many were working in very complex situations and often at home. Given the unpredictability of Covid-19, emails were delayed until late 2020 and early 2021. Emails were sent followed by two repeat emails and follow-up phone calls. A further five interviews were undertaken via Teams and correspondence in February 2021.

On reflection the shift to interviewing via Teams/Zoom created a level of flatness to the interviews. This was particularly experienced when trying to build a rapport with the interviewees. Whilst the questions were answered the flexibility to really bring out the additional opinions or reflections was made more difficult. As a result, some of the more personal perceptions were possibly missed.

Key Official reports and documentation

Booth identified that in comparative governance research it is necessary to use official reports and 'minutes from formal discussions in municipal councils' as well as interviews of key stakeholder and the local press (Booth, 2011, p. 25). The thesis extends the use of the minutes from formal discussions to include those from official committee meetings of the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC. In using these data sources, the establishment of how decisions are made and by whom along with the type and by what authority can be explored (Booth, 2011). Therefore, the researcher can gain a holistic view, which is not reliant solely on the recollections of the interviewees but inclusive of factual and official results.

The selection of documents came from for example:

<i>Local Authority:</i>
<p>CUB/Bordeaux Métropole, council minutes (Délibérations de bordeaux métropole (date range online: 2000- 2018)), Sourced from Bordeaux-metropole.fr, (searched by month/year) which had terms such as ZAC des Quais, development of Left Bank (Aménagement des quais rive gauche de la Garonne) indoor music venue (Salle de spectacles de grande capacité), European Capital of Culture, feasibility studies.</p>
<p>LCC Executive Boards, City Panels, City Plans Panels, Licensing Committee minutes (date range online 2004-2013), sourced from democracy.leeds.gov.uk (searched by year) which had terms such as Development of Leeds Arena, Multi-purposes arena, Feasibility reports, premises licences.</p>
<p>Strategic urban and planning documentation such as Grands Projet de Villes (2000-2010), Bordeaux Euralantique (2010), Unitary Development Plan (2006) Leeds Initiative, Vision for Leeds (1999-2009, 2004-2020, 2011-2030)</p>

<i>Private sector:</i>
Media articles outlining the development of an indoor arena, debates and discussions from local authorities, consultations from Sud Ouest, QUI, Le Monde, Yorkshire/Yorkshire evening post
Music Industry reports such as European Arena Year Book (2017, 2018, 2019) published by IQ Magazine which provide officially endorsed data and input from participant venues (27 countries)
Pollstar a trade publication providing global ticket sales and artists tours (based on actual ticket sales provided by subscribing venues)

The case study design, therefore, uses a mixture of reflections and experiences from the interviewees along with key official documentation, reports presented at the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC to establish an accurate understanding of the decision-making processes. The private sector documentation helps demonstrate the environment at the time when the decisions to develop an arena and provides accurate data on the ticket sales of existing arena. The reflections and experiences from the interviewees are evidenced throughout the case studies along with specific references to the relevant key reports submitted to the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC. This is of particular importance as the timeline of the research spanned some twenty years and it was recognised in the interviews that many could only provide their recollections on what they experienced and what they could remember.

Translating

Throughout the thesis there was a need to have significant amount of French political, cultural and planning documentation translated. The researcher undertook all the translations. It was necessary however, to seek assistance from other colleagues and a native French speaker to ensure correctness in translation, the tone and nuances of meaning particularly of problematic texts. The depth of understanding gained from reading large amounts of information in French was invaluable to the thesis. This was particularly true of the legal and governance subject areas where clarity on the interrelationships between state and local government as well as systems was necessary. A list of translations can be found in Annex 21.

Transcribing the data

The interviews were recorded to ensure that all elements of the interviews were captured. An Olympus Digital Voice Recorder VN-540PC and Voice Record App were used during the interviews. The ones undertaken on Teams/Zoom were also recorded via the digital voice recorder. Transcriptions, a web-based software platform was used as an aid for transcribing the interviews into word documents. These documents were password protected and held on a secure university server. Software such as NViVO was considered which would quantify common themes and patterns within the interviews. The researcher however, decided to transcribe the interviews manually. The rationale for this decision was the need to make an interpretation of the data as it was presented throughout the interviews.

Process for analysing the interview transcripts:

A process of open coding of the transcripts was undertaken which meant manually going through each of the interview transcriptions thoroughly and noting the emerging reflections, purposes and challenges (Flowerdrew and Martin, 2005). In doing so a greater closeness and understanding of the material could be made. Notes of the emerging reflections, purposes and challenges were made. Once these notes were collated and labelled, they were separated into thematic categorisations based on the interview questions. These broadly covered:

- Governance decision-making at the two levels of government
- Urban/cultural policy
- Regeneration
- Key priorities
- Flagship or part of a wider generation project/creative/cultural quarter
- Location, part of urban programme, zoning, change of use, public/private ownership
- Operating processes and the acquiring of the location, constraints, process for development
- Costs and major funding
- Architect appointment, design, impact, challenges, and benefits.

A list of actual questions can be found in Annex 4.

This was followed by an interpretive analysis of the thematic categorisations to gain an understanding of the meaning of what and how things were said as well as the actions taken. Taking into consideration the nuances and tones from the interviewees as they recollected the events, roles and responsibilities it provided the thesis with an enriched data set based on personal responses to the questions. Whilst the thematic categorisations helped identify the most appropriate comments and reflections for the case studies some anecdotal comments made emphasised a personal viewpoint of the challenges and tensions. These have not been included in any quoted comment because their specificity might allow the respondents to be identified. The interviews lasted between half an hour to an hour.

Stage 4: Interpretation and Comparison of data

The thesis is particularly concerned with the implications of the governance decision-making and the different approaches taken in addressing the lack of cultural infrastructure and in particular the arena. Therefore, the findings from the contextual review, empirical data and analysis of the case studies are interpreted in relation to the overarching governance framework and themes to answer the research questions. The thematic categorisation from the interviews identified emerging patterns which when interpreted in line with the literature provided clarity on how the process for the development of the arena has been addressed. The interviewees' accounts are valuable to the research and remain visible to ensure that closeness to the lived experiences is fully demonstrated (Hay, 2010).

Throughout the thesis a continual comparison of the findings is made. It focuses on how the administrative and policy changes impacted on the decision-making process, why they are different, the behaviours and contribution of key individuals and the subsequent consequences for the France and England and the CUB/Bordeaux Metropole and LCC (Wolman, 1993). Chapter 8 provides an in-depth comparative analysis and as such brings together contextual analysis and empirical data which informs the response to the research questions. Whilst most of the paragraphs set out to directly compare and contrast the key themes identified in both countries and cases studies there are times when the information is provided more in a block format. This was to ensure that the key points were fully discussed and then compared.

CONCLUSION

This chapter sets out the methodology for the thesis. The research adopts a qualitative research strategy with case study design approach as it provides the most appropriate way for exploring the research study. The strategy allows the scope through a thematic governance approach to interpret the experience, meaning and perspective of the subject, and gain in-depth knowledge in order to answer the research questions. The overarching framework of governance, three themes along with the two levels of governance (state/central and local) (Table 1.1) is significant as it allows the interplay between the two levels of governance (state/central and local) to be interrogated and provides the framework for the thesis. The interviews give the study a reflective and personal viewpoint on the events and actions taken in the development of the major cultural infrastructure in Bordeaux and Leeds. The research strategy uses a comparative lens which allows the thesis to explore similarities and differences offering key learning for future authorities in developing cultural infrastructure.

CHAPTER 3: FRANCE AND ENGLAND: TWO COUNTRIES, TWO APPROACHES, POLITICS, ADMINISTRATION, URBAN AND CULTURAL POLICY

INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a comparative view of the national context for France and England and explores the socio-economic, political, administrative and cultural environment in which decision-making takes place. As such it plays an important role for the thesis in establishing the comparative context as a basis for understanding the reactions of local authorities in Bordeaux and Leeds in terms of governance and addressing the increasing competition. The thesis has used the discussions by Le Galès and Mawson (1995), Wolman (1993), Cole and John (2001) and Booth (2011) which demonstrate how the context of cross-national trends and patterns in relation to governance and urban and cultural policymaking can be identified, compared, shared and reflected on individually. In so doing the chapter explored the evolving political landscapes that have shaped government and governance, at state, central, regional and local levels, along with networks such as public and private partnerships. In engaging with the discussions presented in chapter 1 concerning the overarching framework of governance it explores the shifts and in particular the relationships between the development of cultural and urban policy and their influences on cities to enhance cultural infrastructure in order to remain competitive. This chapter plays an important role for the thesis as it establishes the comparative context.

THE EVOLVING POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

The political administration of France and England

France and England (part of the UK) are European countries with different languages, political systems and social and cultural dynamics. The ebbs and flows of political change were seen in both countries with movement from one political party to another. Le Galès and Mawson (1995) highlight in their description of the administrative structure of France and England that both are 'governed by powerful geographical centralised administrations' (p. 380). These powerful administrations are important particularly in the way in which major

reforms of the 1980s were implemented with subsequent impacts on local authority government and governance. France had also witnessed a significant political structural change in 1958 with the creation of the Fifth Republic, which reflected a powerful shift in governance and leadership (Elgie, 2000). The new and evolving constitution of the Fifth Republic produced for de Gaulle the role of President, a role that at the time was the most powerful head of state position in Europe. The newly established government structure allowed the president to manipulate and influence government policy breaking free from previous political regimes. The increased powerful role of president and elitist attitude allowed other subsequent presidents, for example Mitterrand in 1981 the ability to implement major reforms with a level of ease as well as the building of significant cultural facilities 'grands projets' in Paris (Brown, 2011).

From the background of recession and turbulent economic times along with political and social instability, significant change came in the political landscape. François Mitterrand, elected president of France in 1981, was the first socialist president of the Fifth Republic and Margaret Thatcher the first female prime minister in the UK 1979. Both had longevity in their respective roles, 14 years in the case of Mitterrand and 11 years for Thatcher. Mitterrand's success was helped by the fact that by the time the Socialists came to power in the central government many of the large cities and regions were already under Socialist rule. For example, in 1973 the Left held 28 of 95 general regional councils and by 1977 this had increased to 42, while the number of mayors also saw a significant rise from 99 in 1971 to 155 in 1977 (Nakano, 2000, p. 109). The arrival of Thatcher at the time of the 'UK's economic decline empowered Thatcher's move to leverage against her predecessors' pragmatism to promote a revolutionary (neo)liberalism (Fontana and Parsons, 2015, p. 93). So called 'Thatcherism' followed this neoliberal ideology and was a period which left a dramatic mark on UK politics as well as her policies influencing other countries particularly Eastern Europe (Gaunt, 2013).

This key political period according to Pike et al., saw Mitterrand and Thatcher's leadership styles maintain the 'classical ideas of state authority and sanctions in a top-down command and control-type system' that left a lasting legacy on the political landscape (2016, p. 180). In the case of Mitterrand this is seen in his influence on modernising France, but more relevantly to this thesis his legacy was also seen in the built environment in the form of the grands projets (1982-

1995) (Northcutt, 1991; Brown, 2011). Thatcher swept away any perceived political consensus of previous governments that she saw as a sign of weakness and took a lead on an ambitious programme to boost the economy and society. This led to a shift in national urban policy focussing more towards 'property-led policy initiatives' (Loftman and Nevin, 1995, p. 302) along with an increase in prestigious projects particularly in retail with out-of-town shopping complexes such as Meadow Hall, Sheffield (1990) and Bluewater, Kent (1999). The two very different political ideologies are important to the thesis as they reflect the impact on regional growth, and ultimately the growth of cities. They left a political environment on which further governments would base future policies.

Laying the foundations: Decentralisation and Centralisation

In comparing policy development within the Mitterrand and Thatcher governments a distinct difference was noted with the 'decentralisation' reform, which increased the power of the regions in France, against 'privatisation' on a grand scale that saw an overall weakening of the regions and local authorities in England (Poulard, 1990; Connelly, 2011). In contrast, however, was the growth of the private sector engagement in both countries that was further emphasised with the strengthening EU integration.

The decentralisation and centralisation reforms began in the 1980s. The implementation of the reforms and interactions between political parties impacted on the governmental landscapes in France and England particularly in the power struggles relating to privatisation and fragmentation (Poulard, 1990; Connelly, 2011). The growth of the private sector was witnessed in both countries. However, in France the government was placed in turmoil when Mitterrand, with only two years of the president's tenure left, lost the Socialist majority in The National Assembly. Defeated by the Rally for the Republic (Right Wing) in the elections and unwilling to stand down, Mitterrand had to appoint a Prime Minister from the opposing side, Jacques Chirac. This period of cohabitation in 1986 saw 'both Mitterrand (president) and Chirac (prime minister), with an equal legitimacy with which universal suffrage provided them, decide to make the best of this unprecedented situation' (Poulard, 1990, p. 256). Poulard (1990) points out that the political crisis which cohabitation could have brought failed to materialise. The Right now had power to influence domestic

policy and with the ability to overturn the Socialist nationalisation programme, did exactly that. The Right-Wing government implemented the contentious reform, which deregulated and privatised businesses and industries across France thereby increasing the role of the private sector. The increased private sector influence within the neoliberalism policy and free market philosophy of the Conservative Government created a 'very fragmented institutional landscape' (Connelly, 2011, p. 5). This fragmentation was seen in the increase in Quangos (quasi-autonomous nongovernmental organisation) along with the promotion of the private sector and a shift in the authority of local government. In so doing it separated its responsibility for providing provisions to implementing it, thus reducing financial spending in the regions and creating much more centralized control (Newman and Thornley, 1996). The New Labour Government under Tony Blair (1997) and subsequent governments however would continue to work with businesses and continue to limit central government intervention.

In France whilst responsibilities increased within the Regions, Departments and Communes, overlapping provision of resources and responsibilities for certain areas created duplication. The reduction of central state funding also created difficulties in providing public provision previously supported by the state. This meant that those in local power had to turn to the private sector to fulfil the needs of the public. The changes impacted on regional and local authority responsibilities and paved the way for increased competition between cities (Cole and John, 2001). This competition is integral to the thesis as it highlighted the need for local authorities to enhance cultural infrastructure often without financial support from the state/central governments. A further stimulus since the mid-1970s was to include the private sector in urban regeneration (Ball and Maginn, 2007). According to Kort and Klijn (2013) the process of regeneration generally has been the development of partnerships between the public and private sector to manage and implement urban projects, network governance, sharing the risks as well as the profit. The creation of public/private partnerships reflects the specific roles played by the various stakeholders.

The dynamics within the public/private partnerships however can create difficulties in governance decision-making where differing opinions are evident (Kort and Klijn, 2013). Despite any difficulties partnership initiatives are variously adopted across countries and cities and are very differently regarded between

countries. In North America and Britain, with their liberal approach to the private sector and acceptance of public private partnership, development has been much more rapid than in Europe where the private sector is less well accepted in such developments (Trache and Green, 2001). According to Ball and Maginn (2007), partnerships have flourished as they have been able to solve financial issues for urban regeneration at the local authority level. In France it was more common to have the private sector involved in large national infrastructure projects such as road building. However there has been a growth in public/private partnerships noted in urban development. These are most frequently seen between the private sector and the different levels of government, the state, regions, department and commune for example or through the formal model of the Société d'économie mixte (SEM). It is worth noting that in 2018 23% of SEMs were for activity in the leisure, tourism or cultural sector (République Française, 2019), which demonstrated a greater level of public-private partnership although the state/local authorities retained the capital majority shares.

Regional Focus

The development since 1980 of the regions provides a backdrop for the thesis in terms of their growing role in urban and cultural development. It is noted that political party ideologies have had particular influence on the internal structure, which has seen changes to Regions. Pike et al., states that 'the contemporary transformation of the state has been a broad global trend towards decentralisation', the impact of which has seen a growing role for local and regional governments and governance in the promotion of local and regional development (2016, p. 184). From a position of being used as an administrative boundary, the regions in both countries strengthened their structures, financial independence, resources, responsibilities and power, to become an important function in providing economic growth to aid a country's bid to become a powerful nation. This was seen in France where the 22 Regions (1982-2015) acquired legal status and acted as the top tier territorial units; this number was reduced to 13 Regions in 2016. In England 9 Regions were established in 1994 as areas of administration followed by Regional Development Agencies in 1998 (until their demise in 2010). The strengthening of the EU, its integration and regional policy as well as globalisation also played a significant part in regional development. With the focus on collaboration and cohesion favoured by

European policy, new ways of working together as well as opening up new funding streams was seen (Bachtler and Wren, 2007; Farole et al., 2011).

The changing structures and responsibilities of the regions in both countries coincided with the state and central government transfer of governance to the local authorities (Cole and John, 2001). This transformation has according to Pike et al. (2016) been an unequal process which has resulted in different levels of economic, social, and environmental outcomes. The impact of the uneven process saw local authorities and regions having to respond and adapt to the processes of growth and decline.

The origins in the move to decentralization and regional planning in France came in the work of a geographer, Jean-François Gravier titled *Paris, et le désert, Français* (Gravier, 1947). Gravier's research, fundamental to the future of regional planning in France highlighted that France's centralized Government had allowed Paris and its region to grow in strength and power to the detriment of the rest of the country⁸. Andreani (2008, n.pag.) underscores the significance of Gravier's work saying 'that it's more than a reference, it remains a testimony, a symbol' in which France sought to readdress the power of the overwhelming capital-region towards the provinces. The findings by Gravier can be related directly to the position of the English administrative regions, and the dominance of London. In England, a dominant pattern in regional disparities was noticed in the 1980s with the northern regions demonstrating slower economic growth than the south, often referred to as the north-south divide (Gudgin, 1995). The inequality of the English regions had continued with no real attempt 'over the last 30 years to fundamentally rebalance the economic geography of the UK' (Ellis and Henderson, 2014, p. 66). The differing economic prosperity of English cities and administrative regions had a major impact on many to remain major players in the European and global economies.

Approach to address the disparity

It is useful to note two earlier approaches to address the issues of disparity as it identified the importance placed on major cities outside of the capitals. In France this took the form of the Métropoles d'Equilibre (metropolitan counterweights)

⁸ To put this disparity in to perspective, the size of Paris city population in 1962 was 7.4 million compared to the next largest city Lyon with 871,000 inhabitants (MacLennan, 1965, p. 62).

which built upon existing regional cities and England which developed a policy for creating New Towns. These approaches gave major cities a greater impetus in developing urban and cultural infrastructure. To counteract the imbalance, France implemented a national scheme, within the auspices of DATAR (Délégation à l'aménagement du territoire et à l'action régional), the Schéma Directeur d'Aménagement Urbain de la Région Parisienne (SDAU) (1965). The SDAU restricted growth, employment and building in central Paris but created a planned development programme for its region without disadvantaging regional growth. In contrast was the New Towns Act 1947, hailed as an important attempt to modernise the English planning system, was a local authority level strategic development scheme rather than a national approach to counterbalance the prominence of London and the Southeast.

To fight the regional imbalance a self-selecting and self-financed collaborative Core Cities Group was created in the UK (1995), a partnership initiative to encourage major cities cooperation on issues such as economic and sustainable development. This group has the ability 'to lobby central government for more powers and resources' (Punter, 2009, p. 33). As an advocacy group these cities were intended to act as a 'counterbalance to the economic weight of London' (Rae, 2013, p. 96). A total of 10 UK cities with the following eight English cities, Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham and Sheffield make up the group. (The remaining two cities are in Scotland.) The New Labour government intent on delivery the urban renaissance agenda published two white papers 'Our Towns and Cities' (2000) and 'Strong and Prosperous Communities' (2006) which set out decisions on the implementation of the urban policy vision. Inner cities were to be regenerated using brownfield land and conversion of existing housing. Large-scale development of previous industrial areas of the city was required and a shift towards inner city living was encouraged.

In France however, a report by Hautreux and Rochefort (1964) provided evidence of a set of 42 cities that had varying levels of economic strengths and populations. Based on the outcomes from the report DATAR put forward eight regional metropolises, Lyon, Marseille, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Nantes, Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing, Nancy-Metz and Strasbourg, to act as counterweights to

Paris⁹. These eight groupings were meant to 'symbolise the modernity and dynamism of metropolises' (Sénat, 2017, n.pag.). Situated around the edges of France, these cities are 'major provincial centres of population designed to act as centres of economic development for the respective regions to counter Paris' (Hall and Tewdwr-Jones, 2010, p. 184). A significant difference in approach to counteract the power of the capital cities of Paris and London is evident. This provides important context for the thesis because the approaches and resulting transfer of power and governance to specific cities led to increased competition and the emphasis placed on enhancing cultural infrastructure.

The New Labour government White Papers of 2000 and 2006 set out decisions on the implementation of the urban policy vision. Inner cities were to be regenerated using brownfield land and conversion of existing housing. Large-scale development of previous industrial areas of the city was required and a shift towards inner city living was encouraged. The increased provision of higher education was also an important factor in revitalising the cities with a significant increase in the building of student accommodation. In addition, the population growth within the core cities 'increased by 7.9% in the decade for 2001 to 2011' although this was at different rates with all but Leeds, Liverpool and Sheffield experiencing an above average population growth (Rae, 2013, p. 96).

A significant difference in approach to counter-act the power of the capital cities of Paris and London is evident. It was the French state which acted to counterbalance the power of Paris and raise the profiles of regional capitals. In contrast, in England this was driven at a local level by prominent cities coming together to lobby central government on issues relating to fairer economic growth and society.

French and English Regions

Power of the mayors

Integral to the argument of the thesis is the significant changes in regional and local administration and governance witnessed from the 1980s. Decentralisation was implemented by the state to deepen French democracy. This was a major

⁹ These were expanded in 1973 with Rennes, Dijon, Nice, Clermont-Ferrand and Rouen and in a second phase Montpellier, Caen, Limoges, St-Etienne and Grenoble, added to the original list.

step-change in how the French state governed as previously 'powers had been confiscated by a centralised elite and which was scarcely representative of the local population as a whole' (Négrier, 1999, p. 134). The transfer of power and additional responsibilities from the state to local government occurred through the approval of the Act of 2 March 1982, with further acts of 28 March 2003 and 13 August 2004 (Mirabaud and Deberre, 2006). Yet whilst the move saw increased powers within a three-tier level governance structure it was referred to by the state as a 'local politico-administrative system' (Négrier, 1999, p. 120). The emphasis on the term 'system' rather than using 'governance' reflected more of a political compromise between the state and local elected representatives. The state retained a level of control of the social and political consensus for the regions' policy development leaving the elected representatives with responsibilities and accountability to the local population.

The transfer of central power through the *préfet* was replaced by regional councillors. These regional councillors often held many other offices (*le cumul des mandats*) for example a mayor of a commune could also act as a department-level councillor (Smith and Heywood, 2000). This shift led to more power being held at the local level as 'mayors and other locally influential people serve constituencies which wield great political power not only locally but through the polity' (McKay 1996, p. 20). Along with the increased power the state expected *intercommunalité*, a level of cooperation between communes in particular that mayors in affluent communes assisted less affluent communes. In practice however, local authorities developed municipal monarchies instead of the local republics which they were intended to be (McKay, 1996). The evolution of regions and the position of mayor however remain complex with varied representation in networks at the local, region and national levels (McKay, 1996).

This is a distinct contrast to England where British members of parliament and senior officials traditionally have not had joint roles in local government. This is changing in the UK, as the role of elected mayors is more popular, and they are becoming politically vocal in support of their communities. The disjointed network between the mayors at local level and central government is still evident however. It was this lack of effective intergovernmental political network that allowed Margaret Thatcher to abolish many local government powers and to

establish 'centralised power and authority' removing any opposing local authority (Wood et al., 2006, p. 71).

Changes in regional structures

In France the restructuring of local authorities created further issues. From a starting point that saw France as a 'highly centralised state in which local authorities had little freedom for action' (Green and Booth, 1999, p. 14) after 1980 some planning power was shared between the various levels of local government, regional, department and commune. Communes all having some responsibilities for urban and town planning led at times to unhelpful competition and policies which overlapped rather than cooperated. The process caused fragmentation, with often richer communes unwilling to assist poorer communes as seen in chapter particularly as the new system was indisputably more costly than the old for the public purse. It also led to some fragmentation of tasks and objectives, as 'local authorities act primarily on their own rather than the national interests' (Swift and Kervells, 2009, n.pag.). The changes in responsibilities for local authorities also saw an emphasis placed on the inclusion of different stakeholders in decision-making, highlighting that local authorities were required to take into consideration the needs of the local communities and they were included appropriately when decisions were made.

In England New Labour (1997) attempted to redress the fragmented institutional landscape left behind by the Conservatives reforms with a renewed interest in regional policy and more power for local authorities (Connelly, 2011; Dallingwater, 2011). The devolvement of power to local authorities was a significant change from the top-down approach favoured by the previous Conservative government. The move was to enable decision-making at regional and local authority level in order to exploit specific local area opportunities and challenges. To manage economic growth and regeneration, encourage investment and competitiveness and reduce disparities in the regions eight Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) were created in 1999 (Pearce and Ayres, 2009; Dallingwater, 2011). The level of decentralisation however was found to be too rigid to allow regions economic independence and the central government remained influential. The fragmented internal structures of the regions also limited the authority of the RDAs and the increased central

bureaucracy and constant changes made improving regional economic development difficult.

It was realised by central government in 2010 that its control over local authorities and local matters remained unworkable. In a ministerial statement the then Rt Hon Greg Clark MP, Minister of State for Decentralisation declared that 'the time has come to disperse power more widely in Britain today' (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2011, p. 2). The Localism Act 2011 followed, which set out how and what powers would be given to local authorities with an emphasis on greater freedom and choice in dealing with their communities. However, large-scale national infrastructure planning would remain at the national level and under the guidance and approval of ministers in Central Government. The process of the devolution of power to local authorities whilst changing the landscape of governance attracted criticism for not going far enough with the balance of power being retained by central government and a failure to recognise how input from local communities would be handled (Holman and Rydin, 2013; Pipe, 2013). This transfer to local governance allowed the decision-making for the cultural infrastructure and more specifically the development of arenas to be within the remit of local authorities.

Urban planning agencies, initiatives and planning

The thesis recognises that both France and England have several agencies such as Agence d'Urbanisme and Planning Departments that are implicated in the development of policy, initiative and implementation tools. In terms of planning, there is a distinct difference between France and England. In France there is a strategic zoning plan for urban development in contrast England had a lack of cohesion between strategic vision and local planning with increased development control across many local governments (Rozee, 2014). This led to a situation where according to Rozee (2014) planning was less driven by a positive vision and long-term strategy and more of a reactive and bureaucratic process.

These differences are of interest as they provide potential explanations for the different approaches taken in major cultural developments. According to Newman and Thornley the 'French system is characterised by a national codified law, the Code de l'Urbanisme et d'Habitat' dating from 1950 with

constant revisions (1996, p. 45). The communes play important role as stated within the *Code de l'Urbanisme* (Urban Code), as they have the power to grant or withhold planning permission for any public or private sector developments (Cole, 1998, p. 117). The importance of the communes in urban planning was evident in the Bordeaux case where the mayor of Floirac, Bordeaux, was responsible for approving the planning permission for the multi-purpose arena.

In addition to several legal planning documents which come within the general Code d'Urbanisme, there have been a series of more specific initiatives and tools over time. Of these the Zone d'Activités Concertée (ZAC) is of specific interest. It is a French planning tool with the objective to initiate the redevelopment of an area of land. For example, this can be for infrastructure, housing or public buildings that are either funded by the public or private sector or in a public/private partnership. It is therefore a policy tool that permits a public body, for example state, region or commune, or other *établissement publique*, to initiate change of use or development of a specific area of land often through compulsory purchase or ownership transfer.

There has similarly been a plethora of urban initiatives and planning policies in England but as outlined by Hall the 'attempts at urban regeneration have been tawdry and superficial' which has led to cities being unable to respond to the external challenges posed by globalisation (Hall, 2014, p. 2). The Town and Country Planning Act 1947 became the legal basis which meant that all urban development had to have planning permission from local authorities. The intervening years have seen additions to the Act but according Hall (2014) these have increased the complexity and restrictions of the planning system rather than simplify it. Formulated from these acts are the development plans which since 1947 have 'waxed and waned' but remained a key component of the planning process (Cullingworth et al., 2015, p. 107). Whilst the many acts have changed since 1947 along with the development plans for example being morphed into structure and local plans, planning development control has mainly remained the same. The English planning system is designed so that local authorities have control of what is built and where, provided it fits within the Plan for that area. The governance of local authorities according to Ellis and Henderson (2014) continued to influence planning and the vision for a city by those in power rather than demonstrating network governance to include a range of different stakeholders.

What resulted was 'a patchwork of legislation and policy' including EU directives, different government and governance across the nations of the UK, specific 'framework in London and other regional cities; and a separate consent regime for Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects' (Airey and Doughty, 2020, p. 16). The National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) 2012 and subsequent updated versions in 2018 and 2019 attempted to reduce the complexities of previous policies. At the heart of the NPPF were specific priorities for spatial development with local authorities developing local and neighbourhood plans such as the Unitary Development Plan (UDP) and revised Local Plans.

CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

French and English attitude to culture

The thesis is focussed on the development of commercial arenas that accommodate popular music which attracts mass consumerism. It is therefore necessary to differentiate between types of culture so that clarity is provided to the thesis. The term high culture is representative of cultural products, mainly the arts, which are held in high esteem whereas popular culture is illustrative of mainstream activities such as contemporary music, magazines, and reality TV programmes. However, as Bennett et al. (2009) argue the structure of culture has changed due to the wider range of culture challenging the boundaries of the predisposed association of what high culture and popular culture represent. A view supported by Bramham and Spink (2006) who also highlight that there has been an erosion of the distinction between high and low culture forms. This blurring between high and popular culture from an audience perspective is not reflective however in terms of funding where there remains a distinct difference (Bennett, et al., 2009). High culture often seen as a public-sector concern is often funded by state/central government and patronage. Popular culture can be seen as more commercialised form of culture attracting mass consumerism funded often by large organisations and corporations. Taking these differences into account the response to culture and cultural development from a government perspective is varied between the two countries (Evans, 2001; Devlin and Hoyle, 2000; Bickerton, 2016). Whilst culture remained highly politicized along with an elitist view in France, England retained an arms-length

approach with investment coming from patronage or private subscription (Devlin and Hoyle, 2000; Looseley, 2013, 2011).

Culture has played an important role in the image of France and French lives and unlike many European countries maintained a political presence in its development. There is a long history of state investment in the arts along with an historic tendency to have highly cultured members of Government, such as authors and academics (de Gaulle, d'Estaing, Mitterrand, Macron, Feltesse). This perhaps explains a level of disbelief when Nicolas Sarkozy (President 2007-2012) was elected, since he was 'not a product of an elite military or intellectual education' (Schwartz, 2013, p. 35). Sarkozy also claimed to dislike *La Princesse de Clèves*, one of the so-called classics of French literature, and is also married to Carla Bruni (an Italian-French singer songwriter)¹⁰.

In contrast the UK has seen an uneasy alliance between the central government and the creation of cultural policies. Until the mid-20th century there was a distinct lack of engagement or investment for culture policy by the central government. Instead, culture was sponsored through private patronage or public subscription to collections housed in 'civic buildings' which meant that high culture influenced the cultural agenda and was normally only accessed by the wealthy (Evans, 2001, p. 87). Popular culture however was a useful tool for the government's propaganda machine during the Second World War to keep morale high with the Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts (CEMA) and Entertainment National Services Association (ENSA) providing popular entertainment for troops. This was soon abandoned with the creation of the Arts Council of Great Britain (ACGB), an arms length body designed to be free of government influence. It originally took a high cultural stance concentrating on 'excellence and safeguarding standards' much as the French government of the same period also did (Devlin & Hoyle, 2000, p. 11).

Thus, according to Evans 'by turning their backs on ENSA, the government effectively prescribed and separated 'high-art' from popular culture' (Evans, 2001, p. 88). This separation focussed the promotion, development and commercialisation of popular culture, such as pop music in the commercial,

¹⁰ A further stir was caused by the appointment of Fleur Pellerin as Minister of Culture (2014-2016) in François Hollande's government: 'Pellerin declared she had no time to read books' (BBC News, 2014, n.pag.).

independent and voluntary sectors. In essence national government was leaving popular culture to the private sector (Devlin & Holye, 2000). These facts are important as they demonstrate the different approaches taken by France and England. The French governments' attitudes to culture remained firmly an elitist view with a reluctance to embrace popular music within a political landscape. In England there was a disregard by the government and maintained its arm-length approach to culture.

Cultural policy

There are similarities to the development of cultural policy in France and England. Firstly, neither country had a cultural policy until the 1950s/1960s and secondly there was a clear lack of understanding of the pressing needs of the growing youth population particularly with reference to the emerging passion for popular Anglo-American music. The thesis focuses on the two major influences in cultural policy in France occurred since the late 1950s with the creation of the first minister of culture, André Malraux (1958-1968) and the Ministry of Cultural Affairs by de Gaulle in 1958 and then under Mitterrand in 1981, the appointment of Jack Lang (1981-86 – 1988-92) as culture minister. The intervening years between these appointments saw frequent changes in the role of minister of culture and varying interpretations of Malraux's cultural policy leading to what Looseley (2011) describes as a conservatism of thinking at the national level.

Malraux's remit was separated from the entertainment and cultural industries and despite having a single ministry to bring together cultural affairs its remit was very narrow, his focus remained 'on the highest and most lasting forms of artistic expression' rather than embracing popular culture in all its forms (Devlin & Hoyle, 2000, p. 11). The sentiment was also echoed by Poirrier (2004) who highlighted that Malraux's interpretation of access to culture meant the bringing together art and the public by removing material barriers such as ticket prices. However, the attempt to democratise the arts to the masses did little to encourage public participation (Looseley, 2011). Seven years after France appointed Malraux, Harold Wilson (Prime Minister, Labour Party) established the first Minister for the Arts, and appointed Jennie Lee as its first holder (1965). The first White Paper: A Policy for the Arts: the First Step (1965), aimed to increase the cultural budget, and her tenure as minister saw Arts Council of Great Britain funding double. Lee 'argued that the arts must occupy a central

place in British life and be part of everyday life for children and adults' (Gardner, 2015, n.pag.). The White Paper achieved support from all parties in national and local government in principle (Stark et al., 2016). The emphasis however was towards local authorities collaborating with each other and the private sector, and higher education as well as the cultural sector to bring cultural policy to the fore. Therefore, shifting the responsibility for the development and implementation of cultural policy from central government to local authority.

In France when Jacques Duhamel was appointed Minister for Cultural Affairs in 1971 however there was some renewed interest in state cultural policy. Influenced by the leading sociologists Joffre Dumazedier and Pierre Bourdieu there was a move to broaden cultural policy to address contemporary issues with as much more flexible approach towards all forms of culture (Ahearne, 2002). The former *Maison de la Culture* (house of culture) would be rebranded to become multi-purpose centres for culture (Duhamel, 2002). Duhamel strategy for cultural policy however was short lived, particularly with his successor Maurice Druon influenced by the Pompidou government reducing investment and Giscard d'Estaing (1974) moving further away from the state cultural policy (Ahearne, 2002).

Whilst France under Mitterrand in 1980s was increasing the cultural budget in France, the Thatcher Government moved to a cultural enterprise focus as the financial constraints of the 1980s recession led to an emphasis on increasing revenues by increasing ticket prices to what the market would bear and an attempt to attract more private investment. The dismissal of public funding for the arts by Richard Luce, Minister of the Arts (1985-1990) brought a clear threat to the arts sector raising more challenges for artists and 'Arts organisations similarly felt that the themes of the enquiry were to 'dress up' the hidden agenda of shaking the arts sector up to bring forward the 'reality' of the 1990s' (Kawashima, 2004, p. 30). The funding constraints under Thatcherism did little to encourage regions and local authorities to enhance cultural infrastructure.

The Labour Party however maintained an importance on enhancing the cultural sector to drive economic growth and regeneration (Hesmondhalgh, et al., 2015). There was a greater need for collaboration and 'after a 12-year absence ... Britain under New Labour rejoined UNESCO, the world's principal collaborative cultural organisation' (Stevenson et al., 2010, p. 165). The emphasis was placed

on regionalisation and the regions. Arts Councils and local authorities were charged with becoming more strategic in their approach to culture whilst ensuring value for money. Tessa Jowell, Arts Minister (2001-2007) stated that culture should be at the heart of the Government, but the question of how to measure the return and value of culture for the public purse continued to overshadow cultural policy; the DMC had 'lost sight of the 'intrinsic value of culture' (Jowell, 2004, p. 10). In summary, in both France and England cultural policy appears to have suffered from political seesawing, lack of investment and clear understanding of what constitutes culture.

Regions and cultural agencies

In England, until the 1972 Local Government Act, the regions had little to do with cultural policy. This act gave local authorities responsibilities for the arts and culture; yet it was not mandatory and hence created differing levels of support in different locations. To promote more effective cultural activity within the regions the Arts Council closed their regional offices in favour of the Regional Arts Associations (RAAs) (1970), a collaboration of local authorities or groups of art organisations. Yet their growth was ad hoc. These RAAs acted as intermediates between the Arts Council and regions increasingly moving towards decentralisation of arts funding. By early 1970s all English regions had a RAAS, a Council of Regional Arts Associations (CoRAA) and Regional Development Departments which had 'rapidly increased their power and presence in the national framework for cultural policy' (Kawashima, 2004, p. 28).

Whilst the presence of these agencies promoted culture, the structure and accountability of regional cultural policy remained confused, a situation that was further exacerbated by the decline of arts funding during the Thatcher Government. A reemphasis on culture and its importance was seen with New Labour creating the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DMC)¹¹ out of the former Department of National Heritage (Selwood, 2006). For the first time there was a level of transparency in the Comprehensive Spending Review (1998) for culture. This commitment seen through the paper 'A new Cultural Framework' which outlined how the DMC and its sponsored bodies would deliver the objectives set by the Government (Selwood, 2006).

¹¹ Now Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS).

According to Hesmondhalgh et al., New Labour held 'formidable power and resources' to implement their strategy which saw increased access to culture by removing charges to national museums and galleries (2014, p. 2). The aim was to provide culture that was accessible to all and at the same time maintain excellence, engaging it within education and promoting creative industries, the beginnings of serious interest in popular culture. However, focus remained on high culture even though there was a merging of the traditional subsidised arts (museums, art galleries for example) with large commercial cultural industries that began to drive cultural policy. One scheme that has significantly impacted on culture at all levels is the National Lottery, which was established to raise income for good causes and hence improve cultural activities and resources across the country (Moore, 1997). The revenue from players has raised 'more than £37 billion for good causes' (National Audit Office, 2017, p. 10) and has seen increased opportunities for funding all types of cultural activities and major projects such as the Sage (Newcastle) and the Lowry (Salford).

The structural and administrative changes of departments and agencies responsible for culture within the UK Government are replicated in France. Malraux's policy of 'democratization and decentralization' (Devlin and Holye, 2000, p. 12) aimed to modernised administration at regional level with three Regional *Directorates for Cultural Affaires* (DRAC). The DRAC had the responsibility for overseeing the cultural budgets in the French provinces that were provided by the state for cultural action (Girard, 1997). These would be a lasting type of administration for the promotion of culture at the local level with each of the 22 regions under a DRAC (reduced in light of the reorganisation of 13 regions as of 2016). Their scope and engagement with local cultural organisations and experts has increased although they still remain closely attached to the state through the Ministry of Culture. They have made progress in drawing up contracts for cultural development between the State and the local authorities (Council for Cultural Co-operation, 1991).

The DRACs along with a 10-year musical development plan saw 15 *Centres Dramatiques Nationaux* (CDNs) created to promote local theatre and the *Maison de la Culture* programme, which over a period of 20 years from 1961 to 1983 saw 11 centres established. Urfalino (2002) argues however, that the creation of these agencies posed further competition to the existing theatres. The cultural agencies attempted to bring culture to the heart of the community, particularly

the youth whatever their background. Yet the lack of engagement and growing independence of youth population were enjoying the 'thriving consumer society, [and] began to look to the USA and Britain for cultural identification' (Looseley, 2007, p. 262). At the point at which Malraux resigned however, there was no clear cultural policy and with a further change of ministers, 'nine ministers in 12 years, the lack of continuity impaired any future policy' (Haine, 2006, p. 35).

Whilst the growing importance of culture was demonstrated with the new ministerial positions at government level in both countries, there has been a lack of clear direction and accountability. Both countries had created many agencies (government and non-government) in various iterations to provide administrative structures that often failed to materialise in local cultural policy.

Jack Lang, Minister of Culture

Jack Lang was pivotal in the development of dedicated venues for popular music in France and it is for this reason a specific focus is placed on his influence at state and regional level. Lang epitomizes how political personalities become important in the drive for change. His flamboyant nature, love of the media and 'his own youthful energy, his personal style, and the quadrupling of a national cultural budget during a period of official austerity' gives an indication of his power to influence cultural change, particularly for popular culture (Bernstein, 1985, n.pag.).

For the first time a minister of culture embraced popular culture as a key component in government policy as well as the need to invest in culture despite economic decline. This is demonstrated in Lang's interim report which called for culture to be put ahead of economic progress (Ory, 1984). Such was his determination, he argued that investing in culture even at times of recession was important as 'a country will not take off again economically if it does not take off again intellectually' (Lang, 2002, p. 117). The importance he placed on culture saw the cultural budget increased which made 'the French Government by far the world's most lavish cultural patron, and Mr. Lang far and away the world's most powerful cultural politician' (Rockwell, 1993, n.pag.). In addition, to aid with the transfer of powers following the decentralisation reforms a specific fund was set up to lessen the burden on local authorities in the development of cultural

activities (Council for Cultural Co-operation, 1991). Whilst the 1980s saw increased transfer of funding particularly within the State-region plan contracts, Lang remained determined that the Government should steer the cultural programme for France to ensure quality and maintain standards. As an influential Minister of Culture holding office for nine years (1981-1986 – 1988-1992), he was outspoken and above all patriotic.

The increased budget allowed Lang to develop a cultural policy that not only promoted high culture but also a range of popular culture, from music such as jazz, rock and roll to cartoons and graffiti art which had not previously been recognised. It was this acceptance of the diversity of culture and the engagement with both independent and commercial sectors that was reported on by the media (Bickerton, 2016). Whilst he was the driving force behind the realisation of Mitterrand's *grands projets* he also instigated several other initiatives such as the *Fête de la Musique* (Music day) where streets are turned into concerts free of charge with a mixture of professional and amateur performers. It was Lang's recognition of the diversity of popular culture and the driving need to promote French culture over the influx of Anglo-American music as well as calls from French artists and music industries for dedicated spaces that led to the innovative state-led initiative of the Zénith.

This initiative saw the agreement between Lang and COKER (an independent company), led by Daniel Colling (*co-fondateur et directeur du Printemps de Bourges*) and Daniel Keravac (*qui inventent le concept et fondent la société*) that created the original prototype for the Zénith in Paris. The success of the venue style saw a further 16 Zéniths built across France metropolitan territories. Whilst the state initially provided concessions to any city wishing to build a Zénith, since COKER became a public limited company in 2010 this was stopped. In order to ensure the state within its cultural policy maintained oversight of the existing and any new venues, it created the *Centre Nationale de la Chanson des Variétés et du Jazz* (CNV). The CNV operates under the public industrial and commercial establishment (EPIC) to ensure that the specifications and programmes of the Zéniths are adhered to (Annex 5). The restrictive specifications and the main focus internally on French music rather than externally to the international market influenced the decision-making process in Bordeaux (chapter 5). There has been no adopted model such as the Zénith in

England, and no national politician, which has been influential in championing venues for popular music.

Cultural policy and the growing demands of popular music

When popular music emerged in the 1950s and 1960s France and England had very different responses to it. In France the state attempted to control the impact of the music at best or ignore it at worse. At the heart of the French response, is 'deep-rooted: [in] the role of the French Language' (Guibert, 2018, p. 20). As a political 'republican egalitarian ideal' the protection and use of only the French language was to unite France hence the influx of Anglo-American music was to be resisted (Guibert, 2018, p. 20). The Académie Française¹² has also played a role in attempting to prevent the use of anglicised words in order to protect French culture. In England there appears to be a level of indifference and acceptance. Early rock and roll from America whilst initially copied by UK bands was soon adapted, with English musicians creating their own styles, with bands such as the Beatles, Rolling Stones and Pink Floyd becoming successful economic exports. Thus an Anglo-American dominance on the international music stage was seen. The emergence of the popular music genre and its growing importance for the youth in establishing their age group and a disassociation from previous generations forced local authorities to acknowledge the growing demands (Guibert, 2018). At the same time it highlighted that with the commercialisation of the music industry it had potential economic growth and marketing benefits.

The production and consumption of popular music became the key driver for the commercialisation of popular culture. The popularity of the Beatles and their fan base was not lost of the UK Government (Collins, 2020). Harold Wilson (UK prime minister) attempted to attract younger voters and the masses by choosing to exploit the success of the Beatles. Using this as a key marketing tool for the Labour Party he demonstrated his connection with popular music. Elected back into Government in 1964-70 and 1974-1976, he went as far as awarding the Beatles with the Members of the British Empire (MBE) in 1965 for services to the export economy in terms of their music (Collins, 2020; Sandall, 2004;

¹² The Académie Française, also known as the French Academy, is the principal French council for matters pertaining to the French language.

Looseley, 2012). Wilson aligned his political policies for a 'New Britain' and set about modernising the UK through the 'white heat of the technology revolution' (Atkinson, 2014, n.pag.). These technological advancements were seen across the creative industries, as vinyl, radio and TV as well as films provided easier access to popular culture. In comparison France at state level was attempting to ignore the whole popular music revolution leaving the youth feeling left out. According to Schmidt (1990) 'the state structured its relationships with society, legitimating as it subordinated those groups with which it chose to deal, and ignoring the others' (p. 142). The disaffection of youth with established government and the general crisis of university systems culminated in the student uprising and subsequent general riots of 1968. According to DeRoo (2004) in the aftermath of the riots, students, artists and critics wanted a major change to the traditional and elitist thinking of culture as well as the cultural policy of the 1960s developed by Malraux. Whilst there was criticism of the continued and dominant conservative attitude towards art there was little in the literature that focussed on the plight of the changing musical tastes of the youth or demands for venues (Looseley, 2011). However, the fact that art had become prominent in discussions for change an assumption can be made that this would also be reflected in musical tastes.

This is important context for the thesis as it demonstrates how France and England responded to the evolving popular music and increased demand. Again it highlights the significant elitist view by the French state (Girard, 1996) until Jack Lang proved that popular music had a place in government policy. Yet this is not to be misunderstood, as Lang's drive was to protect French culture and music not to expose France to Anglo-American music. In England the commercialisation of popular music became a focus for its possible financial benefits and raising the image of the country through exporting artists rather than included in cultural policy.

Attitudes towards popular music and music venues in the urban environment

The increased competition between cities has created an environment where decision-making concerning cultural infrastructure relating to identity, rebranding and marketing has become commonplace for local authorities (Lloyd and Clarke, 2002). The link between culture and regeneration, which according to

Garcia has been evident during the past 30 years, has seen cities become increasingly interested in 'using culture as a tool for urban regeneration' (Garcia, 2004, p. 312). This is particularly noted with cultural attractions triggering urban development (Lloyd and Clarke, 2002). So too the idea of 'placemaking' that combine the arts, culture and heritage have been an attempt by cities to impact positively on the lives of its communities as well as encouraging an increased level of city re-branding and marketing (Kong, 2012). The report 'People, Culture and Place' in 2017 also stressed the importance of understanding communities and the historic past whilst at the same time increasing economic growth and positively engaging with a diverse range of stakeholders to promote the urban areas (LGA, 2017).

In England the first response to the emerging rock and roll music genre was to include it into the mainstream music scene particularly the existing structures and mainstream entertainment such as the pub and club circuits. Town halls in many cities were used as multi-purpose venues to accommodate rock and roll concerts (Brennan, 2010). Independent venues also evolved, such as the '100 Club, the basement space at 100 Oxford Street' where many artists ranging from jazz through to punk rock appeared and where music scenes were created (Burrows, 2009, p. 17). French elites, however, were much more unwilling to accept this new music genre and whilst Jack Lang changed the emphasis on popular culture in terms including it in state cultural policy there remained tensions and ambivalence between the state, local authorities and the music subcultures favoured by the youth (Tamagne, 2018).

In both countries economic growth and increased numbers of a younger generation provided the momentum for a new cultural movement. In the UK bands such as Beatles, Rolling Stones, as well as those from the USA became popular. In France the influence from the Anglo-American groups saw the creation of 'ye ye' covers (pop music adapted for the French audience) and performers such as Johnny Hallyday, and Sylvie Vartan appeared. This along the chanson in cabaret venues had started to produce new talents such as Greco, Brassens and Brel. France had predominantly two specific streams of music from the 1960s, 'French Variété (early teenagers and working class) and Anglo-American rock (late teenagers and university students – middle classes)' (Guibert, 2018, p. 7). The Anglo-American groups however, continued to overshadow the French rock groups from 1960s-1980s. Youth culture also had

a darker side, seen with the tensions and conflicts between various groups, the Mods and Rockers (England) and the Blousons noirs [black jackets] (France) which did little to promote the acceptance of popular music amongst those who wielded political power. In the 1970s 'in a very different social and political context, rock music came once again to the centre of public attention when several French municipalities decided to ban pop festivals' as well as concerts (Tamagne, 2018, p. 39). For example, a tour by Johnny Halliday appearing in venues such as the Palais des Sports became problematic due to the incidents that occurred inside and outside the venues.

The new form of rock music enabled by the commercial music industry and the evolving technology led to different requirements from bands particularly with larger sets and music amplification (Frith et al., 2019). The rock bands that emerged in 1970s staged large productions, with complex lighting and music systems, which were problematic for the existing venues. These requirements were problematic even from the larger arena-type venues such as the Empire Pool as they lacked the space for the increasingly spectacular productions and the growing audience (Frith et al., 2019). The demands from artists and audiences alike demonstrated the historical issues from the declining commercial theatres and the use of concert halls which had conventions such as a specific dress code and audience behaviour which did not fit with hard rock. The growth of university venues that in the past had hosted bands such as Pink Floyd and The Who also saw the music scene flourish, creating a demand for further venues to accommodate popular music, starting the 'pub gigging circuit' (Brennan, 2010, p. 4). The rise of music venues such as the 'O2 Academy' owned by Academy Music Group (AMG) suited the semi-professional groups but were still too small for the professional rock and pop bands. The use of football stadiums for highly spectacular concerts with specific technology and equipment needs were largely found to be inappropriate.

The commercialisation of the pop music scene became viewed as profitable with promoters, agents and with the added attraction of a fan base proved to be commercially very viable. This bringing together of culture and economics saw the city centre become a 'catalyst for civic identity and public sociability' (Bianchini, 1993, p. 10). This newly rediscovered civic identity can be seen in the form of a flagship building such as the arena, but as Garica (2004) suggests the location can bring some dilemmas when attempting to find space between

the city centre and periphery. This was evident in the decision-making for the location of the arenas in Bordeaux and Leeds (chapters 5 and 7). Culture-led schemes such as the ECoC further promoted competing cities to draw down on European funding as well as public and private investment to increase their cultural offering and branding and marketing of their cities. Glasgow and Liverpool, Lille and Marseille as well as other European cities have used the ECoC to enhance their international standing in terms of culture and boosting city image. The ECoC scheme also allowed cities to invest in building arenas as seen in Liverpool with the M & S Arena. The prospect of applying for the ECoC scheme is further explored in the case studies particularly in Bordeaux where it was used as a further driver in the decision-making process.

As well as international standing, cultural events such as those in Marseille during the ECoC in 2013 saw challenges between enhancing the culture and economic standards but at the same time the acceptance and understanding of the local culture of the communities (Giovanageli, 2015). The diversity of cultural activities during a concentrated period provides easy access for all as well as promotion of image and increased tourism locally, nationally and internationally. So much so that the UK used cultural interventions to showcase how culture can transform communities through the UK City of Culture, Great Exhibition of the North and through the Discover England Fund. The city of Hull, awarded the UK City of Culture in 2017, claimed that they have delivered '365 days of transformative cultural activity' through the use of public/private and charitable partnerships (Hull UK City of Culture 2017, n.d, n.pag.).

The potential for harnessing production and consumption of popular music within the city centre led capitals and regional capitals creating individual identities in order to respond to the increased competition brought about by globalisation (Blanco et al., 2004; DeGeatano and Strom, 2003). The growth of competition between cities saw local authorities at the start of the 1980s decide to build new multi-purpose venues attracting stakeholders such as promoters and private funding, in partnerships with city councils. For example, LG Arena, Birmingham, First Direct, Leeds, and Motorpoint Arena, Sheffield (England) and the Zénith venues along with Palais Nikaia, Nice and Arkea Arena, Bordeaux (France).

The acceptance by the state/central and local government that popular music needs its own specific venues has been a slow process. Whilst the evolving popular music scene has created local music scenes in cities across France and England, the building of new venues such as arenas to accommodate the commercial and touring global artists remains limited. The emphasis placed on cultural-led regeneration and the increased competition between cities provided the circumstances to review cultural infrastructure. The development of an arena therefore can contribute to cultural regeneration as well as provide a facility with which to identify a specific city. In developing an arena as part of regeneration provides a city with the opportunity for branding, marketing, and attracting external investment as well as increasing economy through transient tourism. Whilst these buildings hold a flagship status for the city, they remain different from the local music scenes given they are products of commercialisation and mass consumerism.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has reviewed the political landscape of France and England and the implications of the reforms on the administrative, political and governance structures. Through a comparative lens an analysis of the responses by both countries in terms of the challenges faced in the global market and EU integration, the importance of cultural policy and how the emergence of popular culture was addressed. A key finding was the evolving competition between nations and cities and how both countries used this to drive cultural-led regeneration in order to reposition themselves in the international economic scene.

The two key political reforms implemented by Mitterrand and Thatcher of decentralisation and centralisation respectively set the political agenda. The impact witnessed shifts in regional and local authority administration, responsibilities and governance and resulted in greater engagement with the private sector. Whilst network governance became more prominent, the powerful leadership role of the mayor in France evolved and retained the ability to influence decision-making the different levels of polity in state, regional and local public policy. In contrast the English councillors were left with little or no influence in central government policy.

The growth of the private sector was noted as a key development in both countries, demonstrated by the widespread neoliberal ideologies of the Conservative Government across England and the increased engagement in France with the private sector particularly providing resources at regional and local level. The historic view by the state elite that viewed the private sector with suspicion now had a reliance on it. The challenges and tensions between public and/or private sector investment is useful to note as it becomes integral to the decision-making for the arenas.

The introduction of cultural policy and its implementation has posed challenges in both countries. Cultural policy remained difficult to implement and often emphasised high culture. In France this changed dramatically with the appointment of Jack Lang whose tenure as minister for culture demonstrates the extent to which personality affects policy. Lang supported the broader spectrum of popular culture but more importantly it was his state-led initiative, which revolutionised cultural policy to integrate popular French music, and in collaboration with COKER, established specific dedicated music venues. In England whilst there were several cultural ministers and a general agreement about cultural policy, its implementation was almost optional at local level. The importance of cultural policy in the development of arenas remains ambiguous. Schemes such as the National Lottery and ECoC have however, helped with cultural-led regeneration in both countries.

The response of the two countries at national level towards popular music and the associated need for venues has been varied. French definitions of culture remain elitist and even with the growth of the Zénith venue; the state was insisting that popular music should be predominantly French. There are however several arenas built since the 1980s that have allowed greater international visibility. In England the profitability of popular music remained key to its acceptance with the government leaving it to the music industry. The growth of network governance between the local authority, agencies and the private sector was key to the development of cultural infrastructure and more specifically music arenas.

The outcomes and findings from this chapter are important to the thesis as they have provided a basis on which the governance and development of cultural facilities and infrastructure led by local authorities can be understood.

PART 2

CHAPTER 4: BORDEAUX: AWAKENING THE SLEEPING CITY

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter the evidence relating to the growth of urban and cultural development in the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole is used as a precursor for the primary research case study on the Arkea Arena, Floirac, Bordeaux. It provides the analytical framework, historical, geographical, administrative and political, to support the case study to answer the research questions. The main function of this chapter is to identify the characteristics of CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and how governance has influenced the administrative and political decision-making processes. A critical review is undertaken of the influences of urban and cultural governance in shaping key urban regeneration schemes and explores how these have supported the arguments for developing of a multi-purpose arena.

The thesis uses information from the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole, academic papers, official council minutes (*délibérations de Conseil de Communauté/Conseil de Bordeaux Métropole*), regional and national newspapers such as *Sud Ouest*, *QUI!* and *Le Monde* as well as grey literature particularly promotional materials.

From the 1980s Bordeaux implemented an ambitious urban regeneration agenda which included the renovation of old and new buildings, enhanced public infrastructure and flagship buildings (URBACT, n.d.) to attract business and talent to the Métropole. The thesis draws on the documentation from these key major urban projects such as *Grand Projet de Villes (GPV)* (2000-2010), and the *ZAC des Quai de Floirac* (1991) and *Bordeaux Euralantique* (2010), which particularly emphasised the regeneration of the Right Bank where Floirac is situated and ultimately the location of the arena. These urban policy schemes along with waterfront and transportation infrastructure developments are important as they are the key to developing the economic, social and cultural image of the city and create an overview of Bordeaux Métropole and a framework for the case study.

The chapter begins with a brief overview of the city and its history. Whilst a more detailed analysis will be made later in the chapter, it is important to have a

thumbnail sketch as a framework for later discussion. It then explores the development of the administrative and political structure and its evolution since the 1960s with the creation of the métropole d'équilibres (chapter 3). The evolving political structure led to Bordeaux becoming a communauté urbaine in 1968 and following Territorial Reforms of 2015, gaining Métropole status¹³ which brought together 28 communes surrounding the central commune of Bordeaux. As the chapter develops it highlights the significance of city leadership, notably the mayors and presidents of the CUB/ Bordeaux Métropole in the development of the city and the communes. According to Feltesse (2012) (former President CUB/Bordeaux Métropole) however it is the president who has the key role to provide the vision for the métropole, and in order to achieve their objectives uses their influence to steer policy. The challenges of both roles the president and the mayors are further explored to understand the power relationships in decision-making. The emphasis on the urban structure, both historically and post-war evidences the relationship between the city and the Garonne River, in particular the embedded tensions between the Left and Right Banks (a'urba, 2020; Martin-Herrou, n.d.). This is important context for the thesis as the tensions were exacerbated in the decision-making about the final location of the arena.

Brief overview of the city

Bordeaux is situated on the Garonne River within the Gironde department in Southwest France. It is the capital city of the Nouvelle Aquitaine Region and the préfecture (location of the department's administration) of the Gironde. The area is one of the most prominent wine regions in France both for growing and production with many vineyards surrounding the city centre on both Left and Right Banks of the Garonne River. As a city it attracts a large number of tourists particularly as it is second only to Paris in the number of 'Batiments Classées', in France and is one of the biggest urban areas to be listed UNESCO World Heritage Site (Eurocities, n.d). 'La port de la lune', for example has a large collection of exceptional urban and architectural buildings. The prominence of cultural buildings was added to in 1980 when Bordeaux created Arch en rêve, an architecture exhibition and research centre, funded by the CUB/ Bordeaux Métropole, the State and Region and was the first of its kind in France. Recently

¹³ Décret n° 2014-1599 du 23 décembre 2014 portant création de la métropole dénommée « Bordeaux Métropole ».

Bordeaux was noted in the Lonely Planet as 'an intoxicating cocktail of 18th century savoir-faire, futuristic architecture and urban street life' (Lonely Planet, 2019, p. 4). Whilst this is obvious commercial marketing it does have resonance with the varied style of Bordeaux. The description in the Lonely Planet only refers to the City and its Left Bank. This is reflected on by the CUB /Bordeaux Métropole where 'the imbalances of the two banks have always existed' (a'urba, 2020, p. 117). The Left Bank boasts the city centre and affluent communes whereas the Right Bank has retained an image of large housing estates and areas of social deprivation. Since the late 1980s and 1990s the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole has attempted to redress the balance with major regeneration programmes to improve the quality of housing and social conditions within urban planning programmes such as Zones à urbaniser en priorité (ZUP), and increased infrastructure internal and external networks, bridges and tramline.

The Garonne River has played a varied and complex role in the development of Bordeaux, particularly the division of its communes with the city centre of Bordeaux (collectively known as the Métropole) and 17 communes on the Left Bank that have greater historical architectural significance than the 11 communes located on the Right Bank. The split between the Left and Right Bank is interwoven into the discussions as the location of the arena placed on the Right Bank has a higher level of social inequalities, fewer cultural facilities and a lack of transportation links. This inter-relationship between the communes, along with the wider issues which Vincent Feltesse when in his roles as Mayor of Blanquefort and President of the CUB/ Bordeaux Métropole described as 'a reality and the difficulties of today's large cities, of the complicated articulation between city and countryside, centre and periphery, municipality and metropolis' (Feltesse, 2012, p. 8).

The tensions and difficulties between these different urban areas and their relationships are discussed further in the thesis, particularly the gentrification of the City of Bordeaux which increased under the prestigious projects of Alain Juppé. In his drive to make the city centre and the Métropole an attractive place to live and work the increased cost of living forced those on modest salaries out of the centre into the suburbs accentuating the social segregation that is seen particularly in the Right Bank. This chapter develops these issues as well as the administrative and political tensions between the Left and Right Bank and how

governance through the urban and cultural development tried with varying degrees of success to address them.

The administrative and political context

The City was recognised in the 1960s as a key element in the attempts to correct the dominance of the political and administrative power of Paris following on from Gravier's seminal work on regional structures in France (chapter 3). The introduction of the métropoles d'équilibres, gave Bordeaux the status of communauté urbain along with Lille, Lyon, Marseilles, Toulouse and Strasbourg. More recently, in line with French policy of creating more cohesive urban structures, it has had the status of 'Métropole' since 2015. Within this structure are 28 communes, bringing the number of inhabitants to 774,929 (Comersis, 2019). As with many large French urban areas, it is important to distinguish between the central commune in this case Bordeaux with a population of 25,4436 (INSEE, 2020) and the broader Métropole including the other 27 communes (Image 4.1).

Image 4.1: Bordeaux Métropole



Source: Comersis, 2019, n.pag.

The CUB was established on 1st January 1968 (la loi du 31st December 1966)¹⁴ under the mandate of Jacques Chaban-Delmas and as previously noted became known as the Bordeaux Métropole in 2015 (Pivodori, 2021). Its role as a *établissement public de coopération intercommunale* (EPCI) brings together the 28 Communes (Annex 6) as an administrative, legal and decision-making authority, providing quality public services across the agglomeration, strategic urban and economic development, along with the realisation of major urban projects to benefit the agglomeration as a whole. Today (2020) the Bordeaux Métropole has a total of 104 elected members which is determined by the population figures and is represented by a President, deputies and delegated municipal councillors from across the communes (Bordeaux Métropole, 2020).

The President is also an elected mayor of one of the communes and can often hold other roles at state, regional or local level these are identified in Annex 6. Each of the 28 communes, regardless of size, has an elected mayor and councillors that have responsibilities for the budget and all local decision-making over a range of competences such as built and cultural heritage and urban planning. The CUB/Bordeaux Métropole resides in the Mériadeck district of Bordeaux with each commune having a least one seat on the Council although the number varies across them. The president has 20 vice-presidents who have specific responsibilities. Whilst there have been various political parties from the Right and Left in charge of the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole it is notable that all the presidents have been mayors from communes on the Left Bank and ones which are contiguous with the central commune of Bordeaux. These mayors have held a level of political status and popularity which is not seen in the Right Bank and further demonstrates how politically less significant it is to the Métropole

Current status of the Bordeaux Métropole

The municipal elections first round took place on the 15 March 2020. The second round of municipal elections in France delayed by the Covid-19 virus and associated policies led to a shift in the political structure of the Bordeaux Métropole. Round two was delayed until 28 June 2020. Of particular interest was the shift towards the ecologists, who won mayorships in Lyon, Marseilles,

¹⁴ La loi no 66-1069 du 31st decembre 1966 relative aux communauté urbaines: Une communauté urbaine est créée dans les agglomérations de Bordeaux, Lille, Lyon et Strasbourg.

Nancy, Strasbourg and specifically in Bordeaux where Nicolas Florian (LR¹⁵) lost to Pierre Humic (EELV¹⁶). Although it is perhaps too early to analyse the shifts that this will cause in policy in Bordeaux, there are already signs of a greener approach to development across the Métropole.

Alain Anziani, formerly vice president, mayor of Merignac was elected president of Bordeaux Métropole in June 2020. In a press conference on Tuesday 15 September 2020, he announced three key themes, transport and accessibility, water supply to be brought back into public ownership and greening the city that would dominate policy in the Bordeaux Métropole. The future expansion of the tramway, one of Alain Juppé's flagship projects would be reviewed and the completion of the Simone-Veil bridge, important for the Arkea Arena and the development of the Right Bank is to be funded to open in early 2024 following the financial settlement with the contractors, the estimated final cost having risen from 146 million Euros to 170 million Euros. The overall thrust of these policies, involving as they do significant questioning of both costs and environment impacts, raises the question if the arena had not been completed before the 2020 elections would the political mood have worked against the development. More fundamentally, these policies represent a major shift away from the boosterism of Chaban-Delmas and Juppé and the Grands Projets of the Mitterrand years (Brown, 2011).

City leadership, importance of the mayors and presidents

The creation of the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole provided the president and mayors a vehicle to push forward their agendas and ameliorate the city centre as well as across the communes. The advantage of shared governance is in the ability to develop coherent political agendas in order to increase economic, cultural and social policies (Griffith, 2017). According to Griffith (2017) having a métropole wide framework creates opportunities for integrated planning to improve the quality of life in urban areas which extend across the network of different communes. However as noted in chapter 1 increased numbers of decision-makers brings with it complexities and tensions (Raco, et al., 2006). Therefore, the interplay and relationships particularly within the governance decision-making of the CUB/Bordeaux is explored. In addition, the prominent

¹⁵ Les Républicains.

¹⁶ Europe Ecologie –les Verts.

presidents during the timescales of the research are further investigated, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Alain Juppé both of whom had held the State role of Prime Minister and Vincent Feltesse who was described by Lafon, journalist for SudOuest, as a 'socialist from Paris [who] is one of those gifted politicians who quickly succeed' (Lafon, 2020, n.pag.). Each has had a significant influence on urban and cultural development of the Métropole and during the period where the decision to build the arena was discussed and realised.

Mayor of Bordeaux

As noted in chapter 3 the elected mayor in France has a significant political and administrative role and as such is a representative of the state in the commune. Bordeaux has had notable leadership of the city since the late 1940s in terms of its mayors. Jacques Chaban-Delmas (1947-1995) and Alain Juppé (1995-2004 – 2006-2019) held the position of mayor of Bordeaux and as such have influenced urban and cultural development of the city. It was Juppé that made a significant impact on the image of the Métropole.

Jacques Chaban-Delmas a member the Gaullist Rally of the French People (RPF) and at times various positions (Annex 6) came into the role of mayor as France was recovering from the Second World War. Under the Charles De Gaulle's presidency France embarked on rapid and dramatic change in terms of urban growth along with instilling patriotism and nationalism across France. According to Tom Compayrot [journalist for AQUI] Chaban-Delmas understood that the future of Bordeaux had to include the regeneration of its 'entire agglomeration and joint management of projects between Bordeaux and its neighbouring towns' (2018, n.pag.). The urban regeneration projects implemented such as large industrial zones on both banks in Bruges, Blanquefort and Bègles and the ZUP in Floriac and Talence started this process of building for the future.

Following Chaban-Delmas, in the period 1995 to 2019, Alain Juppé held the mayoral position with a two-year break from 2004 to 2006 following a 14 month suspended prison sentence and ban from public office for a year. Like Chaban-Delmas he was a political heavy weight and was able to promote the way in which the City and Region was regarded on the national stage (Chrisafis, 2015). As was the case with the socialist mayor of Lille, Pierre Mauroy, prime minister

of France under François Mitterrand between 1981 and 1984, who transformed the declining industrial city [Lille] into a thriving metropolitan city, Juppé also provided the necessary steer for the renaissance of Bordeaux in an attempt to turn the city into a beautiful place (Bonin et al., 2021; Lachaise, 2022; Myer, 2019). The significance and drive of such a leader to develop the Métropole, aiming to make Bordeaux the capital of the southwest and an international hub to rival other cities in France is of importance.

Of note was the urban infrastructure project to implement a tramway system to link the territories, making it very accessible for locals and tourists along with the installation of a new two-hour high-speed link to Paris (2017), making Bordeaux a viable commuting distance from the capital. The importance of Juppé's position was recognised in the more traditional sectors of the Bordeaux economy. When he replaced Michèle Alliot-Marie as Foreign Minister in 2011, Sylvie Cazes, president of the Union des Grands Crus de Bordeaux told Adam Lechmere in an interview with *Decanter* 'To have a champion for Bordeaux at the very centre of government is very important – he is a major ambassador for French business' (Lechmere, 2001, n.pag.). This typifies Juppé's status in politics, but also the public and symbolic role the mayor commands.

President of the Métropole

When Juppé had to stand down from both mayor of Bordeaux and president of the Métropole, while the political party of the right stayed as mayor, the change in presidency saw the election of the socialist mayor of Pessac, Alain Rousset. This term of office would be short lived as Rousset stood down (2007) in order to take up the presidency of the Aquitaine Region. At this point the presidency went to the youngest mayor in the Métropole, Vincent Feltesse, the socialist leader. Feltesse was not afraid to highlight the social disparity in the agglomeration nor to speak up for those who appeared to be forgotten at a time when the City Centre continued to be regenerated. A champion for sustainability he was complimentary of the work of Juppé and Rousset, declaring 'I am the first to praise the merits of Alain Juppé's urban project and to recognize that it was a great success ... and with the support of Alain Rousset at the time' (Feltesse, 2012, p. 24). As he continued the work started by Juppé he pushed the sustainability agenda, promoting the Self-Service bicycle system (VCUB) and River shuttle (BatClub) in May 2013. Relevant to this thesis, however, is his

determination to fulfil the arena agenda and the fact that he had the casting vote to confirm the location in Floirac amid challenges from the mayors of Bordeaux (Juppé) and Bruges (Seurot).

According to Feltesse the city leadership put in place the essential projects to bring together a more cohesive city region and went on to described it as 'a real window of opportunity' for change (Feltesse, 2012, p. 26). The leaders, both mayors and presidents, have created a more dynamic city centre, enhancing public spaces along with the regeneration of the quays and the launch of the tram system. All these projects have attempted to unite the Left Bank, the historic city centre and the improvements of the Right Bank. Having political heavy weights holding several positions¹⁷ at regional and state level creates the opportunity to raise the status of the city and Métropole. An analysis of the work of the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole exemplifies the considerable redevelopment work that has taken place over the past 30 years (a'urba, 2020). It also points to a change in orientation of that activity away from the gentrification and renovation of the Left Bank towards the Right Bank. The Right Bank, not part of the historic development of the city, was largely neglected until after 2000. The neglect is perhaps encapsulated in the fact that the most recent edition of the *Lonely Planet* guide to Bordeaux makes no reference to it at all even though the arena is housed there (Lonely Planet, 2019). The absence of reference to the right bank highlights its lack of significance to the city as a tourist destination. The issues relating to the Left and Right Bank and the urban and cultural developments are also identified by a'urba (2020) and Martin-Herrou (n.d.).

THE RENAISSANCE OF THE CITY AND ITS MÉTROPOLE

The city's development is complex. Sitting on the river Garonne, close to the Atlantic Ocean, its major commercial port made it an ideal location during the First World War for the American Army and Naval Forces and a base for Italian and German submarines during the occupation of France in World War Two. The French Government also used Bordeaux as a base during the First World War. It became the location for the Vichy Government during occupation. Therefore, the port and city has been an important strategic location.

¹⁷ Known as 'le cumul des madats' (chapter 3).

The port has seen several waves of development, driven by the changing relationship of this region of France with the rest of the World, and the changing nature of shipping itself. The relationship of the city with England in the 12th century to mid-15th century ensured easy export of wine and import of grain and textiles. Martin-Herrou, *Direction de la Nature*, describes how during the 17th-19th centuries the port was used as a centre for the 'commerce triangulaire' referring to colonial trade and in particular the slave trade (Martin-Herrou, n.d.; a'urba, 2020). This enhanced the port's international status importing coffee, cocoa, sugar and coffee and ensuring at that time that Bordeaux was the second port in the World after London. As with other cities such as Bristol that traded in slavery, this commercial and lucrative trade brought a prominence to the city and its port, as well as economic growth. It also influenced much of the architecture of the time. The growth led to Bordeaux becoming one of Europe's biggest 18th century urban architectural areas and a blueprint for Haussmann's plans to modernise Paris. In the 20th century, and particularly after the Second World War, patterns of shipping began to change. The old port located on the deep Left Bank of the river became less suitable for larger ships and container shipping. The port authorities began the development of specialised facilities downstream in response to these changes leaving the 'old' port increasingly underused and eventually semi-derelict. The new developments, taking advantage of available flat land and deeper channels, were located downstream at Pauillac (petroleum and cruise), Blay (cruise), Le Verdon (containers), Ambées (petroleum) and Bassemns (timber and general bulk cargo).

Reimagining the city

The declining industries along with the increased rail and road transportation for goods and people, and a lack of drive from the leadership at the time created the image that Bordeaux had started to become complacent as Gravier, rather caustically described it writing in the 1960s.

The ruling circles continued to live in the memory of the colonial opulence of the 18th century and gave all their care to a port function whose future is limited. In short, the city was looking towards the Atlantic rather than Aquitaine (Gravier, 1964, p. 287).

This is expanded upon by Martin-Herrou who explains that

The relationship of the city of Bordeaux with its river has been changed

many times over the centuries but sometimes a total lack of interest has given away to ports becoming large wastelands' (Martin-Herrou, n.d., p. 2)

The complex relationship with the river and its varying shifts in economic growth and decline emphasized the 'relationships marked by periods of strong symbiosis, ignorance and contempt' (Martin-Herrou, n.d, p. 12). Gravier (1964) with a certain disdain, suggests that there came a period in the later 1960s when 'Bordeaux ... acquired an influence commensurate with its history, its architectural prestige and its cultural heritage' (p. 288). The city region with a population of 500,000 had begun to look towards the wider region for further development possibilities (Gravier, 1964). In latter period of the 20th century the city lost over 50,000 inhabitants, in part due to significant movement out of the city into the hinterland and coastal settlements such as Lacanau and Biscarrosse, settlements in easy commuting distance of Bordeaux. The lack of modernisation of the city saw its historic building facades revealing years of neglect and pollution and decaying waterfronts, which gave it its 'nickname 'La Belle Endormie - sleeping beauty. And by the 1990s the city had slipped into a coma' (Pietrasik, 2014, n.pag.). This was acknowledged by Michèle Duchene, Vice President de Bordeaux Métropole, en charge des grands projets, who said that for many years the city had hardly changed (Duchene, 2018).

The changing city and its communes

As Griffith (2017) argues the shared governance of the communauté urbaine status required Bordeaux to collaborate closely with the communes to increase its profile, competitiveness, economy and attractiveness. In so doing the role as an métropole d'équilibre (counter magnet) would be fulfilled. In line with the strategic development and modernisation plan for the agglomerations in 1964 (Programmes de modernisation et d'équipement PME), Bordeaux published 'le programme pour l'agglomération bordelaise' (a'urba, 2020). As early as the mid-1960s this urban development programme identified as a priority the need to rebalance the two banks, increase the number of bridges across the Garonne and improve local transport (a'urba, 2020). According to Pividori (2021) urban development progressively became part of state legislative and regulatory framework. However, Bordeaux delayed developing its schema directeur d'aménagement et d'urbanisme (SDAU) [Master urban development plan] due to what Guillebaud (1972, n.pag.) describes as the 'traumatisme psychologique'

[psychological trauma] caused by the bringing together of the 27 communes within the métropole d'équilibre. By the late 1970s Bordeaux under the presidency of Chaban-Delmas had finally created a SDAU. According to Chaban-Delmas the remit of the SDAU was more than an urban policy it was the vision for the development of Bordeaux and the Métropole (Chaban-Delmas, 1972). Within the SDAU there was specific mention of improving cultural infrastructure across the communes but in particular that the development of cultural facilities should be placed alongside a number of existing public services SDAU, 1972). This is at odds with the decision for the location of the arena which now sits on the Right Bank with few cultural facilities in proximity.

The Métropole as part of urban governance used zoning as an urban development tool creating multi-functioning housing, cultural and retail areas, incorporating planning tools such as the ZAC. Along with increased governance for urban development, the CUB/ Bordeaux Métropole under the guidance of the state created a dedicated planning agency. Agence d'urbanisme Bordeaux Aquitaine (a'urba) provided guidance on town planning with a multi-disciplinary angle (a'urba, 2020). The a'urba therefore combined the associated services of the state and the CUB/ Bordeaux Métropole into a single entity to manage the urban and regional development programme. The evolution of the Right Bank however remained problematic and while many urban projects had started during the 1980s none had come to fruition until the 2000s (see Annex 7).

The importance of transport infrastructure and two key major urban projects, which saw the development of the waterfronts, tramway, and the development of the Right Bank, are of importance to the thesis. Each has had a level of impact on the regeneration of and around the location of the arena. The importance of the river is apparent as are the major developments that enhanced infrastructure with public transport, the tramline and national rail links for example. The major urban projects Bordeaux Euratlantique (2010) designated as an urban planning project of national interest (OIN) and a Grand Projet de Ville (GPV) (2000-2010) provide the opportunity to improve social, cultural and education facilities for several of the poorer communes. These urban projects have also contributed to improving the image of these communes and in particular Floirac. The selected projects as well as other regeneration projects not investigated in the thesis are identified as the key initiatives to

trigger changes in social, cultural and economic profile of the Métropole (Martone and Sepe, 2012).

The river has played an integral part in Bordeaux's history; however, there was a considerable lack of interest in its waterfronts for many years. Discussions under Chaban-Delmas's term as mayor of Bordeaux indicated his wish to implement a highway network alongside the river, similar to that in Paris. Had this been approved it would have severely diminished access to the river, as well as creating a greater barrier to public access to the waterfront. According to Smith et al. North America had since the 1960s and 1970s successfully regenerated several city waterfronts and this 'phenomenon of urban waterfront regeneration and development has spread geographically' (2012, p. 3). The spread also saw the evolution of regeneration programmes with waterfronts becoming important in the creation of public space, enhancing city image and 'in some cases they [waterfronts] have been given a larger role in re-launching the entire city of which they form part' (Smith and Soledas Garcia Ferari, 2012, p. 5). Bordeaux, with its vast areas of waterfront, eventually came to see that this urban space was integral to its development and, as suggested above, its regeneration was used to enhance its public image and create better social spaces along both the Left and Right Banks.

Waterfront development

Giovinazzi and Moretti (2010), Jones (2017) and Sepe (2013) identified the importance of waterfront regeneration in urban governance and how during the latter part of the twentieth century it has been used in major redevelopment planning strategies often extending across the urban area. This is particularly relevant to Bordeaux where the emphasis during the 1960s had been road transportation and increased road building leaving the industrial ports in decline along with other industries moving further away from the banks of the river. The warehouses now left in disrepair also limited the possible access to the river and often created stagnation and dereliction in these areas. However, this was changed with the arrival in 1995 of Alain Juppé who instigated a major regeneration project in 1996. The aim of this project was to modernise and gentrify the city particularly the wasteland around the docklands to improve health and wellbeing of its residents and to attract tourism (Rodrigues, 2018). Major developments of the waterfronts were according to Martin-Herrou (n.d.) a

bid to return the quays to the residents of Bordeaux via a social mix of recreational, leisure areas, public art and commercial and cultural facilities (Image 4.2).

Image 4.2: Phases of the quais de Bordeaux



Source: Ville de Bordeaux, Mairie de Bordeaux, n.d., n.pag.

This waterfront regeneration project attempted to make Bordeaux and its communes a more enjoyable and attractive place to visit, live, work and study. Giovinazzi and Moretti (2010) describe however the dual challenges of this type of regeneration that has to be considered within governance decision-making. On a practical level through city planning, architecture, and urban and cultural facilities the decisions are linked with enhancing the attraction to the city's image and increasing economy. At the same time the need to acknowledge the impact on citizens and maintain the historical references to the past. This is often a difficult balance to achieve and one that the leadership of CUB/Bordeaux Métropole had to consider when changing the nature of the ports and the associated regeneration needed to modernise these areas.


Within network governance the planning policy tool *Schéma de Cohérence Territoriale* (SCoT) saw major urban projects launched with the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole working proactively alongside the public, private partnerships, and social groups to develop the urban environment for a new city. The success of the city's improvements has seen an annual increase of 11,200 residents between 2011-2016, a third a result of a natural increase of residents whilst

migration accounted for two-thirds (a'urba, 2020). These migration figures also include Parisians relocating to Bordeaux. According to Fedouach incomers from the capital account for 'a large share of the 12,000 yearly arrivals that have been recorded in recent years in this city of 250,000 inhabitants (750,000 when counting the suburbs)' (2017, n.pag.).

The ongoing regeneration of the city from the 1980s created the need for enhanced public transport. Bordeaux was witnessing concerns about the impact of increasing population and urban sprawl, which had seen the excessive use of cars in and around the city (a'urba, 2020). According to Boquet (2017) there was a remarkable comeback in France in the 1980s of tramways. Bordeaux was no exception. In response to alleviating congestion and increase networks across the Métropole, linking the more isolated neighborhoods and to encourage better use of public transport, Alain Juppe implemented the Tramway Project in 1995. This was one of Juppe's most prestigious projects and it benefited from funding which had already been assigned to the underground transport system by Chaban-Delmas that was no longer deemed to be viable or even desirable (Boquet, 2017).

The Tramway developed over three phases from 1996 to 2000 and attracted international interest from *The Irish Times* where Frank McDonald, Environment Editor compares the modest Dublin network with a 'tram system which has utterly changed Bordeaux for the better' (McDonald, 2008, n.pag.). What set this tram system apart from others was how it used the opportunities to enhance the landscape around the city rather than it being just a transport project (McDonald, 2008). As can be seen in Image 4.3 the four lines connect many of the communes and, according to CUB/Bordeaux Métropole, were a popular solution for public transport, for the reduction of cars and pollution which would create an easier way of travelling between the communes and, with the enhanced landscaping, a more attractive place to work and live (Bordeaux Métropole, n.d).

Image 4.3: Tramway routes



Source: Bordeaux Métropole, n.d.a, n.pag.

Boquet (2017) argues that tramways tend to cross areas where pedestrian traffic is at its greatest such as universities, retail areas and entertainment venues and hence provide a good link between urban development and transport planning. One possible weakness of the Tramway as far as the arena is concerned however, is that whilst having a terminus in Floirac there is no specific direct line. Instead a shuttle bus is run to and from the arena to a particular tram station on concert days. Indeed, as can be seen from the plan, in its original conception, the tram did little more than pay lip service to the Right Bank.

The Bordeaux Euratlantique major project

The Bordeaux Euratlantique project (approved by CUB 27/11/2009) was a major urban development programme for the modernization of Bordeaux and transport infrastructure (Images 4.4 and 4.5). The programme also included the urban development policy specifically for the regeneration of the Right Bank which included the communes of Bègles, Bordeaux and Floirac. The major project managed by a public body Etablissement public d'aménagement de Bordeaux-Euratlantique (EPABE) (similar in status and purpose to UK Development Corporations) was also recognized as 'an operation of national interest and is

the largest urban project in France outside the Paris region' (Bordeaux Métropole, 2021, n.pag.).

Image 4.4: Bordeaux Euratlantique Plan


Ce plan guide explique l'approche globale de l'EPA sur le territoire de l'OIN. Il met en exergue les maillages des espaces verts, des espaces publics (en jaune), des moyens de transports (tramways et des équipements publics (en rouge).



Source: Bordeaux Métropole, 2021, n.pag.

'This guide plan explains the global approach of the EPA on the territory of the ISO. It highlights the links between green spaces, public spaces (in yellow) means of transport (trams and public equipment (in red)).

Image: 4.5: Bordeaux Euratlantique Map



Source: Bordeaux Metropole, 2021, n.pag.

The project was focused on the Bordeaux St Jean and capitalised on the long awaited TGV (Train de grande vitesse) line between Bordeaux and Paris. The TGV according to the report presented to the committee at its meeting held 20 February 2004 was a major economic development and would provide a rebalancing of the national and European territory bringing with it a reduction in congestion (Brana, 2004). The objective was to improve the St Jean train station, which up until 2010 had been a bottleneck of a railway station (Escolin, 2016) with only two lines with a maximum speed of 30 kmh. The improvements included a new four-lane bridge allowing the construction of the planned new LGV link to Paris to go ahead. The introduction of the high-speed rail LGV Sud Europe Atlantique which opened on 2 July 2017 provided Bordeaux with enhanced national and European networks which is important for potential audiences travelling to the arena. The time taken to get to Paris was reduced to 2 hours 4 minutes from 2 hours 58 minutes (L'Hostis et al., 2017). The connectivity with other cities, particularly Paris and hence the whole of mainland Europe created the opportunity for the Métropole to become a key European city, accelerating urbanism, attracting new businesses and residents. According to Feltesse (2012, p. 48) 'just as the tramway was the symbolic urban project of 1996, I think that the TGV can be the ambassador of the decade for Bordeaux'.

The arrival of the TGV however that cuts through 3 Regions (Aquitaine, Poitou-Charentes and Centre) reshaped landscapes and its construction affected and disrupted local residents and farmers alike (Lorinquer, 2016). This is further acknowledged by France 24 news that highlighted that the arrival of the TGV-Paris link and success of the regeneration programmes created frustrations from some residents. The attractiveness of Bordeaux and the growing wealth and easy access provided by the TGV saw real estate prices rise significantly (Fourquet, 2019). The result was seen in the urban transformations, gentrification, high priced housing and businesses run by newcomers which resulted in a housing crisis. The regeneration of the traditional work-class areas to attract newcomers affected students and lower and middle-income families who were increasingly being priced out of the city's neighbourhoods. The newly renovated Saint-Michel for example, bore witness of the frustrations of existing residents through graffiti and anti-Parisian signs (Fedouach, 2017).

While some residents were frustrated by the effects of gentrification, businesses also experienced some ups and downs in their fortunes; on the one hand an

improved rail network brought custom, but reduced domestic air travel, particularly the shuttle between Merignac and Orly airports. (L'Hostis et al., 2017). This was a result of a decision by President Macon in June 2020 who instructed Air France to terminate any domestic flights where alternative transports could be made in less than two and a half hours (Willsher, 2021). These interlinking major regeneration programmes and enhanced infrastructure are important to the thesis as they indicated the attempt to bring the two banks together. In improving the urban environment and transportation the development of the Right Bank and arena would provide greater regeneration opportunities as well as financial and cultural benefits to the commune of Floirac.

The development of the Right Bank

As highlighted by Griffith (2017), shared governance is an important element in the development of a Métropole. Within this context the discussions and debates when deciding on the location of the arena highlighted the tensions of Left and Right Banks. To understand these tensions however, a brief explanation is required.

According to Martin-Herrou (n.d., p. 8) 'the two banks of the Garonne have ignored each other for two hundred years'. The two banks have very different urban configurations; the Left Bank has the city centre and its historical facades and while having a large area of abandoned warehouse and modern roadways it is still much more prominent than the Right Bank, with its social degradation, waste land and poor housing. The connection between the two banks remained limited with only one crossing point, a stone bridge built in 1821 until a further three road bridges constructed between 1960s and 1990s and with a rail bridge added in 2008. The movement between each bank was difficult and the latest bridge, le pont Jacques Chaban-Delmas (formerly Bacalan-Bastide Bridge opened in 2013) was an attempt to increase connectivity with the Right Bank to the city centre.

The full integration of the Right Bank into the urban area and the modernisation of the old port buildings however has not always been a smooth process. Juppé summed up the problem 'if we want the agglomeration not to be a vast conurbation joining Arcachon, we must refocus, and the centre is the river'

(Godier and Tapie, 2009, p. 30). This shift in focus from Bordeaux city centre to the river created many and various attempts to bring together the two banks (Annex 7). It was nonetheless a bold decision that the Right Bank and the commune of Floirac should be chosen as the site for the large multi-purpose arena given the history of the Right Bank and its limited infrastructure and the investment that would be needed for such a grand urban project. The explanation for this choice will be explored in chapter 5.

Improving the image of the Right Bank Communes

Urban poverty is typically found on the outskirts of French cities, the banlieues, and whilst many regeneration projects have been conceived many have either been delayed or failed to come to fruition. Alain Juppé had felt that previous urban regeneration policies for the Métropole had failed and that new policies were needed (Hall and Chignier Riboulon, 2005). From the 1980s and particularly 1990s state policies such as Contrats de Ville and Grands Projets Urbaines were established to provide a framework for planning, better housing and social cohesion as well as inter-communal working (Green et al., 1997). In addition, a new city policy Pacte de Relance pour la Ville (1996) established three levels of zones (Annex 8) to provide cities a greater opportunity to tackle issues relating to urban decline. These new policies along with specific regeneration programmes such as the Grand Projet de Villes (GPV) attempted to address the social deprivation and economic decline found in the Right Bank. The location of the arena on the Right Bank therefore would enhance the social, cultural and economic infrastructure leading to greater investment and image.

Grand Projet de Villes (GPV)

In 2000, CUB/Bordeaux Métropole established the urban policy GPV (Grand Project de Villes) and at the committee meeting held 24 September 2004 identified its purpose was to address the challenges faced in revitalising the most stigmatised neighbourhoods on the Right Bank (Touzeau, 2004). The GPV objectives was to improve the image, enhance the opportunities for the residents particularly with regard to culture, sustainability, public spaces and education in the four communes, Bassens, Lormont, Cenon and Floirac Grand Projet de Villes (GPV) 2000-2010: La reconquête (Parin, 2000). These communes fit within 'les banlieues' status and as such have a reputation that is less favourable. The joint project was managed by the Le Groupement d'Intérêt

Public (GIP) and involved representation from the state, the four communes and the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole along with Aquitaine Regional Council Gironde Council and the Caisse de Dépôts et Consignations as well as relevant local groups. This group provided within network governance the opportunity for joint decision-making, shared responsibilities and ownership of the overall project (Touzeau, 2005).


Within the GPV policy document the project clearly emphasised that 'the Right Bank is not a "problem", but an essential asset for the entire agglomeration (Parin, 2000, p. 16). The need for such statements highlights the continued stigma that these poorer areas and their population received from the more affluent city centre and communes on the Left Bank. However, it was initial projects such as this one which brought to the fore the social and economic disparity between the two banks. The overall aim of this project was to reverse the stigma and permanently cement the relationships between the cities on the Right Bank and the rest of the Métropole and in doing so through regeneration enhance their social, economic and cultural facilities (Parin, 2000). The project's four key aims (Table 4.1) place innovation, quality and creativity at its heart along with collaborative working of partners in order to achieve and implement the project at a cost of 95 million euros.

Table 4.1: The GPV brought together four key aims

1	Simplify administration so that all the territory works as one
2	Build strong partnerships and realise that urban renewal is a business for everyone
3	Maintain a flexible project which changes as needed
4	Remove the pre-conceived ideas of the Right Bank

Source: Parin, GPV 2000-2010, p. 4.

Image 4.6: Grand Projet de villes 2000-2010



Source: Parin, GPV 2000-2010, p. 24.

Image 4.7: The 3rd phase of the project: 2010-2020




Source: Parin, GPV 2000-2010, p. 65.

The GPV identifies the ZAC de Quais in Floirac and the proposed new bridge (Images 4.6 and 4.7). These urban projects included the proposed location for the arena and therefore are important to the thesis. However, the project plans revealed no proposal to increase public transport such as the tramline into Floirac.

The Commune of Floirac

Whilst the above project identified four communes for redevelopment, Floirac is the focus of the thesis given it was originally identified within the urban policy scheme (ZAC des Quais) as the location for the large indoor music arena. The commune of Floirac in which the arena is now located is situated on the Right Bank of the river Garonne and has a population of some 16 500 people (Image 4.8). Within the larger master plan of the Bordeaux Métropole, the Contrat d'Agglomération and Schéma Directeur, Floirac is identified as having strategic importance in the restructuring and balancing of urban development in favour of the 'quartiers' of the Right Bank. This significance in the overall development of the Right Bank was recognised in the designation of the ZAC des Quais in 1991 on the site of former cement works and soap factory, both of which closed in the 1980s.

Image 4.8: Location of Floirac



Source: Bordeaux Metropole, 2021, n.pag.

As a result of the Pacte de Relance pour la Ville, Floirac was identified with having a high level of urban deprivation and hence in addition to regeneration programme such as the GPV, the commune had both a 'zone franche urbaine'¹⁸ and a 'zone de redynamisation urbaine'¹⁹. These targeted policies aimed at

¹⁸ Urban Free Zone - neighbourhoods of more than 10,000 inhabitants, located in sensitive and disadvantaged geographic areas.

combating social and economic deprivation and reviving economic activity by encouraging business and companies to relocate in Floirac or support those that were already in situ. The benefits of exemption from income tax for a period of five years as well as an exemption from employer social security contributions for up to 50 employees offered companies a clear incentive. This as well as the addition of an arena could potentially attract further investment for the commune.

In a newspaper article by Aubert and Beteille (2016) the mayor Jean-Jacques Puyobrau declared that 'in Floirac, construction sites are flourishing, and it is not over yet' (n.pag.). As previously identified by Giovinazzi and Moretti (2010) the challenge of such major renewal programmes is a balancing act. The Mayor was attempting to enhance the city with a refocus for the entrance to the city, linking the town centre with the old town and make better use of the current facilities, along with the new urban façade on the river and the proposed 11,000 capacity arena. Crucial to the success of the renewal programme however was the need to consider the impact of the residents (Aubert and Beteille, 2016). This was echoed by Feltesse who highlighted that 'for this peri-urban population - the furthest from the city and its services, daily life is far from easy' particularly with major on-going changes (Feltesse, 2012, p. 16). The question of balance and alleviating some of the problems of living in these areas perhaps cannot be remedied solely by regeneration. The impact of major changes and in particular a lack of consultation for the construction of the arena was an issue that was raised by the political opposition in Floirac, further developed in chapter 5.

The chapter so far has focussed on regeneration as the key for major changes to the image, infrastructure and facilities of the Bordeaux Métropole. This had led to some major changes in the way the Left and Right Banks are viewed along with improved waterfront facilities and infrastructure networks. However, cultural governance and influences do not appear to have been a key component in these major urban changes or the decision-making processes. There appears therefore a lack of cultural policy at the heart of political decision-making within the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole.

¹⁹ Urban renewal zone implemented where there are acute needs.

THE CULTURAL CONTEXT

Important to the thesis is the cultural context and the development of venues for music across the Bordeaux Métropole. As noted earlier particular mayors of Bordeaux and presidents of the CUB/ Bordeaux Métropole have been influential in the urban development and political context. The following three mayors have had a significant influence on the cultural and architectural landscape of Bordeaux, Adrien Marquet (1925-1944), Jacques Chaban-Delmas (1947-1995) and Alain Juppé (1995-2004-2004-2019). These prominent mayors used political power and prestigious urban projects to stamp their personality on the city. The inclusion of Adrien Marquet is useful as it is a period before the creation of the (CUB) (1968) and hence reflects directly on the central commune of Bordeaux and his personal approach and style to cultural development and its challenges from this period. It is the period that laid down the foundations for Chaban-Delmas and Alain Juppé who both became instrumental in developing the cultural prominence of Bordeaux in different ways, in conjunction with regeneration and ultimately the decision-making for the construction of the arena.

Chapter 3 identified that culture in France under the Fifth Republic was highly politicised with the national appointment of Andre Malraux the first Minister of Culture Affairs, Ministry of Culture (1959) under the De Gaulle presidency. Prior to this, the responsibility for cultural policy was at a municipal level with the mayor having substantial power and influence to develop the cultural offerings and architecture of the city. Marquet became mayor of Bordeaux during one of the most troubled periods of the mid-twentieth century, particularly the Occupation (1940-1944); he was also the Minister of State to Marshal Pétain (1940). During the 1930s Bordeaux was transformed to reflect a significant imprint of the vision of Marquet (Taliano-Garets, 2010). According to Cloutet Marquet became 'the builder-mayor of Bordeaux (stadium, communal house of La Bastide, building of the Régie du gaz, swimming pool, slaughterhouses, labor exchange, etc.)' (2012, n.pag.). The cultural and architectural development provided a mixture of stability and safeguarding of the city's cultural heritage along with the promotion of a traditional talent base, often relating to the funding of the orchestras and classical music as well as that of fine arts education. This can be seen in the restoration of many religious buildings across the city, La Porte Dijeaux as well as the restoration of the iconic Grand Theatre. This led to

a high value being placed on high culture and its associated education, with the Grand Theatre becoming the cultural icon for the city (Cloutet, 2012). There was a contrast however when Marquet engaged Raoul Jourde, a French architect to design what was described at the time as a controversial building for the municipal gas and electricity authority (1930) and the stadium Lescure Park, now Chaban-Delmas Stade (1933-1938). The stadium designed in the art deco style was at the time one of the most modern stadia in Europe due to its stands being entirely covered without any impaired visibility as there was no pillar obstructing the view of the pitch.

These buildings heighten what Taliano-Garets describes as an emphasis on tradition 'it focuses on architecture, the decoration of buildings in a sort of French monarchical tradition' (2010, p. 5). Thus, the emphasis was on Marquet's political power and influence and of leaving a legacy of grandeur for generations to come, 'If patrimony is thus bequeathed to future generation, the Mayor understood very well how to leave his mark on the landscape of Bordeaux' (Taliano-Garets, 2010, p. 5). In using architecture and high culture Bordeaux remained bourgeois in its outlook with little interest in promoting popular culture. When Chaban-Delmas became mayor (1947-1995) he became one of the longest serving mayors, spanning a 48-year period. Whilst heavily involved in State level politics, according to Morris (2000) he had the ability to encourage liberal reformism through funding opportunities for high culture and retain Gaullist nationalism at the same time which became his trademark. As mayor of Bordeaux his longevity of power became known by the term 'chabanism [which] was forged due to the emotional identification of the Bordelaise with their mayor, and the identification of the latter with his city' (Taliano-des Garets, 1999, p. 44). Chaban-Delmas's persona and self-belief was about his personal charm as much as political prowess and 'above all, he loved to 'seduce'. And his greatest conquest was Bordeaux, the town and its townsfolk' leading to an almost romanticising of his leadership style (Lemoine, 2000, p. 1).

The two major state changes in cultural governance brought cultural policy to the fore, particularly with themes such as 'Democratisation and Decentralisation' at national and local level (Devlin and Hoyle, 2000). However, little cultural policy development was seen in Bordeaux and culture remained within the remit of the mayor. Chaban-Delmas, being well connected at the state level as well as

regionally was able to use his influence to attract famous musicians to the city. These influential networks provided him the opportunity to integrate the State's Landowski plan²⁰ (Senat, n.d.), which had the benefit of provided funding for the regional Bordeaux orchestra, housed in the Grand Theatre. Chaban-Delmas asserted his political control by adopting an approach not unlike Mitterrand in allowing only a small, trusted group to work with him (Brown, 2011). This image was echoed by Morris who described him as 'one of France's most celebrated regional political bosses, using his position as mayor of Bordeaux to build up a network of alliances and clients, which transcended party barriers and led to him becoming known as the Duke of Aquitaine' (Morris, 2000, n.pag.). This lack of governance in decision making widened the gap between the president and cultural institutions leaving decisions to be made by a small group of elected officials without any public debate (Sud Ouest, 1993).

The city's cultural image however was experiencing a renaissance in economy and culture under Chablan-Delmas. Like Malraux at state level, cultural activities remained focussed on high culture with the single exception of one contemporary festival Sigma held in the 1960s. The trend by Bordeaux to favour opera, museums, contemporary art and libraries was supported politically (SudOuest, 1993; Augustin and Favory, 1998). His policies and excessive spending on culture saw Chaban-Delmas's power start to wain and he was particularly criticised for subsidies given to various cultural organisations, such as the funding of the city orchestra. According to Négrier (1997) 'in 1990, Bordeaux like other cities spent 'more than 14% of their budgets on culture' (p. 67). The decentralisation reforms had given local authorities a greater responsibility for culture, and it was used to create a strategic political identity (Negrier, 1997). This was seen with Lang and his state cultural initiatives that increased the national budget from '2.6 billion francs in 1981 to 13.8 billion francs by 1993' (Compendium, 2019, n.pag.). This increase was also replicated as Lang created a cultural frenzy in Bordeaux where 'in 1987 15.7% of the budget went on culture; by 1992 this was 27% which was four time bigger than Direction Régionale des affaires culturelles (DRAC) insists upon' (Taliano-des

²⁰ The "Ten-Year Plan for Music Education" known as the "Landowski Plan" , accompanied the movement of cultural decentralization and democratization of access to culture then instilled by this ministry, notably supposing the proliferation of orchestras (Senat, n.d.).

Garets, 1999, p. 51). By comparison, the share of the cultural sector in the general expenditure of the communities is on average 10.2% (Taliano-des Garets, 1999, p. 44). Venries (1993) notes that because the cultural vision of Bordeaux was a domain reserved for the president (Chaban-Delmas) his spending of a third of the city's overall budget was under threat and the very cultural organisations which he supported were no longer protected and started to disappear. Chaban-Delmas's lack of understanding of the population between their daily struggles, unemployment, transport and quality of life created a situation for accountability and a change of vision in particular 'that the city is known as the "5th Avenue" is no longer a local priority (Sud Ouest, 1993, p. 20). By 1990 the policies and excess in spending on culture resulted in Chaban's power and his management of subsidies to the various cultural organisations being criticised. This led to the significant step of the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole reducing the power of the Mayor and by 1994 the people of Bordeaux found themselves in debt twice that of other French cities. With the financial crisis many projects were put on hold or terminated.

When Juppé became mayor in 1995 he was left with a huge deficit in terms of cultural and needed to regain control of the budget. Of particular interest to the thesis is Juppé's attitude towards culture. His view according to Feltesse et al. (2011) was that culture should remain municipal and be left to the commune and had less conviction that culture and cultural activities were more economically important than urban regeneration, particularly infrastructure investment such as the proposed tramway. Juppe's vision of culture appears more interlinked with urban regeneration and the city's image rather than specific venues for popular music and events. Romain Beteille (journalist for *AQUI*) highlights this in an interview with Juppé when he described the Heritage Days held on 19 and 20 September 2015 as a 'way to highlight major buildings, and to justify the status of Bordeaux as the second city in terms of protected historical monuments' (2015, n.pag.). There is a tension here however that in enhancing local heritage found mainly on the Left Bank and which is seen as an important element for the development and attractiveness for the city difficulties in the integration of the two banks are created (Beteille, 2015). This is further expanded upon by Miglioretti (2012) who suggests that the enhanced development of cultural facilities observed in the middle class and richer suburbs was in stark contrast of the continued deprivation of cultural investment for the Right Bank.

Despite the major urban regeneration programmes attempting to consolidate the Left and Rights Banks, a new arena was still not seen as a priority within a cultural context. However, when la Port de la Lune was listed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2007 the interest in reviewing and enhancing the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole's cultural offering resurfaced. In the context of the decision to make an application to the ECoC (2013), the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole agreed that for the size and status of a city like Bordeaux the lack of a multi-purpose arena was a significant disadvantage (Bron, 2007). It was noted that all winning metropolitan strategies have relied heavily on cultural infrastructure and facilities whilst in Bordeaux there was no such culture plan in place (Feltesse et al., 2011). Feltesse observed that 'this is one of the main challenges for the coming decade for our agglomeration' (Feltesse et al., 2011, p. 144). Chapter 5 further explores the relationship between the ECoC and the development of an arena along with the associated discussions. The significant number of historic buildings in the city (350 buildings listed or registered as historical monuments) has provided Bordeaux with a high level of cultural esteem and as such there seems to have been no urgency for a cultural policy for the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole.

The historic political heavyweight mayors manipulated the cultural environment to benefit their own agendas and so as to leave their mark on the city. Whilst festivals and architectural centres, as well as more recent sustainable initiatives have come to fruition, until the decision to apply for the ECoC the impetus to build an arena had not been a priority. In addition, whilst three main cultural projects had been realised, the cultural centre for wine (Juppé), regional funding for contemporary art (Rousset) and the installation of the arena on the Right Bank (Feltesse) there still was no essential strong cultural marker for the Métropole. The political will to undertake urban regeneration was more forceful than establishing a cultural policy. This was the case with Alain Juppé and the building of the tramline. Cultural development therefore, was seen more as a result of redevelopment rather than a specific cultural policy. This is important context for the thesis and is further discussed in chapter 5. Whilst there was a focus on regeneration, Bordeaux had had a long history of high culture and heritage that was established by the mayors as seen in Grand Theatre and funding of orchestras for example. However, like many cities, the evolution of venues for popular music in Bordeaux came from independent spaces that created local music scenes from Concert halls to café concerts.

Music event space in Bordeaux

Whilst the music scene is primarily through independent venues, at a local authority level festivals appeared to be a popular choice for cities to explore more contemporary culture. According to Guibert (2011) festivals can generate a positive effect for the local authorities from the perspective of cultural, tourism and economic development. They also frequently use transient venues rather than dedicated spaces. Bordeaux is no exception. The influence of ministers such as Jack Lang (Minister of Culture 1981 and one of the instigators of the Zénith blueprint) and Maurice Fleuret (Director of music and dance in the Ministry of Culture) emphasised French contemporary music and created the notion of music festivals (Ministère de la culture, n.d.). Bordeaux now hosts many music festivals; some like the Bordeaux Rock Festival, host acts in permanent venues, whilst others use various park locations in and around the city centre, such as Bordeaux Open Air and Festival Relache Bordeaux. The La Fête de la Musique is also a celebration of all types of music with free music and street parties held across the city. Whilst festivals are a popular choice in Bordeaux there are very few permanent locations that have the capacity to hold large commercial bands. The Patinoire de Mériadeck (Ice rink) is one such venue that was built in 1981 initially to house two ice hockey teams, but it is also used for concerts. However, with a maximum capacity of 4,800 it is still a relatively small venue.

As previously noted it is very difficult to count the precise number of venues across a city (Cohen, 2012; Kronenburg, 2011). The list for Bordeaux was derived from the Bordeaux Métropole website which identifies the types of venues for popular music, capacity (where known) and locations (Annex 9). The venues are predominantly in the city centre with only a few located in the communes. Where data is available, most venues have less than a 2,000-seating capacity with a mixture of more intimate music venues, as well as a number of modest venues for jazz, electronic music and hip-hop. The football stadium and the Ice Rink are the only venues that can be used for larger popular music concerts. What becomes apparent is the lack of a medium-sized indoor arena. This was identified in the ZAC des Quais in 1999 yet was a need that remained unfulfilled until the decision by the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole required an arena as part of the submission for the ECoC (2013) (chapter 5).

CONCLUSION

This chapter has critically reviewed the administrative and political context which saw changes in responsibilities and the drive by mayors and presidents to alleviate the tensions between the Left and Right banks. In particular, it has analysed how the development of the métropole which brought together 28 communes created the opportunities for a greater level of network governance. However, the power of the mayors and presidents of the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole have continued to be prominent in decision-making regarding culture and urban regeneration.

When Bordeaux became an Métropole and communauté urbaine with a remit to counterbalance the strength of Paris a focussed regeneration programme started in order to fulfil its role as a leading European metropolis. The creation of the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole brought together a new administrative body for the whole Métropole. The political heavyweight politicians such as the president and several mayors holding several positions have played an important role in promoting a clear strong identity and approach for change. However, Bordeaux was slow in redressing the declining and derelict wastelands as well as the high level of pollution, which gave it the image as the 'sleeping city'. Relying on its many historic buildings it had failed to modernise its image and city.

The underlying tension which ran throughout the regeneration of Bordeaux is the divisions between the Left and Right banks. Waterfront regeneration was significant as it allowed the banks to be re-developed into public and leisure spaces. However, it was the major regeneration programme such as the Bordeaux Euratlantique and GPV implemented to establish greater inter-communal networks and raise the status of the Right Bank communes. The regeneration however did little to change the attitudes towards the Right Bank. This point is worth highlighting, as it will be the cause of debate and disruption in the decision-making for the arena.

A real change for the city centre, its internal and external networks came under the leadership of Juppé in the 1990s with the tramway and high-speed train. The outcome from these initiatives saw a level of gentrification for the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and in doing so increased Bordeaux's image, attractiveness and strengthened urban environment that led to higher priced accommodation and

housing. This boosterism of the city centre was frequently to the detriment of those on modest and lower incomes who were priced out of the housing market.

Despite the national cultural agenda seen from the 1958s and regional organisations such as the DRACs, there remained little in the way of policy towards the regions, departments, communes and cities. This allowed the mayors of Bordeaux to continue to be influential in steering the cultural agenda in line with their own predilections. The increased cultural budget, which reflected the state picture during the 1980s, was seen particularly under Chaban-Delmas but the focus remained primarily on high culture along with an increased number of festivals. Whilst there was a popular festival programme and several more informal and smaller venues that encouraged music genres such as jazz, there was no large arena to accommodate the larger international commercial bands. Unlike many regional cities the state initiative to create Zéniths failed to impact on Bordeaux.

CHAPTER 5: DEVELOPING AN ARENA, LE PROJECT D'UNE RÉGION: BORDEAUX

INTRODUCTION

This chapter offers an in-depth investigation into the narrative of governance and decision-making surrounding the inception, construction and opening of the Arkea Arena. It particularly highlights the interplay of elements of governance in the protracted decision-making process. The chapter critically reviews the contributions from key stakeholders, such as the mayors and presidents and how the top-down approach influenced the decision-making process. In terms of urban governance, it reflects on the regeneration project of the ZAC des Quais which is key for the thesis as within this scheme the development of an arena was identified, as well as highlighting the associated benefits of such a facility. The emphasis on urban regeneration and waterfront development is considered within the role of cultural governance and cultural policy particularly in light of discussions in chapters 1 and 3 where it lacked prominence in local authority development plans.

The timeframe is from the year 2000 when the initial ZAC des Quais was modified to include a multi-functional venue for popular culture, to final inauguration of the Arkea Arena in 2018. The data obtained is from a range of reviewed academic journals, archived official council minutes, newspaper articles particularly Sud Ouest²¹, short films in which key stakeholders are interviewed, and semi-structured interviews. As this case study introduces a wide range of actors with different responsibilities and roles it was thought useful in guiding the reader with list of the key actors which is presented in Annex 10.

With the investigation covering a period of 18 years the structure of the chapter is broken down into four phases. The choice of four phases is in recognition of the different approaches taken during these periods and they also help to identify the key aspects along with presenting a timeline.

²¹ Sud Ouest: Politically, the paper is regarded rather neutral, family owned. The third largest regional daily in France in terms of circulation.

The four phases are:

- 1) 2000-2005: A bullring – are you serious?
- 2) 2006-2012: Publicly or Privately Funded, Zénith or Arena – time to make your mind up!
- 3) 2012-2014: After failure comes success, decision to continue the arena project
- 4) 2014-2018: Phase 4: Finally an Arena for Floirac

PHASE 1: 2000-2005: A BULLRING – ARE YOU SERIOUS?

Table 5.1: Timeline for the ZAC des Quais and a multi-purpose venue

Date	Actions
June 2001	Creation of the ZAC des Quais, Floirac
12/07/2004	Messrs. Del Rio Cortes and Lartigues proposal for a multi-functional arena notably for bullfighting
2004	Land sale approved
27/05/2005	The proposal withdrawn
2005	Discussions within the CUB to look at the possibilities of including a multi-purpose arena within the regeneration project for the University of Bordeaux campuses of Pessac-Talence-Gradignan.

The timeline in Table 5.1 outlines the creation of the ZAC des Quais in Floirac, which covered 43 hectares dedicated to housing and important for the thesis under a modification in 2001 when it included a multi-purpose arena. It also identifies the first attempt to build a venue that came from a private Spanish/French collaboration Victoriano Del Rio Cortes and Alain Lartigue both with experiences of organising bullfights or breeding bulls for this purpose. With the withdrawal of this proposal a year later, further discussions in the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole was focussed on the possibility of incorporating a new venue within the established University regeneration project. These key dates and actions are now discussed in greater depth to contextualise the first attempt to build the multi-purpose arena.

Floirac and the ZAC des Quais

Chapter 4 identified the distinct lack of a medium sized arena to attract national and international bands and performances. The inclusion of an arena in the ZAC

des Quais (Image 5.1) was the first step towards addressing the lack of this type of cultural facility, which other cities of similar status already had. The ZAC des Quais was included within several initiatives planned within the context of the Bordeaux Métropole 'grands projets urbain' and partly integrated into the Bordeaux Euratlantique (chapter 4). The redevelopment activity included La Salle de spectacles Bordeaux Métropole Arena de 11 000 spectateurs [referred to as an arena from now on], the redevelopment of the town centre of Floirac, a significant housing development and the creation of over 800 new jobs in a new business centre. The entirety of this redevelopment activity was based on the site of former cement works and soap factory both of which closed in the 1980s. The ZAC des Quais was originally approved in 1991 and subsequently modified formally in June 2001, November 2006, April 2015 and projected to be formally wound up in 2022.

Image 5.1 ZAC des Quais (orange section on the map)



Source: Bordeaux Métropole, 2015, n.pag.

A new bridge, the 'Simone-Veil' [formerly Jean-Jacques Bosc] bridge which is integral to the linking of the Left and Right bank of the Garonne and the logic of the integrity of the developments within the ZAC is still to be built, the new date for completion now being 2024. This is significant for the development of the commune, as the positioning of the arena, facing out towards the Garonne and

the new sixth road bridge across the Garonne provide the essential linkages with the Left and Right banks and ease of access to Floirac as well as the arena. The creation of the arena and associated public parking lot, within the ZAC des Quais, both of which are now completed and are the subject of this case study. In doing so it provides a narrative of the complex governance issues surrounding its development as well as the continued problems surrounding the non-completion of the bridge.

The first proposal for venue in Floirac - A bullring


In the early iterations of the programme for the ZAC des Quais a large public venue was listed without any clear indication of what that included. Following modifications from 2001 and 2005, formerly approved by the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole on 24 November 2006, the allocated space for an arena was confirmed. Therefore, whilst the application to build a bullring sits outside this confirmation it is useful to include as it highlights the governance and decision-making by the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole at that time.

To start the case study with a discussion of bullfighting arenas might appear odd but it is relevant to the first attempt to construct an arena. As noted above the preference of the ZAC des Quais was for a large public venue, so the application for a bullring fits with that description. Bordeaux has a history of bullfighting and until the 1970s continued to hold events at the Arenes du Bouscat located in the commune of Le Bouscat. The site has now been turned into an apartment block. Whilst bullfighting then went out of favour more generally in Bordeaux, it returned in 1988 where a temporary structure, 'Plaza de Goya' was erected in Floirac. Whilst there is no real evidence of why it returned in 1988 there are indications that the ability to 'draw big-name matadors' attracted audiences and hence it was a profitable proposition (Par, 2012, n.pag.). This structure which held an audience of 7,000, held events until 2006 amid many animal rights protests.

The timing would suggest that the first attempt to build a large public venue was motivated by the will to replace the temporary Plaza de Goya with a permanent structure. A Spanish/French collaboration Victoriano Del Rio Cortes (private Spanish Construction Company) and Alain Lartigue [a businessman known for organising bullfights in Spain and France] applied to the CUB/Bordeaux

Métropole to purchase l'îlot M1, a plot of 21 500 square metres within the ZAC (Image 5.2).

Image: 5.2: Plan of the ZAC des Quais



Source: Bordeaux Métropole, n.d., p. 6.

At the council meeting [Conseil Communauté/de Bordeaux Métropole] of 12 July 2004 it was announced that Messrs. Del Rio Cortes and Lartigues wished to create a multi-functional arena primarily for bullfighting (Lamaison, 2004). The arena with a capacity of 9-10,000 would accommodate 5-10 bullfighting shows per year. In addition, cultural and sporting events would be held throughout the year and whilst it mentioned that other organisations would be contacted there was no explanation of what these would be. With a planned investment of 8 million Euros it was indicated that 70-80% of the financing would be private. It was clear from the application that Del Rio Cortes, a famous bull breeder and his partner, were both heavily involved with organising bullfights.

It appeared from the decision that the majority of the council, including 'President Alain Juppé approved the sale and use of land with the exception of the Greens who voted against it' (Lamaison, 2004, p. 4). The top-down approach highlight that while network governance of the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole was in general agreement, there was no discussion on how a bullring

could conceivably have satisfied the proposal in the ZAC des Quais once the modification had been approved for an arena for popular music and events.

By May 2005 the proposal had been withdrawn. All that can be found as a reason for the project being pulled is reference to a hand delivered letter from Victoriano Del Rio Cortès and Alain Lartigue informing the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole of their wish to abandon the project. At the council meeting held on 27 May 2005 a report presented by Lacuey identified the developer's wish to cancel the project. The outcome from the meeting was to 'Decide to cancel deliberation n° 2004/0541 of July 12, 2004. The conclusions, put to the vote, are adopted unanimously' (Laucey, 2005, p. 2).

The possibility of incorporating the arena into another major regeneration project


Once the Cortès and Lartigue arena project failed, no further movement by the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole to seek alternative funding or possible private sector interest to take the arena project forward was noted for two years. However, the report 'Un grand équipement de spectacle vivant sur l'agglomération bordelaise : Données comparatives au plan national et local' [Towards the building of a live concert venue in the Bordeaux city region: Comparative Issues for the National and Local Plan] undertaken in 2007 by a'urba outlined that reviews had taken place in 2005 to look at the possibilities of including a multi-purpose arena within the regeneration project for the University of Bordeaux campuses of Pessac-Talence-Gradignan. According to participant A:

*This study is actually based on a first analysis carried out in 2005 ("The Potential to establish cultural venues and shows on the campus site and its surroundings. Summary report"), but there is only one version of the paper at the town planning agency.
(Participant A, Planning Officer)*

Without sight of the report it is difficult to ascertain if this was an additional project for an arena or a relocation of the arena from the Floirac site. What is known is that within the regeneration project for the University campuses a competition had been held to design public space with a music venue included in it. In the University of Bordeaux magazine 'le dossier Université et mobilité' (2005) the successful project, 'Campus et la mobilité' [Campus and mobility] designed by Tania Concko, architect, DS Landschaftsarchitekten, Landscape

designers, Viatic Technical advisors was outlined. This project included the possibility of 'un lien d'agitation – or amphitheatre (Le Dossier, 2005, p. 24). Image 5.3 outlines the potential open-air amphitheatre, which was one of the possible projects within the 'Le Project Campus'.

Image 5.3: Potential open-air amphitheatre



Source: Le Dossier, 2005, p. 25.

According to the Report (2007) 'discussions at the time showed that the university site was incompatible with the hosting of such urban facilities' (a'urba, 2007, p. 2). The limited public spaces around the campuses and the impact on the transport infrastructure was felt to be incompatible with the needs of an arena and hence was not taken forward within the regeneration project for the university. This was confirmed by Cartron in her paper presented at the council meeting where she declared that the 'the assumption was that it was not retained in the Campus Project' (Cartron, 2008, p. 2). This first phase gives a sense of the direction taken by the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole in what it would accept in terms of building an arena.

The private company wishing to build a bullring was accepted with little argument and whilst bullfighting continues in France, it is perhaps not more widely known. How the concept of an arena predominantly for bullfighting would affect the ability to attract national and international performers or the effect on

the Métropole's image is unclear. The work by PETA²² highlights the need for ethical treatment of animals and a belief in non-violence towards them. It is assumed that the sensitivities therefore, around animal exploitation and cruelty would impact on the reputation of international stars and hence they would refuse to play at a venue where bullfighting takes place. In terms of urban governance, the decision to undertake a study in order to see if an arena would fit within another regeneration project, namely the university, rather than seeking alternative funding for a project in Floirac was reflective of the attitudes towards the Right Bank (chapter 4).

PHASE 2: 2006-2012: PUBLIC OR PRIVATE FUNDED, ZENITH OR ARENA – TIME TO MAKE YOUR MIND UP!

Table 5.2: Timeline of the key dates for the second attempt at the arena

2007	European Capital of Culture (ECoC)
2008	Discussions by the CUB following feasibility reports which provided in-depth research on different types and locations
2008	A new venue and proposal for a Zénith appears
2008	Approval of SAS Montecristo Development (a joint framework of partners which included NFU and Bouwfornd MAB), for a commercial centre and arena
2009	Montecristo Development Project acquires land and permissions
2012	Failure of the Montecristo Development Project.

This second phase highlights the importance of the arena within the ECoC bid and draws out further the role of cultural governance in the decision-making process for the arena. In bringing together the application however, the decision-making was far from straight forward.

As Table 5.2 outlines instead of simply going ahead with the proposed arena located in the ZAC des Quais, a feasibility report was requested by the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole to ascertain other potential areas and whether a Zénith was a more appropriate form of development. This delayed the process for the development of an arena further and whilst the private company SAS Montecristo Development [referred to as SAS Montecristo] had put forward a proposal in 2007, its approval in 2008 was politically contentious. The following

²² The People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) Foundation is a UK-based charity dedicated to establishing and protecting the rights of all animals.

investigates the governance surrounding the decision-making process, which saw resistance from some of the mayors in the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole who were politically opposed to any private sector application. However, the evidence from the research demonstrated that they had little option but to approve it.

European Capital of Culture (ECoC)

The decision by CUB/Bordeaux Métropole to make an application to the ECoC 2013 provided the scope for broader discussions about cultural facilities across the Métropole. In doing so, it prompted the investigation into the different types of venues and whether an arena or a Zénith was more appropriate. The debates within the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole around the governance of political decision-making highlighted disagreements between the mayors. The powerful voices of Alain Juppé, Mayor of Bordeaux and Bernard Seurot, Mayor of Bruges supported a Zénith style venue rather than an arena and at different locations. This was met however, with direct opposition by Conchia Lacuey, Mayor of Floirac who supported the ZAC des Quais and the development of arena in her commune.

Whilst the political disagreements about the multi-purpose venue continued throughout 2007 and 2008, what was agreed was that 'Bordeaux suffers today from the comparison with French conurbations of a comparable size' (a'urba, 2007, p. 5). Emphasising that with the number of French cities bidding for the ECoC, several perceived as being in direct competition with Bordeaux (Table 5.3), the lack of a substantial multi-purpose indoor music venue was seen as a disadvantage. Since all other cities bidding having suitable venues to attract internationally renowned bands and events, Bordeaux had to take action. The lack of the cultural facility had according to an article in AQUI by Nicholas Cesar (2008) been in discussion for at least 10 years and yet remained one of the larger cities in France without one. Whilst artistes could use the Patinoire de Mériadeck (Skating Rink) the adaptability for change of use from ice rink to music venue proved problematic along with its poor acoustics, thus providing further evidence of the need for a dedicated space for popular music and events.

The unsuitability of the Ice Rick was identified by participant E who explained that:

*Since January 1982, the great performance hall in Bordeaux has been... an ice rink. The sports venue was used for 35 years to host concerts with a capacity of 7,000 people, but in unsuitable technical conditions, despite regular improving acoustics.
(Participant E, Journalist)*

The application to the ECoC therefore, gave further impetus to the decision-making of the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole in that without an arena the application had limited chance of being successful (Par, 2008).

Table 5.3: Cities bidding for European Capital of Culture with a Zénith /Arena

City	Perceived Direct Competition for Bordeaux	Zénith or Arena
Amiens	No	Zénith Amiens Métropole
Lyon	Yes	Tony Hall Garnier
Marseille	Yes	Le Dome de Marseille
Nice	Yes	Palais Nikaia
Saint-Etienne	Yes	Zénith de Saint-Etienne
Strasbourg	No	Zénith Europe de Strasbourg
Toulouse	Yes	Zénith de Toulouse

Source: Par, 2012, n.pag.

The frustration over the lack of progress of the arena by the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole became apparent in an article that appeared in the regional newspaper *Sud Ouest* titled 'Monte Cristo à Floirac' (Sud Ouest, 2007, n.pag.). The Mayor of Floirac, Conchia Lacuey made pointed remarks about how the arena project should be treated equally with two other Bordeaux projects that had received support from the CUB/ Bordeaux Métropole and CDEC²³ and suggested 'Alain Juppé should be more ambitious, even when certain projects do not concern his city' (Sud Ouest, 2007, p.3).

This highlighted that tensions remained between the Left and Right banks and also with the Mayor of Bordeaux. Whilst SAS Montecristo had put in an official application to build the arena and Laucey appeared confident that the proposal

²³ La Commission Départementale d'Amenagement Commercial (CDAC formerly a Commission départementale d'Equipement Commercial (CDEC) Town Planning.

would be passed before the summer of 2007 there was no official approval. The ZAC des Quais had indicated that the arena would be part of a commercial development, with the possibility of private sector investment. However, in an article published by the online daily newspaper *20 minutes*²⁴ on 27 September 2007, Alain Juppé declared 'I don't think a new 50,000 m² shopping centre would be a good thing' (Arrivé, 2007, n.pag.). The investment for the development of the arena remained a point of contention. Within the same article Juppé, while acknowledging that the 12,000 capacity could be expensive, argued that the finance should be found from public purse rather than relying on the sale of commercial space. This was in direct contrast to the promoters of SAS Montecristo who believed entirely private funding and ticket sales to finance the project was the right approach. One such promoter Benjamin Delaux of *Nouvelles Fonctions Urbaines*, rejected Juppé's claims 'I don't have to take into account Alain Juppé's intentions. We have made a proposal and it will be debated' (Arrivé, 2007, n.pag.).

Further tensions came to a head for the SAS Montecristo project when the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole decided in October 2007 to suspend all projects that had a commercial space over 20,000 m² for two years. The rationale for the decision made by the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole was that 'it considers itself to be overcrowded' in terms of commercial density (Jayat, 2007, n.pag.). The timing could not have been worse for the proposed project given it came a few days after Bouwfonds Mab had submitted their SAS Montecristo project to the prefecture of the Gironde. Given the project was based on covering the cost of the arena by selling private commercial space, the reduction from 50,000m² to 20,000m² was problematic. The continued indecision by the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole on this project would rumble on with no firm decision taken until the summer 2008.

With the emphasis placed on the ECoC, Bron [council representative] presented a paper at the council meeting of 21 September 2007 which highlighted the economic benefits to other cities that had been awarded the ECoC status, such as Lille in 2004. The significant regeneration projects undertaken in the 1990s and 2000s, and improvements of the urban environment, along with internal and

²⁴ 20 minutes French newspaper, the third largest regional daily in France in terms of circulation. Several editions based on the key cities of France. Politically neutral.

external transportation (chapter 4) placed Bordeaux in a strong position to compete with the other French cities. However, the one regeneration project which had been agreed in 2000, the arena at Floirac, and that would enhance the bid, had still to be started. At the council meeting of 21 September 2007, the call to put forward a bid and a preparation budget of 120,000 euros (divided between the four partners) was unanimously approved. The bid, a partnership between the city of Bordeaux, the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole, the General Council and the Regional Council, aimed to put forward:

An ambitious and unifying project at the local level but [which] must also go beyond the borders of the territories: the city of Bordeaux thus intends to involve in the event the whole of the regional territory enlarged to the euro - Franco-Spanish region'
(Bron, 2007, p. 2)

The geographic reach of the bid emphasised the network governance this collaboration encompassed, with local and regional stakeholders along with increasing links across Europe but particularly with its Spanish neighbour. Playing on the importance of the potential boosterism for the city, with the ability to merge the historical and heritage dimensions with the more contemporary forms of culture, the paper suggested that the bid should go further than traditional cultural activities. In addition to an arena, the bid also included access to creativity for the whole population through events, street art and festivals, which would take place across the Métropole. The inclusion of a diversity of events suggested a general acceptance of popular culture. For such an ambitious project Bordeaux's budget for the preparation of the bid was the lowest of the other southern cities (Them and Cendrès, 2007). There is no evidence to suggest that the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole was aware of the budgets proposed by other cities. However, as Table 5.4 outlines Bordeaux, whilst in agreement to put forward an application to the ECoC, proposed a much lower budget than other cities of similar status. The importance placed on the bid given the limited budget could be called into question.

Table 5.4: Budget for ECoC preparation bid

Bordeaux	Lyon	Marseille	Nice	Saint-Etienne	Toulouse
120 000	300 000	Not/available	650 000	450 000	1 200 000

Source: Them and Cendrès, 2007, n.pag.

With potentially 60 million euros of investment at stake for the successful city, as well as being a catalyst for future investment, as seen in Marseille (2013) and Liverpool (2008) with a mixture of public, EU and private investments, it might appear counterproductive to alienate cultural organisations in the bidding process. Yet in the year that the European Jury reviewed the strengths and weaknesses of the bid, Bordeaux chose to close its oldest cinema 'Jean-Vigo' due to a lack of funding, was accused of a lack of inclusivity by cultural organisations such as Soho Music and was embroiled in an argument with 'saxophonist Jean-Jacques' who claimed to be a victim of ostracism and plagiarism' (Courtois, 2008, n.pag.). These claims made in a newspaper article for *Le Monde* by Courtois received a somewhat generic response by 'The Bordeaux 2013 Association indicated that nothing is set in stone. Some projects will be integrated afterwards, we can assure you' (Courtois, 2008, n.pag.). The lack of network governance surrounding communication or collaboration with existing cultural organisations also led to the perception that the project leadership had its own agenda.

On the 19 December 2007 the French and European Jury held a pre-selection meeting to choose which cities would go forward to the ECoC. According to Bron 'success in this first stage was in recognition of the proliferation of culture of Bordeaux, its agglomeration and its region' (2008, p. 2). With Bordeaux now formally a candidate, Vincent Feltesse, president of the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole, at a council meeting in January 2008 asked for the approval of the legal status of the new association « I3ORDEAUX 2013 », support for the candidate for the ECoC and any associated documentation. All points were unanimously approved (Feltesse, 2008, p. 2). In February 2008 an additional 780,000 euros were requested for the completion of the bid (22/02/08).

From a Zénith (public funding) to an Arena (private funding)

The requirement for an arena was in response to some of the challenges faced by Bordeaux in the ECoC bid, the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole however, remained reluctant to pursue the application of the SAS Montecritso project in Floirac. Instead the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole requested a feasibility study to review the cultural facilities across the Métropole and the merits of a Zénith (public funding) or an arena (private funding). The outcome of this study would identify eight possible locations, as well as revealing the criteria for Zénith or arena, thus

adding a further complexity for a final decision to be made on what would be built and where.

The study in 2007 'Un grand équipement de spectacle vivant sur l'agglomération bordelaise : Données comparatives au plan national et local' by a'urba, investigated the two following concepts:

Hypothesis 1: A regional beacon venue linked to the Zénith style with a capacity of 9,000 seats.


Hypothesis 2: A national beacon venue belonging to the European Arenas Associations label with a maximum capacity of 12,000 seats. (a'urba 2007, p. 19)

These two concepts allowed a comparison at the regional and national level and the impact of the different types of venues and capacities in terms of profitability, competition and cultural image for the Métropole. According to participant G,

'the typical size of audiences for French bands are between 4-5,000'
(Participant G, Consultant)

This made the Zénith a suitable sized venue if the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole wished to attract predominantly French artistes. The concerns over the type of investment for the arena public, private or a mixture of both was highlighted in the report by the different venues. The Zénith would be publicly funding whereas, the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole could continue with the interest from the private sector. The Zénith was favoured across the south west of France as indicated by Image 5.4 and therefore, a tried and tested model.

Image 5.4: Location of Zéniths across the South-West region



Source: Darfay and Mathurin, 2008, p. 2.


The disadvantage of building a Zénith would be competition from other cities to attract major bands and events, whereas an arena with a larger capacity had less competition given the limited size of these other venues across the region. The prospect of the larger venue could also attract international events meaning that Bordeaux could become one of the cities along with Paris, Lyon and Toulouse able to accommodate mega-events. Joining the European Arena Association²⁵ (EAA) would also provide easier access to major international tours, as the EAA would become partly responsible for the management and delivery of the programme. Currently only the Accord Hotel Arena in Paris is represented by the EAA; Bordeaux would thus potentially be in prime position to attract international events and tours.

The report revealed a high proportion of concert audiences travelled by car and the venues were located near to motorways or intersections, rather than in city centres. Therefore, the location of the arena would need to sit within an efficient

²⁵ The EAA represent members across Europe that operate some of the world's most cutting edge venues, hosting programmes with artistes, productions, sports and corporate events.

transport infrastructure and access to car parking. Eight potential sites were chosen which tested the viability as a venue site (Image 5.5).

Image 5.5: Potential sites across Bordeaux Métropole



Source: a'urba, 2007, p.17.

In terms of regeneration Floirac was the only site that already had the development of an arena within its Plan Local d'Urbanisme (PLU) and incorporated within the ZAC des Quais (Table 5.5). All the other sites would need to apply for planning permission and changes to the PLU, leading to delays in potential construction and extending the development timescale out of phase with the ECoC bid.

Table 5.5: Potential sites for a Zénith or Arena

Site	Planning permission
Bordeaux-Lac	Possible although site constrained. No planning permission and need to adapt the PLU
Technoparc – Avenue de Magudas	Possible although site constrained. No planning permission and need to adapt the PLU
Merignac - Bioparc	Possible although site constrained. No planning permission and need to adapt the PLU
Pessac – La Crabette	Possible although site constrained and greater need to create appropriate infrastructure. No planning permission and need to adapt the PLU
Begles - Hourcade	Possible although site constrained. No planning permission and need to adapt the PLU
Bordeaux - Soferti	Possible although site constrained. No planning permission and need to adapt the PLU
Floirac – Les Quais	Construction guaranteed
Gattebourse	Possible although site constrained. No planning permission and need to adapt the PLU

Source: a'urba, 2007, p. 37

The report presented in-depth information concerning the eight sites, the different types of venues and costs but there is no conclusion and no recommendations. Ultimately, the report was a technical exercise with no clear recommendations; the steer for the most appropriate site was left to the political will of the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole. It became evident that the political challenges to the Floirac location, in particular, from Bernard Seurot, Mayor of Bruges had begun.

A new venue appears – Le Zénith


With the council meeting to be held on 18 July 2008 to discuss the multi-purpose venue imminent, Bernard Seurot, Mayor of Bruges made a surprise announcement at a press conference on the 4 July 2008. The Sud Ouest reported that 'the Mayor of Bruges, Bernard Seurot, will create a sensation this lunchtime. He is holding a press conference to announce his city's candidacy to host the future Zénith' in the communes of Bruges (Gilles, 2008, p. 9). He reflected that an arena in Floirac proposed by the SAS Montecristo was not suitable for the city. Access to the arena on the Right Bank was difficult and along with Alain Juppé, he doubted that the investment needed for the arena by offsetting it against the sale of the commercial space would come to fruition.

The second proposed location of Bordeaux-Lac also came under scrutiny and whilst close to the boundary of Bruges its size and access were deemed insufficient, particularly when according to Seurot there was a more appropriate 10 hectares site closer to the town. It was because of these concerns that 'he will today propose to welcome a Zénith project to his commune (Gilles, 2008, p. 9).

The three proposed sites, an Arena or Zénith

Whilst eight potential sites had been identified, by 2008 two had become the front-runners, the original site of 'Floirac' (Right Bank) supported by the Mayor of Floirac and Bordeaux-Lac (Left Bank) backed by the Mayor of Bordeaux. The additional site put forward by Seurot in the commune of Bruges (Left Bank) created competition between the three mayors until a final decision could be made (Image 5.6). Fundamentally this decision would be financial, the associated costs, particularly for a Zénith which had an estimated price tag of '40 million euros' that would be required from the public purse, as opposed to the more modest '15 to 17 million euros' of public money for the arena (Gilles, 2008a, p. 7).

Image 5.6: Proposed sites for the new multi-purpose venue, Arena or Zénith



Source: Sud Ouest, 2008, n.pag.

On the 18 July 2008 at the last meeting of the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole before the summer break the final decision on what to build was made. The challenges and tensions in the period before the meeting saw a last minute addition of a new venue, mayors in opposition and some elected officials declaring more time was needed. It is not surprising then that Sud Ouest reported that this would be 'President Vincent Feltesse's first big political debate since taking over from Alain Rousset' (Mathurin, 2008, p. 6). Whilst Feltesse and Juppé were 'on the same wavelength' in wanting a firm decision, they were in contrast supporting different venues and location and banks (Mathurin, 2008, p. 6). It was at this meeting where internal network governance saw a strong turnout of members (123 elected members of the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole present at the meeting) which demonstrated the sensitivity around this particular issue. Vincent Feltesse stipulated that the question of whether Bordeaux needed a multi-purpose permanent space was not for debate as this was already agreed and was part of the ECoC 2013 bid. The members were asked to vote on the location, type of venue and the existing privately funded project. The deliberations took over two and half hours, highlighting the highly politicised nature of the issue and decision-making.

The paper 'Salle de spectacles de grande capacité' based on information from the 2007 report, conference outcomes (2008) and a feasibility study for a Zénith undertaken by the Alphaville Company presented by Cartron (2008) discussed the viability of the three sites. It found that Bordeaux-Lac and the peninsula located in Bruges on the outskirts of the city would need fewer technical adaptations and, with a large car park nearby, could work. Yet the increased consolidation of a multi-purpose site (exhibition centre, convention centre, shopping centres) could cause additional traffic congestion from events held on the same day and would add significantly to the already agreed increased density of population. The Floirac site as identified within the ZAC des Quais already was a multifunctional regeneration project, with housing, shopping and leisure all included. Fundamentally this area was seen as an urban regeneration opportunity and the new bridge would strengthen the link between the two banks. Of the two types of venues discussed, the Zénith was found to be incompatible with the bid for the ECoC due the delay in finding funding, gaining planning permission and regulatory adaptation of the PLU.

The private SAS Montecristo project for an arena in Floirac had already received planning permission and was virtually ready to go. Taking this into account the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole had seven points to discuss and agree (Table 5.6).

Table 5.6: 7 points for discussion and approval

1	The budgetary constraints of the CUB
2	The candidacy of the Bordeaux European Capital of Culture which included the construction of a large performance hall
3	The potential of delay for the CUB to obtain cultural competence even if the prefect was will to transfer this responsibility
4	The potential of strengthen the urban development of the entire southern section of the Métropole, with the TGV service, Euratlantique project for Saint-Jean, Belcier Begles
5	The opportunity to further develop the ZAC des Quais in Floirac by increasing public parking which would be funded by Floirac once completed for 17 million euros
6	The circumvention of the moratorium by the promoters of the shopping centres which limits the space to less than 20,000m ² and therefore would not compete with existing local shops. A abundance of shops and not a traditional shopping centre would be created
7	The need to find other mechanisms in the future to maintain the objectives of commercial planning policy, on the one hand, by implementing appropriate regulations in urban planning documents (SCOT, PLU), whilst on the other hand, negotiating with private operators on the basis of collective interest in the development of new commercial space,

Source: Cartron, 2008, p. 4.

The report was direct in its interpretation of the facts but appeared to emphasise the regeneration opportunities of the Floirac project. The vote for whether a multi-purpose venue should be developed was re-approved by the majority. However, the voting for the type of venue and location was very close and so too was whether to adopt the private SAS Montecristo project (Table 5.7). The number of abstentions, including Alain Juppé and half of those on the Right demonstrated their opposition to a privately owned arena. The rationale for the abstentions was provided by Alain Juppé 'I did not want to take responsibility for derailing the project which had been in limbo for fifteen years' (Darfay and Mathurn, 2008, p. 2).

Table 5.7: Voting outcomes

Matter for approval	Outcome
Reaffirm the agreement of a multi-purpose venue in Bordeaux Métropole	Adopted by the Majority
Decide on the location of the Arena in Floirac within the ZAC des Quais	Adopted by the Majority 59 for 58 against 3 abstentions
Adopt the privately funded SAS Montecristo Développement project	Adopted by the Majority 45 for 37 against 30 abstentions

Source: Cartron, 2008, p. 6.

Fallout following the Decision

The council meeting had been contentious and only just had the majority to take forward the SAS Montecristo project in Floirac. As the decision was publicised it was met with a level of disappointment from prominent people such as Michel Goudard, Manager of cultural and entertainment companies across Bordeaux and the Southwest, Daniel Colling (president du CNV) and hostility from Alain Guichard, UMP, leader of the opposition in Floirac. Michel Goudard felt that too much emphasis had been put on a traditional sporting arena rather than a venue for quality music and events, which the Zénith would have provided.

*The 5th largest agglomeration in France has deprived itself of a quality performance hall in favour of sports space that will be transformed into a variety hall, including the capacities of 8,500 places including 1,500 with reduced visibility.
(Darfay and Mathrun, 2008, p. 3).*

Daniel Colling (president du CNV) agreed:

*I am disappointed with the decision of elected representatives of the Bordeaux agglomeration. The Zénith program was built by entertainment professionals with the government, and it bears the label of the Department of Culture.
(Darfay and Mathrun, 2008, p. 3).*

The comments are useful context for the thesis because it pointed to CUB/Bordeaux Métropole placing the emphasis on a sporting venue, which would then be adapted for concerts and events, rather than a dedicated space for popular music and events.

Despite the regeneration opportunities and expected financial benefits, which would accompany the development of the arena, Alain Guichard criticised the Mayor of Floirac who he claimed had not engaged the 'Floiracais' for their opinions. He went on to declare that a survey showed that out of '912 who took part, only 39% of the Floiracais were in favour of an Arena, against 61 % [for] a Zénith at Bordeaux-Lac or at Bruges' (Andrieux, 2008, p. 18). By September 2008 three appeals had been lodged with the Bordeaux Administrative Court against the development, 'l'Association Floirac Avenir' (headed by Alain Guichard), 'Aquitaine Alternatives' (an environmental group) and 'Floirac against the arena' (a collective headed by Claude Hermet, husband of another city councillor). The main objections appear to have been about the nuisance for those who lived near the proposed site and environmental impact of allowing the large commercial space as well as the arena development (Delneste, 2008, p. 8). There was nothing however, about the increased audiences which a sporting venue would bring.

Alain Guichard however, also made a much more political attack on the president of the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole, particularly denouncing 'the excess power of the President of the CUB Vincent Feltesse, the irregularities in the vote and its conditions, and the lack of skills of the community in the matter' (Monteil, 2008, p. 2). An attack that was unfounded. The response by Feltesse claimed that the 'July 2008 vote in three parts had been carried out correctly, and the development of the arena was an opportunity to regenerate the Right Bank and not just simply about the commercial space' (Delneste, 2008, p. 8). Whilst Bordeaux failed to become the ECoC in 2013, the cultural space for an arena remained within the ZAC des Quais and would continue.


The decision to approve the private firm SAS Montecristo and the location of the arena in Floirac was always going to be contentious given the political party disagreements. The fact that the proposal had been on the table since summer of 2007, and was still not approved, suggests that the issues surrounding the commercial space required by the proposal and its being totally privately funded project remained problematic for the Right. However, in the absence of any other firm proposals and the limited timescale of ECoC bid, which included the requirement to develop a multi-purpose venue, the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole was basically left with little option. The influences of the mayors on the Left Bank had on this occasion failed to change the type and location of the arena.

Coming to terms with the arena in Floirac – SAS Montecristo Development

With a favourable vote by the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole in July 2008 (albeit very close), the next technical stages for the SAS Montecristo project, was to apply for full planning permission, purchase the site and gain approval at the department level from the Commission Départementale D'équipement Commercial (CDEC)²⁶. In an article in *Sud Ouest* 18 September 2008, Marc Vaquier, PDG of Bouwfonds MAB was interviewed about the arena project (Monteil, 2008) (Image 5.7). The proposed arena's internal design would have a front or central stage (Image 5.8) and would be able to accommodate various configurations (from 1900 seats to 15,000 seats) from the small and intimate needs of solo artists through to large sporting events for handball, basketball or motocross. There was a level of reliance on other partners for the national programme of events such as Arena Events (a Spanish company managing arenas in Madrid), Gibert Coullier Productions (leading agent for French variety artists), Octagon (leader in sports events), a television channel and press groups. However, it was 'the fact of being a member of the European Arena Association [which] would strengthen the network' that would provide a greater access to international tours such as 'Elton John, The Lion King that other cities like Paris, London and Madrid attract' (Monteil, 2008, p. 8). With the objective of hosting '100 to 110' events per year it was suggested that the development would create around '420 jobs' and an additional '100 temporary' positions on event days (Monteil, 2008, p. 8). With a start date of summer 2010, the investment made by the company was 130 million Euros of which 17 million Euros would come from the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole for the building of a car park.

²⁶ Departmental Commission for Commercial Development.

Image 5.7: Grand Arena: External view of proposed arena



Source: Thierry, 2010, n.pag.

Image 5.8: Grand Arena: Internal view of proposed arena



Source: Thierry, 2010, n.pag.

Despite the continued political objections, it is clear from the article that SAS Montecristo wanted to progress without any further delays. According to a paper presented at the CUB meeting in January 2009, they had submitted a letter on 17 November 2008 outlining their proposal and asking for approval for the commercial site and planning permission. However, the two considerations for approval were not presented to the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole until its 16 January 2009 meeting.


At this meeting a paper presented by Bost (2009) outlined the criteria of the proposal (Table 5.8) and the actual space allocated within the ZAC (Image 5.9), which required approval, by the committee. This would allow SAS Montecristo to obtain the commercial and building permits required to achieve their goal of opening the arena to the public in summer 2012.

Table 5.8: Specified aspects of the SAS Montecristo Arena and Commercial proposal

15,000 capacity	Arena
20,000 m2	Commercial Centre (housing furniture and home decoration type shops)
8,000	Retail space related to the Arena (cultural, leisure and sport)
1,500	Retail space for local shops linked to housing within ZAC – some of which will be built within the proposed project
2,000	Car Parking (belonging to the CUB)

Source: Bost, 2009, p. 3.

Image 5.9: SAS Montecristo Development Proposed space for Arena and Commercial space (M1-2 and J)



Source: Bost, 2009, p. 4.

The vote in July 2009 was again close, particularly given that 41 members abstained (Table 5.9). Even so there was a majority and hence the authorisation was given.

Table 5.9: Outcome of voting from the CUB meeting 16 January 2009

For	47
Against	23
Abstentions	41
Did not take part	8

Source: Bost, 2009, p. 3.

With the green light to go ahead, it was now for SAS Montecristo to finalise their proposals and apply for the building and commercial permits to allow them to start construction. This included the purchase of the land at '8,000,000 euros (excluding VAT)' (Bost, 2009a, p. 3) and the approval of the building permit by the Mayor of Floirac. Whilst the project for the arena had been highly political, by the end of 2009 with all legal approvals in place and the opportunity to oppose the development through any lawsuits had passed, Bordeaux was now ready finally to get its arena. This was reflected in the article '*Grand Arena: enfin un Bercy a Bordeaux*' [Grand Arena: finally, an Arena at Bordeaux] which indicated that the building of the arena was due to start in spring of 2011, and the three decade wait was finally over (Delneste, 2010, p.1). However, by June of 2011 the sale of the commercial space was in doubt and by February of 2012, SAS Montecristo had informed the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole that they were unable to market 40% of the retail space which would allow the start of construction (Cartron, 2012). Therefore, according to participant E:

the penultimate element of the project which envisioned a large shopping centre around the arena, failed because the commercial space could not be sold.
(Participant E, Journalist)

This was further evidenced by participant B:

a project led by a private group (arena + shopping center) was not successful for economic reasons, the project leader not having sold enough commercial spaces to balance its operation'
(Participant B, Project Manager)

Reflecting on the decision in 2008 to permit SAS Montecristo to build the arena and a commercial centre, Vincent Feltesse declared that 'it was a gamble, and we did not win it' (Lherm, 2012, p. 1). Given the failure of the project compounded by the effects of financial crisis 2008, the finalisation of the land purchase due to take place on 3 February 2012 was stopped. This left the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole retaining ownership of the land and they pointedly

made it clear that ‘there is no longer a link between SAS Montecristo Development and the CUB’ (Lherm, 2012, p. 1). This was a political blow for Feltesse, given that he was instrumental in the final decision-making process to approve this project. He was keen to stress however, that whilst this was disappointing, the arena project was not buried.

The SAS Montecristo project had caused a great deal of political debate and argument over its approval. Whilst the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole was content to sell the land, the choice of a private company to invest in its development was an attempt to safeguard the public purse. The project had been in process for three and half years and when the decision to finally approve it in 2008 came it was in the midst of a global financial crisis. Any ambitious project reliant on selling commercial space in this environment was clearly going to be difficult to achieve. Even though the commercial space was reduced to 20,000 m² the fact that there was still 40% of the available retail footprint unsold before starting on the build reflects the difficulties. With no arena and the land now reverting to the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole, decisions on whether an arena should be built was the next priority for Vincent Feltesse.

PHASE 3: 2012-2014: AFTER FAILURE COMES SUCCESS, DECISION TO CONTINUE THE ARENA PROJECT

Table 5.10: Timetable of key dates and actions for the new proposed arena

13/07/2012	The concession of public work, public contract and legal assembly retained.
25/03/2013	3 out of 5 candidates are retained for the construction and management of the arena
16/07/2013	Vincent Feltesse president de CUB/Bordeaux Métropole received three offers for construction and operation of the arena: Lagardère Unlimited, Vega and 4A architects.
16/04/2014	Le contract de concession’ signed with CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and SAS (group Lagardère) for 20 years (operators for 20 years). After this date the arena become publically owned.
25/09/2014	Alain Juppe, Mayor CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and Jerome Langlet president of Lagardère Unlimited sign an agreement to build the arena.

The third phase outlines the decisions made by the CUB/Métropole following the failure of the private company project. Table 5.10 demonstrates the speed at which the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole moved once the basic principles for the development of the arena and venue type and location had been agreed. The

move from a privately to a publicly funded project was indicative of the discussions that had been held prior to the approval of the failed private company project. However, the confirmation of an arena rather than a Zénith confirmed the needs of Bordeaux to expand its attractiveness internationally rather than only to its domestic market.

Following the termination of the private arena project, the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole had a decision to make on what action to take next. According to a report presented by Cartron at the council meeting on 13 July 2012, the Bureau communautaire²⁷ had been asked in February 2012 to examine the position after the failure of the SAS Montecristo project and make recommendations on an appropriate course of action. The initial consensus was that the development of an arena should go ahead and a 'un groupe de travail' [a working group] headed by Françoise Cartron was created to advise the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole on the necessary requirements. The decision to continue the arena project encouraged collaboration between Conchita Lacuey (PS) Mayor of Floirac, Alain Cazabonne (Extreme Droit), and Max Guichard (Communist) who all agreed that the arena was an 'an important element in rebalancing the left bank-right bank – the Arena must stay in Floirac' (Sota, 2012, p. 1).

Whilst the feasibility reports of 2007²⁸ and 2008²⁹ had provided in-depth research on the potential impacts of an arena, le group de travail required additional information. By extending discussions with relevant people within the entertainment sector and reviewing comparative studies from other cities a clearer vision for the arena was compiled. The findings presented at the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole meeting on 13 July 2012, confirmed that the benefits of hosting the arena in Floirac were an important part of the regeneration of the area, and would 'make an exceptional contribution to the regeneration of the river, constitutes a new facility, a step further south in relation to a future pole of cultural and creative economy' (Cartron, 2012, p. 5). As part of the ZAC des Quais and PLU, the improved transportation networks, such as being close to the Saint Jean Train Station, having easy access to the ring road and with the approved Simone-Veil bridge linking the Left and Right bank, access to the

²⁷ A community office, made up of a number of mayors is part of the public inter-municipal co-operation of the CUB.

²⁸ Un grand équipement de spectacle vivant sur l'agglomération bordelaise (a'urba 2007).

²⁹ Etude de faisabilité et d'implantation d'une salle de spectacle de grande capacité sur la commune urbaine de Bordeaux, (Alphville, 2008).

arena would become easier.

This time there appeared to be little resistance to the proposed site, but it was clear is that a private initiative would not be considered given the recent failure of the private sector to deliver. The CUB/Bordeaux Métropole had several decisions to make based on the findings. These included:

- The location quai de la Souys, Floirac, land space allocation 127 îlot M1 – 25 000m²
- 10,000 capacity
- To assure the greatest flexibility, the venue needed to accommodate popular concerts and events which would be the largest users but also had to be appropriate to large sporting events. A selection competition therefore, should include the different shaped venues, for example centre stage, a U shaped venue or one with a frontal stage as well as cost effectiveness
- The construction and operation of the venue would be private and under the “concession de travaux public” [public works concession]
- Limit the CUB investment to 35-40 million euros excluding tax and the cost of developing appropriate car parking.
- The president would notify all mayors of the 27 communes of the discussions to ensure their agreement.

(Cartron, 2012, p. 9).

These points were all adopted at the council meeting of on 13 July 2012. There was a clear indication that network governance was important to the decision-making for the arena project and particularly in considering the public funding necessary. The focus had returned to the bringing the arena within the regeneration programme of the ZAC des Quais as participant B reflected:

*The arena facility will be located within the ZAC des Quais (Floirac) development
(Participant B, Project Manager)*

By October 2012, the Préfecture de Gironde (department level) had indicated their approval for the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole ‘to create and operate a 10,000 capacity large venue for events, located within the ZAC des Quais (Cartron, 2012a, p. 2). The reduction in size from the original failed private proposal of 15,000 to the suggested 10,000 capacity and a review of parking spaces now

achieved the regeneration objectives of the ZAC des Quais. The Mayor of Floirac and the Commune, now much more involved in the decision-making, welcomed the reduction in size of the arena along with a greater emphasis in the use of public transport. To ensure the Métropole had sufficient time to review, comment and object to the arena project, a consultation process in line with the law 'L.121-16 du Code de l'Environnement',³⁰ was implemented.

At the council meeting held 21 December 2012, Cartron presented a paper and working document which outlined the procedures compliant with the appropriate laws and regulations, with which to launch the competition to find a company to develop and operate the arena and the specifications. As the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole had agreed in July 2012 that it would not engage a private company to provide investment and develop the arena, a 'public works concession' scheme was put in place. This meant that the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole retained oversight of the development and would provide the majority of the construction costs through public funding. The private company would however provide some investment, but on a much smaller scale. It would be responsible financially for the design, project management of the whole construction and the running of the arena on completion. The CUB/Bordeaux Métropole would sign over a lease agreement for a specified term, which in this case was 20 years. The company would recoup their investment through the charges related to the operating of the arena, additional services to improve the venues use and where applicable the integrated parking revenue. The benefit to the CUB/ Bordeaux Métropole was that it would own the arena, but not have any of the potential financial risks or problems related to its development and operation until the end of the lease.

Location approved but still indecision on design

At this stage the location was agreed but the actual design was still undecided. There was a slight contradiction in the specifications for the arena. It needed to be durable and have flexibility ensuring good visual seating and acoustics to benefit popular music and a diversity of events such as dance, opera and circus shows. Yet it also needed to be able to accommodate national and international sporting events. However, without a resident sports team it was clear that

³⁰ Environmental Code L121-16 outlines the process for public consultation available from <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/>.

additional space or technical equipment necessary (reception rooms, media rooms, spectator boxes) for these types of events should be kept to a minimum. The venue therefore needed to accommodate a wide range of cultural events but also be capable of accommodating the requirements of European level sporting events such as handball. The emphasis of a specially designed venue for popular music and events but with adaptability to accommodate major sporting events lends itself to the definition of the dedicated space (Kronenburg, 2011). The adaptability of the use of the arena and the potential to attract international artists is perhaps a reason why the Zénith label was no longer in discussion.

According to participant C

The Bordeaux métropole wanted a venue geared towards shows, but with the capacity to host indoor sporting events, such as Handball. The Zénith specifications could not be adapted to this need, a tailor-made room was required.
(Participant C, Head of Services)

Participant B simply stated:

This is an arena not a Zénith. The Zénith label requires strict criteria
(Participant B, Project Manager)

Whilst the Zénith label has national recognition and had initially been supported by the mayors of Bruges and Bordeaux, the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole required a flexible venue to meet the needs of the Métropole and Region. Participant C acknowledged the restrictive nature of the Zénith.

Standardization was not the aim of this project. The characteristics for the type of venue and expected uses was too specific
(Participant C, Head of Services)

Given that this was the first arena to be developed for popular music and events, as well as some sporting events in Bordeaux, the Zénith, whilst a popular choice in other cities, could not achieve the broad reach required by the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole. The Zénith however, was a particular choice for a city to make and provided a network of venues across France. Participant D noted this when discussing other cities:

*It was the choice of the City of Strasbourg
(Participant D, Manager)*

Participant G also felt that the Zénith in Nantes which is bigger in population size than Bordeaux

*worked the best in France and was dynamic in terms of culture
(Participant G, Consultant)*

With the decision made for an arena the 'Grande salle de spectacles orientations pour le programme de la salle' working document (Annex 11) outlined the specifications of the arena.

As well as the location and its uses, which have already been discussed, there was a clear steer by the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole that the arena was a landmark on the urban landscape and, in particular, was seen from the Left Bank. The CUB/Bordeaux Métropole was looking for a strong architectural vision which was 'ambitieuse ou audacieuse' [ambitious or daring] (Cartron, 2012, p.1), elevating it to a flagship building for the Métropole. This architectural statement however, had to be kept under control financially and any additional costs would be unacceptable for the local authority and potential applicants. The arena had to achieve excellent environmental performance externally and internally and be accessible but be cost effective at the same time. The Working Document provided the specification, which was used as a basis for the consultation of potential candidates within the 'concession de travaux publics – public works concession'.

A new timetable (2013-2017) was agreed and implemented that outlined the decision-making process for the selection of the candidates to build and operate the arena. On the 4 January 2013 a call for tenders for the design, construction and operator was launched for arena project. The result from the call for applicants saw that out of five, three were shortlisted. The small number of applicants was seen as a success for the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole as Feltesse expressed that:

A year later, the CUB can boast about having bounced back fairly quickly with three candidate groups for the design, build and operation of a 8 – 10,000 capacity arena (with a 20 years lease) dedicated primarily to shows but also able to host occasional sporting events (Deneste, 2013, p. 6).

The three tenders submitted to the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole, were Ricciotti-Bouyues-Lagardere (49.3 M Euros), the Fayat/Axel Vega/Cabannes and Stark (48M Euros) and Michel Petuaud-Letang/Claude Camus/Canal Events (40M Euros). Feltesse on the advice of Public Works Concession Commission (Advisory Commission) engaged the Ricciotti-Bouyues-Lagardere trio although it was the most expensive of the three. The key reasons for making this decision related to the quality of the aesthetics, which were sober, beautiful and elegant, and its visibility across the Métropole (Lherm and Sota, 2013).

According to Cartron (2014) Ricciotti offered the best design based on three criteria; a) the architectural, functionality of the building and environmental quality; b) the quality and credibility of the legal and financial package including the price and c) the consistency and quality of the operating project. The tender also outlined a programming schedule which proposed 118 events in the first year consisting of 112 music shows/variety and six sports events. The proposal also stood out by taking a political stance indicating that a high level of attention had been given to the general public, local cultural structures and artists. It also promised to donate 1% of the annual turnover to local cultural or sports projects (Lherm and Sota, 2013). The choice of Ricciotti however came when he was one of the most popular architects of the time, 'la coqueluche des grands donneurs d'ordres' – darling of the building/construction industry, as well as being 'bankable' given his reputation for attracting tourists and media articles providing a level of boosterism and raising the profile for the CUB/ Bordeaux Métropole (Lherm and Sota, 2013). Ricciotti's designs pay homage to the use of concrete which he manages to elevate such as in his previous projects the MuCEM (Museum of European and Mediterranean Civilisations) in Marseille, the Jean Bouin Stadium in Paris and the Jean Cocteau Museum in Menton (Ricciotti, n.d.).

Despite the lengthy time taken with the initial SAS Montecristo Development project, which eventually failed, the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole had acted with a level of urgency to retain and progress this new version of arena project. Once the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole had approved the public funding available and the

public concession of 20 years, the actual time taken to appoint a new team was within a three-year period (from 2013 to 2014). Whilst the consultation process that closed in January 2014 had identified some concerns, such as ‘visibility, the cost to the public and noise pollution, a paper presented by Cartron assured the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole that all these had been within the original criteria and hence were not serious issues (2014, p.3). With no objections a year later, the Group had obtained the necessary legal approvals and signed contracts to allow construction to commence.

PHASE 4: 2014-2018: FINALLY AN ARENA FOR FLOIRAC

Table 5.11: Timeline of the key dates and actions

16/04/2014	Contract signed between the CUB and Lagardère Unlimited
17/07/2015	Building permit approved
11/04/2016	First stone laid
23/04/2016	French Handball Federation did not select the Arena for competition due to a mismatch between the teams and specifications of an international competition
May 2016	Rudy Ricciotti was asked to design the car park adjacent to the arena. Car park owned by Bordeaux Métropole Arena (renamed Arkea Arena) and Parcub.
7/11/2016	Car park – 5 levels – 962 spaces
March 2017	80% of the arena built
September 2017	Problems with acoustics – false ceilings and treatment and sound insulations – Christian Malourt brought in (had done the acoustics in Zénith in Pau, Toulouse, Nice and Arenas in Chartres and Blois)
11/12/2017	Arena built
10/01/2018	New public transport infrastructure to service the arena ‘Comment se rendre à arena’
24/01/2018	Dépêche Mode inaugural concert

The last phase outlines the key dates, which saw the arena finally constructed and opened for business. As table 5.11 indicates the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole decision to build an arena lacked the specifications to host the International Handball competition. This was a disappointment for the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole, particularly as the arena was a cultural facility to compete with other venues in France. The choice however, of an international British band to open the arena was intriguing. Participant E outlined the rationale as follows:

For the opening, Lagardère really wanted an international group, known the world over. A French group or artist would have been less expletive amazing!
(Participant E, Journalist)

With all the approvals needed the arena project could start in earnest. According to Delneste 'Vincent Feltesse signed his last administrative act as president of the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole, his first contract for the province between Jérôme Langlet, managing director of Lagardère Unlimited' (2014, n.pag.). Now officially signed on 16 April 2014 and the permit to build obtained in 17 July 2015, the arena project was launched with the first stone being laid on 11 April 2016. However, five months after the signing of the contract Alain Juppé, the new president of the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole also felt compelled 'to sign the agreement on behalf of the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and Lagardère' (Delneste, 2014a, p. 1). This was the act of a mayor and president who wanted to ensure he remained influential throughout the building process and at its opening. The article also indicated that the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole would invest 77 million euros (58.1 million euros for construction and 14.9 million euros for car and truck parking and 3.9 million euros additional costs) which is a lot higher than originally planned (Delneste, 2014a, p. 1). By the end of the construction in 2017 this budget had again increased.

Agnes Versepuy presented a paper that included several annexes at the council meeting held on 21 October 2016. The paper and annexes outlined amendments required to the construction of the arena along with images of the design and project plan (Annex 12). The shape of the arena was confirmed as a fan shaped seating arrangement with a frontal stage, which had the flexibility to be configured to a more central position in order to adapt to the needs of individual events. It is very similar in shape to the Zénith style arenas rather than the conventional oval style favoured by sports. Whilst the emphasis for the arena was on popular music and events to raise the Métropole's international status a bid for the Women's Euro 2018 handball competition (two years before opening) was submitted but was unsuccessful. According to Marjoire Michel (2016), journalist for Sud Ouest it was the configuration of the arena that was inadequate for the international competition.

Completion of the arena

The third attempt to build an arena appeared to progress without the disputes or political opposition which had disrupted the earlier attempts. In December 2017 the arena project was completed. Juppé's insistence that the arena should be publically funded had come to fruition and in his capacity of mayor of Bordeaux and President of the CUB/ Bordeaux Métropole, he was now fully supportive of the arena. The total investment by CUB/Bordeaux Métropole for the arena was 84 million (9 million euros Parking and 75 million euros arena and fittings). Within the total cost of the development 'the construction came to 62million euros of which two thirds was funded by CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and one third by Lagardere' (Delneste, 2017, p. 1). The lease agreement came into effect as the new major cultural facility location on the Right Bank in Floirac was handed over to SAS Senso to manage and operate for 20 years as part of the 'concession travaux public' contract. After that time, it will revert to Bordeaux Métropole, although there is no clarity about what that means for the future of the arena.

The architectural brief was to create an iconic flagship statement, which was ambitious or daring and could be seen from the Left Bank. The need for it to be seen from the Left Bank indicated that the more affluent communes wanted to retain some of the glory that came from the major flagship building even though it was located on the Right Bank. In an article by *Chroniques d'architecture* (2019) the scale of the arena design was described as spectacular and furthermore easily identified from afar which meant that the brief to be visible had been met. The choice of Rudy Ricciotti as architect for the project was, according to Amaury Giraud of *Le Figaro* 'The man ... unanimously recognized as one of the great builders of his time, like Jean Nouvel or Frank Gehry' (2018, n.pag.). In an interview for France 3 (2018) Ricciotti highlighted three key aspects when talking about the project; a) working in Bordeaux was a pleasure and in his opinion the mayor (Juppé) and the city was the best in France, b) the design had to be something that Bordeaux Métropole would be proud of and c) the materials and resources had to be sourced locally. Whilst ambitious in scale and shape the building was not to be seen as a 'bling bling thing', something purely for show which had no connection with the surroundings (Giraud, 2018). Ricciotti described his concept as 'a gigantic pebble that would come out the Garonne and land elegantly on the shore' and therefore create a connection with Bordeaux Métropole and the site (Giraud, 2018, n.pag.).

The use of the poured concrete technique which saw casting on site using a custom-made wooden framework was to create the smooth, curved lines and compact surface with an external LED lighting system (Dupont, 2018). The shape of amphitheatre however posed problems for its construction as the double concrete curve which enveloped the whole building had to maintain the same shade of white throughout (Bougyues, n.d.). On the exterior the many windows which perforate the entire arena and illuminated with LEDs are according to Arédissian reminiscent of a 'digital equalizer' (2016, n.d.). A strength of the building however, is in its multi-use and in particular in the motorised system that can quickly and efficiently change the interior seating positioning (Bougyues, n.d.; Escolin, 2016a).

Whilst the mass of concrete guaranteed a level of acoustic insulation there was a significant amount of time taken on the technical acoustic aspects to ensure that the arena had minimal noise pollution (France 3, 2018). The soft landscaping of its surroundings also helped the arena fit within the regeneration ideology of the ZAC des Quais through creating an enjoyable public space (Chroniques d'architecture, 2019). The arena therefore has played an important part in the regeneration of this up and coming commune by developing a greater connection with the Métropole and the city of Bordeaux (Escolin, 2016a). This will be further enhanced once the bridge is completed in 2024 (Lherm, 2021). Ricciotti was also very keen to highlight the sustainability of the development by using local employment and materials which were sourced across the territory (France 3, 2018). For example, 80% of the work was carried out by enterprises based in the New Aquitaine region and the build also made use of recycled or reconditioned construction materials (Mapei, 2019).

Image 5.10: Arkea Arena from the Left Bank



Source: De Marcos Lousa (personal photograph 2020).

In terms of the arena's design however, according to participant F

it's beautiful, polished and closed pebble shape does not invite openness towards the neighbourhood and the city, unlike the Grand Théâtre de Bordeaux, when, at the time, the colonnade was on a level with the city to promote public engagement in the urban environment
(Participant F, Academic)

Other participants also picked up on the point made by participant F about the lack of openness. One participant felt it was a paradox as the arena was a part of regeneration project to enhance the quality of public life but unless there is a concert or show being held:

'It's dead infrastructure that adds nothing to the neighbourhood'
(Participant G, Consultant)

To these participants it was felt the arena was a territorial iconic structure and whilst a:

Beautiful object, for sure, but placed like a monolith, situated on the ground but not integrated with the city
(Participant F, Academic)

The arena then has a difficult remit, taking into consideration the views above the building needs to be much more open and accessible for public to use at all times. In the current climate this would be very difficult to do. The combination of the operators need for the arena to be financially viable and the required high level of security makes flexible opening less cost effective. Despite those

dissenting views, the completion of the arena has provided Floirac with a flagship building that will be known across Europe and internationally as touring bands and events are hosted, raising its profile not only for the Commune but for the Right Bank. However according to participant B:

*Even if the Arena is located in Floirac, a town which adjoins Bordeaux, people think that it is in Bordeaux
(Participant B, Project Manager)*

This comment reflects the fact that there remains a disconnect between the Left and Right banks made more difficult by the fact the Simone-Veil Bridge to link the two banks has still to be completed (Image 5.11). For those in Floirac who raised concerns about the arena due to a perceived loss of identity for the Commune as well as the nuisance created by the large influx of people, parking as well as traffic congestion on event days, their fears have been realised. Perhaps when the Simone-Veil Bridge, is completed it might create a better bond particularly with easier access and improved traffic management between the two sides. The opening of this bridge is, according to Michel in Sud Ouest 'déjà 8 ans de retard' [already 8 years late] (2019, n.pag.) but it should now be completed by 2024. Similar to the arena the bridge has also had many setbacks, beset with technical and financial disputes between CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and the Razel-Bec consortium. These problems resulted in the contract being terminated followed by a new call for tenders in 2019 (Cheminade, 2018).

Image 5.11: Proposed Simone-Veil Bridge



Source: Cheminade, 2018a, n.pag.

As with most large music venues sponsorship is common and from October 2018, the Arena became officially known as the Arkea Arena, sponsored by the Arkea Bank, part of the Credit Mutuel de Bretagne Group. The private sponsorship creates difficulties when attempting to link the arena to a specific cultural policy as according to participant G:

*the management and sponsorship is linked with profits not cultural policy and therefore nothing to do with local policy
(Participant G, Consultant).*

Throughout the decision-making by the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole for the arena and the official papers presented to the committee there has been little mention of cultural policy. The only indication that the arena was part of a wider cultural policy was when the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole was preparing an application to the ECoC.

Living up to expectations?

Since opening on 24 January 2018 with Depeche Mode's inaugural concert, the Arkea Arena has attracted a high number of music concerts and events, proving to be a popular venue for the Métropole and Region. As Stéphane Jonathan puts it in *Sud Ouest*, 'Bordeaux Métropole Arena is shaping up to be "the venue for the 21st Century' (2018, p. 5).

An overview report on the Arkea Arena presented by Versepuy to the council meeting 20 December 2019, highlighted that in the first year 'between January and December 2018, Arkea Arena hosted 70 events and more than 347,612 spectators, thus establishing itself as a showcase for performing arts in Europe and the most popular provincial arena in terms of attendance' (2019, p. 4). The projection for 2019 was an increase to 89 events and by June 2019, 50 events had been held with 292,163 spectators. Participants B and C echo these claims made in the report:

*The arena has been open for 2 years, spectators and artists are delighted with the acoustic quality of the hall, which allows it to be ranked first in the provinces in terms of attendance.
(Participant B, Project Manager).*

*In 2019, the Arena is the 1st venue in France in terms of attendance behind only Paris, for the 2nd year in a row.
(Participant C, Manager).*

The figures from the report and subsequent comments demonstrate that the long-awaited Arena was fulfilling the needs of the Bordeaux Métropole by becoming a popular music venue at the regional, national and International level. Whilst the early successes are clear, an article in *Sud Ouest*, published in June 2020, reported that the Largardère Group wanted to sell its entire entertainment division, which includes the Arkea Arena (two years into the 20-year concession period) (Rabiller, 2020). The reasons for such a sale are not clear. In normal circumstances the proposition to sell the operating contract would have been attractive to the major competitors, such as Fimalac Entertainment or Live Nation, but given the current difficult financial environment being experienced by the entertainment sectors it may be a while before any sale is completed. What impact this might have on the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole financially is not clear at this stage.

CONCLUSION

This Chapter has provided an in-depth analysis of the governance surrounding the decision-making adopted by the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole in developing a multi-purpose venue for popular music and events. In doing so it identified several factors which influenced the process, the impact of the top-down approach to decision-making, network governance in terms of developing urban and cultural-led regeneration and the use of the ECoC scheme as a potential stimulus to develop the arena. As the sixth largest urban agglomeration in France, it remained the only one without an appropriate venue to accommodate national and international popular music and events. This coupled with the desire to become recognised as a European city and be competitive with cities of a similar status such as Lyon, Marseille and Nice, made the lack of a cultural facility on the larger scale as a significant disadvantage.

The CUB/Bordeaux Métropole took a top-down approach throughout the process for the development of the arena. Governance was through CUB/Bordeaux Métropole, the intercommunal body, set up to make strategic decisions easier and more straightforward. However, in the context of the arena

development, attempting to get agreement from 28 mayors was far from straightforward. The research findings from the council meetings and the newspapers demonstrated how Juppé and Seurot (powerful mayors from the Bordeaux and Bruges) were able to steer the political decision-making and in doing so lengthened the process for the development of the arena. Despite the various regeneration schemes to promote better communication between the Left and Right banks it was evident in the development of the arena that tensions were still present. The attempt to move the arena location was a key example.

Despite the little interest in developing an arena initially, the decision to apply for ECoC was a key turning point. The importance of the ECoC was crucial to reviving the arena project as it brought cultural governance to the fore. Whilst the opportunity for network governance proved a key component of the application in practice the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole maintained overall control. Cultural stakeholders within the Métropole had little influences on the decision-making. The fact that planning had already been in place for the arena in Floirac the evidence demonstrated that the ECoC application provided opportunities for several mayors to demand that feasibility studies were undertaken to broaden the scope and look across the Métropole for other suitable sites, clearly ignoring their own planning system. In terms of cultural governance whilst the arena came within the ECoC application there was no cultural policy to drive the development of the cultural facility. The context for the arena remained within an urban development particularly in view of the ZAC des Quais.

The research findings demonstrated that both mayors failed to change the outcome of the SAS Montecristo successful bid, but they did push to reduce the size of the commercial space, which created further difficulties for the company. The impact of the length of time taken to come to an agreement coincided with the difficult economic climate in 2008, making selling enough commercial space to build the arena almost impossible and SAS Montecristo having to default on the project by 2012. When the third and final attempt to build the arena was initiated a much more cohesive and collaborative process was implemented with the involvement of the developers and operators. The Zénith had been rejected but as the project was publically funded with only a small amount of investment from the operator, Juppé had got his own way.

France has a rigorous planning system that is described in chapter 3. In the case of the Arkea Arena the presence of such a system with the ZAC and PLUs should have provided a straightforward development framework. It was evident that this was largely ignored and had little impact until the very end. The arena, designated as a flagship building designed by an international architect Rudy Ricciotti, is now part of the Bordeaux Métropole's cultural infrastructure. However, there was a clear lack of engagement with any cultural policy and once the ECoC bid was unsuccessful the arena development reverted to an urban regeneration project.

The decision-making process for the arena was complex and problematic and at the heart of issues was that an arena, a flagship building for the Métropole, was located on the Right Bank; finally, one element of governance, the formal ZAC process, came into play.

CHAPTER 6: GOING UP A LEAGUE AS A CITY? LEEDS

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter the evidence relating to the growth of local politics, urban and cultural development in Leeds is presented as a precursor for the primary research case study on the First Direct Arena, Leeds. The main function of this chapter is to critically analyse key aspects of governance as they have influenced the administrative and political decision-making processes that changed Leeds city, along with the key urban developments that supported the need for a multi-purpose arena.

The thesis uses information from LCC, academic papers, official council minutes, regional newspapers such as Leeds Evening Post and Yorkshire Post as well as grey literature particularly promotional materials. It draws on the work of the Leeds Initiative and the three overlapping strategic plans, the Visions for Leeds (1999-2009, 2004-2020, 2011-2030). These strategic plans are significant as they reflect the decades as Leeds moved from under the influence of Thatcher's government policies of neo-liberalism during the 1980s, to a corporate city in the 1990s and then a move to a civic emphasis of the 2000s.

The chapter begins with a brief overview of the city and its history. Whilst a more detailed analysis will be made later in the chapter, it is important to have a thumbnail sketch as a framework for later discussion. It then explores the development of the administrative and political structure and the key urban developments, which changed the image of the city.

Brief overview of the city

Leeds is a regional capital city positioned in the north of England which with several surrounding areas makes up the Leeds City Region (Image 6.1).

Image 6.1: Leeds City Region



Source: West Yorkshire Combined Authority, n.d., n.pag

Leeds is the third largest Metropolitan District in the UK with a 'built up city centre surrounded by small towns and villages in a polycentric pattern' (Meegan, 2015, p. 42). This extensive boundary has 'a large rural hinterland [which] makes it a different kind of place from other major English city' (Unsworth and Smales, 2009, p. 68). As the regional capital of Yorkshire and the Humber, Leeds according to LCC, is the main driver for its economy (2013, p. 1). The thesis focuses on the development of the city centre but without a clear delineation of the area, population figures are not available. The population of Leeds district, which includes 33 wards, was estimated at 798,786 on 30/06/2020 (UK Office for National Statistics, 2021, n.pag.). This population figure makes Leeds the largest of the cities in the West Yorkshire Combined Authority with estimated population figures for Bradford of 542,128, Calderdale 211,439, Kirklees 441,290 and Wakefield 351,592 (UK Office for National Statistics, 2021, n.pag.). These population figures indicate the size of the Leeds District and are a reason why as Prachett (2000) suggests a city of this size requires a dominant figure to lead such a potentially unwieldy organisation. This powerful leadership is discussed later.

The image of Leeds and its brief history

Historically, Leeds had textile production as early as the 1700s but the industrial revolution allowed the textile trade to develop and Leeds became well known for

its manufacturing (Howe, 2019). Granted city status in 1893 the landscape of Leeds was covered with large warehouse, mills and factories linking raw materials and production of cloth with easy access and distribution via the network of railways and canals (Aire and Calder Navigation and Leeds and Liverpool Canal). In addition to textiles, Leeds District became known as an engineering and milling centre. The wealth and status of the factory and mill owners allowed the growth of middle-class suburbs to the north of the city leaving the polluted city centre to be populated by the workers often in cramped and unsanitary conditions (Stillwell and Leigh, 1996). The affluent suburbs and the poorer inner-city areas such as Little London, Woodhouse, Gipton and Harehills remain visible although not to the extent of the nineteenth-century. Described as the 'two-speed' city, Douglas writes of 'the division between 'the haves' and the 'have-nots' which continued well into the twentieth century (2009, p. 55). As recently as 2008 however there is evidence that the gap continued to grow (Douglas, 2009).

From the early 1900s Leeds became known internationally for its tailoring industry which was epitomised by the Burton's brand. According to Hutchinson '[Burton's] was once the largest clothing factory in the world boasting 10,000 workers' and at its peak was making '30,000 suits a week' (2020, n.pag.). The demise of manufacturing in the 1980s came when fashions changed and the demand for suits plummeted along with cheaper imports from the Far East. During the 1970s and early 1980s most of Burton's factories, including Hudson Road Mills, ceased production. Like many of the northern cities the Thatcher government's policies coupled with an economic downturn led to industrial decline, leaving Leeds with many empty buildings in the city centre and a changing economic profile with manufacturing 'only 9 per cent of the workforce, while service industries make up over 80 per cent' (Unsworth and Smales, 2009, p. 68).

The changing economic fortunes created the need to re-image the city. Bramham and Spink (2009) and Smales and Whitney (1996) argue that the changing image of the city through the renovations of Victorian brick and stone added to the attractiveness of the city centre in buildings such as the Corn Exchange, Leeds Library and the shopping arcades. The Victorian architecture however, once deemed inappropriate for a contemporary city in the 1950s and 1960s, had however, an influence on the new iconography of the Leeds Look.

This 'Leeds Look' typified the influence of LCC on the planning and developing for the city (Smales and Whitney, 1996). As Smales and Whitney (1996) suggest, this conservative approach taken by LCC to maintain this style may have prevented more exciting and innovative planning designs from being considered as part of the urban fabric of the city. Whilst these innovative designs might not have found their way through the planning approval system, the Leeds Look also failed to attract people to come into the city centre to experience its entertainment and retail offerings. The fall in demand was exacerbated by the successes of the out-of-town retail and entertainment parks with free parking. Pressures from retailers and the Leeds Chamber of Trade and Commerce saw the LCC abandon the Leeds Look and, in its place, establish the Landmark Leeds Initiative (1991-2).

The Initiative provided urban governance through its implementation to increase the city's attractiveness and according to Julier 'demonstrates a significant turn from architecture to design as the key defining feature in the identity of a city (2014, p. 142). This created the emphasis on the image or urban spectacle which encompassed urban art and furniture, mini-piazas to break up the familiar shopping street lines along with new paving as a means to identify the city rather than the use of buildings (Douglas, 2009). LCC engaged Faulkner Browns architects to undertake 'a wide-ranging study of the city as a whole, reviewing transport, green corridors and key city-centre sites in order to revitalize its use' (Julier, 2014, p. 142). This influenced LCC in the 1990s to create a city identity by using the urban experience for tourist and residents to replicate the experience of a 'good European city' (Smales, 1994, p. 51).

This became more apparent with the move away from a heavy industrialised city to a profitable financial, insurance and service-based economy as well as the expansion of a new professional workforce that presented different demands on housing, retail, accommodation and culture within the city. In pursuit of transforming the image of the city and enhancing the cultural infrastructure Jon Trickett, LCC Leader (1989-1996) spearheaded the 24-hour city policy (1991) and led the various Visions for Leeds, each of which clearly demonstrates a European vision. For example, the Visions for Leeds highlighted that Leeds was to be one of the principal progressive European cities of Europe (LCC, 1994) and an 'internationally competitive European city at the heart of a prosperous region' (The Leeds Initiative, 2004, p. 2).

The administrative and political context

Meegan (2015), Cole and John (2001) and Douglas (2009) highlight the importance of leadership in LCC. George Mudie (1981-1989) and Jon Trickett (1989-1996) provided that strong and concentrated Labour leadership as the Leaders of LCC with contrasting views on the engagement with partnerships. With the emphasis placed on neoliberal policies and greater involvement with the private sector, LCC under the leadership of Mudie 'pursued its own local economic development policy steering clear of partnerships' despite calls for more business involvement by Central Government (Meegan, 2015, p. 46). This changed with election of Jon Trickett who understood the importance of partnerships in the pursuit of economic growth and urban development. The move for greater partnerships created the network governance by the bringing together of different interests and organisations as theorised in the Framework (chapter 1) of the Leeds Initiative. This, established by Trickett in 1990, was 'eleven years before it became mandatory' (Douglas, 2009, p. 39). The Leeds Initiative³¹ appeared to be useful in two ways. First it brought a wider collaborative group together to deliver the city's policies such as the Local Area Agreement (LAA). Second, it provided the vehicle to bid for central government funding through the Regional Development Agency (RDA). This is useful context as the ability to attract funding via the RDA was required to support the funding of the arena and is explored in the case study.

Political Structure

In terms of governance, LCC has a Leader of the Council who appoints members for the Executive Board. The Executive Board, chaired by the Leader of LCC, is the principal decision-making body of the Council. It is made up of eight executive members from the ruling political party and the leaders from the two significant opposition parties. The Executive Board is important to the thesis as it is the decision-making forum for the development of the arena. To assist the Leader of LCC achieve the strategic aims and objectives for Leeds, a corporate leadership team with several subject specific directors is in place (Executive Committee). The governance structure is through the various committees, boards and panels which are responsible for ensuring a democratic level of engagement and accountability (LCC, 2015). The democratic network

³¹ Became the Local Strategic Partnership (LSP) in 2000s.

governance which appears to be guaranteed by the Executive Board is perhaps more apparent than real as the leader of LCC has overall power.

LCC has 33 wards (Image 6.2) with varying social and economic profiles, each with three elected members who represent the local community (Annex 13). Locally-based, these councillors are charged with representing the local area, developing leadership in the community, playing a part in developing council policy and are appointed to regulatory committees as appropriate. Whilst the power of decision-making sits with the leader of LCC, the councillors from the 33 wards can raise objections to decisions. This was evidenced with the proposed use of money acquired from the sale of Leeds Bradford Airport and is further discussed in chapter 7.

Image: 6.2 Map of Leeds Wards



Source: The Local Government Boundary Commission for England, 2018, n.pag.

Key leaders of LCC and Culture development

Jon Trickett was an influential leader of LCC enhancing network governance through the Leeds Initiative and his drive to increase economic and urban growth in the city centre (Chatterton and Hodkinson, 2007). Acting more like a European mayor who is able to push forward their own political ideologies,

Trickett attempted to transform the city by enhancing its economic and urban environment to replicate a Europeanised city (While et al., 2004; Unsworth and Smales, 2009). LCC driven by its pragmatic approach and drawing on the successes of Graham Stringer's 24-hour city policy in Manchester and the growth of cultural industries seen in Sheffield, adopted a positive attitude towards urban and cultural change (Bramham and Spink, 2009). The shift in political leadership of LCC, which saw a Coalition in 2004 (Conservative and Liberal Democrat) however led to changes in leadership styles with a less innovative approach and a more functional regeneration approach.

According to Strange, cultural development was linked to specific people such as 'Bernard Atha, Chair of Leeds City Council Cultural Services Committee; and Jude Kelly, artistic director of the West Yorkshire Playhouse' who were instrumental in building a cultural focus for Leeds (1996, p. 142). As Strange (1996) indicates Atha was a prominent force in driving forward LCCs cultural policy and was open to many different types of cultural activities even though his own personal passion was that of the performing arts. For many commentators and in light of the influences of Atha and Kelly there was a significant emphasis on a personal and individual drive towards developing cultural projects (Chatterton and Unsworth, 2004). The rebranding of the Leeds Playhouse as the West Yorkshire Playhouse for example was the result of a long campaign by Doreen Newlyn, with Councillor Bernard Atha and Jude Kelly (artistic director West Yorkshire Playhouse from 1990) who argued that the renaming would raise its profile. Building on the strengths of its cultural offerings its success has influenced further regeneration of the theatre and Quarry Hill. This has been seen through the partnership of LCC and West Yorkshire Playhouse³² that would according to Council leader Judith Blake create network governance to support potential future funding, transform the area and establish the theatre as a flagship building of the 21st century to attract cultural tourism (Yorkshire Evening Post, 2015).

URBAN DEVELOPMENT

When Labour returned to the leadership of LCC there was a marked change in the regeneration of the city in the 1980s. In terms of urban governance tensions

³² The West Yorkshire Playhouse was re-named Leeds Playhouse in 2019.

and challenges were seen between the central government initiative in the form of Leeds Development Corporation (UDC)³³ and LCC in terms of regeneration (Smales and Burgess, 1999). According to Haughton 'George Mudie, and later Jon Trickett (both now MPs) found the imposition of the UDC politically unpalatable, though both in time came to varying degrees of acceptance' (Haughton, 1999, p.180). Whilst politically contentious the Leeds UDC however had played a part in improving the South Central Leeds area, with offices, hotels, and restaurants and led to attracting the Royal Armouries and Tetley's Brewery Wharf (Haughton, 1999). The demise of the Leeds UDC, alongside all the others across the UK, came in 1995 because they were increasingly unpopular and perceived as expensive. According to Haughton and Whitney visits to the USA by ministers failed to take on-board the key lessons of partnerships in urban planning such as 'government investment programmes, the inability of the private sector to invest significantly in non-commercial projects, and the need to build local leadership in tandem with the local democratic process, not outside it' (Haughton and Whitney, 1994, p.108). Taking account of what Haughton and Whitney (1994) argue the Leeds Initiative by its inclusive network approach however demonstrated how partnerships could work as it pushed forward the strategic policies, Visions for Leeds.

The city centre

The shift to a service sector economy led to economic growth in Leeds, which has been identified as one of the relatively faster growing Northern cities. Significant shifts in the built environment such as 'Waterfront developments to the south, new shopping quarters, refurbished commercial development mixed used development and city centre living' had also been witnessed (Tyler et al., 2017 p. 26). The expansion of the city centre came with a diversity of new areas of commerce and services in which the Victorian architecture was used to good effect, with refurbishment rather than demolition of industrial buildings and the development of waterside areas (Bramham and Spink, 2009). The flagship and landmark buildings such as the Millennium Bridge, the arrival of the prestigious Royal Armouries national museum (1983), and the luxury retail department store Harvey Nichols (1996) provided evidence of the city's economic growth and advertised nationally identifiable cultural experiences. These growth areas produced a private sector developer-led form of gentrification which saw Leeds

³³ A quango created by Central Government to undertake local regeneration.


support some enclaves of gentrification through the changing professional population keen on high density city living (Dutton, 2003). However, the benefit from gentrification was not being felt in areas of deprivation particularly in the inner city and outer estates broadening the gap between the more affluent and less affluent communities (Haughton and While, 1999).

The Leeds Initiative (1990) and more specifically the Visions for Leeds are particularly significant given the approach adopted by LCC in remodelling a former industrial city into a competitive European and International city. The Unitary Development Plan (UDP) drafted in 1990 but adopted in 2001 (evolved into the Local Plan), provided a framework for the development for the Leeds District and incorporated the aims and objectives from the Visions for Leeds. However, according to Unsworth and Smales (2009) the UDP failed to adapt to the changing political environment and with a lack of strategic guidelines was unable to steer the urban development. Whilst the UDP may have had a lack of strategic guidelines it did however, have specific aims which saw the city centre identified as 'the focal point of the whole City and District' (LCC, 2006, p. 29). A strong city centre therefore was imperative for the whole of the district in terms of attractiveness and economy. The regeneration objectives within the UDP identified the need to enhance existing facilities to maximise the future successes of the City particularly in the ability to compete with other cities (LCC, 2006). The use of existing facilities rather than a large regeneration programme implies that whilst LCC wanted to transform its image into a more European style city it did so within the constraints of the UDP (LCC, 2006).

The city centre boundary (Image 6.3) has been the subject of change and was expanded in 2006 to include, Elwood Lane, Regent Street, Marsh Land Goods Yard, Clarence Dock, Tetley and Yorkshire Chemicals, Crown Point Retail Warehouse Park, Holbeck/Marshall Street and West Street/Burley Street area (LCC, 2006, p. 273). With a concern that an increased size of the city centre, if it became too large, would lose its cohesiveness and identity, the emphasis was placed on the quality of buildings and infrastructure rather than its quantity (Smales, 1994; LCC, 2006; several interviewees). The inclusion in the city centre of new areas for development including certain historic, commercial, retail and accommodation opportunities allowed LCC to maximise major initiatives to promote national and international stature for the city. For example, Clarence Dock has provided Leeds the opportunity to expand a regeneration programme

to include residential and office spaces around the major tourist attraction of the Royal Armouries Museum (Douglas, 2009).

Image 6.3: Leeds City Centre Boundary



Source: Leeds City Council, 2021, n.pag.

The Leeds UDP city centre plan indicated areas of the city specifically identified for permitted development. These areas included amongst others, gateways, quarters and prestigious development areas. The prestige development areas had two purposes. Firstly, they were areas for substantial developments for example, office, leisure cultural facilities, conference and exhibition facilities and hotels. However, given the limited space within the city centre the new boundary would provide greater scope along the periphery for such developments. Secondly these areas are located at prominent road intersections and therefore can be considered as gateways into the city. One such gateway was situated to the northern side of city, where Claypit Lane meets the Inner Ring road and is important to the thesis, as this became the location for the arena. Another gateway was the Quarry Hill regeneration site to the eastern side of the city. The remaining space from this project was identified as a possible site for a concert hall or exhibition centre to complement the Playhouse (LCC, 2006). This option, however, did not appear in the discussions for the location of the arena. LCC used the term 'quarters' to identify specific areas but rather than separating

them into concentrated individualised areas, a broader mixed-use approach was adopted to avoid dead spaces at different times of the day.

The location of the arena on Clay Pit Lane would later become defined as the Arena quarter as a result of further regeneration. Whilst Leeds continued to develop and recreate its urban cityscape, the Renaissance Leeds Project (2003-2007), a collaboration between LCC, Yorkshire Forward, English Partnership and the Leeds Initiative was instigated to 'give clarity to where the city is going and where the focus of partners efforts should lie' (Renaissance Leeds, 2003-2007, n.pag.). The project provided the opportunity to look at Leeds, its heritage and future city design and, by creating a level of network governance between the public and private sector, promote a confidence for investment towards the regeneration of Leeds (Renaissance Leeds, 2003-2007). A series of drawings produced by Civic Architect, John Thorp³⁴, explored the dynamics of Leeds and its metropolitan district, the flow of the city, its identities, the two-speed city, its development and proposed planning. A critique of the project noted that 'the more intensely urban-design-orientated thinking of the Renaissance Project came too late in the boom, has not been thoroughly connected into the planning system, [and] was too dependent on the input of one key officer' (Unsworth and Smales, 2009, p. 78). This resulted in the project having a lesser impact on the shaping of the city than might otherwise have been the case.

Simon Jenkins argues that it is through the work of John Thorp that 'Leeds seems to understand itself' and has a cityscape and urban flow that balances between the new and old (Jenkins, 2006, n.pag.). It has resisted large imposing shopping centres like Manchester but established a pedestrian style shopping experience with a number of arcades retaining their Victorian splendour. Even the new Leeds Trinity shopping centre with its state-of-the-art roof appears to blend with, rather than impose on, the surrounding buildings. This view is supported by Bramham and Spinks (2006) who suggest that the retaining and refurbishing of much of the nineteenth century architecture had a positive effect on the city image. The message in Jenkins' article was that urban design had to adapt existing structures rather than destroy them, and that it was necessary to understand human behaviour and its movements before imposing change. The project by Thorp brought all aspects of urban development, urban flow and

³⁴ Series of John Thorp's drawings, Propeller, Petals, Five Identities, Mosaic, Pizza, Collage, Dilemma.

human behaviour together to create a template to assist with the strategic delivery of the Vision for Leeds 2004-2020.

The changing city

The shift from an industrial past to a global city involves what Pagano and Bowman refer to as boosterism in which it is the image and identity of the city which is important (Pagano and Bowman, 1997). Their argument highlights that those in power use their abilities to bring together a collective vision for the city and in doing so create policies to develop those ideas. These groupings, an example of network governance are seen in the political structures within LCC with leaders and likeminded colleagues working towards enhancing city images. Taking into account what Pagano and Bowman (1997) outline, Cole and John support the argument emphasising that LCC took an important role in creating the 'local government scene' (2001, p. 103). More specifically they argued that the 'politics in Leeds is bound up with a strong identity within the city and a sense of superiority over the other Yorkshire towns such as Sheffield' (Cole and John, 2001, p. 103). The circumstances leading to Sheffield City Council opposing the building of an arena and subsequent arguments regarding the use of Regional Development Agency (RDA) funding provide an example of this sense of superiority and political will of the LCC. The interviewees also reflected on the situation with a level of consternation particularly as it led to political tensions between the two cities (chapter 7).

Within an environment of central government spending cuts and decreasing powers of the local authorities implemented by the Thatcher Government, unlike other local authorities, LCC took the decision not to challenge it. Instead LCC focussed on the Visions for Leeds in order to develop into a competitive European city. The concept was to create an attractiveness of the city centre for its communities and tourists, which included the need for public art, a greater level of pedestrianisation, café culture and increased cultural facilities (The Leeds Initiative, 1999). The emphasis of the Visions for Leeds was however on commercially led economy rather than a focus on cultural life for the benefit of the public. This led to an increase in the disposal of land to private companies and whilst increasing the economy and city's ability to invest in its future, reduced the possible sites for the arena (Cole and John, 2001; Meegan, 2015). Several strategies have interlinked with the Visions for Leeds across the period

from 2000 to 2014, for example, the Core Strategy (2014) and the Regional Spatial Strategy (2008) and Urban Design Strategy (2000). However, it is the Visions for Leeds that are important to the thesis as they provide an insight of the decision-making by LCC about the future focus of the city but more specifically identified the need for an arena as early as 1999.

Vision for Leeds I (1999-2009): A European city in the making?

A drive by Central Government in the 1990s stipulated that all local authorities and their strategic partnerships must have a community strategy that covered a period of 10-15 years 'for improving the social, economic and environmental wellbeing of a local area' (The Leeds Initiative, 2004, p. 5). The first of these strategies under the leadership of Brian Walker (Labour) 1996, was the City Pride prospectus which were 'conventional economic development documents for the time, following an agenda that prioritized wealth creation and economic growth over other issues' (Haughton and While, 1999, p. 17). This was evidenced by the six objectives that focussed on Leeds, the promotion and visibility of the city, the economic development of the city as well as improved public transport (Table 6.1)

Table 6.1: Vision for Leeds 1999-2009: 6 objectives

1	Promote the city as a major European centre
2	Ensure the economic vitality of the city
3	Create an integrated transport system
4	Enhance the environment of the whole city
5	Improve the quality and visual appeal of the city
6	Develop the city as an attractive centre for visitors

Source: Douglas, 2009, p. 39.

The City Pride became known as the Vision for Leeds 1999-2009. In creating this Vision for Leeds, LCC undertook the large-scale consultation 'Your city, your choice' to review what the population of Leeds felt was important to them for the future development of the city. The consultation the largest of its type in the history of the city (Haughton and While, 1999), invited comments from all households, businesses and community groups as well as undertaking market research. It 'took five months to complete and elicited 10,000 individual responses' from a variety of questions (Holt, 1999, p. 11). The outcome from the consultation put regeneration at the bottom of the 36 priority areas. Even so, 47% of respondents felt that the development of a flagship project for the city

such as arena/conference/concert hall, city museum, art or sculpture attraction was important against 31% who felt it was not important (Haughton and While, 1999, p. 20). Under 'what you want' heading only 6% identified a large indoor arena (The Leeds Initiative, 1998, p. 4).

The low level of positive responses about an arena project is perhaps not a surprise. The other questions related to for example, the quality of life at the neighbourhood level, better transport, crime reduction and reduction in unemployment (The Leeds Initiative, 1998). As these issues directly affect individuals' daily life they are perceived as fundamental in improving the social, economic and health of the local environment, more so than a cultural facility. The consultation however, provided LCC with an evidence base of community priorities of where investment should be made and in what areas, and as such demonstrated a level of inclusion in the decision-making processes. Whilst the questions related to the quality of life little emphasis was given to culture, and the consultation gathered little information about how respondents used cultural facilities or what they felt was missing from the City's cultural infrastructure.

A pragmatic approach to increasing the economic benefit was at the forefront of the Visions for Leeds documents and hence it reflects LCC decision-making. This was particularly emphasised with the flagship project placed under the theme of competitive performance and competitive environment via a specific building to enhance the city's image in a global market, rather than focusing on its potential cultural importance. Whilst the possibility of a major cultural building such as an arena was included in the Vision for Leeds I, this first iteration was focussed on economic development and engagement with the private sector rather than enhancing cultural facilities. The formal and informal relationships and partnerships between the public and private sector and LCC in the development of the Initiative and Visions created a network governance approach for the city (Meegan, 2015). With greater engagement the private sector was able to take on leading roles in the economic development of the city leading to what Haughton and Williams (1996) the term 'corporate city' for Leeds.

Vision for Leeds II (2004-2020): A shift in thinking for the city?

The change of central Government to New Labour (1997), with a ‘concomitant shift in urban policy and increasing local pressures for change’, is the context in which the second iteration of Vision for Leeds II (2004-2020) was developed (Meegan, 2015, p. 47). The shift in central urban policy emphasised that local government needed to engage in multi-agency partnerships and local communities to promote and improve social and economic growth. The additional power given to LCC by central government to achieve this development saw the Leeds Initiative expand its membership along with a greater community engagement in the Vision for Leeds II. To achieve greater community engagement, as with the first iteration, a public consultation, The Leeds Initiative Vision for Leeds II (2003 to 2018) your chance to have your say, was undertaken. This took views of ‘over 6,200 people and over 24,400 people contributed to the research that has directly influenced the development of the strategy’ (The Leeds Initiative, 2004, p. 7). The results highlighted strong support for the following three aims:

Table 6.2: Vision for Leeds 2004-2020: Three key aims

1	Going up a league – becoming an internationally competitive city, the best place in the country to live, work and learn, with a high quality of life for everyone
2	Narrowing the gap to improve the position of disadvantaged people and communities and the rest of the city
3	Developing Leeds’ role as the regional capital, contributing to National Economy as a Competitive European city

Source: Leeds Initiative, 2004, p. 21.

Against a background of economic growth, LCC demonstrated a strong sense of self-identity as aims 1 and 3 are strongly focussed on the City, its status and position and competitiveness (Cole and John, 2001). The decision-making of LCC signified clearly its intentions for Leeds to become a global city. LCC had however, recognised the issues relating to the poorer disadvantaged areas and aimed to narrow the gap. The first and second key aims (Table 6.2) were the ‘twin mantras’ according to Douglas that were repeated in the many LCC and Leeds Initiative publications (Douglas, 2009, p. 39). The recognition by LCC of the widening social disparity between those on lower incomes or the unemployed who were forced to live in the inner city and those more affluent city dwellers which created the so-called ‘two speed city’ of Leeds, remains (Douglas, 2009). For Chatterton and Hodkinson (2007) however, Leeds was

unable to narrow the gap particularly as the city-centre continued to focus on tourists, students, the wealthy and the professional business class.

Whilst Leeds had 'strong artistic and sporting traditions' along with the 'best attended free outdoor festivals in the country' it had 'been criticised for a lack of specific major facilities such as a concert hall, arena or conference and exhibition centre' (The Leeds Initiative, 2004, p. 20). The criticism highlighted that Leeds was only one of two cities in England without suitable indoor cultural facilities for popular music and events (Bristol being the other) (The Leeds Initiative, 2004; Yorkshire Evening Post 2006; alluded to by several interviewees). Cities across England had built arenas often linked with other activities such as M & S Bank, Liverpool Arena (ECoC) 2008), and the AO Arena, Manchester (failed Olympic Bid 1996 and 2000). Manchester and Birmingham both have more than one arena but Leeds remained without such a venue. Leeds had not engaged with any of these types of initiatives until 2015 when LCC decided to bid to be the ECoC 2023. However, the timing of the decision by LCC to finally bid for ECoC was unfortunate as after Brexit Leeds was no longer able to participate.

Within the Vision for Leeds II, LCC had finally committed to building a large multi-purpose event space. Its importance was such that it was identified as one of 12 major projects within the Vision for Leeds II. At this point however, there was no agreement by LCC that it was to be an arena; other options included a conference or exhibition centre. Therefore, with no clear strategic development and funding plan there was increasing commitment that Leeds would at last get a music arena; however, there was no guarantee.

Vision for Leeds III (2011-2030): 'Best City in the UK', Recession and a fallen city?

At a time when Leeds like other cities were still feeling the effects of the worldwide financial crisis after 2008 and significant cuts in public sector investment, Labour leadership returned to the LCC (2010), the exact opposite to the national political change. The economic climate was very different from the previous Visions for Leeds and this is reflected in the preparation for the next iteration. A Development plan and 'Where are we now? Report 2009 was produced by the Leeds Initiative, which incorporated 23 thematic experts'

opinions on where Leeds was at that time and how it would respond to the following questions:

Will Leeds be a leader or a follower? What are the key issues we need to consider between now and 2030? What are the future trends and big choices we need to make?
(The Leeds Initiative, 2009, p. 5).

In terms of culture, the report indicated that the provision of first-class cultural infrastructure had not progressed unlike in the other core cities (The Leeds Initiative, 2009). Even though many of the cultural priorities had been achieved (Annex 14) it was recognised that there was no cultural development plan and a general apathy towards the benefits that culture could bring to a major city (The Leeds Initiative, 2009).

According to Meegan 'just as the preceding boom left its mark on the city centre so too has the recession' (Meegan, 2015, p. 49). The effects of the recession appeared to have influenced the terminology of the new Vision for Leeds. Whilst as with previous ones it retained ambitious aims (Table 6.3) its emphasis now moved to a national focus. The emphasis on becoming a European and International city was now replaced with Leeds wanting to be the best city in the UK. This was a more inward looking vision and at the heart of the aims was to improve society, economy and the quality of life of those who live and work in Leeds (Table 6.3). The focus for the Vision was much more community based and was a result of the consultation. This is important to the thesis as outlined by Martin Dean, Head of Leeds Initiative who commented in an article by John Baron, Guardian Online; that the consultation process had 'come out with a clear message that Leeds people didn't have a shopping list of large capital projects like the arena and that there was a need for 'shared community action' to get things done (Baron, 2011, n.pag.). This left the arena project in some doubt if the consultation outcome was to be influential.

Table 6.3: Vision for Leeds 2011-2030 Aims

Our Vision for 2030 is to be the best city in the UK	
a	Leeds will be fair open and welcoming
b	Leeds' economy will be prosperous and sustainable
c	All Leeds' communities will be successful

The Leeds Initiative, 2009, p. 6.

A further response by LCC was concerned with the governance of the city which aimed 'to become the best council in the country' (Wakefield, n.d. p. 3), and retained the aspiration to be strong nationally and internationally and, as the biggest city in the north, it would be able to bid for and attract investment for major national projects such as HS2. This appeared to be contrary to what the consultation outcome had indicated particularly as there was little noted about the engagement with local communities in the decision-making for the city. The aspiration of LCC pointed to maintaining its superiority over other cities. However, the increasingly difficult economic position due to the recession saw major projects such as Leeds Trinity paused and flagship buildings such as the Kissing Tower and the Lumière Building cancelled. Yet as many cranes were removed over Leeds, one went up initially in 2009 to demolish the area in preparation for the arena build. This is important context for the thesis as LCC had chosen to continue with the possibility of building an arena (chapter 7).

THE CULTURAL CONTEXT

For Leeds to become a European and global city, culture was seen as a key driver to maximise the benefits that a more attractive city brings, such as increased tourism and investment as well as enhanced quality of life and cultural facilities. These aspects are important to the thesis as they demonstrate the emphasis placed by LCC on the decision-making process for cultural development. The thesis draws on authors Pratt and Hutton (2013) and Strange (1996) who highlight that despite the difficult financial conditions the culture and creative sector provided a boost to the economy. Cultural governance was enhanced with local authorities collaborating in partnerships with private and voluntary sectors that realised that these cultural industries could contribute to the economy and urban regeneration (Pratt and Hutton; 2013; Strange, 1996). Spracklen et al., (2013) suggests that using creative industries for economic benefit was a global trend and that every city across the West was in competition with each other in attracting large global corporations to invest in a city's cultural facilities for economic gain. This is reflected in the engagement by LCC of ASM Global³⁵ (formerly SMG Europe and AEG), a worldwide events and

management company, to manage and operate the arena offered the opportunity for Leeds to enhance its visibility through the company's global networks.

As well as contributing to economic regeneration like many cities, Leeds recognised the impact of using the arts and cultural-led regeneration to address the problems associated with urban decline in the post-industrial period (Strange, 1996). In enhancing cultural facilities, such as the arts, entertainment and nightlife, LCC was able to re-position the image of the city through a 'post-industrial make-over' (Chatterton and Unsworth, 2004, p. 363). The 'make-over' also incorporated the idea of using cultural clusters or quarters which was seen particularly from the 1980s where Leeds developed its retail, cultural and exchange quarter such as the St John's Centre, the Headrow Centre and the Victoria Quarter (Tallon et al., 2006).

Cultural policy: Top Down Approach

Leeds positioned itself as a postmodern city that was dependent on the service and financial sector, underpinned by property-led regeneration along with the cultural and leisure sectors but without a dedicated policy for culture until 2002 (Wagg and Bramham, 2009). However, the lack of a cultural policy had led to key individuals such as Bernard Atha³⁶ championing the culture agenda focussing on large development opportunities but within a pragmatic financial approach (Strange and Long, 2009). The emphasis was placed on the importance for culture facilities to demonstrate a return on investment, increased economy and tourism rather than developing a cultural policy which was driven by a public benefit to the community. This approach was also adopted by Central Government. With a level of reluctance to develop a cultural strategy, in 2002 LCC finally gave in to pressure from the 'Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), the Lottery, the museums and other councils because in doing so it gained access to external funding' (Strange and Long, 2009, p. 26).

The Cultural Strategy for Leeds (2002) helped change cultural development across the city via its co-ordinating role. Rather than a stand-alone policy its

³⁵A venue management and services company that spans five continents, with a portfolio of more than 300 of the world's most prestigious arenas, convention and exhibit centres, and performing arts venues.

³⁶ Bernard Atha, Leeds City Councillor (1957-2014) Lord Mayor of Leeds 2000-2001.

purpose was to link with the Leeds Initiative and LCC strategies as well as adding to the scope of the Vision for Leeds (Leeds Cultural Partnership, 2002). Therefore, cultural policy was seen as a theme within the Vision for Leeds and whilst emphasising the message for culture to be central in policy development and decision-making for community regeneration there was a caution in developing a balanced approach (Leeds Cultural Partnership, 2002). The policy identified the need to be aware of the different views of stakeholders and communities and proposed that a balance needed to be achieved between cultural development which was influential for the city but at the same time in keeping with local areas strategies (Leeds Culture Partnership, 2002). Therefore, in theory the development of an arena that would be beneficial for the city also had to take into account the affected local strategies and communities. The Leeds Cultural Partnership³⁷, was put in charge of developing a cultural strategy for Leeds 2002-2007, and in keeping with a network governance approach put an emphasis on culture being at the core of all policy making for Leeds (Local Government Association³⁸, 2017).

Tom Murray, Chair of Leeds Cultural Partnership also outlined that 'the City's culture is too important to be led by one single champion – we need many' to ensure that it reaches the diversity of Leeds communities (Leeds Culture Partnership, 2002, p. 2). This removed the possible influences of individuals and their visions for culture which Leeds had previously seen. Murray went on to acknowledge that the cultural strategy reflected Leeds as the regional capital and key European city and as such with the many different cultural facilities attracted tourism to the city. The strategy however appeared to focus on major projects such as Northern Ballet and Opera North to enhance cultural facilities and the City's image and less on broadening widening participation of local communities.

LCC may have been late in creating a cultural policy but 'since 2002 £180m has been invested in the cultural infrastructure of the city' (Douglas, 2009, p. 45). This investment gave LCC the ability to promote the city's cultural environment along with enhanced infrastructure to promote Leeds as a competitive city. The

³⁷ Leeds Cultural Partnership part of the Leeds Initiative.

³⁸ Local Government Association is a national membership body for local authorities, working on behalf of their member councils to support, promote and improve local government.

value of culture continued to be recognised by LCC and even within the recession period and associated decrease in central government funding decided to continue with investment in cultural infrastructure unlike many other local government (Johnson, 2021). The financial investment by the LCC has continued and is seen with its support of the delivery of the Leeds City of Culture bid publically known as 'Leeds2023' which has been given an 'ambitious budget target of £32m [that] aims to invest 50% of this in programme delivery' for the year long Leeds festival (Johnson, 2021, p. 18).

However, whilst Leeds has excellent cultural facilities it lacked a clear marketing campaign to promote it which appears counterintuitive given the need to promote the city (Strange and Long, 2009). Rather than a clear framework, it has had 'a collection of cultural vision statements often imprinted with personalised views of culture and cultural development' (Strange and Long, 2009, p. 26). The lack of a framework was in part an issue when Leeds was attempting to grow cultural tourism particularly as there was no steer for the city centre which often closed early evening demonstrating a lack of night-time economy for a diversity of audiences (Sandle, 2002). The grow of a 24-hours city policy influenced by John Trickett however saw the night-time economy grow to such an extent that throughout the 1990s Leeds was 'voted UKs Number One clubbing city', although perhaps this was not the image the city wanted to portray (Chatterton and Unsworth, 2004, p. 363). The continued move from a production to a consumer city which is an essential element in securing Leeds' economic success was also supported by the 'retail sector with five miles of shopping streets and the increase in hotels from 7 in 1989 to 23 by 2007 with 3,387 beds for tourists and other overnight stayers' (Douglas, 2009, p. 37). The development of the arena would add to this consumerism and further support the development of city's image and economic growth.

LCC's approach was to emphasise tourism and saleability of a city by promoting cultural activity. In terms of cultural governance however, LCC demonstrated a lack of engagement with stakeholders and communities (Chatterton and Unsworth, 2004). Haughton however, saw this saleability through tourism as one of the success stories of the region. Particularly highlighted was an inclusive approach between communities and local authorities, with an increased emphasis on a cultural approach with Opera North and West Yorkshire Playhouse for example and community-based festivals such as Opera in the

Park, Party in the Park, and West Indian Carnival (Haughton, 1994). Other events such as the Christmas Lights, Rhythms of the City programmes and the Valentine Fair attempted to transform Leeds City into an inclusive community with a European feel: the so-called 'Barcelona of the North' (Douglas, 2009, p. 41). These events however are arguably led by LCC as authority led spectacles. The Leeds St Valentine Fairs for example are 'top-down events, more concerned with re-imagining the city to attract capital than with contesting society's norms through transforming the public realm' (Harcup, 2010, p. 228). The pragmatic approach taken by LCC to cultural activities suggests a level of exploitation in order to enhance economic growth through tourism, local and national, rather than local community events that aim to bring neighbourhoods together. A theme which is seen in the development of the arena.

'Barcelona of the North' but still no arena

The suggested comparison to Barcelona by Douglas is worth noting. Its transformation provided the 'blueprint for many others throughout the world in marking out a new direction for a city and claiming itself as a significant place for the attraction of investment' (Julier, 2014, p. 139). The direction taken by LCC was a clear attempt to exercise greater local influence over the city's development. The trajectory of the city had similarities to the blueprint used by Barcelona particularly as it moved to a service sector economy, a level of gentrification as well as improvements in the urban environment which strengthened its reputation for retail and night-time economy (Julier, 2014). Leeds also changed its use of architectural mix of materials for buildings such as 'powder-coated steel, aluminium tubing and granite' which according to Julier demonstrated a more 'European modern' image (Julier, 2014, p. 138). This image was criticised by Ken Powell³⁹, who felt the choice of materials and architecture was not representative of the Leeds Look and the City's Victorian heritage (Julier, 2014).

The thesis aligns itself with Sandle who highlights that these changes were part of an urban planning process with new urban spaces used to regenerate the city centre and put Leeds in a better position to be seen as a competitive European and Global city (Sandle, 2002). However, there was still no planned arena for popular music and events, along with a lack of contemporary or modern public

³⁹ Ken Powell, architectural historian, consultant and critic.

art in and around the City (Sandle, 2000). Sandle also draws upon the sensitivities to the use of public spaces and art and confirms the personality driven agenda noted earlier with the rejection of the 'Brickman' project⁴⁰ in the early 90s by those who were most influential in the LCC. One cultural project however that was realised was the flagship Millennium Square to mark the year 2000. It was the only part of an ambitious Pride of the City bid to the UK National Lottery fund to be successful. Costing £11.9 million, LCC received half of the investment needed, the rest being funded through the public purse. This multi-functional outdoor live public space and entertainment venue 'aimed to provide a stronger sense of place and a greater sense of space' (Sandle, 2002, p. 187). As a cultural facility, the Square hosts many events all year round such as the German Christmas market, Ice Cub outdoor rink and the end of the recent Tour de Yorkshire (2018), bringing with it economic regeneration and transient tourism and a greater engagement with the private sector.

It is worth noting that the Millennium Square flagship project was developed whilst Leeds still had no cultural policy and cultural projects were more likely to be initiated or rejected by influential politicians or council officers driving their own personal view (Chatterton and Unsworth, 2004; Sandle, 2000). This personality approach is, according to authors Chatterton and Unsworth (2004), Strange and Long (2009) a typical characteristic of Leeds and its approach to culture. This was further highlighted by Strange and Long (2009) who argued that cultural provision remained within a traditional labour and patronage view and this influenced other party political ethos when in power. When the Culture Policy (2002) was created there is no evidence to suggest that it made significant changes to the governance of decision-making by LCC and in terms of the development of cultural infrastructure and in particularly the arena there appears no clear link (chapter 7).

Music event space in Leeds

Like many other cities Leeds has numerous event spaces for a wide range of genres of music. These venues are important context for the thesis to understand where the arena development fits within the wider music sector and facilities in Leeds. The venues typically 'range from the back rooms of

⁴⁰ The Brickman project was to be a unique landmark. The 120ft tall sculpture was to be located on disused land near Leeds City Station.

independently run pubs to the largest corporate arenas' (Parkinson et al., 2015, p. 11). Whilst Leeds lacked a large indoor arena, the football stadium (Leeds United) and open-air spaces such as Roundhay Park have been used as concert spaces. The smaller venues have helped Leeds establish a music scene with an eclectic mix of genres as well as helping to promote new and emerging artists. Spracklen et al. (2013) argues that over the past decade the purpose of these music and leisure venues (in Leeds and elsewhere) have changed). These changes are reflective of the venues that have come and gone in Leeds. Popular venues such as the Cockpit (1994-2014) and Branningans (1983-2004) have closed down whilst others such as the Wardrobe (1999 -) and Belgrave Music Hall and Canteen (2013-) have been able to combine live music and food successfully. Other venues such as the Brudenell Social Club, located in Headingley close to the university student population have managed to maintain a high level of success.

In terms of temporary venues for popular music, Leeds has many festivals and open-air events to enhance its cultural offerings. As boasted on the Visit Leeds website 'you can't mention 'Leeds' and 'Festivals' in the same sentence without thinking music (Visit Leeds, n.d., n.pag.). According to Négrier whilst the transient festivals have grown in popularity they remain 'a relatively new phenomenon in Europe' (Négrier, 2015, p. 18). Whilst some of the street carnivals and festivals occur within the city centre, the larger festivals are scattered across the metropolitan district; for example, Party in the Park is held at Temple Newsam and Leeds Festival at Bramham. There is a tension however between this type of cultural offering in that the organisation of festivals often reflects the local priority in bringing together communities and cultures rather than a commercial requirement which needs to enhance tourism, marketing and economy (Maughan and Jordan, 2015). As LCC encourages the festival programme, the commitment to community cohesion is seen at a rhetorical level but without the financial commitment of maintaining and managing a permanent building (Maughan and Bianchini, 2004).

It is difficult to identify all music venues within a city (Cohen, 2012; Kronenburg, 2011) and hence the discussion has taken examples of several different types of venue to build a picture of the Leeds music scene. There is a large gap between those venues that can offer between 1,000-3,000 seating capacity and that of the football ground which has a capacity of around 38,000 (Annex 15). The

arena therefore with a capacity of between 12,000 and 15,000 adds to the cultural facilities with the ability to attract a greater variety of professional touring bands. Smaller venues noted are invaluable to the local music scene and often are 'defined by a set of social, cultural and economic attributes' but these venues that represent these communities often have programmes that are at risk financially (DCMS, 2019, p. 23).

Financial necessity is perhaps a reason why some of these venues have diversified, offering multi-functioning bars, food and event space as well as hosting other forms of entertainment such as dance and comedy (Parkinson et al., 2015). These smaller venues play an important part in the music industry particularly as the 'long-term success of the UK's larger music and cultural institutions is inextricably interlinked to the opportunity provided at the grassroots level' (DCMS, 2019, p.23). The report 'Live Music' (2019) ordered by the House of Commons highlighted the threat to many smaller venues that find themselves unable to meet higher rents and licensing laws. In light of the issues reported Leeds established the 'The City Music Forum' in 2019, which aims to bring together stakeholders in the Leeds music scene and support the development of music. Time will tell if this has a major impact on the music venues across the city.

Not all small venues are in difficulties however. Venues such as the Brudenell Social Club have successfully continued to be one of the 'in places' for bands that are probably not seeking the commercial success or the following to play at an arena. The Brudenell Social Club celebrated its centenary in the same year the Arena was opened (2013). The venue has gone through a series of transformations and Nathan Clarke (who took over from his father in 2004) now runs it as a fully public venture rather than as a private members' club. This provides flexibility for different genres of music, beer festivals and comedy to appeal to a wider audience, although music is probably listed on the bill the most. In an interview for the Yorkshire Evening Post in 2013, Clarke identified that he has 'always been very aware it was not about getting the biggest band possible ... So it's an eclectic mixture that ticks a lot of boxes for a whole range of genres that expressed the values of what we like as a music venue' Clarke (quoted in Seaman, 2013, n.pag.). Situated in Headingley with a 400 capacity it is in the midst of student land, and they make up a large proportion of its

audiences with ticket prices ranging from free to around £25 (2019) make it an affordable night-out that can be repeated on a more frequent basis.

The example of the Brudenell Social Club demonstrates that there is clear a distinction between the smaller venues and the larger more corporate venues. Whilst the various types of venues can attract the same audiences it is the performing artists that are significantly different as well as the ticket prices. The large corporate venues such as an arena attract the highly professional international artists and groups with large fan bases. Therefore, an arena can only complement what is already available rather than adding competition. In the broader sense, a diversity of audiences is likely to visit more than one type of music venue within Leeds. This can only be seen as an added benefit to the overall attractiveness and economy of the city.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has critically reviewed and analysed the administrative and political context and the governance of LCC and the significance of the three overlapping Visions for Leeds. The powerful leadership in LCC saw Trickett who understood the need for network governance establish the Leeds Initiative to develop a clear vision for Leeds. The Visions for Leeds provided LCC a strategic framework for re-positioning and re-imaging the city and emphasised economic development through cultural-led regeneration. Within a collective agreed pathway for the future development of Leeds, LCC could position itself as a competitive national and international city.

The city centre became key to restructuring Leeds and LCC encouraged the expansion of the financial and service sectors. The ability to diversify into new areas of commerce and services created an expansion and economic growth that changed the social profile of the city centre, which saw a level of gentrification become an important facet of urban regeneration. Unlike other cities Leeds reclaimed its city centre and instead of demolition, the old Victorian warehouses retained their look and for a while the 'Leeds look' remained the preferred architecture of LCC.

The Europeanisation of the cityscape was an attempt to re-positioning Leeds to the same standard of other cities of similar status through its urban fabric and its 24-hour city policy. The major waterfront regeneration and city centre development within the UDP, created gateways, quarters and prestigious development areas along with increased city living in high-rise buildings for residents and students, enhanced retail and hospitality experiences leading to a widening of the city centre boundary, all of which pointed to the recurring theme of becoming a competitive global city.

There is no clear formula that indicates a city needs an arena to be able to compete with other cities. However, as Leeds was one of only two without an arena, LCC realised the opportunities it would bring in attracting investments, world-class performers, benefiting the economy as well as an increased footfall from transient tourism across the city by adding to its cultural infrastructure. These opportunities were a clearly a reason for developing the only one key major cultural project during the financial crisis.

There is no evidence to suggest that a cultural policy influenced the governance of LCC. Instead of an independent Cultural Policy 2002 it was included in the themes of the Vision for Leeds. The pragmatic top-down approach taken by LCC, heavily focused on economic benefits through urban regeneration and cultural development to enhance the city's infrastructure rather than public benefit. Whilst Leeds has a vibrant music scene demonstrated by the many varied informal and formal music venues of differing sizes, which come and go and a large number of festivals, there remained no appropriate indoor music venues for popular music.

Overall LCC has retained its civic pride in the way it has promoted and defended its local identity. The Visions for Leeds provided the strategic plans to cultivate the aspirations and defined values which saw it change from an industrial to a European and global city. Through urban and cultural regenerations the fabric of the city has changed but as Leeds evolved progressively, it has done so without a clear strategic planning framework, the Visions for Leeds and UDP are arguably the ambition and guide for the city.

CHAPTER 7: DEVELOPING AN ARENA: AN INSPIRING VENUE FOR A VIBRANT CITY? LEEDS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter offers an in-depth investigation into the narrative of governance and decision-making surrounding the inception, construction and opening of the First Direct Arena. It reviews the roles of key stakeholders, such as the leaders of LCC, councillors and corporate leadership team in terms of influencing decision-making and the role of urban and cultural governance. It critically analyses the impact of the Leeds Initiative and the three iterations of the Vision for Leeds as they helped shape the long-term priorities for the transformation of the city, of which the arena was one. It also considers the importance of the pressure from media campaigns and the public. In terms of urban and cultural governance the decision-making by LCC is reviewed and discusses how external actors affected the development processes and the funding for the arena.

The timeframe is from the year 1980 which saw the demolition of the Queens Hall and the first interest from a private company to build an arena, to the final inauguration of the First Direct Arena in 2013. The data obtained is from a range of academic journal articles, archived official council minutes, newspaper articles and the outcomes from semi-structured interviews with those with different roles and responsibilities such as councillors, planning officers, developers and operators.

Given the length of time taken for the development of arena the chapter is structured into four phases.

- 1) 1980-2004: Antecedents
- 2) 2004-2007: The idea becoming a reality
- 3) 2007-2009: A ruffling of feathers
- 4) 2009-2013: The arena is 'good to go'

PHASE 1: 1980-2004: ANTECEDENTS

Table 7.1: Timeline of key dates and actions

Date	Action
1980-2004	Labour controlled City Council
1989	Demolition of Queens Hall
1990	Leeds Initiative created
1999-2009	Vision for Leeds: Your City Your Choice
2002	Cultural Policy introduced
2004	Reviewing the Vision for Leeds

The timeline in Table 7.1 indicates that the demolition of the Queens Hall in 1989 left Leeds without a medium sized venue for popular music. The creation of the Leeds Initiative in 1990 played a major role in establishing the strategic focus for the city and the three overlapping Vision for Leeds where the discussion for an arena was started. Whilst there was initially reluctance by LCC to develop a cultural policy such a policy was eventually developed in 2002; its impact, however, was relatively small in terms of developing the arena.

The missing cultural facility – an arena?

The demise of the Queens Hall (5,000 capacity) in 1989 left concert audiences in the Leeds City Region with no option but to travel to other major cities to see popular bands and events. According to participant B:

*There was a perception that there were popular music arenas in Sheffield, in Manchester, in Liverpool and Newcastle and in some way Leeds was the missing link.
(Participant B, Councillor)*

Leeds's capacity to compete with other cities of similar status, which had a least one arena, as well as fulfilling its ambition to become a major European centre (Vision for Leeds I), was limited. If the city was to be competitive in cultural terms, the lack of an arena had to be addressed. The decision by LCC to create an attractive urban environment with appropriate cultural facilities such as an arena was identified by participant F:

So x might have told you about some of the council's vision that we had in its widest sense to introduce some key additional facilities in the city and one of those things that would add value was the arena – we hadn't got one.

(Participant F, Planning Officer)

The argument for building of an arena was much wider than a national or local policy for regeneration and cultural development. It was intrinsic to enhancing the cultural infrastructure with a view to raising the city's profile and encouraging global investment. Participant D however, questioned the aspiration for Leeds to have an arena:

So, is having an arena a good thing for Leeds? I don't know. I think it's just an expectation that a city like Leeds ought to have an arena. Who created the impression that major cities had to have an arena? – I don't know – presumably something we inherited from the States and Leeds is the second biggest city outside of London so why wouldn't it have an arena.

(Participant D, Academic)

Whilst the expectation of a city such as Leeds having an arena was alluded to by participant D, the public support from residents across Leeds was far more concerned with the practicalities of attending music concerts as noted by participant F and G. The existing music indoor venues in the city centre lacked appropriate space, technical and acoustic capacity to promote and host large professional productions of global bands. This lack of an appropriate venue was perceived as a missing link in the provision of the city's cultural offer. Participants F and G summarise their perspective and the frustration felt at having to go to other cities to watch live performances:

I have always lived in Leeds; whenever we wanted to go and see music with a large production we had to go to Sheffield or even further afield than that, so they had something we didn't. So it was something we identified as a need for.

(Participant F, Planning Officer)

...music fans [were] frustrated at having to go to Manchester, Sheffield, Birmingham taking hard earned Leeds money to other cities.

(Participant G, Music archivist)

Whilst LCC had accepted the need for an arena as early as 1996 there was no progress until the early 2000s where it became included in a wider approach within the Vision for Leeds II. There were two different perspectives however about the inclusion of the arena within the Vision for Leeds II. Participant B

indicated that it was included but not the main focus and whilst being competitive with other cities was important the strategic plan was much broader. It was recognised by Participant F however, that the arena was an important element of the Vision and in practical terms one which LCC had indicated wanted to deliver.

We were keen to also have an entertainment facility that rivals some in Europe – absolutely yes – but was that in any way the driving force? No it wasn't.

(Participant B, Councillor)

In the strategic plan the city vision in the early 2000s we identified that this is one of the key elements that we were trying to deliver.

(Participant F, Planning Officer)

To ensure the arena development maintained momentum, The Yorkshire Evening Post ran a large-scale campaign in 2006 calling for an arena to service the Leeds City Region, satisfy the needs of the public and in doing so increase the local economy. Paul Robinson, journalist at the Yorkshire Evening Post wrote in his article 'Bring it on' how it was 'MUSIC to our ears – that's the delighted public reaction to the Yorkshire Evening Post's Leeds Needs an Arena campaign' (2006, n.pag.).

The article highlighted that a range of Leeds residents supported the need for an arena. Robinson argued that the Leeds economy was missing out by not being able to accommodate large acts:

Leeds's lack of a flagship indoor venue means it is invariably bypassed when top acts like Kylie Minogue, an Australian singer songwriter and Oasis, an English rock band created in Manchester 1990s) (both have huge commercial success) who have a global reputation head out on tour.

(Robinson, 2006, n.pag.).

The geographical location of Leeds however, could be problematic in attracting these top acts. As explained by participant E:

generally there is something called the spine of the country which is London, Birmingham, Manchester and Glasgow and artists that have limited time on their European tour will only play these four venues, with the expectation that those who wish to see them will travel.

(Participant E, Manager)

Therefore, the arena would have competition; particularly as some bands with limited tour dates were likely to stay within those cities located on the 'spine'. Even with that caveat, the estimated value to the economy as well as boosting the city's image was evident as highlighted by Robinson (2006) (Table 7.2).

Table 7.2: Estimated value to the local economy from international artists playing at an arena

Arena	Opened	Capacity	Bands	Estimated value [pounds sterling]
MEN Arena	1995	21,000	Paul Simon, Scissor Sisters, George Michael	£45m
Hallam FM Arena (Utilita Arena, Sheffield)	1991	12,500	Bruce Springsteen, Christina Aguilera, Muse	£27m
Metro Radio Arena (Utilita Arena, Newcastle)	1995	11,000	Basement Jaxx, Richard Ashcroft, Iron Maiden	£24m
Nottingham Arena (Motorpoint Arena)	2000	10,000	Lionel Richie, Shayne Ward, Deep Purple	£22m

Source: Robinson, 2006, n.pag.

Open-air concert venues – competition for the Arena?

As Table 7.2 shows in attracting global artists to a city venue brings increased economic benefits and boosts the local economy with a high number of transient tourists. The variety of venues across a city can also increase competitiveness. This is particularly the case with the open-air concerts, in which Leeds has had success attracting global stars. The use of Roundhay Park in 2006 for example saw Robbie Williams⁴¹ bring around a £10million boost to the Leeds economy. The Ed Sheeran (Yorkshire born singer, songwriter), Divide Concert at Roundhay Park over two days 16 and 17 August 2019 saw 'well in excess of 150,000 people flock into Leeds' (Casci, 2019, n.pag.). According to BBC News, Roundhay Park was 'one of the biggest outdoor concert venues in England [to be] approved' with an increased capacity of 80,000 each night (BBC News, 2019).

⁴¹ A solo artists formerly of Take That who has achieved major commercial success.

The offer of large open-air spaces, however, brings a different level of competition to the dedicated permanent venues. Participant E alluded to the trend for 2019 where big named stars were opting for the open-air temporary venues:

*I think the competition element of the industry that is really interesting but also very detrimental to arenas is all the promoters using the outdoor spaces now. So you will see Pink has gone outdoor next year and there are another couple of things going outdoors, [the] Spice Girls [have] gone outdoor next year and no arena in the UK has got that. So that's not a competition between us and Sheffield or us and Manchester that is competition between us and open space.
(Participant E, Manager)*

The point made by Participant E is of interest particularly as well as outdoor facilities another arena would mean that there are several arenas in close proximity to each other and could be detrimental in terms of attracting audiences. This view was taken by Sheffield City Council which is discussed later in chapter. However, it is the impact of outdoor venues which appear to be of concern. It is worth noting the differences between indoor and outdoor venues particularly as the outdoor capacity for events provides a huge opportunity for a city wanting to increase its global profile. Outdoor capacity far exceeds anything an indoor arena can offer, making it a profitable option for organisers, artists and promoters. These venues however are at the mercy of the weather and the acoustics and visibility to the stage are inferior to those of a purpose build arena. The outdoor spaces have additional disadvantages such as sustainability of the site before and after, as well as objections, particularly from local residents who argue that a park, such as Roundhay Park in Leeds, within a residential area does not have the infrastructure to cope with large numbers of people. The LCC Licensing Committee held on 21 May 2019 discussed a report put forward by the Chief Officer Elections and Regulatory which detailed an application to vary a premises licence. The application sought to 'increase the capacity of the existing premises licence of 19,999 to a capacity of 79,000 at Roundhay Park' (Raper, 2019, Report item 118). The increased capacity for the Ed Sheeran concert received 20 objections from residents (examples in Annex 16).

According to the minutes of the LCC Licensing Committee held on 21 May 2019 the discussion was held in a closed session and returned a favourable vote to allow the increase to be granted. In terms of promotion of the city, Leeds could

boast that the 'largest park now has a bigger capacity than the likes of Old Trafford, Elland Road and Twickenham, making it one of the largest live music venues anywhere in the UK' (Johnson, 2019, n.pag.). Exploiting open-air venues was one avenue for LCC to demonstrate its ability to host large popular music concerts. Therefore, the outdoor venues could have taken precedent over the building of a new indoor venue. However, LCC remained focussed on the strategic priorities within the Vision for Leeds, which had identified an indoor entertainment facility.

When the private company, Leeds Arena Ltd,⁴² came forward expressing an interest to build an arena on their land at Clarence Dock at no expense to the public purse however, LCC showed little interest in the proposal. The presence of this company is seen throughout the several development discussions and various competitions until 2006 when they took the offer elsewhere in the Region (Kirklees and Bradford). There was no official documentation found in council minutes concerning this development and most of the dialogue about the company came from a Blog (Skyscraper City). In interviews, the participants also made no comment on this company. The assumption therefore is that LCC was not convinced that this was a serious proposal.

The introduction of a Cultural policy

As previously noted, there was a lack of cultural policy until 2002. Prior to this, one participant mentioned that they 'may have had' a 'Leisure Policy' for Leeds and like many other local authorities, had tried to resist a cultural policy. However, as one interviewee commented there was still some resistance:

most of the time it [a cultural policy] got resisted because certain politicians didn't like them and that's common, it's not unique to Leeds. Certain politicians don't like being tied by a policy, you know they want to be opportunistic get something to happen as they have relatively short timescale, you know they will be up for re-election in four years time. I don't think it's just me saying this, it's a general assessment of the things that happened.

⁴² Leeds Arena Ltd is no longer trading and unavailable for comment.

*So I think that - they don't like having a policy that's for sure, though I never really understood that because I would have thought that an adept politician (and some of the people who have been responsible for cultural policy have been extremely adept politicians) would be able to use a policy saying "look we said this - this is what we have agreed that we are going to do and you have to give me money to get this sorted."
(Participant D, Academic)*

Leeds as evidenced by participant D appeared to have adopted a more pragmatic approach to cultural developments rather than being led by a coordinated cultural policy. The cultural governance was focussed on a small number of key individuals and their own visions for the culture agenda of the city (chapter 6) as alluded to by Participant D:

*For a lot of the time those years around the millennium they had a very powerful advocate and champion in Bernard Atha. The problem was that his vision was not necessarily shared even by fellow members of his political group on the council.
(Participant D, Academic)*

When the Cultural Strategy (2002) was implemented its vision was to work within a network governance strategy building partnerships and aimed to prevent individuals from retaining powerful roles in the decision-making. This was a significant change in cultural governance, which led to an approach by LCC to have a network to oversee major flagship projects that required large-scale investment and hence alleviate some of the potential risks as participant D outlined:

*I think the thing about the arena is that it is an investment on a scale that Leeds had not seen before in terms of its cultural policy, just nothing came close.
(Participant D, Academic)*

Despite the implementation of the Cultural Policy, the outcome from the consultation and the media campaigns there was still no firm decision to what LCC intended to develop as part of enhancing the cultural infrastructure for Leeds.

PHASE 2: 2004-2007: THE IDEA BECEOMING A REALITY

Table 7.3: Timeline of key dates and actions

Date	Action
2004-2010	Conservative and Liberal Democrat Coalition
2004-2020	Vision for Leeds II (2004-2020) 'Your chance to have your say
2004	LCC Feasibility study into the need for a music venue
2005	A Cultural Facilities Task Group created
November 2005	Review recommendations of the Feasibility Study (Phase 1, 2, 3) LCC Executive Board meeting Discussion about the sale of Leeds Bradford Airport (Executive Board meeting 16/11/2005)
January 2006	Approval for the arena development
June 2007	Market Awareness open day event for the Arena

Table 7.3 provides an outline of the key stages and actions for the next phase of the arena development. A changing political landscape, and the election of councillors for a four-year period, increased the tensions between devising a project within a policy and being able to realise it. The potential for a set back to the development of the arena or concert venue was a real possibility at this time with the change of political control. It was left to the coalition leadership to decide how to respond to the flagship project given it was still at the discussion stages. The approval of the revised Leeds Initiative II however was fundamental in taking the arena project forward and it demonstrated the continued support of the LCC for the project. LCC was however reliant on consultants and the Cultural Task Force Group, consisting of members of the private and public sector to provide recommendations as to which cultural facility was the best fit for Leeds. The arena project had overall support from the different political parties within LCC. As participant B highlights, the new political coalition confirmed that they wanted to make things happen and with the flagship project having public support it was a good opportunity to keep the scheme.

*LCC were extremely determined to move forward on a series of fronts and was pleased that we got so much in place very quickly.
(Participant B, Councillor)*

Whilst the arena option was supported by the media and the public response to the previous campaigns had been positive, LCC still had not confirmed what it intended to build. By 2004, five years had passed since the initial consultation that had indicated a need for a multi-purpose events venue, yet the LCC were

still far from making a decision. According to participant A, an arena, a conference centre or a concert hall were all still in the mix:

*I think the first dilemma was having those three broad ideas: which one did you progress?
(Participant A, Councillor)*

The Leeds Cultural Partnership (an offshoot of the Leeds Initiative) had been responsible for the development of cultural policy in Leeds and to progress the arena project appointed the consultant company PMP, Donaldson and Hetherington (Strange and Long, 2009). Whether the previous study undertaken by Faulkner Brown was taken into consideration is not clear (chapter 6). The role of the consultant was:

*to undertake a comprehensive study into the provision of concert, arena and other music related facilities in the City and, to consider whether such facilities are sufficient, of the appropriate quality or have the capacity to be improved to meet present and anticipated future needs.
(LCC, 2005, 2.1)*

The consultant's role therefore was to review the established cultural facilities within the city, and to offer advice on the most viable size and type of permanent event space for Leeds. The study considered if Leeds should have a stand-alone flagship building or be part of a multifunctional complex. The Cultural Facilities Task Group acted in an advisory capacity to the consultants. Following the outcomes from the study, it was this Task Group that recommended to the Leeds Cultural Partnership on the course of action needed, based on the consultant's recommendations. The governance of the reporting process ensured that the decision-making remained under the control of LCC.

First, second and third phase of the Feasibility study 1

The study by the consultants was divided into three phases, 'Identifying the Potential, Developing the Options, Detailed Options Assessment' (LCC, 2005, p. 2). The first phase concluded that further research was required in several areas to provide greater clarity on value for money and cultural benefits for the city (Table 7.4)


Table 7.4: Areas on existing and new cultural provision requiring further research

Cultural Facility	Capacity
Retain the Town Hall – further investment in its operation and quality.	Non-specified
Develop a new purpose built concert hall for symphonic music	2,000 seats
Develop a multi-purpose venue	2,500-5,000
Develop a multi-purpose venue with smaller auditoria for conference business.	Non-specified
Develop a major arena	8,000-12,000

Source: LCC, 2005, p. 4.

The second phase considered the options regarding location in and around the city, development costs and the potential financial return. At this stage the consultants were asked to look at all potential sites regardless of ownership. Their aim was to consider sites based on the suitability and needs of the facility, taking into account ‘planning policy compliance, transport links and ease of land acquisition (where relevant)’ (LCC, 2005, p. 3). In other words the search for a suitable location should not be constrained by land ownership issues. The outcome from this phase identified several potential sites (Image 7.1) and the projected costs of development along with the possible financial return of each of the options (Table 7.5).

Image 7.1: Potential locations for the arena



Source: Michelin, n.d., n.pag.

The coloured circles indicate the location on the map:

Blue: Shannon Street, east of Quarry Hill

Black: Stourton North, immediately west of Junction 7 of the M621

Orange: Holbeck, South of Sweet Street

Yellow: Carlisle Road, close to the Royal Armouries and Clarence Docks

Table 7.5: Projected costs and Financial Outcomes

Facility	Cost	Funding	Projected financial outcome
Concert Hall	£70m approx.	Public funding - No obvious grants	£1.6-£2.7m annual subsidy needed
Mid-size venue	£25-45m approx.	Enabling and commercial input	Operated at an operational deficit
Arena	£40-£60m approx.	Possible private funding with public sector support (land acquisition)	Break even or make a small surplus

Source: PMP (quoted in LCC, 2005, p. 4).

The third phase undertook a further detailed study for the development of the following options the 'Town Hall (redevelopment/improvement); First class symphonic concert hall; mid-size venue; large arena and the potential of a conference and exhibition facility as part of or alongside any new facility' (PMP, Donaldson and Hetherington, 2005, p. 1). The outcome of this study provided recommendations on what was the most achievable and the best financial return for LCC. As seen in Table 7.5 the arena facility which included private/public funding was the only development to either break even or make a surplus. The other two options would have run at a projected financial loss. The consultants indicated that there was 'excellent support from private operators for the development of a multi-purpose arena in Leeds' and interest from the private sector in being involved (PMP, Donaldson and Hetherington, 2005, p. 12). The options of a mid-size venue or concert hall received much less interest.

Given the projected costs and financial outcomes of the cultural facilities, the arena was identified as the most beneficial to LCC. The Cultural Facilities Task Group agreed the recommendations (Annex 17) indicating that LCC should concentrate on the arena and possible improvements to the Town Hall. The matters for discussion from the feasibility study (Executive Board meeting 16 November 2005) are significant as the decision-making by LCC was now based on recommendations from official in-depth studies rather than the consultation

outcomes following the development of the Vision for Leeds or from the media. Whilst the recommendations clearly advise LCC that a new arena was the most beneficial cultural facility for Leeds, it also indicated that a further study was necessary to cost the improvements to the Town Hall and prepare a delivery strategy for the arena. According to participant A the steer for the arena actually came from the consultants:

*So there was an evidence base that was kind of marshalled by the consultants that led to the conclusion ... forget about the concert hall and forget about exhibition space, concentrate and deliver an arena.
(Participant A, Councillor)*

However, as noted above it was the Cultural Facilities Task Group that had the authority to agree the initial recommendations put forward to LCC. The endorsement from LCC signalled the potential development of the arena, and with the further funding for a feasibility study it had now become a serious prospect. During 2005, LCC finally endorsed the funding model to build the arena, which was likely to be a mix of private and public money. In terms of potential funding, it is important to note at this stage that at the LCC Executive meeting held on 16 November 2005, the first discussions about the continuation of the Council's shareholding in Leeds Bradford Airport were held. The sale of the airport was ultimately significant in terms of providing the funding for the development of the arena.

The development plans were made available to the public in 2005 and created interest from a range of organisations including Leeds Arena Ltd (a private company), as well as Ken Bates (former owner and chairman of Leeds United). According to an article in the Yorkshire Evening Post, the Leeds Arena Ltd made a plea to the council to 'let me build your new music arena says boss' (Robinson, 2005, n.pag.). The company claimed it had the finances available removing the need to spend public money. It owned the land at Clarence Docks and plans had already been drawn up for an arena that would include facilities for Ice Hockey, although no application for planning permission had been made. In the same article, LCC seemed less convinced with the company's statement wanting instead to keep their options open. Councillor Carter said 'I am pleased to hear of his continued interest, but he's not the only fish in the sea. We have to get the best possible deal for the people of Leeds' (Robinson, 2005, n.pag.). The possible plans to build an arena also caught the interest of Ken Bates, who

stated that 'this city needs an arena and it must be at Elland Road' (Robinson, 2005, n.pag.). Bates also declared that there would be no investment from him. Instead he indicated that he intended to redevelop the wasteland site outside Elland Road and attract 'investors keen to build hotels, restaurants and luxury flats on 50 currently derelict acres' (Taylor, 2005, n.pag.). The arena if built there would be an attractive option within this potential bigger redevelopment.

Another feasibility study and still no decision on location for the arena

Publication of the plan to build an arena had created interest from individual parties who already owned some of the potential sites. LCC however decided that at a cost of a further £20,000, consultants PMP, Donaldson and ARUP be commissioned to undertake a further feasibility study (Proposed multi-purpose arena & associated conference/exhibition facilities in Leeds, 2006). This study was to advise on how to deliver a strategy for the arena and the possibility of improving the Town Hall to transform it into a world-class music venue. LCC was criticised for this further spending by the Yorkshire Post. The rationale for the additional study was to ensure that prior to fully committing to delivering a major building project LCC had fully investigated the process and cost.

Whilst LCC waited for the outcome of the second feasibility study before making a final decision, the Yorkshire Evening Post was stepping up its campaign with headlines that started to appear in the newspaper supporting the narrative of the economic benefits of an arena even if one was in reference to the open-air concerts. For example:

*The value of bringing global stars to Leeds was highlighted earlier this month when Robbie Williams' outdoor concerts in Roundhay Park gave the local economy a [pounds sterling] 10 m boost
(Robinson, 2006, n.pag.)*

Several interviewees mentioned that the second feasibility study was needed and even though they were aware of the media campaign no decisions would be made until all aspects of the financial risk had been thoroughly investigated.

When the second feasibility report 'Proposed Multi- Purpose Arena and Associated Conference/Exhibition Facilities in Leeds 2006' was concluded it produced a series of key findings and 10 recommendations for the LCC to consider (see Annex 18). Several of the recommendations are worth noting at

this point as they provide an insight of how LCC used them in its final decision-making (Table 7.6).

Table 7.6: Recommendations from the feasibility report

Number	Recommendation
R2	The procurement competition should invite bids from developers/landowners on their own sites, whilst also providing a publicly owned site (namely Elland Road) for those participants that either do not have land interests or believe that the public land available offers the best solution
R3	The Council should follow a 'split' procurement route, selecting the operator separately from the development consortium
R4	The Council should undertake a delivery study (at the appropriate time) into the implications of forming a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) ⁴³ to operate the facility, should the operator procurement fail.
R6	The Council and its public sector partners should set a 'Public Sector Investment limit' for the project. The bidding consortia could use the sum in whole or in part, however through competition bidders may not necessarily seek to use the total funds available.

Source: PMP/Donaldson/Arup, 2006.

In a move to express inclusivity, the procurement process was to invite bids from participants with or without land (R2). This would leave the door open for a private company with its own land to win a procurement competition, an outcome which LCC appeared not to favour. The report identified that two locations on the edge of the city could potentially accommodate the arena, land around Elland Road and around Stourton both of which had become publicly owned. However, the report highlighted that a city centre site was desirable as it would contribute significantly to its regeneration. There were no sites however big enough already in public ownership to accommodate an arena. If LCC wanted a city centre site, it would need to purchase privately owned land, which would not be available for compulsory purchase.

Indeed, it would be difficult for LCC to make a compelling case for a compulsory purchase on the grounds that developing an arena would be in the interest of the public when other sites were available. A further complication was the UDP (2006) which indicated that the 'sites within the City Centre which offer such potential are now largely committed to other development proposals – and scope is limited' (LCC, 2006, p. 237). Instead "satellite' City Centre locations should be considered, and Elland Road was reserved for leisure and tourism

⁴³ SPV a partnership whereby the Council in partnership with a company, where the company manages the facilities directly but the Council retains involvement.

proposals which would enhance the regional and national role of the city' (LCC, 2006, p. 237). Therefore, as part of the competition the Elland Road and Stourton North sites were kept as possible locations for the arena.

The recommendation to have a 'split' procurement process (R3) allowed the selection of the arena operator before choosing the land and developer. This emphasised LCC's focus on attracting global operators by allowing the successful company greater governance in how they wanted the arena to look and function. However, this preference would also lessen the developer's ability to influence decisions. This approach brought criticisms from Leeds Arena Ltd, who argued that doing this before the bidding process was 'prejudicial to achieving the best solution for Leeds' (Silverwood, 2006, n.pag.). Moreover, the company argued that 'Leeds will end up with just another 'me too' arena like all the rest of the loss-making arenas that currently exist in the UK' if the LCC selected the operator before the site (Silverwood, 2006, n.pag.). Leeds Arena Ltd continued to highlight that they had the land, the money and experience to develop an arena that would be iconic and leave them as owner, developer and operator. They also identified that LCC remained fixed on its municipal approach to the development, listening to consultants rather than seeking private sector investors who could deliver something creative and exceptional for the city. The company believed that in following this approach LCC would create something, which was low risk, boring and lacking in design creativity.

Despite the argument posed by Leeds Arena Ltd, LCC continued to review all the potential sites. The UPD (2006) had made reference to using quarters and whilst there was an entertainment quarter in the city centre from the Grand Theatre to Leeds Playhouse, there was no strategic plan in place for future developments on a scale such as an arena. The lack of a suitable city centre site and the size needed was problematic as outlined by participant F:

There wasn't an obvious site for it because there is not a plan that say this is where the arena should go – that would be easy. Once you are starting to work on the premise of trying to get around about 12, 13, 14,000 capacity arena you've got limited options of where it's going to go.
(Participant F, Planning Officer)

A city centre location however, remained the preferred location for the arena. LCC argued that 'an arena proposal can play a key role in raising the profile of

the city, helping Leeds fulfil its role as the focus of the city region and raise itself up a league to be recognised as a major European city' (Learning and Leisure and Development Departments, 2006, p. 4). At the Executive Committee held on 13 December 2006, a summary of the Feasibility Report providing key findings and recommendations was presented. The consultants recommended the split procurement route, which would see the operator appointed prior to acquiring land and developer. The consultants also advised that at the appropriate time LCC should consider the development of a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) (PMP/Donaldson and ARUP, 2006, p. 6). The SPV could be invoked if any of the procurement processes failed which meant that LCC would have to deliver the arena in the capacity of the Operator or Developer.

Table 7.7: Key outcomes from Executive Meeting 13 December 2006

Resolved	
a	That the findings and recommendations contained in the PMP consultants' report on the proposed funding and procurement of a multi purpose arena and associated facilities be supported.
b	That approval be given to the proposed delivery plan to be pursued by the City Council to select an operator and developer/funder for the development of a multi purpose arena and associated facilities.
c	That the requirement for up to £20m as the public sector investment limit needed to facilitate the development of a multi purpose arena in the City be acknowledged.
d	That authority be given for the on-going appointment of PMP Consultants to project manage the implementation of the detailed delivery plan to select a preferred operator and developer/funder to develop a multi purpose arena and associated facilities
e	That authority be given for an injection of up to £235,000 into existing Capital Scheme No 12589/ARE and the incurring of expenditure of up to £535,000 for the appointment of consultants and internal City Council fees to project manage the detailed delivery plan.

Source: LCC, 2006, p. 216.

In Table 7.7 the Executive Board had provided the final approval for the arena development (a) and to follow the proposed delivery plan (b). Both these approvals are significant, as LCC had finally made the decision to proceed with the arena development. The task for seeking appropriate investment had now started although LCC was adamant that only £20m would come from the public purse, which included investment from Yorkshire Forward (c). A further £20m would be sought from the sale of the Leeds Bradford Airport and around £50m from private investors and developers. Alongside the search for investment LCC began the process of looking for an operator and developer. The consultants

would be retained and an injection of capital funding would be used to cover the delivery and management of the project (d and e).

The final decision taken by LCC in 2006 to address the lack of an arena had taken seven years from the first Vision for Leeds I. To engage a wider audience and demonstrate the flagship arena facility LCC held a Market Awareness day on 11th June 2007. The purpose of the day was two-fold, firstly to seek interested parties in initial discussions and secondly to demonstrate that Leeds was enhancing its image and the arena was central to this. Councillor Andrew Carter CBE, Leader of the Conservative Group confirmed his belief that ‘an arena can play a key role in realising the profile of Leeds and helping it go up a league as a major European city’ (Yorkshire Evening Post, 2007, n.pag.). Now that the arena process had begun in earnest, Leeds Arena Ltd who had fallen foul of any opportunity to build their arena in Leeds disappeared from any future discussions.

PHASE 3: 2007 to 2009: A RUFFLING OF FEATHERS

Table 7.8: Key aspects from 2007 to 2009

Date	Action
11/09/2007	Consultant PMP and LCC discuss the option of the SPV
20/09/2007	Project Board advise on three expressions of interest for the developer.
12/12/2007	LCC Extraordinary meeting to discuss the opposition party’s alternative proposal for the use of the money from the sale of Leeds Bradford Airport
2008	Economic Crash
09/01/2008	MEL and GMI submitted bids for the developer
15/05/2008	SMG preferred operator
January 2008	Leeds Met Staff vacate Brunswick Building
May 2008	Sale of Brunswick Building fails
September 2008	LCC approach Leeds Met for the sale of the land Brunswick Building is situated on
November 2008	Termination of Developer search
November 2008	Clay Pit Land approved as the preferred site with Elland Road in reserve
November 2008	Row between Leeds and Sheffield
04/02/2009	Montpellier Estates Ltd takes LCC to court

Table 7.8 outlines the chronology of the next stage of the development of the arena. With the procurement process in place there remained issues surrounding the financing of such a major project. The financial crisis in 2008

plunged the arena project into doubt for a time. The effect of the crisis however, also created an opportunity for LCC to find the location for the arena. The sale by Leeds Metropolitan University of the Brunswick Building to a private developer failed and LCC were in a position to buy the land. This provided the opportunity for a city centre location for the arena, which had been favoured all along. Using the money from the sale of Leeds Bradford Airport however created tensions and arguments within LCC. Tensions also arose from external networks and potential competitors such as Sheffield City Council and following the termination of the developer procurement process brought LCC under fire that resulted in further delays.

Investment for the arena or divided across the 33 wards?


LCC had planned to use income from the sale of the Leeds Bradford Airport to part fund the arena development. In the original proposal LCC had identified the refurbishment of the City Varieties and the building of a new city-centre swimming pool, as well as the arena. The focus on several large projects caused disagreements with the Labour group of LCC who had put forward an alternative proposal for how the receipts from the sale of airport should be used. This was a direct challenge to the Coalition Council as without the income from the sale the development of the arena was in doubt. There is irony in this challenge given the flagship project discussions had started when Labour was in control through the Vision for Leeds (I) and remained a priority in the Vision for Leeds (II).

In an extraordinary meeting held on 12 December 2007 an alternative White Paper Motion proposal from the Labour group was discussed which 'goes to the heart of local democracy and accountability of councils towards the electors in this city' (LCC, 2007, p. 2). In essence they felt that the income in excess of £50 million that came from the sale of the Leeds Bradford Airport should be distributed across the 33 Council wards in Leeds, supporting improvements to sports pitches and other green spaces and financing council house building. Following a heated discussion, the amendments to the original proposal were eventually defeated. This defeat meant that the income from the sale of the airport was to be used for the development of the arena.

A split procurement process

LCC, on advice from PMP consultants, had agreed to use an overlapping split procurement route (LCC, 2006) (Image 7.2). This allowed the selection of the operator at the same time as, or followed by, a site/developer selection.

Image 7.2: Split procurement process



Source: PMP/Donaldson and ARUP, 2006, p. 6.

Also advised by PMP consultants and agreed by LCC was that within the split procurement process, the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) option was included. This option would be invoked if either the operator or developer procurement process were unsuccessful. LCC therefore remained in control and retained ownership of the whole process as well reserving the ability to change elements to work with other agencies to deliver the cultural facility if needed. This gave LCC a level of flexibility if the financial climate changed. The procurement process to seek an international operator was however successful. SMG⁴⁴ was awarded the contract in May 2008, '[SMG] subsequently entered into an agreement with the LCC whereby they would contract to enter into a 25-year full repairing insuring lease to operate a 12,500 seat arena at a location to be determined in the city' (LCC, 2008, p. 10). Importantly the SPV specified at the onset of the procurement process also meant that SMG had to be willing to work with LCC to deliver an alternative solution should one be needed. This was a useful clause for LCC if they took the decision to become the developers themselves.

⁴⁴ SMG merged with ASM Global 2019.

PMP consultants had put forward an identified limit of up to £20 million of public sector funding for the facilitation of the development of the arena. With this limit agreed by LCC any developer plans had to work within this amount. In July 2007 the competitive procurement process for a developer started. Following the initial Pre-Qualification Questionnaire (PQQ) two companies MEI⁴⁵ and GMI⁴⁶ were invited to the next stage, 'Participate in Dialogue' (ITPD). The ITPD stage 'was to enable the Council to discuss all aspects of the project with the bidders, so that a solution may be reached which is capable of satisfying the Council's needs and requirements' (LCC, 2008, p. 337). Both companies were put through to the next stage, 'Invitation to Continue Dialogue' (ITCD). It is worth noting here of the significant cost associated with the amount of work and resources needed by each company at these stages, as it was raised when the procurement process was terminated. The ITCD submission had agreed evaluation; a detailed breakdown is outlined in Annex 19.

According to the report from the Director of City Development (2008) it was during the ITCD stage that the two potential developers claimed that the available gap funding for the arena would be problematic in terms of viability. It was agreed that the bidders 'focus on their commercial proposals and to submit a shortened version of the ITCD requirements on 10 September 2008. The emphasis was for bidders to focus on submitting their best commercial offers' (Director of City Development, 2008, p. 338). Throughout the process LCC stressed that it would use Public Sector Comparators to assess the value for money and if the developers were unable to put forward a competitive bid within the £20 million limit already approved, the procurement process would be terminated.

The developer scheme continued into July 2008, with only two sites in the running, Sweet Street, Holbeck (owned by MEI) and land adjacent to Elland Road, which would be acquired by LCC. At the Executive Board meeting held on 18 April 2009, it was decided that the land adjacent to Elland Road was to be

⁴⁵ Montpellier Estates Ltd (MEI) An established property investment company which experience in working with professional advisory teams involved in the delivery of arena schemes in the UK.

⁴⁶ GMI Construction Established property development company which has carried out numerous development projects ranging in size up to £360m and has an established construction company.

acquired or, if necessary, compulsory purchase powers would be implemented. This gave LCC the option to own the land where the arena potentially was to be located rather than use a site which was owned by the private company MEI. During this time, the City Council Project Board for the arena [established in 2006] was raising issues about the worsening state of the commercial property market and that the responses from the developers were weaker than expected. The developers argued that LCC agreed the original limit of £20 million for the development the arena in 2006 and this was no longer reflected the economic climate of 2008. In the turbulent economic crisis LCC had no other financial options to increase in the budget and therefore upheld the specifications that had been agreed previously. This decision is reflected by Participant C:

This project is about many things but only two that really count to build a building that met SMG's facilities specification and [to] do it for 59 million (Participant C, Director of Services)

On the recommendation of the Director of City Development, the Executive Board at its meeting on 5 November 2008 approved the termination of the procurement process for a developer. This was a significant move by LCC, and whilst the financial crisis could not have been predicted, the decision-making process to adopt the split procurement process and the SPV suggests that LCC had believed that this had been a possibility all along. Following the termination LCC took on the developer role for the arena. The reason for highlighting the shortened submission to the ITCD, the constrained economic climate and the inability of LCC to increase the budget are related to MEI taking LCC to court.

Securing a location, another change?

The impact of the economic crash in 2008 also saw a £275m regeneration scheme proposed by Black-Country-based Castlemore Securities, which included the sale of the Brunswick Building, fall through.

Image: 7.3: Brunswick Building



Source: Leodis, n.d., n.pag.

This provided LCC with the potential for a new city centre location to be considered for the arena. The money from the sale of Leeds Bradford Airport gave LCC the leverage to buy the Brunswick Building from the University. One participant highlighted that several aspects came together into a new mix of opportunities, a case of serendipity. Despite the debates about different sites the actual location choice was the result of a series of disconnected coincidental circumstances. LCC claimed that the recession had made the original locations (Holbeck and Elland Road) too expensive, and the option to purchase a new site was preferable and affordable. Participant B highlighted:

[the arena] simply could not have proceeded on the other sites because the costs had spiralled completely out of control from our point of view it became unaffordable.
(Participant B, Councillor)

This resulted into the Clay Pit Lane location in the city centre with its proximity to the inner road being chosen, six months after the operator SMG had been approved (Image 7.4).


Image 7.4: First Direct Arena, Clay Pit Lane



Source: Google maps, 2021, n.pag.

Image 7.5 identifies the sites of the Brunswick Building (B) and the site (car park) already owned by LCC (A) that provided a total of 2.08 hectares (5.14 acres). The combination of these sites was deemed a suitable space to accommodate the arena. The surrounding areas would be put forward for regeneration to offer additional facilities to audiences (Director of City Development, 2008).

Image: 7.5: Arena development sites Clay Pit Lane



Source: Leeds City Council, 2009, n.pag.

The suggestion that LCC knew all along where the arena was to be located was clearly unfounded as two participants note:

[some say] we knew all along [the location]: well we jolly well didn't know all along.

(Participant B, Councillor)

I knew at the time the Council pulled the rabbit out of the hat with Clay Pit Lane with Leeds Met when Leeds Met was in its building phase at the time and so that site was identified by the Council to develop the arena itself.

(Participant A, Councillor)

LCC was now in a position to approve the new location for the arena in the city centre. With the location finally determined, finances in place and the decision to be the developer, the dual procurement process, which included the SPV, had been a good move. When the Executive Committee in November 2008 took the decision to terminate the developer procurement competition it raised tensions

between LCC and MEI who felt that they had been misled particularly as the competition had continued well into 2008.

The preferred location of Clay Pit Lane, which had been purchased for £6m from Leeds Metropolitan University, was finally approved. The circumstances of how this location became the arena site however, lacked any serious planning or strategic analysis. This was alluded to by Participants B and A where they outline a more opportunist and serendipitous route:

*We went into the whole operation extremely straightforwardly and it was set of circumstances that meant we finished up where we ended up.
(Participant B, Councillor)*

*So, I don't think there was a great controversy – a moment of opportunity and the Council and University put that together – although it was an eyesore the site before.
(Participant A, Councillor)*

Clay Pit Lane was limited in terms of space and building a new car park to accommodate additional use by arena audiences was not an option. LCC therefore had to look at what was already available in the vicinity. Town Centre Securities PLC⁴⁷ who already owned the car park adjacent to the proposed arena site was approached by LCC with a proposal to invest in the council-owned Woodhouse Car Park. Their investment of £20 million would allow LCC to refurbish the car park and satisfy the planning permission. The subsequent income from the car park would be attributed to the company. The arena development was now set, LCC was the owner and developer. Within network governance operators SMG now worked directly with LCC, the design team and building contractor.

The court battle: Montpellier Estates Ltd (MEI) versus Leeds City Council

The termination of the developer procurement was significant as it highlighted how LCC was able to change the way in which it decided to progress with the arena development. This was challenged in court when, on the 4 February 2009 MEI took LCC to court, and claimed for damages of £50m for breach of contract under the European procurement law. There appears to be no apology from LCC and a level of defiance was indicated towards the challenge with some of

⁴⁷ Town Centre Securities PLC, Leading Property Investors.

the participants when asked their response was to simply disregard it. Yet for company, which had been involved in a bidding competition for years, using their own land and internal resources, it was a significant loss. It took four years to reach a conclusion with the challenge defeated on 6 February 2013. As a result of the economic crash that left the land a lot less attractive to sell, it is easy to see how the company felt the whole thing was unjust. BBC News reported that, 'Harrogate-based Montpellier Estates, which had proposed an alternative site, claimed it had been deceived into entering and remaining in the competition to develop the arena' (BBC News, 2014, n.pag.). The lack of a confirmed site and, as participant A outlines, support for the arena to be near a motorway were part the Court Case in which MEI accused LCC of 'secretly planning a public development option' (England and Wales High Court, 2010, n.pag.). Participant A and B outline the issue relating to the court case:

There was still the view that the arena should go up on the motorway And the Fletcher proposal was much nearer to that ... so clearly that element had to then work its way through the system and there was a court case which the Council won.
(Participant A, Councillor)

...and there was a famous court case at the end of it all where we [LCC] won, where a potential developer made allegations which were found to be untrue by the court.
(Participant B, Councillor)

The Court Case was costly for both parties, with LCC spending £4m on defence cost. Whilst the Yorkshire Post reported, 'Jan Fletcher's company must pay Leeds City Council interim court costs of £2m' (2013, n.pag.) the company initially failed to pay. An out of court settlement saw only £2m being repaid. In the Yorkshire Post article, statements from two councillors outlined their vindication of any LCC actions during the whole procurement process as well as further costs incurred in the attempt to recoup the council's money:

Council leader Keith Wakefield, said: "We welcome the judge's decision and council taxpayers will be pleased to hear that we are well on the way to recovering £2m of public money and will now be looking towards further recovery of our costs, which were well in excess of £4m"

Council chief executive Tom Riordan added: "We also note the judge's comments about his feeling that the deceit claim should never have been brought in the first place. This further reinforces the integrity of the council's conduct on the decision to cancel the competition to develop the arena"
(Yorkshire Post, 2013, n.pag.)

Sheffield City Council remove support for the Leeds Arena

Sheffield City Council decided to challenge the development of the arena and in particular the potential investment from Yorkshire Forward in 2008. Whilst the feasibility study had indicated that the arena would complement other arenas in the region and Sheffield City Council who were initially supportive decided to oppose the bid from Leeds for the arena. The row that erupted saw the management of Sheffield Arena and local MP Clive Betts calling for Yorkshire Forward to rethink the funding. The protest from Sheffield, which escalated to Parliament through David Blunkett, MP representing the Sheffield Brightside and Hillsborough constituency, claimed that an arena in Leeds would be detrimental to Sheffield and therefore regional development funding should not be used. Paul Robinson of the Yorkshire Evening Post highlighted that Sheffield's argument was that 'it would be inappropriate for Yorkshire Forward to invest public funds in a project that favours one part of the county over another, as its brief is to improve the economy of the Broad Acres as a whole' (2008, p.10). This provoked quite forceful responses from participants C and B:

*You have Yorkshire Forward money, we never question where you put your money you never chose to put any of the Yorkshire Forward money you had towards your arena: please don't question what we do.
(Participant C, Director of Services)*

*Well Sheffield went as far as to complain about the grant from the Development Agency which was a bit rich because by far the biggest recipient of grants from the Regional Development Agency was South Yorkshire.
(Participant B, Councillor)*

Yorkshire Forward however, declared that it thought that the arena would benefit the whole region and had supported the use of £18m towards the project. Ambivalent about the investment itself it left making a considered decision early in 2009. The failure to make a decision was, according to a report to the LCC Executive Committee (14 October 2009), a result of the Government not authorising Yorkshire Forward to provide the funding for the arena (LCC, 2009a). Despite this initial financial setback, the report also indicated that LCC would continue with the project regardless. This challenge illustrates a continuing tension between the two cities as seen in the remarks of those interviewed:

Well I mean [an MP] was the person who was quite frankly stirring the shit – and as a citizen that's how I feel about it ... who the hell does he think he is saying that we can't have things in Leeds because they have them in Sheffield – just plain ridiculous.

(Participant A, Councillor)

One of the disappointing things was that Sheffield who were initially supportive changed their mind and actually quite vociferously opposed what we were doing - which was a great pity because the Industry was saying there's room for a Leeds Arena – what it boiled down to basically was a trade objection effectively whereas Manchester [was] not a problem and continued to support which indicates a greater degree of confidence in their position in Manchester as opposed to Sheffield.

(Participant B, Councillor)

The perceived threat to the viability of the Sheffield Arena and affect of direct competition in terms attracting artists and tourism reducing the financial benefits to Sheffield was noted by Participant C:

I think the affect might have been on the margins but you can't hold Leeds back to protect Sheffield.

(Participant C, Director of Services)

Although the Sheffield objection and the Leeds response are politically based, they do highlight more fundamental aspects of arena development. The Regional Economic Strategy, (RES) (2006) developed by Yorkshire Forward identified the drive to work together across the Yorkshire and Humberside Region to promote regional change, economic performance and to boost cultural assets. The arguments between the councils went against the integrated thinking posed by the Regional Economic Strategy (RES) demonstrating that there was little shared understanding or willingness to compromise by either council in terms of the development of the arena (Counsell et al., 2007). The reflections from some interviewees about the development of the arena indicated it was a LCC decision and not about regional strategic planning and as such there remains no framework by which major infrastructural development such as arenas can be assessed. The investment from Yorkshire Forward may therefore create a situation to the detriment of the three arenas through unnecessary and avoidable competition.

On submission of the planning application for the arena only one objection was noted, which argued that the space should be turned into a park. The response

from LCC's claimed that over a six-year period they had made some significant investments as noted by participant B:

We invested extremely heavily in our parks and in the squares of the City. Park Square was redone, we did work on Hanover Square which is a little bit out but one of our squares nonetheless.

'We delivered the new museum, delivered the arena, delivered the city varieties heritage grant funding and refurbishment, we delivered Northern Ballet, [the] Northern School of Contemporary Dance all over those six years. (Participant B, Councillor)

With the statutory requirements met in terms of publicity for the proposed plans no other objection was received. This was surprising given the size of Leeds and the possible impact on other music venues around the city. As a commercial venue with the ability to attract global artists with a capacity of 12,500 people, alternative music venues in and around Leeds that held between 100-1,000 had the opportunity to object but none was forthcoming. The arena could be seen as a benefit as the footfall coming into Leeds would be increased and as such may be attracted to other music venues.

As participant F commented:

I am confident that everybody in the City knew about the scheme and that would have included the music venues that were operating in the city at that time.
(Participant F, Planning Officer)

PHASE 4: 2007-2013: THE ARENA IS 'GOOD TO GO'

Table 7.9: Timeline and key actions from 2006-2013

Date	Action
2007	First Project Board meeting [26 th January 2007]
2008	First look at the Vision for the Arena [16 th December 2008]
2009	Brunswick Building demolished [spring]
2009	Panel Plans [June/August] Workshop [October] Outline Plan 09/04815/OT [9 th November]
2009/2010	Competition to seek a Builder [first stage] December: Outcome, January 2010 to November 2010 [second stage] Jacobs Strategic Design Partner and sub-consultants Populous confirmed John Thorp, Civic Architect advised on the design ARUP Planning Agents and Technical Advisors confirmed BAM Construction confirmed LCC Developers confirmed Sponsorship and investment in place for the Arena
2011	Best City in the UK [2011-2030]
2013	Arena opens

Table 7.9 outlines the final stages of the process for the development and delivery of the arena. As mentioned in Phase 2, a change of leadership provided an opportunity to change or stop certain developments. However, as the leadership of LCC returned to Labour in 2010 the arena project was so far along that there was no threat to stop its development. The Coalition leadership had undertaken the governance of decision-making relating to the arena, Labour was now able to finalise the delivery.

There was overall support for the development of the arena and increased confidence in LCC particularly with the decision to undertake the roles of the developer and owner.

Participant F outlines the confidence displayed by LCC:

In this case the Council was key because there was so much support for it and the Council decided to take the risk itself in terms of bringing together the bits of land we needed and finding a developer/operator who gave us some confidence that all the investment that we would put into it we didn't end up with an empty shell of a building, so that was all there.

(Participant F, Planning Officer)

As noted earlier, Leeds has an entertainment quarter, yet it is not zoned for just that type of activity (unlike many of the French cities that use zones to separate their development). As one interviewee commented:

*[Zoning] didn't mean necessarily that everything in that area had to be for entertainment or anything new had to go in that area because it doesn't always fit like that and once you are starting to work on the premise of trying to get around about 12, 13, 14, 000 capacity arena you've got limited options of where it's going to go.
(Participant F, Planning Officer)*

Added to the issue of the size of the arena was the design shape, so undertaking a pre-application stage was critical in understanding how it would work given that most of the UK arenas then (and now) are based around an oval shape. The same participant highlighted:

*The decision was taken in Leeds that we wanted to go a bit more special than that and SMG supported us – we started to give some thought to the shape of the building.
(Participant F, Planning Officer)*

With the Clay Pit Lane site (2008) confirmed, the discussions on the shape and capacity took place, with a further three years spent with the planners, architects [Populous] and technical advisors [Arup]. Visits to other arenas nationally and internationally as highlighted by participant F provided further details on how an arena could work and function:

*We went to Dublin [O2 arena] and we went to Belfast [SSE arena] just to have a look at their arenas. It was interesting if you've not seen the arena before but they're boxes - they are music boxes that have access for vehicles clearly and everything for the set, but they don't tend to have lot else - suppose we looked at Liverpool as well who tend to have additional structures really.
(Participant F, Planning Officer)*

LCC brought in experts with experience in arena design to aid the decision-making. The key objective was that nothing should interrupt the strategic decisions on the project build and, importantly, the project had to come in on budget. This pragmatic approach by LCC demonstrated that it was able to continue with a major project despite the economic decline and that it had to be successful. This is reflected by participant C and F:

From my perspective I don't like failure and this is really the last chance saloon. We have got to deliver this.
(Participant C, Director of Services)

It was a very tight budget and brought forward at a time or actually started building it at a time when we really starting to struggle in relation to the economy.
(Participant F, Planning Officer)

A positive outcome from the arena project was that it provided LCC with an element of 'boosterism' as well as demonstrating their ability to delivery a major project during the tough economic climate. What was clear that whilst the arena would be a flagship building for Leeds, it would not be a great architectural statement as participant C pointed out:

If you want to build the great architectural statement then this isn't for you. We are in the middle of a recession. Leeds needs an arena and we've got an operator. We need[ed] to get on with it and [we] focused on delivering on that specification for 59 million.
(Participant C, Director of Services)

In delivering an Arena and in any large project of that scale you have got to be really clear about what it is you want to achieve - well you might say that's obvious: it's delivering an arena. – [But] it's more finer grained than that: what are the core principles of the project that you're trying to deliver and that's often quite easy but the harder bit is then to be very clear about what you are not doing
(Participant C, Director of Services)

Completion of the Arena for Leeds

Whilst SMG Europe⁴⁸ was confirmed as the operator in 2008, the competition had attracted the four top arena operators, SMG, Live Nation, Comcast and AEG indicating the importance placed on the arena by the music industry. During 2010 BAM Construction and ARUP Planning Agents and Technical Advisors were appointed to build the arena. ARUP held a dual role, as technical advisors as well as representing LCC in the role of developer on planning matters. With the relevant companies in place the arena moved from an idea through planning process to the eventual build as indicated by participant A:

It kind of then went to the building anoraks, at a certain point it went into the Development Department.

⁴⁸ SMG Europe, owners of Newcastle Arena, manage Manchester, Hull and will open Aberdeen Exhibition and Conference Centre. In total they have 12 venues in the UK and World-wide 212 facilities mainly in the USA.

(Participant A, Councillor)

The Planning Department made two presentations to the City Council's Plans Panel who have the responsibility for making recommendations about large, complex or controversial planning applications in a public forum as well as to CABE⁴⁹. External bodies such as the Highways Agency were also brought in at the early stages to discuss the impact the arena would have on the surrounding areas and transportation. As participant F outlined, Clay Pit Lane sat within a prestige development planned area and as such the arena would contribute to the Northern Quarter of the City:


[we were] comfortable from a townscape perspective. It is going to be something that works, that was comfortable in its setting and as mentioned in the UDP it was a prestige development area where we were asking for large buildings at the gateway. In essence there is some flexibility in design there [Clay Pit Lane site].
(Participant F, Planning Officer)

The challenges of the location Clay Pit Lane

Image 7.6 shows the proposed location for the arena on Clay Pit Lane, north of the city. The proposed site nestled between the inner ring road and nearby residential areas, particularly Little London, an inner-city suburb. Surrounding the area is a wide range of land uses, retail, University buildings and offices. The LCC Headquarters, Merrion House, itself extensively refurbished in 2018 is also situated close by with some parts in direct view of the arena.

Image: 7.6: Map of proposed Arena

⁴⁹ Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE) – now Design Council 2011.



Source: LCC, 2010, ARUP Design and Access, p. 13 (Planning Application 09/04815/OT).

The idea for this particular shape came from John Sutherland (MD, SMG Europe) who argued that given the lack of a basketball or hockey team there was no need to have a court in the middle of the arena. The super-theatre configuration would allow for a more effective seating arrangement, and would allow audiences to be closer to the stage at 68 meters as opposed to 120 meters for the traditional horseshoe shape design (Image 7.7). Whilst it would be the first arena to be based on this shape, it was also cheaper to build and therefore better value for money for LCC as noted by participant C:

If your 95% of the revenue comes from the end stage entertainment why don't you design a building around 95% of your market – it's quite simple really.
(Participant C, Director of Services)

The shape also created some concerns amongst the promoters who, although supportive of the idea of the new arena, were unsure of the new style arena. As participant E explained:

This Arena was slightly different because it was a different shape so that threw a curve ball ... it's a brand spanking new arena. We like that but actually it's not a traditional shape so people had to get their heads around how they would work it, how they would understand it and move in and out of it.
(Participant E, Manager)

A constant theme throughout the development of the arena was keeping it on budget. The pragmatic approach by LCC was demonstrated in the initial decision to retain LCC's own Strategic Design Alliance (SDA), an in-house team with a long-term partnership with Leeds architects Jacobs, for the design of the

arena under a framework contract. However this proved unsustainable in the light of budget limitations (LCC, 2011). A Design and Build contract was put in place in order to deliver the arena on budget in a network governance structure consisting of the operator SMG Europe, BAM Construction Ltd appointed in 2010 and architect Populous. Populous was supported by Jacobs UK Ltd, who acted as lead consultants to navigate the various RIBA stages until 2011, and ARUP who were the technical design company. Populous⁵⁰ an international architectural firm was chosen for their vast experience in building arenas rather than they being world-renowned architects. The engagement of Populous who were supported by John Thorp, Civic Architect, was seen as a practical approach as 'the design intention was to create a rewarding experience for spectators and participants – maximising revenue generating potential, while achieving a strong identity, sense of fun and celebration of the facility' (Populous, n.d., n.pag.). The emphasis on experience, identity and income generation echoed the drive by LCC in its Vision for Leeds II. In addition, Populous whilst wanting to create a dynamic façade created a project that was labelled as an 'austerity arena' by Populous (Wainwright, 2013, n.p.) who emphasised that the design was a functional space that worked for the audiences and operator, as Participant C comments:

Rather than it being stunning architecture it's a very well designed building because in functional terms it performs what it does very efficiently on a very efficient floor plate which is a commercial proposition ... it's about the driving the business of [the City Council] and SMG rather than a building on the banks of the UNESCO World Heritage site and looks nice.

'So the arena build cost – pure construction is about 60 million which is phenomenal value for money relative to other arenas. It's because it's a very efficient floor plan, a very efficient building with a very clever design' (Participant C, Director of Services)

As the arena is embedded in the urban space with no panoramic view the cost envelope is focussed on a 120-degree angle rather than the sides or back of the building, which are purely functional spaces. The design process was in two stages with the outline permission approved in 2010 despite concerns raised initially by CABE who felt that 'a step change in the quality of the design

⁵⁰ Populous a global architectural design company had built over 70 arenas across the world.

thinking' was needed (Hogg, 2010, n.p.). CABE, whilst supportive of the city centre location, felt that the planning application lacked cohesion with its immediate surroundings and the city as a whole (Waite, 2010). As the design evolved and soft landscaping added, approval was finally given in November 2010 for a 'honeycomb design, based on a voronoi diagram' (Hogg, 2010a, n.p.). The design according to Hoefnagels (2014, p. 54) 'is an odd building and doesn't try to hide it'. It has a distinct frontage of large green hexagonal areas of glazing which create soft hues throughout the day (Annex 20). These were carefully planned to match the natural levels within the arena so from inside the view outwards is not disturbed. The new fan-shaped design and distinctive façade however created technical difficulties for the construction team. These difficulties were overcome during the design phase by the use of Building Information Modeling (BIM) software that allowed a digital representation of the project to be continually updated reducing associated costs, risks and delays to the project (Contributor, 2013). The location and acoustics also presented problems with a planning stipulation that external noise levels 'had to be 10dB lower than ambient noise level' from outside the (Lane, 2012, p. 4). To obtain better understanding of how noise works inside an arena the technical engineer visited a number of different types of concerts. One of the casualties from the economic crisis of 2008 was the special roof manufactured in Finland to abate noise levels. As participant J highlights:

we had to re-think a new solution ...but this happens often in large projects
(Participant J, Technical Design Officer)

The changes to the roof included a layer of concrete between two layers of material which blocks sound from escaping (Baxter, 2012; Lane, 2012). As the arena was designed on a compact site and proximity to residential areas the 8metre-drop in height across the site was used to an advantage which allowed the arena to nestle slightly into ground reducing its visual impact on the surroundings (Baxter, 2012). The arena design is a balance between 4, 2000 tons of steel for the long-span roofs and overhangs and concrete for the acoustic barrier (Baxter, 2012). A specialist lighting design feature is created at night by a network of LED lights that can change colour according to the event or performer at the arena. According to Hoefnagels the lighting system transforms the arena into a 'compact Technicolor spaceship' and as such

describe it as a unique architecture feature for Leeds (2019, p. 54). Following completion of the arena the £60 million music venue was handed over to the operators ASM Global (formerly SMG). It was highlighted as the most sustainable venue in the UK by Populous (Ramchurn, 2013).

Whilst the pedestrian access and landscaping around the arena was all part of the development itself, and this has offered enhanced pedestrian routes to and from car parks, the Merrion Centre and Woodhouse Car Park have both received subsequent investment. The location of the arena has also encouraged a major regeneration project, which started in 2012 by Town Centre Securities⁵¹. Capitalising on the arena development, they have undertaken a £17m transformation of the northern side the centre into a food and leisure hub, followed by a hotel and car park (Town Centres Securities, n.d, n.pag.). The whole area, which includes LCC's Merrion House and student accommodation has been renamed the Arena Quarter.

Springsteen plays the First Direct Arena but Sir Elton John officially opened it

Whilst the prospect of building an arena had been mooted by LCC in 1999 it was not until 2013 that it was completed and opened for business. Prior to its opening the First Direct, Telephone and Internet Bank was officially named as the sponsors of the arena. The arena therefore became known as the First Direct Arena in May 2013 and the naming rights remain until 2023.

Sir Elton John officially opened the arena on 4 September 2013 with a concert to an audience of 12,000. Yet it was Bruce Springsteen who was the first artist to play at the arena 'personally asking to "road test" the new venue before its official opening in September' (Simpson, 2013, n.pag.). The Springsteen concert held on 24 July 2013, to a sell-out crowd was his first arena show in six years. The significance of two world-class stars playing in the first year of the arena opening was according to LCC Leader Keith Wakefield 'a great coup' and he went on to say 'This is a real statement of intent for Leeds Arena as a venue

⁵¹ Town Centre Securities (TCS) are a property investment and car parking operator.

that will compete with the best in Europe and indeed the world' (BBC News, 2012, n.pag.).

Leeds may have been late to building an arena but since it's opening it has continued to attract many high calibre acts and events. The ticket sales for 2017 placed the arena 13th in the World which according to participant E:

*So the arena was the 13th in 2017 but as I said we had an absolute bumper year and we won't be that again - but the fact that we reach 13th in the world was amazing given we were 5 years old and 4th in the UK.
(Participant E, Manager)*

*It's nice and in 2017 we probably had the pretty much the perfect mix so we had the theatre, we had the family, we had the rock and pop we had the heritage stuff - it was a really really nice mix and you just don't get that very often.
(Participant E, Manager)*

The popularity of the arena has seen its ticket sales fluctuate and according to Pollstar data in 2015 it was ranked 28 but by 2019 it had slipped to 68 in the World. That it remains in the top 200 venues in the World is significant for Leeds, as it can compete regionally, nationally and internationally in providing a world-class cultural facility for popular music and events. The arena is playing its part in the renaissance of the city of Leeds, coupled with being awarded the accolade of 'one of the country's top landmarks' by the Construction Industry Training Board (CITB) (Calendar News, 2014, n.pag.). In the same article Tony Watson, Director of Sales, Marketing & PR for the venue said 'We're delighted that the experts at the CITB have recognised the First Direct Arena's iconic design and put us in the top five within the UK' (Calendar News, 2014, n.pag.). In addition, according to ARUP, the Arena achieved the highest BREEAM score for a building of its type in the UK due to the use of recycled products and sustainable materials (ARUP, n.d.).

CONCLUSION

The chapter has provided an in-depth analyse of the governance and decision-making adopted by LCC in developing an arena for popular music and events. It has identified several key influences on the decision-making for the arena, particularly the indecision of LCC, the changing process leading to external

disputes, and the recurring focus within the Visions for Leeds to be a competitive European and Global city.

As the third largest metropolitan district, it remained one of only two cities without an appropriate venue to accommodate national and international popular music and events. Whilst many arenas across England have been built for specific events, such as Capital of Culture (Liverpool), World/Commonwealth Games (Sheffield), or Olympic Bid (Manchester) Leeds developed its arena deliberately dedicated for popular music and events. This was a significant move as the innovative design was a clear indication that Leeds wanted to project itself as having a different cultural facility from other cities. Pragmatically in true Yorkshire style, it was also a cheaper option particularly with the restrictive location.

The Visions for Leeds has had a significant influence on the trajectory of Leeds particularly with the elevation of the image and re-positioning the city on the European and International scene. The network governance promoted originally by Trickett was somewhat ignored in the actual decision-making powers that were retained by LCC for the arena. The urban governance within the UDP should have acted as a framework for new developments, however, there was no strategic plan identified for the arena. The final decision to build an arena was made in 2006 but it was a further seven years to be fulfilled.

External tensions were the result of somewhat ambiguous decision-making processes evidenced by little regard shown to Sheffield City Council in their opposition and the court case brought by Montpellier Estates Ltd. The split procurement process and SPV pointed to LCC retaining options that allowed them to become owner and developer. Internal tensions came from the Labour controlled wards that ironically supported the arena development when in power yet disputed the use of funding from the Leeds Bradford Airport sale. The pragmatic approach by the Coalition leadership was successful despite the challenges and with less funding than expected from the RDA still managed to build the arena within budget.

The impact of the financial crash in 2008 was, counter-intuitively, an opportunity for LCC, in that the approved regeneration project on the Brunswick Site failed. This failure provided the opportunity for LCC to negotiate with Leeds

Metropolitan University and the opportune funding from the airport to purchase it. The fact that the location was only confirmed in 2008 directly demonstrates a clear lack of strategic planning and more of a set of circumstances coming together – serendipity? The pragmatic approach by LCC was seen throughout the development, the choice of Populous as the architect for example and a restrictive budget of £81M that could not be exceeded.

Throughout the interviewees and the official documentation there is little to suggest that cultural policy played a significant part in the development of the arena. The arena project was seen as a key driver for income generation and the raising of the image of Leeds for it to be able to compete with other cities of similar status.

Part 3

CHAPTER 8: A TALE OF TWO CITIES: APPROACHES AND DECISION- MAKING IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ARENA

INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a comparative analysis of the key findings from the two case studies. In doing so it reflects on and engages with the literature within the political, urban and cultural themes in terms of decision-making processes involved in developing popular music venues. The thematic approach provided the context for the three interrelated themes and was guided by the framework of governance. It used the two levels of governance (Table 1.1) which highlighted the importance of the role played by the local authorities and in particular the decision-making for the arena. Bringing together the narratives from the themes this chapter is important to the thesis as it explores the challenges, tensions and successes of the governance structures involved in the development of the arenas.

As noted in chapter 1 the shifts in governance from the 1980s emphasised the importance for local authorities to build broader networks with existing and new actors in decision-making (Brookes and Cullinane, 2006; Bache and Flinders, 2004; Cole and John, 2001; Anheier and Isar, 2012). Whilst there was a level of engagement with network governance in the case studies, significant political individuals continued to hold control of the decision-making (O'Brien, 2014; Raco et al., 2006). National political reforms and global trends seen from the 1980s reflected the key discussions as they created the drive for cities to compete and reposition themselves nationally and internationally. The use of cultural-led regeneration and cultural facilities became an important element of enhancing the attractiveness of a city. The argument made by Healey (2007) in that planning projects become governance projects led the thesis to investigate the possible networks and processes surrounding the development of the arenas. The research findings have however pointed to an approach more aligned with Therkildsen et al. (2009) in that there was a lack of a strategic approach leading to often deliberate changes from strong political will leading to a level of serendipity.

The purpose of this chapter is to bring together within a comparative analysis the influences, attitudes and interplay between the two levels of governance, state/central and local level. It investigates how local authorities addressed the lack of suitable space for the emerging popular music within a competitive environment. In doing so the chapter plays an important role for the thesis in expanding the comparative literature within the three themes.

GOVERNANCE: DECISION-MAKING

‘I want it that way’: the key influences on the central and local government structures

The thesis outlined that France and England faced with similar political, economic, social and urban change followed two distinct paths of development. Chapter 1 identified four significant areas that led to changes in governance and decision-making, which saw the move of responsibilities from state/central government to local government and a greater emphasis on the involvement of the private sector. The first of these was the implementation of state/central government public policy reforms to transform local government (Ferreira de Cruz and Gray, 2015). The significance of decentralisation reforms under Mitterrand and the centralisation and privatisation under Thatcher was that it transformed regional and local authority structures, roles, and responsibilities (Peter and Pierre, 2012). Decentralisation saw a strengthening of the French regions through a plurality of governance consisting of Region, Department and Commune with often overlapping responsibilities such as in regional and urban development.

In contrast, centralisation and privatisation significantly weakened the English regions and created competition between local authorities in accessing resources and available financial support for urban development (Paquet, 1999; Ferreira de Cruz and Gray, 2015). The emphasis within neoliberalism was placed on private sector-led urban development and agencies such as the Development Corporations which under legislation were not required to meet the normal planning approval process or sustainability. Evidence has been provided in the thesis regarding the distinct paths taken by France and England in chapter 3. However, there is little to suggest that these reforms hindered the

decision-making process at local authority level concerning the development of cultural infrastructure.

The shift in governance with an emphasis on networks noted in chapter 1 saw less involvement of the state/central government towards an increased emphasis on the local government level and non-elected organisations such as private and voluntary sectors. The increased responsibility of governance presented local authorities with a much more proactive role in economic development for their cities and enhanced practices in cultural development. Network governance also created decision-making on a broader scale with the involvement of a diversity of groups (O'Brien, 2014; Raco et al., 2006; Peters and Pierre, 2012). There is, however, little evidence from the case studies, interviews and official documentation to suggest that the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole or LCC engaged with increased networks in the decision-making process for the arena. The tendency by the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole was to take a top-down approach throughout the process with influential decisions coming from within the metropolitan council. LCC however, initially took into account the media campaigns and public view which offered some broader involvement of what Leeds needed in terms of a cultural facility. As the discussions for the development progressed the evidenced pointed to LCC adopting a top-down approach similar to that seen in CUB/Bordeaux Métropole. Both cities however took account of the advice of official consultants through feasibility studies. This was extended in Leeds to the appointed operator (AGM Global) who gave advice and commented on various aspects of the development.

Secondly, the interplay between the two levels of governance discussed in chapter 1 was observed in the relationships between state/central government and the local authorities (Table 1.1) (Blanco et al., 2004; Paquet, 1999; Ferreira de Cruz and Gray, 2005; Brookes and Cullinane, 2006). In France a clear link was evidenced between local, regional and state government with councillors and mayors often holding more than one position at the different levels – the so called 'cumul des mandats' (chapter 3). The multi-positional system is core to the French case study as evidenced by the powerful and dominant mayors, Chaban-Delmas and Juppé as well as the president of the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole, Vincent Feltesse. All had held state and local positions (McKay, 1996) (Annex 6). This system allowed a stronger lobbying by councillors and

presidents for resources and created a flexible implementation of policies from the state (Cole and John, 2001). This is particularly present in the investment of several major urban projects for example Schema de Cohérence Terriotriale and Bordeaux Euratlantique. In England the disjointed relationship between councillors in local government and ministers in central government meant that local authorities were less able to influence policies or their implementation (chapter 3). The lack of a supportive network left local authorities fragmented and vulnerable to the decisions of central government with little power to contest them (Bache and Flinders, 2004). The Thatcher Government demonstrated this in the 1980s when it reduced much of local government power.

Thirdly the externally driven changes from post-industrial to globalisation and Europeanization and ideological change created an environment of competition between cities in terms of economic status and image enhancement to attract tourism. Wilks-Heeg et al., (2003) highlighted how cities were measuring themselves against other cities of similar status and this was evident in the case studies as the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC planned their future visions through major urban regeneration and policies. The neoliberal and entrepreneurial trends saw cities engage with the private sector and turn to cultural infrastructure and cultural industries to enhance the city image with associated marketing and branding (Wilks-Heeg et al., 2003; Bianchini, 1993; Sarikakis, 2012; Kong, 2012).

Finally, at a time when popular culture was evolving during the 1950s and 1960s, state and central government created cultural policy that was mainly concerned with high culture. As France and England created Ministries of Culture and the position of cultural minister the move to make culture part of official government policy posed issues in its implementation for both countries (chapter 3). The analysis of Malraux cultural decision-making which maintained an elitist position and the White Paper, A policy for the Arts, first steps (1965) had the message of cultivation and delivery of excellence which failed to recognise the social changes in a youth culture oriented towards pop and rock music and the demands for venues to accommodate the emerging Anglo-American popular music (Devlin and Hoyle, 2000; Looseley, 2011). This attitude was maintained with subsequent ministers. France saw a refusal to engage with popular music whereas in England there was an acceptance of the economic

benefits that came with it. However, successive governments left its development to the music industry.

A challenge to the elitist attitude in France in relation to cultural governance was seen following the appointment of Jack Lang, Minister of Culture. Lang was pivotal in the development of state-led initiatives for popular culture, with the creation of the Zénith venue along with increasing the cultural budget (chapter 3). Although this was a significant move by the French Government to recognise popular music, it lacked an international perspective. An analysis of the state-led initiative for these innovative music venues highlighted that they were ultimately developed by Lang to protect French culture and to resist what he saw as the domination of Anglo-American music and an influx of television programmes (Giubert, 2018, 2011; Looseley, 2013). The restrictive criteria of these venues saw 70% of the programming protected for French musicians and artists. The opportunity for international artists to play at these venues and French youth access to a broader range of music was severely limited.

The work of Bianchini (1993) noted that there was a distinct move between the levels of government as cultural governance shifted from central policies to the local authorities taking the lead. The state/central government maintained a level of authority over the regions in terms of cultural policy with the creation of quangos for example, the DRAC (France) and the Art Council (England). The evidence from the case studies however, indicated that there was little interaction with either national policy or these organisations in the development of the arenas.

‘Under Pressure’: Local government and the changing decision-making for the arena

The thesis has indicated that state/central government major reforms of the 1980s had transformed the administrative structure of local government in France and England along with changes of governance to place an emphasis on network governance (Blanco et al., 2014; Cole and John, 2001; O’Brien, 2014). These changes gave rise to several distinct differences and similarities in Bordeaux and Leeds in terms of how the local authority was structured and in the decision-making related to cultural governance, policy and cultural infrastructure provision. Bordeaux was formally a communauté urbaine (CUB), a

formation which dated back to the 1960s; more recently it became a métropole (2015). Leeds has gone through several metamorphoses since the 1960s ultimately becoming a metropolitan district in 1974. In terms of their political allegiances and despite bearing some similarities in the structures particularly in the number of local mayors and communes and councillors and wards the power dynamics of the mayors in the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and councillors in LCC are distinctly different. The actual numerical structure is similar as LCC had 99 elected councillors and 33 wards following the Boundary Review (2003) and CUB/Bordeaux Métropole services 28 communes with 104 elected councillors. Although similar in number the councillors do not hold the same level of political power (Ryšavý, 2013).

In analysing the findings two comparisons were made to understand how these political roles and structures affected the decision-making for the development of the arenas. The emphasis on network governance created the need to work collaboratively with a larger group of stakeholders (O'Brien, 2014; Peters and Pierre, 2012). The thesis used internal and external networks to distinguish how the different challenges to governance decision-making emerged (chapter 1). Firstly, a direct comparison between CUB/ Bordeaux Métropole and LCC established that the majority of the mayors held greater powers than local councillors in decision-making for their respective communes and wards. This finding aligned with Ryšavý (2013) and was based on the plurality of French local governance where a commune has a mayor and a *mairie* (town hall) and holds a wide-reaching role and direct responsibilities. This structure is not the case in England, with the majority of the decision-making power held by the Leader of the LCC.

Secondly, a comparison was drawn between the mayors within the CUB/ Bordeaux Métropole. The findings show that two mayors, Juppé, mayor of the affluent Bordeaux commune and regional capital and former president and Seurot, mayor of the affluent commune of Bruges and adjacent to Bordeaux, had a greater presence and control over the other mayors. This inequality in relation to political power demonstrated how easily prominent mayors could challenge and create tensions in the decision-making process for the arena (chapter 5). Despite the power tactics of mayors, local governance in both cases followed a hierarchy, which saw Feltesse, the president of the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole, making the final decision to approve the arena (chapter 5) and

Carter, Leader of LCC, who approved the use of the money from the sale of Leeds Bradford Airport (chapter 7).

O'Brien (2014) argued that governance is drawn from the sharing of decision-making by several different external stakeholders. The patterns in the political decision-making that have emerged have shown that network governance arrangements worked differently in each city. In the case of Bordeaux it was the internal networks with the influential mayors with different agendas who were willing to undermine established process and more specifically ignore urban regeneration plans for example the ZAC des Quais (Raco et al., 2006). This found further support with Guichard (municipal councillor in Floirac for the opposition party (UMP)) who identified several shortcomings in the proposed planning and development process and in particular, the lack of engagement with the community by the mayor of Floirac, Lacuey. Guichard disputed the fact that the community wanted an arena in Floirac. This view was not substantiated in the comments from formal consultation. The conclusion drawn from these internal disputes reinforces the point that certain individuals were influential and steered the decision-making process regardless of the hierarchical structures in place leading to a lengthy development process (Raco et al., 2006). This was further demonstrated with the state rationale of restructuring the administration of communes to increase intercommunalité (intercommunality), where the more affluent communes support the lesser affluent ones. In reality the exiting divisions and uneasy alliances between the political parties continued.

An extension of network governance was needed in order to include city authorities as well as public, private and voluntary sectors (O'Brien, 2014; Salet, et al., 2003; Cole and John, 2001). LCC witnessed two periods of problematic external network governance in the development of the arena – the challenge by Sheffield City Council and the court case brought by MEI. Whilst initially supportive Sheffield City Council opposed the use of regional development funding (RDA) to part fund the arena claiming that the new arena would have detrimental effects on Sheffield. This created animosity between the two councils and the impact also led to a reduction in the actual funding received from the RDA. This animosity was highlighted by some of the interviewees when describing some of the challenges and tensions that were faced in the development of the arena. Without the expected level of funding from the RDA, and the limited public money available, the explanation for the pragmatic

approach towards the development of the arena becomes clearer, although there is no indication that this is the case. The challenge by MEI concerned governance decision-making in that LCC terminated the procurement process without engaging the potential candidates.

These findings have shown that the political conflicts and tensions in both cases were different but had a similar effect on the length of time taken to build the arenas. Leeds had the general agreement of the councillors in LCC but experienced conflicts from external sources. In the Bordeaux case it was internal politics, which created the tensions. The prolonged process also had an effect on which political party inaugurated the major flagship building. Despite the final approval being taken by Feltesse (PS) in Bordeaux and Carter (Conservative) in Leeds, it was Juppé (UMP) in Bordeaux and Wakefield (Labour) in Leeds that gained the credit for its completion.

‘The show must go on’: planning and the effect of the financial crisis of 2008 on the arena

The timing of the development of the arena was heavily affected by the financial crisis of 2008 but for different reasons. The transformations of local authority government and governance provided opportunities for greater engagement with the private sector (Singh, 2016; Cole and John, 2001). Both case studies demonstrate that within this period there were several complexities relating to overall governance decision-making and working with the private sector. An importance was placed on three interlinked key issues, timing, finance, and ultimately political will. The SAS Montecristo’s approach to build the arena in Bordeaux relied heavily on selling space to retail and commercial organisations to fund the project. The CUB/Bordeaux Métropole’s decision to reduce available space due to concerns about commercial density and the economic climate made private funding for the arena project untenable. In Leeds whilst the arena project continued, there were limited public sector funds and the termination of the procurement competition added further complexity. Although the financial crisis was experienced differently in Bordeaux and Leeds the results were similar in the continued delays in the development of the arenas (chapter 5 and 7).

In the Leeds case one interviewee called the timing of the whole process a matter of serendipity. The sale of the Leeds Bradford Airport and the collapse of the large housing regeneration scheme aided LCC to purchase the land, at the time owned by Leeds Metropolitan University, allowing the project to progress. The same interviewee was quick to identify the benefit of continuing with its major flagship project. At a time when the country was in a recession, Leeds city was able to demonstrate that it was able to contribute to the badly affected construction industry through employment, and to the start of the regeneration of the area albeit in an ad hoc way.

In Bordeaux the termination of the private arena project by SAS Montecristo was inevitable considering the economic climate that made it too difficult to find the required investment. Further debate within the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole saw Conchita Lacuey (PS) Mayor of Floirac supported by the Communist and Extreme Right parties demanding the arena stay in Floirac. Not only was this an important economic and branding opportunity for Floirac, one of the less affluent communes, it was also integral to the rebalancing of the Left-Right Bank which had been attempted since the late 1980s under the former Bordeaux mayor Chaban-Delmas.

From the beginning of the discussions, in both cases the planning and decision-making for the arena had seen significant changes in terms of investment and formal processes. The drive by cities to become entrepreneurial to increase economic growth was seen in the drive to maintain ownership (Wilks-Heeg et al., 2003). However, this only became evident the closer the development of the arena came towards final approval. In both cases private organisations had wanted to be involved. In Leeds, Leeds Arena Ltd, owner of sufficient land near Clarence Docks to privately fund the development and run the arena was disregarded without any clear rationale. Bordeaux had been presented with two applications from private companies, initially as a bullring and then a large arena complex by the SAS Montecristo project. Both projects were withdrawn, in somewhat different circumstances, the Cortès and Lartigue project seemingly withdrawn without explanation and the SAS Montecristo project under financial constraints.

The analysis of the case studies highlighted that at the final approval stage and the beginning of construction there was underlying tensions that neither

authority really wanted private investors solely to build and own the arena. There are several reasons for this. The arena was a public sector capital asset, and as such the equity would provide the security if in future a loan was needed to be raised against it. Keeping control provided overall power over what happens with the building and in ideological terms the authorities were not 'held to ransom' by the private sector. At a time when state/central government was encouraging the private sector to be more involved in planning (Cole and John, 2001; Blanco et al., 2014; Pike et al., 2016), the decision by LCC appears to be at odds with this policy. In France the private sector was viewed with suspicion by the state and whilst public/private partnerships became more accepted particularly in the part they played in the EU integration, there was no offer of assistance by the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole for the SAS Montecristo project when it ran into difficulties (Green and Booth, 1999). In the end both were publicly funded but in different ways. In each case much of the funding came from the public purse. Bordeaux created a 'public works concession' scheme to ensure that the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole retained overall control of the construction and had ownership with some private investment from the approved operator Largadère Unlimited Live Entertainment (agent/operator).

The prospect of acquiring this private investment according to one interviewee was a reason to build an arena instead of the Zénith style venue. In Leeds the ownership of the land and the sale of the Leeds Bradford Airport, in addition to RDA funding, ensured that LCC retained ownership and developer role. However, a deal secured with Town Centre Securities and the operator ASM Global, formerly SMG Europe, provided some private investment. In both cases the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC sought to arrange lease agreements with the operators. These arrangements demonstrate the level of network governance involved. Whilst retaining ownership, CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC lessened the risk associated with the running and operating the arenas. Thus, the operators had the responsibility for decision-making on a daily basis within the rules of the lease agreements. In Bordeaux, the operators, Largadère Unlimited Live Entertainment agreed a 20-year lease before ownership reverts to the Bordeaux Métropole. In 2020 Largadère Unlimited Live Entertainment were seeking to terminate the lease. In Leeds, ASM Global retains an indeterminate lease period.

‘A never-ending story’: At last, the final decision to build the arena is made

The decision-making process around the final approval and choice of site was protracted in both cases. In Bordeaux with the ZAC des Quais in place it could have been a straightforward decision. This was not the case. For several years the ZAC des Quais was disregarded; instead, the research findings identified several attempts to locate the arena in different planning programmes and sites, such as within the university regeneration project under the national U2000 programme (Dubet and Sembel, 1994), and the move to the Left Bank before coming full circle back to Floirac. The whole process in Bordeaux is linked to governance decision-making and asserting of individual power of politicians with different agendas. In Leeds there was no regeneration project to direct the discussion of the location. Whilst the feasibility reports (2005 and 2006) suggested several suitable locations in and around the city, with some sites such as Elland Road having support from Ken Bates, owner at the time of Leeds United, none was taken forward. The UDP (2006) had also indicated that any major project would need to be located on the outskirts of the city due to the lack of available inner-city space. Despite undertaking the feasibility study and the indication from the UDP (2006), LCC took another route. This route came together in an opportunistic way and as LCC owned the problematic location of Clay Pit Lane with its proximity to the inner-city ring road and residential area; it became the only option for the arena.

The national and global trends and government reforms have directly influenced the changing structures of local government and governance (Blanco et al., 2014; Paquet, 1999; Ferreira de Cruz and Gray, 2015; Peters and Pierre, 2012). Within this environment the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC placed an importance on repositioning and reimagining their cities to increase economic growth and compete with other comparable cities. The shifts in governance from national to local gave opportunities to both local authorities in the decision-making to develop cultural infrastructure. Whilst the different political and administrative systems and structures were in place the research findings have shown that the process and governance decision-making for the development of the arena appeared similar. The CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC both took an inordinate length of time to make the decision. This, accompanied by the changing of political parties and the fluctuation in processes along with arguments in the case of Bordeaux on location and uncertainly in Leeds,

demonstrated the similarities. Both local authorities faced political challenges, tensions around funding public, private or a mixture of both and land ownership but with no clear strategic plan for the major cultural development, it was allowed to continue for years. The research findings suggest that the financial crisis of 2008 created the circumstances for the arena to be finally progressed from the discussions to the actual project management of the construction. The thesis argues that the financial crisis was significant as it focused governance decision-making for the development of the arena both in terms of location and funding as well as increasing the role of CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC. In terms of network governance there is a lack of blended networking (O'Brien, 2014) with little to connect CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC with a greater involvement of stakeholders in the actual decision-making process. This however, changed once the decision was made on the successful operators who had some influence on the design and requirements of the arena.

CULTURAL GOVERNANCE: THE NEED FOR CULTURAL VENUES

‘This is how we do it’: Reflections on the cultural attitudes and cultural policy

The thesis was concerned with the development of cultural policy and its influences on the development of cultural infrastructure and more specifically arenas. It identified that France and England adopted a state/central government approach to cultural policy with the formation in the 1950s and 1960s of a specific ministry and culture minister. This top-down approach saw cultural policies of Malraux and Lee retain the focus on increasing access to high culture rather than embracing popular culture (Devlin and Hoyle, 2000; Looseley, 2011). At the same time popular culture was more the preserve of the lower levels of governance, if at all. Indeed, it was more an underground subculture with small venues and disconnected from official patterns of governance

The appointment of Lee in England however was recognised as a move by the central government to have greater involvement in culture with an increased budget and a move away from the previous arms-length approach. The White Paper A policy for the Arts (1965) emphasised a mixed approach to culture

governance at the regional and local levels, bringing together the private sector and higher education. There remained an uneasy alliance between central and local government in terms of the implementation and resources required for cultural development and it remained unenforced. With the Thatcher Government focussing on privatisation cultural policy took a definite backwards step where it suffered from a decline in investment. The elitist focus of culture remained in France until the appointment of Jack Lang in 1981 in the Mitterrand Government. Lang promoted popular culture in all its forms, but with a forceful preference for protecting French culture rather than promoting the Anglo-American influences that the French youth were demanding (Looseley, 2011). In contrast to England which saw a decreased in funding for culture, Lang increased the budget allowing for initiatives such as the Zénith to be realised (chapter 3).

To oversee culture both countries established various agencies in central, regional, and local levels to assist the growth of cultural activities in regions and local authorities (Table 1.1). Decentralisation created new responsibilities for the three levels of governance with support for example from the DRAC in France. The DRAC, which is responsible for the promotion of culture at the local level and overseeing the financial budget, retained a focus on high culture activity (Girard, 1997). Their scope and engagement with local cultural organisations and experts increased but remain closely attached to the state through the Ministry of Culture. In the case of Bordeaux there was little evidence of interaction between the DRAC and the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole in the governance decision-making for the arena.

In England the responsibility at local authority level came in the form of the 1972 Local Government Act which lacked a clear strategy for investment. The different political parties have all created organisations such as the Arts Council, The Foundation of Arts England (2003) and the Regional Cultural Consortia (RCCs) (1999) with responsibility for interacting with local authorities in developing cultural policy. Yet often these developments only added further complexity to the creation of cultural policy. In both cities there is little evidence to suggest that external agencies such as these had any interaction with the development of the arenas. It was more often left instead to dominant individuals in the local authorities such as Chaban-Delmas in Bordeaux and Bernard Atha in Leeds to drive culture and cultural activities forward. Despite the

changes to organisational structures, it remained the case that individuals were often the key drivers of cultural activities. Again, this was largely in terms of high culture.

Whilst French cultural policy attempted to protect French culture and latterly incorporate popular French music, in England it lacked an importance at the central level, with central governments preferring instead to leave it to local authorities and private companies in the case of music. As well as different attitudes towards cultural policy there are also differences in terms of how cultural outputs are measured. This is argued by Gugu and Dal Molin (2016) in that cultural policy had engaged with a wider scope of profit-making activities. In France, which had historically invested in culture, any output was measured by ambition rather than any financial benefit. In contrast in the UK arts organisations had to meet tight financial constraints with clear economic output. Central government therefore, placed culture in the economic sphere rather than an acceptance of the society benefits.

A fundamental shift occurred in France in terms of assessing cultural outcomes. As Sarkozy came to power in 2007, he declared that there would be a 'dramatic break with the past' (Looseley, 2013, p. 184), not only with social and economic policies, but also in terms of cultural policy. Favouring Anglo-Saxon neo-liberalism Sarkozy attempted to inject growth into the French economy through several policies and used culture to respond to France's growing domestic problems. For the first time in French cultural policy, culture had to make a profit, which brought it into alignment with England. This shift reflects the argument by Gugu and Dal Molin (2006) but also the financial opportunities of popular music was further evidenced in the case studies where it was a key driver in the development of the arenas in both cities.

The drive in developing the arena was complex and reflects an intricate interplay between the various elements of local governance. The thesis emphasised that local authorities used the development of the arena to increase status and financial return. Cultural policy had little impact on the decision-making process. The responsibility for investment for the development of venues for popular music and events rested with local authorities often using any available public money rather than cultural policy-led investments by the state/central government. The exception was the Zénith model, originally financially

supported by the state, subsequently changing to local level funding, and the establishment of a non-elected organisation CNV to ensure compliance with the criteria. The research findings suggests that cultural policy at the national level in France had a direct impact on the growth of dedicated venues for popular music in terms of the Zénith yet played little part in the evolution of other arenas. The decision by CUB/Bordeaux Métropole to go down the arena route was in part to evade the constraints imposed by the Zénith model and the exigencies of national level requirements, but also to expand its own image on the international music scene.

‘I want to break free’: attitudes to popular music and the need for venues

The attitude in the two countries to the evolving popular music scene is fundamentally different. The French government initially refused to engage with popular music, which created a barrier between the elites and the youth. Such was the elite’s control of state-controlled radio and TV that the youth breaking free from these constraints had to listen to radio stations bordering France which played Anglo-American rock and pop music as well as the growing ‘ye ye’⁵² music (Guibert, 2018). The lack of engagement by the state had promoted a level of social discontent as well as hindering the growth of French rock and pop music. In contrast whilst the UK recognised the market value of British bands, both nationally in terms of export and as growing leaders in popular music, the growth of dedicated venues was limited. This lack of dedicated accommodation meant that often the diversity of bands and sub-cultures had to be incorporated, often unfavourably, into the mainstream pub and club circuits and entertainment programmes (Brennan, 2010; Frith et al., 2019). An assumption made here is that popular music could be contained within existing venues and given the expectation that it was unlikely to last, why build specific venues?

The change came in the 1980s. At this time cities recognised the profitability of commercialisation of rock and pop bands along with the ability to attract promoters and private funding, more often in partnerships with city councils (Brown et al., 2000). In the UK, for example this led to the developments such as the LG Arena, Birmingham, and the Motorpoint Arena, Sheffield. In France

⁵² French translated pop music.

the recognised state initiative saw Paris and 16 further cities building a Zénith, along with 5 Arenas. The significance of the arenas in the cities of Bordeaux and Leeds, however, was that they incorporated a new design specifically for a better music experience. The thesis identified that individuals such as Chaban-Delmas and Juppé in Bordeaux and Bernard Atha in Leeds had previously led the cultural focus. The global trends and transformations in governance identified by Blanco et al. (2014) saw local governance for the development of the arena become much more committee-led approach. The emphasis for developing cultural infrastructure however, remained on being competitive with other national cities and being seen as a city on a European and global scale (DiGaetona and Strom, 2003; Wilks-Heeg, et al., 2003).

A main driver for Bordeaux to resurrect the arena project in 2007 was linked to the application for the ECoC (2013). The decision to submit a bid to the ECoC forced the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole to review the cultural facilities across the Métropole. There was an agreement that the lack of an arena to support popular music was a disadvantage in terms of competing with other French cities. However, there was no such agreement when it came to the type of venue to build an arena or a Zénith. The political disputes from the mayors of the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole detracted from the decision-making process needed for the arena. Whilst the application process for ECoC had specific timescales there was no evidence of urgency in the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole to make decisions on the development of the arena or Zénith. Whilst the indecisions and tensions within the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole continued, Bordeaux still lacked an arena, a disadvantage in terms of comparability with other similar sized French cities.

The lack of an arena was also demonstrated in the Leeds case. Leeds was only one of two cities, Bristol being the other that did not have an arena (following the opening of Liverpool's arena in 2008). The drive to build an arena was not from a specific cultural bid as seen in the Bordeaux case. The realisation that an arena was needed came from the Leeds Initiative's Vision of Leeds in 1999. It was felt that an arena could enhance the attractiveness and cultural facilities of the city. Yet it did not become part of the LCC agenda until several petitions from the public and the local newspaper, The Evening Post, highlighted the lack of an appropriate facility and demanded the development of an arena.

Overall whilst culture appears more prominent in France, for both cities there was little or no cultural policy at national or local level that influenced the building of arenas. Even the Zénith model had been rejected. An observation is that the building of dedicated arenas was driven by a need to enhance the cultural infrastructure for the city, improve the image and competitiveness, and to derive benefit from the increased economy and transient tourism. Urban regeneration happened in Bordeaux through the established ZAC des Quais where several developments including the arena had been approved and implemented. In the end, it was local governance and the complex interrelations within the local systems which dominated the decisions and implementation of the arenas. Ultimately what is developed is very much in the hands of the local system and associated agencies, both public and private. Cultural policy appears to sit on the sidelines.

‘Hometown Glory’: Legacy, heritage and memory

In chapter 1 the question of leaving a legacy in built form was discussed with François Mitterrand’s *grands projets* being the ultimate example of a 20th century master builder transforming the Parisian cityscape (Brown, 2011). The thesis questioned whether the building of major cultural music venue was directly associated with a powerful individual. If the building of arenas represents a major flagship project for Bordeaux and Leeds, have they provided the opportunity for a politician to leave their mark on the urban landscape at that time? This does not seem to be the case in either Bordeaux or Leeds, due in part to the length of time taken in the decision-making process and the various changes of the controlling political parties.


Both arenas are commercial venues with sponsorship from large multi-national banks (Arkea Bank and First Direct) that pay for the naming rights (Bottà, 2008; Neils, 2012). In both cases the changing of political parties and naming rights paid for by corporate banks prevent individuals claiming legacy regardless of their involvement. Neither of these two arenas can be associated with specific politicians as was the case with Mitterrand’s *grands projets* in Paris (Brown, 2011). Instead as the arenas are iconic or flagship buildings, they provide the cities the opportunity to add to the cultural infrastructure and they have value as branding and marketing tools (Kong, 2012). The fact that banks and global

entertainment organisations are involved in both arenas is a benefit to the cities as they can use their association to attract investment on a global scale.

The thesis is informed by the work of authors such as Cohen (2013) and Bennett and Janssen (2015) about popular cultural heritage and memory. The past histories of popular music and legendary musicians dead or alive have provided cultural heritage for cities. For example, the Beatles, a phenomenon of the 1960s has been brought into the present by Liverpool exploiting their fame, using their birthplaces and various museums across the city to enhance their cultural image. The prospect of potential cultural heritage or associating with home-grown talent was absent in the decision-making for the building of new arenas. Whilst Bordeaux and Leeds can claim to have international artists, there was no inclination to go down the route of music heritage or associate the arenas with particular artists or groups. With the advancements of social media platforms, information on popular music and artists is widely available through downloads, streaming and YouTube providing other means of access rather than physically visiting a city.

The contrast between the local music scenes developed around venues such as the Brudenel, Leeds and Rocher de Palmer, Bordeaux and the commercialised Arkea Arena and First Direct Arena is clear. Images 8.1 and 8.2 show some music venues near the arenas. Bordeaux and Leeds have vibrant local music scenes with varying types of venues from pubs, cafes, and clubs accommodating non-commercial bands with less emphasis on financial return (chapter 4 and 6).

Image 8.1: Music Venues, Bordeaux



Source: Google maps, 2021, n.pag.

Image 8.2: Music Venues, Leeds



Source: Google maps, 2021a, n.pag.

It would be very difficult for these arenas to create a local music scene when the aim of global entertainment operators is to satisfy demand through attracting the largest global superstars and ultimately to make the venues financially viable (Ponzini et al., 2020). The arenas therefore are unlikely to create environments which allow or promote the emergence of organic music found at local venues. However, the performances and the commercial venues can create a level of memory-making as large audiences experience and come together to form a link between place-making and public space (Cohen, 2013; Bennett, 2001). For

one night the arena is the place that offers audiences the experience of specific memories attributed to the same music being listened to.

The thesis argues that the Arkea Arena and First Direct Arena are now part of the city landscape and since opening have created further facilities to enhance the cultural infrastructure of Bordeaux and Leeds. There have been two distinct approaches. The eventual recognition by CUB/Bordeaux Métropole of the importance of the ZAC des Quais saw a level of planned urban regeneration around Arkea Arena. This has been further enhanced with the Simone Veil bridge currently (March 2022) estimated to be completed in 2024 which will connect the Left and Right banks to provide easy access to the arena. In Leeds there was no planned urban development and whilst the First Direct Arena has seen further regeneration, for example, pedestrian walkways have been improved, the number of restaurants and hotels has increased along with two student accommodation towers all within proximity to the arena, it was done in an ad hoc way.

The thesis contends that both local authorities used the decision to build an arena for urban regeneration rather than being part of cultural policy which is seen with the emphasis on enhancing the areas surrounding the locations. There is little evidence to suggest that national cultural policy had an impact on the development of the arena. The local authorities did become the implementers and enablers of national cultural policy. However, the development of cultural policies had a regeneration focus. The political reforms, changes in governance and the increased competition between cities provided the drivers for the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC to enhance their cultural facilities and infrastructure. The lack of state/central government involvement is clear. However, the exception was the appointment and work of Jack Lang. Lang was influential in the development of venues for popular music but as has already been discussed the focus was to protect French music and musicians. The decision by the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole to build an arena rather than a Zénith had been influenced by the flexibility to attract a greater number of international artists along with securing private investment from the operator.

The ECoC played a part in the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole's decision to rethink the arena and both Bordeaux and Leeds were faced with competition from other cities. The evidence from both cases suggests that the arenas have provided a

cultural facility to compete with other cities at a national and international level more in terms of economic and social benefit rather than being important to cultural policy per se. Yet both were late in coming to terms with the need to build them. The thesis identified that regeneration was a major factor, particularly in Bordeaux with the ZAC des Quais in place. In Leeds this link is more tenuous as whilst regeneration has happened there was no planned programme.

GOVERNANCE: URBAN PLANNING AND PHYSICAL REGENERATION

‘The times are-a-changin’: planning schemes and local plans

Bordeaux and Leeds shared similar characteristics in terms of geographical positioning, 6th largest agglomeration in France and 3rd largest metropolitan in England, along with both cities having no medium-sized indoor music venue and a drive to become a European city. The repositioning to a service and financial sector impacted on the urban landscape as the social and economic context changed as demands for cultural infrastructure grew. The thesis has shown that Bordeaux and Leeds had used urban regeneration to boost attractiveness and through a level of gentrification the cities reimaged themselves into what was perceived to be ‘European-style’ cities and compete with other comparable cities. This was particularly true of Leeds with John Trickett’s 24hour city scheme which increased street furniture, lighting and café culture (chapter 6). Waterfront development was popular to both cities (Giovinazzi and Moretti, 2010; Sepe, 2013). However, this took on a different emphasis in Bordeaux with its inequalities between the affluent Left and less affluent Right banks (chapter 4).

The thesis has drawn on Slack and Côté’s (2014) definition of urban governance in which local authorities and stakeholders decide and manage the future visions for the city’s urban development. The thesis highlighted that the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC had increasingly taken a dual role to implement the national policies (SCoT, The National Planning Policy Framework) as well as the responsibility to deliver local urban plans (PLU and UDP). Whilst this involved increased partnerships shaped by network governance, in which LCC and the private sector had a collective vision as in

the Leeds Initiative created by John Trickett in 1990. The Leeds Initiative created the series of strategic plans, the Visions for Leeds, which identified the need for a multi-purpose arena. However, the translation from these visions into an urban development policy was limited. This partnership approach with the private sector was less obvious in Bordeaux with the vision for the Métropole kept within the remit of mayors from each of the 28 communes. The power play between the mayors however played a significant role in the thesis.

There were several key regeneration policies implemented which provide a strategic plan for the future, the SCOT, ZAC des Quais, Euratlantique in Bordeaux and the Leeds Initiative incorporating the three progressive Visions for Leeds (1999-2009; 2004-2020; 2011-2030) along with the UDP (2006) and emerging Local Plans. There is a difference between the planning tools with Bordeaux having defined zoned planning commitment to where the arena would be located. In the Leeds case however, the Leeds Initiative and Vision for Leeds documentation was aspirational rather than a well thought through strategic plan. The UDP (2006) and the Local Plans were more associated with planning tools but still lacked a clear and defined area for the development of the arena.

The shaping of urban development in the local context saw the planning policies, PLU, and ZAC and UDP and Local Plans provide the strategic focus to shape the urban landscape. These plans are significant as they provided the strategy for urban regeneration. The tendency by both local authorities to use these existing plans for the development of the arena however was limited. Instead of being instrumental in providing a framework for shaping the development there was a lack of engagement. In the Bordeaux case, the PLU and Floirac's ZAC des Quais was identified as a site in 2000 for the arena however this part of the planning policy was ignored. There was little evidence in the interviews and the official committee papers that referred to these planning policies in terms of the arena. The only planning policy that became integral to the building of the arena was in 2007 when the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole raised the commercial density issue which ultimately reduced the size of the proposed retail centre creating significant problems for SAS Montocristo.

A similar observation was made in Leeds. Despite the presence of the UPD (2006) and Local Plans, the location of the arena remained undecided and was largely a result of chance, when a site became available at the appropriate time.

Despite the UPD (2006) stipulating that any major urban project would need to be located in a satellite site around the city, this was disregarded by LCC in favour of the Clay Pit Lane site. There is little evidence that a formal site search was undertaken which had congruence with planning policies. Even the zoned area described as the entertainment zone within in the city centre was unsuitable because other buildings not related to entertainment had already been built there. The other locations around the city which might have better fitted with planning policies were either ignored or discarded due to the cost implications.

The narrative behind the debates by the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC pointed to a lack of a strategic framework for the building of the arena despite existing planning policies in place. Without an urban development framework for the arena challenges and tensions were at the forefront of the decision-making process allowing dominant individuals in the roles of the mayors, president, and leaders to be influential. The local context of network governance resulted in a top-down approach. In both cases the key drivers for the arena was a combination of the ambition to become a European and Global city, the ability to compete with cities of similar status through enhancing the image, attractiveness and boosterism as well as the financial benefits brought about by transient tourism.

‘Rivers and Roads’: making the city attractive

The thesis argues that Bordeaux and Leeds developed and created their urban cityscape with a great emphasis on becoming European or globally competitive cities (Pagano and Bowman, 1997; Anheier and Isar, 2012; Sarikakis, 2012). The lack of a major international music venue did not prevent them becoming a competitive city. However, an arena is a key attribute of most major international cities. From the research findings it appears that there was a certain level of apathy from both local authorities which could relate to the long period in which the same political parties held power, Democratic in Bordeaux and Labour in Leeds.

The changing fortunes of the cities in terms of post-industrial economic downturn meant that each had to change their images and reinvent themselves to become attractive places to live, work, study, and visit. These changes saw

Bordeaux emerging from a 'sleeping city' that had seen a level of complacency for many years, and Leeds attempting to shake off the old manufacturing city image to become a regional capital and global city (Pietrasik, 2014; Bramham and Spink, 2009; Smales and Whitney, 1996). These shifts brought a level of gentrification and regeneration in the city centres creating the need to modernise cultural facilities (chapter 4 and 6).

A point of similarity and significant to the thesis because of the location of the Arkea Arena and the potential for the Leeds Arena was the use of waterfront development. Both cities had gone under considerable urban changes and had identified the regeneration of waterfronts as central to their renewal (Giovinazzi and Moretti, 2010; Salet et al., 2003). When la Port de la Lune was listed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2007 the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole's interest in reviewing and enhancing its waterfront resulted in the creation of further regeneration schemes. The major regeneration projects Bordeaux Euratlantique and Grand Projet des Villes (GVP) for example had a specific role to enhance the riverbanks and in part to address the disparity between the Left and Right Banks (chapter 4). The Garonne River which separates the two banks and the Bordeaux Euratlantique that incorporated the ZAC des Quais, a key development programme for the communes in Bèlges and Floirac, was intended to bridge the gap by improving the economic and social opportunities (chapter 4). The intercommunalité (intercommunality) discussed earlier was key in this development as the more affluent communes on the Left Bank were, through these regeneration projects, assisting the less affluent communes. In doing so the whole of the Bordeaux Métropole's image of riverbanks, made more accessible to pedestrians for social and leisure purposes, was enhanced to portray it as a city of European importance. The disputes about the location of the arena within the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole however, demonstrated that this support was still contentious.

In Leeds the waterfront development of the 1980s and 1990s saw the creation of a waterfront corridor with the regeneration of the Clarence Dock area through the Leeds Urban Development Corporation (UDC). The regeneration of this area resulted in Leeds attracting investment for the development of residential and retail and significantly provided the location of cultural facilities such as the Royal Armouries (Douglas, 2009). Whereas waterfront development was a key

regeneration programme for the city, in terms of the arena development there was little interest by LCC in locating it on the riverbank.

‘Space, place and design’: The arenas

The thesis compared the location of the arenas in the broader sense, location within the cities, the design and finally impact on the urban environment. In both cities various sites were proposed for the arenas. The final Arkea Arena was sited close to the riverbank and the First Direct Arena within the city centre close to the inner ring road. In terms of the national positioning of the cities of Leeds and Bordeaux interviewees highlighted that they sit outside from the normal route for international touring artists. In the case of Leeds, it sits to east of the so-called spine of the country where international tours are likely to perform in London, Birmingham, Manchester and Glasgow. Bordeaux is to the west and was outside the normal route taken by international artists who will perform in Paris, Lyon and Marseille on the way to Spain.

The fact that both arenas have performed well since opening has indicated some shifts in the route taken by touring artists. This is in part through the marketing of the global operators and their influence along with artists and promoters wanting to experience the new arenas. According to Pollstar data the First Direct Arena has remained in the top 100 out of 200 global arenas in terms of Worldwide Ticket Sales from ‘2015 to 2019 with a total of 2,287,178 tickets sold during this period’ (Pollstar, n.d., n.pag.). This is difficult to compare with Arkea Arena as they are not listed within the Pollstar data. However, an official report in the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole committee highlighted that the Arkea Arena had the highest attendance figures in the province and was second only to Paris in the first year of operating (Versepuy, 2019). The concern of the arenas sitting outside of the normal route for international touring artists has not been an issue with both able to maintain the number of events within the lease agreements. In the case of Bordeaux, the decision to build an arena rather than a Zénith appeared to be the right decision because it delivered the capacity to have a flexible and international programme.

The thesis is informed by Couch (2016) in the discussion of public spaces and how major projects require the bringing together of the design with the function. The link between fulfilling specific demands for a music venue along with an

aesthetic to represent the city's image is also complicated with the actual shape of the location and the surroundings. This was particularly key for the design of arenas given their proximity to residential areas. However, the contrast between the two cities was significant. In the Bordeaux case, evidence from the ZAC des Quais showed that a location with sufficient space, situated close to the Right Bank of Floirac had been allocated. In planning the location, the design and function could be managed. This type of planning was absent in the Leeds case and hence the Clay Pit Lane site chosen by LCC was particularly problematic given the proportions and restrictive shape. The design therefore had to fit the space.

The attitudes of the CUB/ Bordeaux Métropole and LCC are distinctively different. Bordeaux demanded an ambitious monumental design that was easily seen from the Left Bank, compared to Leeds that had a pragmatic approach having a design that fitted the space. The use of specific architects also highlights the importance placed on the design. Bordeaux engaged Rudy Ricciotti, an internationally renowned architect, whilst in Leeds a much more practical approach was taken with Populous chosen (because they had designed arenas previously and hence had experience). The aesthetics of the arenas are also different. The Arkea Arena is a large white oval building made of poured concrete that can be viewed from a 360-degree vista and represents a pebble deposited from the shoreline (Giraud, 2018). The First Direct Arena had a limited budget and along with the restrictive space provided difficulties in the scale of the actual design. Therefore, the external design emphasised the frontage that is seen by the public, decorated in metal and glass, which has a honeycomb design (Hogg, 2010). What both have in common is the use of external LED lighting when a concert is occurring giving the arena visual effects and brings a sense of place. The thesis argues that the significance of both these arenas is their move away from the oval shaped interior and the emphasis on sport.

Both buildings have attempted to add to the urban landscape. In terms of regeneration, it is easy to see a progression in the Bordeaux case given the ZAC des Quais and the wider regeneration programme of Euratlantique. An interviewee in Bordeaux however, claimed that it was hard to see the arena as regeneration and described it instead as a monolith that was huge dead space when not in use. In Leeds there was no official planned continuous regeneration

programme. Yet one interviewee claimed the arena was always part a larger regeneration programme and whilst several projects have been developed around the location of the arena, the indication is that they are individual projects rather than developments that are taking place within a planned approach. That said the area has now become the Arena Quarter.

CONCLUSION

This chapter through a comparative lens has critically analysed the interplay between national and local governance, the implications of political reforms on the restructuring of local government and the role of cultural and urban policies. The three interrelated themes have provided a comparative perspective to be taken on the decision-making process by the local authorities in developing cultural facilities and specific to the thesis, a dedicated multi-purpose music arena.

The formation of new governance saw networks bringing opportunities for broader based decision-making. The thesis however argues that network governance was more complex to understand and interpret in relation to the structure of the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC. This is reflective of how key individuals were able to steer and influence the decision-making that shape the future plans for the city but more important to thesis was the process surrounding the development of the arenas. The resulting power struggles saw a protracted and far from straight forward process and was further complicated by changing political structures who were attempting to reach decisions in a framework not suited to the circumstances over the duration of the major projects.

The analysis and discussion presented in this chapter has demonstrated that the political reforms, the implications of neoliberalism, globalisation and EU integration created in increased level of competition between cities. The effect of competition and the response to it by the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC led to the re-evaluation of their cities to meet social and economic objectives, to define the city image and enhance the cultural infrastructure, is significant. A key outcome of competition was the need to address the lack of an arena, which was deemed to be a disadvantage and as such was integral to the thesis. The

evidence from the case studies demonstrated that although the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC had different political and administrative systems the actual decision-making for the arenas were similar.

Both cities used several urban and cultural-led regeneration schemes to enhance their physical cityscapes. The popularity of waterfront development during 1980s and 1990s was identified as an important element of regeneration in both case studies. The CUB/Bordeaux Métropole used waterfront regeneration both to modernise the riverbanks and transform them into public spaces for leisure and entertainment and to address the problem of disparity between the Left and Right Banks. Despite the move to bring together the two banks creating greater intercommunalité (intercommunality) the positioning of the arena on the Right Bank remained a contentious issue. In Leeds whilst waterfront regeneration has occurred particularly around Clarence Docks providing LCC the ability to attract major cultural attractions such as the Royal Armouries Museum, when this location was identified by Leeds Arena Ltd (private company) as a potential space for the arena, it was rejected.

The role of cultural policy had been promoted by state and central government with a realisation that local authorities were required to implement a local policy. In terms of the development of the arena however there was little evidenced that a cultural policy was a key driver. Cultural development did provide an influence for Bordeaux however, as demonstrated by the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole in the application for the ECoC. Notwithstanding a previous attempt, the ECoC clearly promoted the enhancement of the cultural standing of Bordeaux and the arena was part of that. In Leeds, the lack of a cultural facility was given further impetus as several media campaigns and support from the community were both recognised as initial drivers for the arena development. In framing the application to ECoC and the campaigns as a key motivator for the development of the arena the opportunity to apply network governance to the decision-making was possible. However, as the process for the development for the arena progressed the decision-making by the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC was hierarchical.

The arenas act as flagship buildings for both cities enhancing the cultural infrastructure and acting as a marketing tool for branding and enhancing the city image, resulting in boosterism. The significance of the arena as a commercial

entity prevents legacy of an individual or cultural heritage in terms of identification of a legendary artist(s). The CUB/Bordeaux Métropole however, was intent on making a significant statement in the choice of internationally renowned architect, Rudy Ricciotti for its design and location, such that it was to be seen from the Left Bank. In contrast, LCC with a very tight budget engaged the commercial company Populous to design the arena leading to a more pragmatic approach which Leeds appears to be associated with. In both cases the outcome were flagship buildings but of very different designs and statements.

The case studies identified several occurrences of internal and external conflicts. In Bordeaux internal conflicts from powerful local politicians particularly dominant mayors made their presence felt and attempted to sway votes to benefit their own purposes. In contrast Leeds experienced external conflict in two ways firstly the opposition from another council resulting in a reduction in regional funding, and secondly the termination the procurement late in the process. These debates, changing attitudes and conflicts prolonged the decision-making process.

The debates surrounding funding either public, private or a mixture of both was evident in both case studies. Ultimately, the cost to the public purse was a major factor in these discussions. However, the thesis highlighted that in both cases there was a reluctance to have an arena solely built and operated by private sector investment but understood the need to be economical use of public money. A limited level of investment from the private company that acted as the operators of the arena was seen in both cases along with the local authorities maintaining ownership of the arenas. Ownership of the arenas was an important factor as it demonstrated that both local authorities wanted to maintain overall control of these buildings for use in marketing and branding and ultimately to retain the economic benefits that the arenas bring. Whilst this is normal practice in France, whatever the political complexion of the specific city, it is less common in England given the emphasis on private-sector-led regeneration at the time.

This chapter plays a significant role in the thesis by drawing together the research findings and providing an analysis within the overarching framework of governance. It has demonstrated how governance decision-making; cultural and

urban governance have influenced the responses of the local authorities in developing the arenas.

CONCLUSION

The thesis has made a significant contribution to knowledge on several levels. It has extended the literature on governance applied specifically within the political, cultural and urban dimension, the decision-making for the development of the relatively new concept of the dedicated arena, and in the mapping of the development of two specific arenas in Europe. The adoption of a comparative approach observed at the outset that there has been very little comparative analysis in the present thematic context. Through its comprehensive understanding and comparative analysis of the decision-making processes for the development of arenas in France and England it has significantly enhanced the comparative literature and thus added to the understanding of the strengths and limitations of comparative study. The thesis explored Wolman's (1993) comparative approach and concluded that the 'systems understanding' as well as Booth's (2011) 'home learning' is relevant for both local authorities. Through these approaches the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC are presented with the opportunity to reflect and learn from the decision-making processes. Therefore, through the comparative lens, the case studies suggest that each local authority has an opportunity for comparative learning with a focus on knowledge transfer that could see a clear framework for major building of significance adapted to the development of future arenas. It also offers a model for considering comparative urban development planning in other contexts and can be expanded across local authorities and countries more generally.

There are two significant contributions which the thesis has identified, a) understanding the importance of governance and b) the anatomy of decision-making in a comparative context. In addition, the thesis presented in Annex 1 an overview of the development of arenas in France and England

The analysis highlighted the move from existing adapted venues and the rise of the dedicated venue. In **understanding the importance of governance**, the thesis was able to highlight the key elements of significance to decision-making and how these interacted through time in the decision to build an arena. The framework of governance was particularly important to the comparative study bringing clarity to an understanding of the particular structural differences, nationally and locally. In so doing it will assist future research in an

understanding of the complexity in public administration decision-making. The thesis presented a detailed analysis of the **anatomy of decision-making** in public sector infrastructure. It dissects the decision-making process for the development of arenas from the initial discussions through to the actual construction. In doing so it has provided an innovative approach, which analysed how, why and when the challenges and tensions from a political perspective appeared and culminated in prolonging the process. It highlighted the importance of political leadership and commitment. The thematic approach in which the empirical data and findings from the case studies were gathered directly answer the four research questions. In answering the questions contributions to the literature are further explored.

1: In what ways did national policy in France and England shape local level decision-making related to cultural infrastructure provision for popular music?

The thesis has established the importance of national government public policy in shaping the context of two political reforms, which saw structural and administrative restructuring. The national policies and reforms from the 1980s attempted to address the challenges faced with the acceleration of the global market and the strengthening of EU integration. The cumulative effect of these policies ultimately changed the relationships and governance between the state/central government and local authorities. The research findings pointed to local authorities and cities becoming central to addressing the challenges faced by globalisation, steered by the political ideologies influencing the visions for the future policy development and processes. The thesis has highlighted that whilst France and England adopted different approaches the resulting competition brought to the fore the need to strengthen their cities to become economic drivers in support of the capital city. The evolving competition between nation states identified several regional imbalances in both countries. The implementation of schemes such as the métropoles d'équilibre and the subsequent redefining the métropoles (2015) in France and the New Towns and further national policy for example by the New Labour government 'Our Towns and Cities' (2000) and 'Strong and Prosperous Communities' (2006) was a move to address the imbalances. However, the analysis of the impact of such schemes remains uncertain and inner cities problems continue. The improving urban governance through national reforms, however, was only part of the

process. What was required was a change in attitude towards governance. This was related to a greater engagement with the private sector and policies which emphasised participation and co-ordination of a greater number of stakeholders resulting in network governance. The thesis has argued that the importance placed on engagement of the private sector particularly in urban and cultural development was to counteract the reduction of central funding for local authorities. Whilst network governance provided greater involvement, shared visions and decision-making and ultimate financial support for local authorities the research indicated that in terms of cultural development often a top-down approach continued.

The research findings suggested that the introduction of cultural policy and its implementation has been varied in both countries often suffering from political seesawing, lack of investment and clear understanding of what constitutes culture. The establishment of specific government departments for culture and ministers seen in both countries emphasised that culture was important in national policy. However, national cultural policy remained difficult to implement and often left to local authorities and initially only emphasised high culture. A way of managing cultural came in the form of cultural governance with establishment of non-elected organisations such as the DRAC and Art Councils. The findings highlighted that the influence of these organisations on the enhancement of cultural infrastructure was limited for popular culture.

The response of the two countries at national level towards popular music and the associated need for venues has been varied. French definitions of culture remain elitist and even with the growth of the Zénith venue the state was insisting that popular music should be predominantly French. There is however a number of arenas built since the 1980s that have allowed greater international visibility. In England the profitability of popular music remained key to its acceptance and central government left it to the music industry to develop. The national attitudes towards popular music had little effect on local authorities which was evident in the dual case study.

The effect on local authorities of the national policies was demonstrated in the shift of local power that created a level of fragmentation of governance, experienced in France with a plurality of local governance and the move to

centralisation and privatisation in England. This led to a weakening of local governance in favour of non-elected agencies and private-sector-led regeneration. The findings highlight that despite the restructuring of local authorities, local governance in the context of public policy continued with the involvement of stakeholders and agencies. Although in Bordeaux it relates predominantly to the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole, in Leeds by contrast, the Leeds Initiative provides an example of network governance at the local level. In transforming the cities both local authorities had urban development tendencies similar to those cities of a similar status. In both cases the lack of an arena was signified as a disadvantage. The research revealed however, that in the case of the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC the influences of the state and central reforms were less intrusive. The decision-making process by the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC was focussed on the local perspective and needs of the area and only looked towards the state and central government for funding opportunities.

Whilst there was no clear format as to what a European or global city was there was a clear link to economic growth and an attractiveness of the city for its communities and tourists with a vibrant cultural infrastructure. The lack of an arena presented challenges for CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC as they competed with other similar cities. The research has provided the evidence that the political climate had influence on the city to become competitive and it was this that became a key driver for CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC in enhancing its cultural infrastructure and a level of boosterism.

2: What was the role of local urban planning and cultural policy in shaping the development of music arenas in Bordeaux and Leeds?

It was clear from the interviews, local strategies and policies and official committee reports that both cities were ambitious and aspired to become nationally important but also European and global cities. In both cases the lack of an arena was identified as problematic. This was emphasised in Bordeaux with the ECoC bid. Without such a cultural facility the city could not compete. It was no longer the absence of high culture facilities and concert halls and esoteric museums which mattered. Specific venues for popular music were a key element of any ECoC application.

The thesis argues that 'image' was integral to addressing competition and rather than it being seen as an abstraction it was used as a guide for intended action by the local authorities. Whilst both local authorities articulated visions for their cities through strategic and coherent development documents for example, SCoT and the three overlapping Visions for Leeds the impact of these documents was limited in the final analysis. It was in the pursuit of urban development with an expected outcome that local authorities would achieve an enhanced cultural infrastructure and thus greater promotion of their cities on the European and international scene. In managing the transformations from post-industrial to service sector the level of gentrification manifested itself in the visions held by both the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC.

Part 2 of the thesis dealt with the case studies and presented a fascinating and original detailed study of city decision-making in which frameworks were generally ignored and personality and political power dominated. As the case studies suggested local network governance and decision-making process was intertwined with urban and city planning policies. Tools such as the ZAC and Local Plans were available but the tendency to use them in the development process was far from straight forward and the potential policies and tools were largely ignored. This is evidenced in chapter 5 in Bordeaux where the PLU and ZAC were ignored until the very last minute. In Leeds, a city centre location was chosen despite the UDP claiming there was no space (chapter 7).

In terms of cultural policy, the link to the arena development and decision-making is unconvincing. Neither Bordeaux nor Leeds followed a directly related cultural policy to ensure the arenas were built. The added complexity evidenced in France was the national model for music venues, the Zénith, which Bordeaux had decided against in favour of a larger capacity arena. The decision to submit to the ECoC indicated a link with cultural policy but from the point of view that a venue was needed to compete with other cities of similar status. In contrast LCC only developed a formal cultural policy in 2002 and this was only on the insistence of central government. Bordeaux maintained a top-down approach and accepted the need to build an arena as part of wider application to the ECoC. Leeds initially adopted a bottom-up approach which had a greater engagement with stakeholders and the public. This was more apparent at the beginning of the discussions as to whether an arena was needed and through the various consultations for the Visions for Leeds. There is however very little

evidence to suggest that there was a greater level engagement with the public throughout the latter parts of the decision-making process.

In terms of cultural-led regeneration the exploitation of the arenas as flagship or iconic architecture allowed additional marketing and branding tools to be used. This is evident with Bordeaux and Leeds attracting stakeholders such as global music corporations, sponsorship and transient tourism. An example in Leeds saw the hosting of events such as the MOJO awards in 2015 and 2017 that meant bigger audiences for the city, and transient tourism for the period of the awards ceremonies. To the present there has been nothing similar in Bordeaux but as the arena only opened in 2018 there has been little opportunity to bid for such events particularly in light of Covid-19. In addition, the arena development enhanced infrastructure such as transport and car parking, and further regeneration has taken place, for example, the Arena Quarter, Leeds.

3: What were the contrasting and comparable experiences of Bordeaux and Leeds in creating spaces for popular music?

A review of chapters 5 and 7 demonstrated the dynamics of the local authorities in the decision-making process for the development of the dedicated music arena. Derived from the dual case study research the following comparable experiences have been highlighted and included a) governance and political influence on decision-making, b) the public and private involvement in terms of financial investment c) use of cultural policy. The contrasting experiences were demonstrated in d) the approaches adopted, e) geography and the type and style of venues.

a. The thesis acknowledged the transformational shifts in governance that have taken place in Bordeaux and Leeds since the 1980s. Whilst network governance brought a greater emphasis on joint decision-making by different stakeholders this was less evident in the process used by the local authorities in the development of the arenas. The research findings demonstrated that the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC had influential political individuals who led the cultural agenda driven by their own predilections and enabled by a lack of a formal cultural policy. This is reflective of the wider political landscape where the trend of cultural-led urban regeneration was seen as more important in the enhancement of both cities image rather than the use of cultural policy.

This was particularly seen in the French case, where the *cumul de mandat* permits local politicians to hold national political positions. Significant personal power rested with mayors of the communes of Bordeaux and Bruges. Bordeaux in particular witnessed severe disruption by powerful mayors in the decision-making processes at the final stages of the approval process for the arena. In contrast the disputes suffered by LCC came from external areas, such as that from Sheffield City Council and the court case brought by Montpellier Estates Ltd. The internal and external disputes highlighted the precariousness of the decision-making and the attempts to drive the development of the arena in a certain direction or not at all. These challenges are significant as they prolonged the development process. Without a clear strategic plan and regard for the planning tools available, the decision-making took place over a long period of time, by different political parties which allowed the processes and direction to be changed at will.

b. The debates surrounding funding either public, private or a mixture of both was evident in both case studies. Ultimately, the cost to the public purse was a major factor in these discussions. The analysis disclosed that both local authorities were reluctant to permit the arena to be solely built and operated by the private sector but understood the need to be cost effective with public money. Although this is less evident in the Bordeaux case with the engagement of international recognised architect to design the arena. The national reforms had impacted on the local authorities' ability to obtain funding for the development of cultural infrastructure and even with several applications by the private sector to build the arena, the trajectories seen in both local authorities was a focus on the use of the public purse. This indicates a level of control held by the local authorities that although accepting some investment from the private sector wanted to retain overall ownership of the major cultural facility. This ownership of the arena confirms that the arena was a cultural asset. Therefore, with lease agreements in place the local authorities had the freedom to use the arena as a marketing tool to position the cities on an equal footing with other cities of similar status.

c. In terms of the development of the arena there was little evidence that a cultural policy was a key driver. Whilst national cultural policy in both countries was in place, they were unhelpful for local authorities in developing cultural infrastructure given the limited strategic steer and funding. The impact on the

local authorities therefore in terms of cultural policy was minimal. Instead, Bordeaux and Leeds had a tendency to use urban and cultural-led regeneration to enhance cultural infrastructure, which came with opportunity to obtain funding. The use of cultural-led regeneration was an important element Bordeaux's decision to apply for ECoC. The broader discussion by the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole highlighted that the arena was important cultural facility as without such a facility it was a disadvantage compared to other cities in its bid. In contrast, the lack of a cultural facility in Leeds was identified through several media campaigns and support from the community, both recognised as major initial drivers for the arena development. The legitimacy of network governance in these instances however, proved to be difficult in practice. The evidence directly relates to the decision-making process for the arena as hierarchical despite the early interventions by the ECoC application and media and community support.

d. Situated within very different political and administrative structures, the approaches taken in the decision-making process took different shapes. In practice Bordeaux operated a very top-down process that is reflected in the discussions and subsequent outcomes between mayors within the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole, but with little involvement of the public. There was no actual system for the inclusion of a wider discussion with stakeholders or the public. The findings from the research indicated the prominence placed on applying for the ECoC and despite the potential impact for stakeholders from other cultural venues within Bordeaux the decision-making remained levelled at the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole. Whilst the interplay and discussions between the mayors suggested views from the wider community were taken account of, in practice there is no evidence to suggest that this was the case.

In England the decision-making process began with a bottom-up approach particularly informed from the results of the campaigns from the local newspaper, The Yorkshire Evening Post and the public responses to LCC consultations. The outcomes of which informed the development of the three overlapping Visions for Leeds by the Leeds Initiative. An example of network governance The Leeds Initiative however, took a lesser role in the decision-making of the arena. Equally, apart from general consultations on its development, the evidence indicated that there was little engagement with the

wider community. In the end however, the research findings point to both local authorities maintaining a top-down approach.

e. In terms of the actual decision-making for the development three key issues stand out; these are the Zénith style venue, the capacity of the venues and use of internationally renowned architects. The average size of the typical arena differs significantly; in France the average seating capacity is 7,600 compared to England's average of 12,900. It is noteworthy that most recent developments such as that in Bordeaux have adopted much larger structures. The geographic distribution is also very different. As seen in chapter 3 many if not most regional cities in France have built arenas whilst in England arena building has been the preserve of the major cities. A major factor that explains these differences is the state involvement in France in the 1980s and its development of the Zénith model, an almost off-the-shelf arena, but one with significant constraints on size and design. It was noted that whilst both local authorities engaged internationally known architects for the design of the arenas, there is a distinction. The appointment of the highly popular individual named architect Rudy Ricciotti suggested that Bordeaux intended to have a major iconic building and create a unique silhouette to enhance the urban landscape and become recognisable around the world. Leeds on the other hand, conscious of the limited budget, appointed a professional international company Populous that had a track record for designing arenas and was a perceived move to limit the risk. The approach taken by LCC towards the design therefore was more utilitarian and pragmatic. Whilst both arenas have iconic designs and have won several awards the assumption of appointing a world-renowned architect potentially provides a greater kudos for a city and in turn attracts tourism to the building itself.

Further findings show that in both cases, Bordeaux and Leeds were late in the development of an arena compared with other cities of similar status. However, the real challenges to the development of the arena were a lack of a clear strategy, which led to a protracted decision-making process in both cases. Regardless of the political and administrative structures the thesis supports the view that the actual decision-making processes were remarkably similar.

4: What lessons can be learned from the cases of Bordeaux and Leeds and the future provision of local cultural infrastructure?

The dual case studies revealed four overarching findings from which an understanding of future cultural infrastructure development can learn. These are identified as a) the importance of local governance: in creating a clear strategic plan that adopts cultural and urban development plans. In linking these together a cultural framework of what exists and what is potentially missing within city allows a local authority to establish an approved planned approach b) funding public/private or a mixture of both: opportunities to discuss whether the cultural project is to be funded by the public purse or private investment or a mixture of both needs to be established early in the development c) urban governance: discussion of how any existing cultural and planning systems already approved and in place relate to new cultural development and d) systems learning: the opportunity for cities to learn from each other and particularly from those that have successfully built major cultural infrastructure.

The findings identified that political tensions were problematic because of the differing political party ideologies and the shifting of power. The **importance of local governance** plays a significant role particularly in the understanding of the behaviours of members within the committee setting. To lessen the possibility of disputes and tensions local authorities wishing to achieve a better process in the creation of major cultural projects should have a systematic approach and a formal agreement on what is needed. This can be achieved through a mapping of cultural infrastructure in order make an informed decision of where gaps are. This would influence the development of an agreed and adopted strategic plan that links public policy, cultural and urban development plans, with clearly defined aims and objectives where facilities development should be viewed in terms of being renewed, continued or strengthened. Independent feasibility studies will help to identify any lack in cultural infrastructure and these can lead to the potential urban regeneration, cultural and financial benefits and cost implications of any major cultural building. The recommendations from these studies is a key element of what will work in a city, and subsequent decision-making and agreement would be based on evidence rather than solely public demand, political expediency or a certain scheme such as the ECoC.

The type of **funding, public/private or a mixture of both** and agreed budget for a proposed major cultural infrastructure project should be planned from the beginning. If a planned approach is taken then there is a greater chance that the allocation of funding once agreed would not be challenged by changes in political power or even financial crises. Public/private partnerships can be useful in terms of investment, resources and allocated work plans according to expertise. However, network governance would play an integral part given the larger group of decision-makers and this needs to be accepted by the local authority. Linked with the type of funding is the question of ownership. The findings revealed that CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC wanted to retain ownership and used lease agreements to do this. The use of lease agreements is useful in this situation as the agreement between a local authority and private organisation covers the responsibilities, liabilities and risk. This type of approach provides income for both the local authority and the corporate industry. This is certainly true in both case studies.

The experiences and attitudes of the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole and LCC towards cultural policy were similar in that neither local authority linked the building of the arena to a specific policy; both were focussed on economic growth. However, **urban governance** is wide reaching with stakeholders, tourism and property developers for example that all have different levels of investment in new cultural facility development. The physical changes to the urban space, planned financial spend and how to manage the urban realm in terms of regeneration requires consideration particularly in how it relates with cultural policy. Urban planning schemes such as the ZAC des Quais as seen in Bordeaux, that are already in existence, and which offer a comprehensive planned approach over several phases are of particular value even if it took Bordeaux some years to recognise this.

In order to make informed decisions stakeholders and those involved in the process of the development of a major cultural project need to have a **systems understanding** of the overall systems they are working within. These can be wide reaching such as political, cultural and urban systems whereby there are different nuances, but all have an impact on the decision-making and development process. This understanding allows for an individual local authority to learn from their processes. Whilst this can be useful for individual local authorities, stakeholders also have the opportunity to learn from the experience

of others. To visit and talk to other local authorities that have been successful in developing cultural facilities can be useful, particularly in gaining an understanding of the pitfalls, challenges and tensions.

Future Research

The thesis has demonstrated that local authorities have been placed in an increased position of competition. In order to reposition themselves into European and Global cities with economic growth a greater focus has been placed on urban and cultural development. As urban development has become a preferred approach to cultural-led regeneration, cultural policy itself has been largely ignored. In transforming the city image and engaging with new cultural economies such as sport and music that increases transient tourism cities have developed cultural facilities and in particular arenas. The thesis has focussed on the emerging dedicated venues, which remain a relatively new concept. These venues offer more intimate experiences and contribute to the cultural infrastructure but whether this emerging concept continues is of interest. The thesis has highlighted that market forces demonstrated the lack of an arena and that competitiveness was a key driver for their development. However, for future dedicated arenas the question of saturation has to be considered particularly when many cities have already an arena of some kind. The use of feasibility studies offers an insight to whether the market can take a new arena from a commercial point of view yet there is limited research to provide an in-depth overview of the impact of arenas in close proximity from a urban, cultural and society perspective.

The approach adopted in Bordeaux and in England more generally suggests that whilst of specific value in the 1980s and 90s, the Zénith model is perhaps in need of review for three main reasons. First, its limited size might impact on its attraction to many of the world-renowned bands and artists who are capable of attracting drawing much larger capacity audiences than Zéniths permit. Similarly, given the size of many or most of the cities which have developed the Zénith model, audience catchments are limited and hence even for the smaller Zénith capacity limits their viability. Finally, the restrictive covenants associated with the Zénith which constrain international performances limits their attractiveness both to performers and audience.

A consideration for local authorities is the limited budgets and a willingness to spend on cultural infrastructure to enhance and accommodate these particular type of popular music venues. The demands on local authorities to share urban governance create the need for a level of maturity and behaviour in order to understand the needs of the population and also accept working closely with public and private organisations to deliver a major cultural infrastructure. The positioning of such a build and associated services requires sufficient urban public space to accommodate it.

In reflecting on the research findings four points for further enquiry have been identified. These potential lines of enquiry, whilst relating directly to the research, were beyond the scope of this study, but can inform future research into urban governance and cultural-led regeneration.

1) Innovative cultural policy for venues: Urban and cultural policy is commonplace in the remit of local authorities. In terms of commercial music venues local authorities often use cultural-led regeneration rather than cultural policy. National government cultural policy has little influence on local authorities in developing cultural infrastructure and specifically dedicated venues for popular music. What was witnessed however was a French exception where a state innovated scheme in 1981 resulted in the specific venue the Zénith. There is little literature which investigates whether the emergence of the Zénith impacted on popular music culture of France and in particular if these venues reduced the influence of the American/British artists as they were designed to do.

2) Arenas and city status: The development of arenas by local authorities has been linked to the economic benefit rather than cultural policy. Yet they are part of a cultural-led regeneration scheme and therefore in what way do these arenas contribute to the cultural offering of the city. The current research has laid the groundwork for future research to explore the tensions between a large music venue and the general urban environment and regeneration. These large monoliths are closed for significant periods of time and therefore reflect of dead spaces. In developing arenas the possibilities to enhance their usage and possible design to become better integrated into the public space should be considered.

3) **Comparison between types of venues:** The dedicated venue has evolved and developed by local authorities in response to the competitive environment. There is little comparative research that investigates the state-led cultural development of the Zénith style venue and the locally led cultural development of an arena in terms of the opportunities for regeneration.

4) **The development of arenas from a European perspective in the late 20th and early 21st century:** So far there has been little research in analysing and mapping the growth of venues for popular culture across Europe. In undertaking an in-depth data analysis it would provide a wider perspective on the key drivers for the development of venues and add to the limited research literature.

Finally, the research has highlighted the intrinsic value of comparative analysis more generally and having recognised the limited comparative research in the literature it is important for future research to expand the approach in other contexts and countries and reflect on and develop what Wolman was advocating as far back as 1993.

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ANNEX 1: FRANCE AND ENGLAND VENUES 1980-2019

Introduction

This annex offers an overview of the development of venues that host popular international and national live music and events in France and England since 1980 to evidence the growth of venues for popular music in the two countries. It provides data on venues with a seating capacity range of between 5,000 and 16,000. The venues within the data set have been developed specifically for hosting popular international and national live music and events. It is acknowledged however, that most venues retain a level of flexibility to host sporting and other events.

The development of venues for popular music in France and England 1980 to 2019

Introduction

This section is concerned with comparing and contrasting the development and distribution of arenas in France and England since 1980. Its prime purpose is:

- a) to identify all those arenas development in the period to confirm the pattern of growth;
- b) to identify the capacity of each arena;
- c) to establish the costs of construction. It is recognised that a direct analysis of the costs is difficult particularly because of the variety of venues, those which incorporate other cultural facilities and different funding schemes. However, it was felt important to provide data on costs to reflect the willingness of local authorities to engage with cultural infrastructure development.

The first challenge is to establish the number of such developments on the basis of which further analysis can be made. Unfortunately there is a lack of official data source for the collection of venues, seating capacities and location (Osbourne and Laing, 2020) and consequently the analysis relies on data collected from various sources including Google, individual venue sites, publications such as UK Music by Numbers (2019; 2020), IQ European Arena Year Book (2017; 2018; 2019), Live DMA (Dee, 2018), Arenas 2015 Rapport de la Commission Grands Salles (Constantini and Besnier, 2010) and music

organisations ASM Global and Centre National de la Chanson des Variétés et du jazz (CNV). Whilst perhaps limited in terms of direct comparison there is sufficient information to make appropriate comparisons concerning the cost, type, and size of venues.

The establishment of precise number and locations involved a two-pronged approach. First, from the available data an extensive web-based search was undertaken and initial list of arenas was compiled. Then a search of individual cities was undertaken to explore further for possible arenas. By taking a dual approach an acceptably accurate list of arenas in both countries was developed. The search and subsequent analysis focussed on the following criteria:


- Regional urban areas with a population of 250,000 and over. By using this population threshold the arenas involved are located in broadly similar market areas with significant urbanisation.
- In France these are Métropoles and Communautés Urbaines (data taken from INSEE 2020).
- In England using the ONS 'built-up area' provided population data for a wider area with major sub-divisions that identified towns and cities, especially in the larger conurbations along with the metropolitan area, Manchester and Leeds for example (data taken from ONS 2017)
- Commercial venues for predominantly popular music and events with a seating capacity range of between 5,000 and 16,000. This allows an inclusion of some of the smaller venues, particularly the Zéniths in France. The decision to omit mega developments such as large arenas (16,000-21,000 capacity) and football stadiums which host music events was taken to ensure that a focus was maintained on the small to medium sized venues.

FRANCE: AN ANALYSIS OF ARENAS

Population of cities with arenas

The research is interested in regional cities designated as Métropoles and Communautés Urbaines and how they accommodate venues for popular music and events. The total number of Métropoles and Communauté Urbaines as of 1 January 2020 are 21 and 14 respectively (INSEE, 2020). Out of a total of 35, the data set consists of Métropoles (16) and Communautés Urbaines (2) and these 18 will be used throughout the analysis (Chart 1). Whilst 5, Métropoles (2) and


Communautés Urbaines (3), fit the population size criterion, they do not have an arena predominantly for popular music and events with a capacity of between 5,000-16,000 and therefore omitted (Chart 3). These Métropoles and Communautés Urbaines may have other arenas and stadiums but these are outside the selection criteria.



Source Data: INSEE, 2020, n.pag.

Average size of population with an arena/Zénith


The mean average size of population of the Métropoles and Communautés Urbaines with an arena is 572,322,833. As Chart 1 shows there are significant outliers between the largest Métropole d'Aix-Marseille-Provence that has a population of 1,900,023 compared with the smallest Dijon Métropole with only 258,782. Whilst the mean average is 572,322,833, the modal class average of Métropoles and Communautés Urbaines is between 200,000 and 299,999 with 5 out of the 18 followed by 400,000 and 499,999 with 6 out of the 22 (Chart 2). This provides a greater commonality of size of population that has an arena or Zénith. For those arenas for which reliable data is available, whilst commercial companies operate them they are predominantly owned by the city councils.



Source Data: INSEE, 2020, n.pag.

Métropoles and Communautés Urbaines outside of the data set

The data set includes 18 Métropoles and Communautés Urbaines. However, there are 5 that have been omitted (Chart 3). These have a population range over 250,000 but do not fit within the arena capacity criteria or are not used primarily as a popular music and events venue. These have sports complexes such as Stade Océane (25,000+ capacity) at the Le Havre Seine Métropole as well a number of venues below 5,000 criteria such as Perpignan Méditerranée Métropole Palais des congrès Georges Pompidou. In addition, Limoges (CU) with a population of 211,508 sits outside the criteria but does have a Zénith along with Amiens 134,057 and Pau 77,130. Whilst these areas have considerably smaller populations there appears to be still a requirement for them to provide a popular music venue such as the Zénith.




Source Data: INSEE, 2020, n.pag.

The decentralisation reform of the 1980s provided cities and regions the autonomy to address cultural infrastructure (chapter 3). Whilst there is no obvious reason why the Métropoles and Communautés urbaines in Chart 3 do not have an arena within the data criteria, the decision remains at the heart of the local governing body and the needs of the particular area. Given that there are other venues it could be suggested that there is no additional need for a specific popular music and events venue. That said Reims has recently completed an arena with a capacity of 9,000 (February 2022). There is also the issue of competition between a multi-use venue and the Zénith type and whether there is a need for both within the same city and region.

Dates of construction

Chart 4 outlines the number of arena/Zéniths that were built over a period of 30 years. Out of a total of 18 venues, 13 were Zéniths and 5 Arenas.




Source Data: Individual Arena/ Zéniths websites, Maillard, 2010

The data demonstrates that the most significant periods of building was in the 1990s when 7 were built and between 2000 and 2009. During the period 12 Zéniths were constructed along with 2 Arenas. In terms of the type of arena developed, the dominance of the Zénith model reflects the activity of the Zénith franchise in encouraging the development. As far as the overall time period is concerned, the limited development in the post financial crash period reflects the difficulty of raising development finance as will be seen reflected in the faltering steps of development in the Bordeaux case study.

Size/capacity


Chart 5 shows that the most popular seating capacity of an arena/zenith is 5,000 to 7,999 (10) with only one arena having a seating capacity of over 10,000.



Source Data: Individual Arena/ Zéniths websites

Model adopted

Chart 6 shows that the most popular model adopted during the period was a Zénith style venue with 13 being constructed as opposed to 5 arenas.




Source Data: Individual Arena/ Zéniths websites

The data demonstrates that first Zénith constructed in Paris in 1984 (outside the data set) has acted as a catalyst for the number of Zéniths across France. Of the 5 arenas, the Palais Nikaia, Nice compares itself to a Zénith due to its exceptional capacity and technical abilities yet without any of the restrictions that are attached to official Zénith developments.

Cost

Chart 7 shows the construction costs for those arenas for which reliable data is available.



Source Data: individual arena/ Zénith websites


The original data is indexed to 2020 using European Central Bank euro inflation data to give a consistent picture of the costs of the developments. In the indexed costs, there are three broad groups, 10-20M Euros, 20-40M Euros and over 40M Euros. Superficially it might appear that these variations reflect the location in cities of different wealth or willingness to make a statement, as in the case of Bordeaux, Strasbourg and Lille. However, St. Etienne stands out, as do Rouen, Clement Auvergne and Nancy as smaller cities with significant budgets for arena development.

ENGLAND: AN ANALYSIS OF ARENAS

Population of cities with arenas

The research is concerned with the development of arenas in 'regional cities' and therefore London has been omitted. Of a total of 15 'cities' with a population size of 250,000 and over, 6 have been identified as having a commercial indoor arena predominantly for popular music and events with a seating

capacity between 5,000 and 16,000 (Chart 8). These 6 will be used throughout the analysis.




Source Data: ONS 2017.

Whilst 8 'cities' fit the population size, they do not have an arena predominantly for popular music and events with a capacity of between 5,000-16,000 and are therefore omitted (Chart 10). These 'cities' may have other indoor arenas and stadiums but they sit outside of the selection criteria.

Average size of population with an arena


The mean average size of population of the 'cities' with an arena is 562,404.667. As chart 8 shows there are significant outliers between the largest Birmingham that has 1,153,717 compared with the smallest Newcastle up Tyne with only 281,842. The mean average of 562,404.667 is reflected in the modal class average with 3 out of the 6 'cities' between 500,000 and 599,999 (Chart 9). The 3 other 'cities' are spread across the population range.



Source Data: ONS, 2017

'Cities' outside of the data set

The data set includes 6 'cities'. However, there are 9 that have been omitted. These have a population range of 250,000 and over but do not fit within the arena capacity criteria or which are not used predominantly as a popular music and events venues (Chart 10).




Source Data: ONS, 2017

For example, Derby has an arena (Derby Arena) but is used mostly for sport; Hull has constructed the Bonus Arena (2018, 3,500 seating) and Bristol (YTL

Arena) is still in progress). Manchester boasts one of the largest concert venues in England with AO Arena, with a 21,000 seating capacity. Others such as Leicester have both a stadium and an arena but both are used primarily for sport (King Power Stadium, Football and Morningside Arena, Basketball). The sports theme is replicated in Coventry with Ricoh Arena for Rugby Union, and for Bradford, Stoke-on-Trent and Southampton all of which have football stadiums.

Dates the arenas were built

Chart 11 outlines the number of arena that was built over a period of 30 years.




Source Data: individual Arena websites

In total there have been a total of 7 venues constructed in the period with 2 in Birmingham (1980 and 1991). The data demonstrates that the most significant periods of building were between the 1990s (3) and 2009 (2). Only 1 arena was built during 1980-1989 and 1 arena built during 2010-2020. As in the French case, development after the financial crash has been limited for financial reasons which is also reflected in the Leeds case study.

Size/capacity


Chart 12 shows that the most popular seating capacity of an arena is 10,000 to 12,000 (3) with 4 arenas having a seating capacity of over 13,000. Out of the 4, 2 arenas have between 15,000 and 16,000.



Source Data: individual Arena websites

Cost

Chart 13 shows the construction costs for those arenas for which reliable data is available.



Source Data: individual Arena websites

The original data is indexed to 2020 using Bank of England inflation calculator to give a consistent picture of the costs of the developments. It is worth noting that both arenas in Birmingham are renovation costs rather than the original build cost. In the indexed costs, there is a similar range across the cities except for Liverpool, which is noticeably the highest; this high cost is explained by the fact

that it was part of a much larger complex designed by Wilkinson Eyre for the European Capital of Culture. Newcastle-upon-Tyne's arena costs were significantly lower.

Conclusion

In summary the analysis has provided an overview of the development and distribution of arenas in France and England since 1980. Using specific criteria, the data set included 18 arenas and Zéniths in France and 7 arenas in England.

The population data showed that whilst the mean average in France is 572,322,833 the modal class average of Métropoles and Communautés Urbaines is much lower between 200,000 and 299,999. This differs in England as the mean average of 562,404.667 is reflected in the modal class average particularly noted between 500,000 and 599,999. This would suggest that the French developments rely on a smaller resident population for their markets and indicating that popular French music has smaller audiences in general. Against this observation however, it should be noted that given the population densities of the two countries, the English arenas command a significant market population within a given travel time compared with France. France saw a significant number of venues for popular culture being built since 1980. This figure has been greatly enhanced by the state-led cultural policy with a series of the Zénith model built during that period. This demonstrates a common trend in France to build a Zénith with a smaller seating capacity than an arena. The smaller seating capacity of a Zénith is representative of the potential catchment size of audiences these venues can attract. The building of the Zéniths is a significant pattern seen in France which is a direct result of French cultural policy. However the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole rejected the Zénith style venue in favour of an arena. The most recently built arena, Arkea Arena in Bordeaux (2018) holds 11,300 compared to 13,781 of the First Direct Arena, Leeds

Both countries had their most significant periods of building between the 1990s and 2009 (14 France and 5 England). In both countries the number of arenas developed following the economic crises of 2008 dropped with only two built in France and one in England during 2010-2020. The difficulties posed by the post crash period on the financing of arenas are common to both counties and this is significant context for the two case studies. The data is important as it highlights that whilst many venues have been constructed during the period of research

more recently the trend and pattern has been for cities to adapt facilities to accommodate popular music rather than build new arena, highlighting the significance of the decision by Bordeaux and Leeds to go down the new build route.

Data set included in the analysis

France

Métropoles and Communautés Urbaines	Type of Venue
Métropole d'Aix-Marseille-Provence	Le Dome de Marseille
Métropole Européenne de Lille	Zénith
Bordeaux Métropole	Arkea Arena
Toulouse Métropole	Zénith
Nantes Métropole	Zénith
Métropole Nice Côte d'Azur	Palais Nikaia
Eurométropole de Strasbourg	Zénith
Métropole Rouen Normandie	Zénith
Montpellier Méditerranée Métropole	Zénith
Métropole Grenoble-Alpes-Métropole	Summum
Métropole Toulon-Provence-Méditerranée	Zénith
Saint-Etienne Métropole	Zénith
Clermont Auvergne Métropole	Zénith
Orléans Métropole	Zénith
Métropole du Grand Nancy	Zénith
Dijon Métropole	Zénith
CU Angers Loire Métropole	L'Arena
CU Caen la Mer	Zénith

England

City	Type of Venue
Birmingham	Arena Birmingham (formerly National Indoor Arena, Barclaycard Arena) Resorts World Arena (formerly NEC, LG Arena, Genting Arena)
Liverpool	M & S Bank Arena (formerly Liverpool Echo, Liverpool Arena)
Sheffield	FlyDSA Arena, (formerly, Motorpoint Arena, Hallam FM Arena)
Leeds	First Direct Arena
Nottingham	Motorpoint Arena formerly (Nottingham Arena, Trent FM Arena, Capital FM Arena)
Newcastle upon Tyne	Utilita Arena (formerly Telewest Arena, Metro Radio Arena)

ANNEX 2: PHD PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET/CONSENT FORM / COMMUNIUCATONS (ENGLISH)

**Leeds Beckett University, School of the Built Environment, Engineering
and Computing**

Title of the study:

THE BUILDING OF ARENAS FOR POPULAR MUSIC IN FRANCE AND
ENGLAND 1980-2019

Introduction:

Since the 1980s there has been a number of new buildings developed specifically to accommodate popular culture in England and France. This study will seek to address how architecture through 'indoor music venues' such as the arena and le zenith has impacted on the popular cultural landscapes of cities in England and France from the 1980s to 2017. It will interrogate their contribution to regeneration of urban spaces and cultural quarters. There are very few comparative studies of England and France that investigate the planning, building and cultural context of indoor music venues. Current research relates to the music, sounds and cultural theory of popular music (Frith et al. 2010, Mourjorpoulos 2014, Kronenburg, 2011). This gap in the research has been identified through the researcher's knowledge of French cultural building following a masters level led research study which considered the relationship between power, leadership at the presidential level and architecture and more specifically, Francois Mitterrand and 'les grands projets'. This series of projects, which support high culture, has made a significant impact on the urban landscape of Paris and the regional cities that copied such buildings. The proposed research therefore, extends this theme to investigate how popular culture has impacted on cities through the associated buildings.

In demonstrating how specific venues for music and public events for popular culture have emerged it will identify the importance placed within an urban environment and the individual city. The rise of the 'arenas' in England and 'le Zenith' in France is the main focus of the study. Two cities have been identified as case studies, Leeds and Bordeaux. Both have recently built an arena. The following high-level questions are being considered as a basis for framing the case studies.

- a) In what ways did national policy in France and England shape local level decision-making related to cultural infrastructure provision for popular music?
- b) What was the role of local urban planning and cultural policy in shaping the development of music arenas in Bordeaux and Leeds?
- c) What were the contrasting and comparable experiences of Bordeaux and Leeds in creating spaces for popular music?
- d) What lessons can be learned from the cases of Bordeaux and Leeds and the future provision of local cultural infrastructure?

Contact details

CONSENT FORM

Name (of participant).....

- I agree to take part in the above research project.
- I have read and understood the Information Sheet.
- All my questions about this project have been satisfactorily answered.
- I understand that my participation in this study is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw from this research project whenever I wish.
- I agree that the research results can be published and that all personal identifying details will be excluded.

Data Protection Act

I understand that data collected about me during my participation in this study will be stored on electronically and that any files containing information about me will be made anonymous.

I agree to the recording and analysis of this information. I understand that information will be used only for the purpose of this study and my consent is conditional upon the study complying with its duties and obligations under the Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

Signed

Date

FOR COMPLETION BY RESEARCHER

I (insert name), confirm that I have informed the above named about this research project. I have given them the Information Sheet. To the best of my knowledge, they have understood and have given free and informed consent to become a participant in the research project.

Signed

Date

EXAMPLES OF COMMUNICATION VIA EMAILS

Dear

I am a PhD student at Leeds Beckett University, within the School of Built Environment. My study is about the development of indoor music venues in post-industrial cities since 1980, particularly, their inception through to implementation. The study will seek to address how architecture through 'indoor music venues' such as the arena and le zenith has impacted on the popular cultural landscapes of cities in England and France from the 1980s to 2017. It will interrogate their contribution to regeneration of urban spaces and cultural quarters.

At present I am undertaking my case study which is all about the First Direct Arena, Leeds and I wondered if you would be willing to be interview to provide your perspective and opinions about the Arena and its impact on the Leeds City Region. I can send the participant information sheet which outlines in more depth the study, type of questions and the process to you if that would help.

Many thanks

Dear

Thank you for agreeing participate in my study.

Attached is the Participants Information Sheet for your information. This will give you some more background information about my study and what to expect on DATE.

At our meeting, I will be interested in understanding the DECISION-MAKING/URBAN AND CULTURAL REGENERATION/PLANNING/OPERATING PROCESSES for such a large building. What was your role, when did it start and when did it end? Have you been involved in any subsequent regeneration projects around the Arena?

My aim is to gather this information so I can understand how an Arena moves from its inception to being built.

Look forward to meeting you at TIME and DATE.

Many thanks

ANNEX 3: PHD PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET/CONSENT FORM / COMMUNIUCATONS (FRENCH)

**Université de Leeds Beckett, École de l'environnement bâti, de l'ingénierie
et de l'informatique**

Titre de l'étude:

LA CONSTRUCTION D'ARÈNES POUR LES MUSIQUES POPULAIRES EN
FRANCE ET EN ANGLETERRE 1980-2019

Introduction:

Depuis les années 1980, un certain nombre de nouveaux bâtiments ont été développés spécifiquement pour accueillir la culture populaire en Angleterre et en France. Cette étude cherchera à examiner l'impact de l'architecture à travers les `` lieux de musique d'intérieur '' tels que l'arène et le zénith sur les paysages culturels populaires des villes d'Angleterre et de France des années 1980 à 2017. Elle interrogera leur contribution à la régénération des espaces urbains. et les quartiers culturels. Il existe très peu d'études comparatives sur l'Angleterre et la France qui examinent la planification, la construction et le contexte culturel des salles de concert en salle. Les recherches actuelles portent sur la musique, les sons et la théorie culturelle de la musique populaire (Frith et al.2010, Mourjorpoulos 2014, Kronenburg, 2011). Cette lacune dans la recherche a été identifiée grâce aux connaissances du chercheur sur la construction culturelle française à la suite d'une étude de recherche menée au niveau de la maîtrise qui a examiné la relation entre le pouvoir, le leadership au niveau présidentiel et l'architecture et plus spécifiquement, François Mitterrand et «les grands projets». Cette série de projets, qui soutiennent la haute culture, a eu un impact significatif sur le paysage urbain de Paris et des villes régionales qui ont copié de tels bâtiments. La recherche proposée étend donc ce thème pour étudier l'impact de la culture populaire sur les villes à travers les bâtiments associés.

En démontrant comment des lieux spécifiques pour la musique et des événements publics pour la culture populaire ont émergé, il identifiera l'importance accordée dans un environnement urbain et la ville individuelle. L'essor des «arènes» en Angleterre et du «Zénith» en France est au centre de l'étude.

Deux villes ont été identifiées comme études de cas, Leeds et Bordeaux. Les deux ont récemment construit une arène. Les questions de haut niveau suivantes sont considérées comme une base pour encadrer les études de cas.

- a) De quelle manière la politique nationale en France et en Angleterre a-t-elle influencé la prise de décision au niveau local concernant la fourniture d'infrastructures culturelles pour la musique populaire?
- b) Quel a été le rôle de la planification urbaine locale et de la politique culturelle dans le développement des arènes musicales à Bordeaux et à Leeds?
- c) Quelles ont été les expériences contrastées et comparables de Bordeaux et de Leeds dans la création d'espaces pour la musique populaire?
- d) Qu'est ce que peut-on tirer des cas de Bordeaux et de Leeds et de la fourniture future d'infrastructures culturelles locales?

Détails du contact

FORMULAIRE DE CONSENTEMENT

Nom (du participant).....

- J'accepte de participer au projet de recherche ci-dessus.
- J'ai lu et compris la fiche d'information.
- Toutes mes questions sur ce projet ont reçu une réponse satisfaisante.
- Je comprends que ma participation à cette étude est volontaire et que je suis libre de me retirer de ce projet de recherche quand je le souhaite.
- J'accepte que les résultats de la recherche puissent être publiés et que tous les détails d'identification personnelle seront exclus.

Loi de protection des données

Je comprends que les données collectées à mon sujet lors de ma participation à cette étude seront stockées électroniquement et que tout fichier contenant des informations me concernant sera rendu anonyme.

J'accepte l'enregistrement et l'analyse de ces informations. Je comprends que les informations ne seront utilisées qu'aux fins de cette étude et mon consentement est conditionnel à ce que l'étude se conforme à ses devoirs et obligations en vertu du règlement sur la protection des données (RGPD).

Signed

Date de signature

À REMPLIR PAR UN CHERCHEUR

Je (insérer le nom), confirme avoir informé les personnes nommées ci-dessus de ce projet de recherche. Je leur ai remis la fiche d'information. Au meilleur de ma connaissance, ils ont compris et ont donné leur consentement libre et éclairé pour devenir un participant au projet de recherche.

Signed

Date de signature

EXAMPLES OF COMMUNICATION VIA EMAILS

Chere Madame/Monsieur

Je suis une étudiante à l'université de Leeds Beckett, Leeds, Royaume Uni, et à ce moment je suis en train d'écrire ma thèse pour un doctorat sur le thème 'L'effet de la politique culturelle et du développement régional sur les villes post industrielles à travers la construction de salles de concerts en Angleterre et en France, 1980-2018'.

J'ai lu les délibérations de Conseil de Communauté/Conseil de Bordeaux Métropole qui s'intéresse au sujet de l'arène à Floirac, et j'ai noté que vous avez parlé à ce sujet.

ADD REPORTS

Donc je me demande si vous voulez me donner vos réflexions sur l'arène et le processus de développement. Normalement je voudrais bien visiter Bordeaux pour faire rendez-vous mais à cause de virus ce n'est pas possible.

Donc je vous pose le suivant:

Qu'est-ce que c'est votre opinion sur:

- Le processus de développement, politiquement et physique pour l'arène
- Le site en Floirac
- La contribution à la régénération de la rive droite et Floirac
- Si vous souhaitez faire d'autres commentaires, veuillez les inclure.

Je suis heureux de vous contacter par téléphone si vous le préférez. Je sais que vous serez très occupé donc, vous préférerez peut-être répondre par e-mail

J'ai joint une fiche 'd'information de mon étude' ainsi qu'un 'formulaire de consentement' que je vous serais reconnaissant de signer si vous êtes heureux de participer à mes études doctorales (ce consentement est obligatoire dans le système britannique de doctorales).

Votre assistance serait très appréciée. N'hésitez pas à me contacter si vous avez besoin d'autres informations. En vous remerciant d'avance, veuillez agréer, Madame/Monsieur l'expression de mes considérations distinguées.

Cordialement

Détails du contact

Chere Madame/Monsieur

Suite à mon emails de 4 et 13 janvier 2021, je me demande si vous pouvez trouver un petit créneau dans votre agenda pour répondre aux questionnes que j'ai posé. Je sais que vous êtes bien occupé dans cette période de virus et que ma demande est quelque chose en plus. Mais vos réflexions sont très importantes pour mes recherches. Je vous remercie profondement pour votre attention à mes demandes.

Votre assistance serait très appréciable. N'hésitez pas à me contacter si vous nécessitez d'autres informations. En vous remerciant d'avance, veuillez agréer, Madame/Monsieur l'expression de mes considérations distinguées.

Cordialement

Détails du contact

Cher Monsieur/Madame

J'espère que cela ne vous dérange pas que je vous recontacte. J'entreprends actuellement mon étude de cas sur l'arène de Bordeaux et mets en place une série d'entretiens. Ces entretiens ont pour but d'acquérir une vision personnelle et réflexive du développement de l'arène et des commentaires sur son impact sur la Métropole. En tant qu'auteur du rapport, je me suis demandé si vous seriez heureux de partager votre point de vue sur l'arène, le choix d'une arène au lieu d'un Zénith et l'emplacement.

Normalement je voudrai faire un rendez-vous mais pour le moment avec le virus c'est impossible. Donc, je serais très content si vous pouvez répondre, par email.

J'ai joint un fiche 'd'information de mon étude' ainsi qu'un 'formulaire de consentement' que je vous serais reconnaissant de signer si vous êtes heureux de participer à mes études doctorales (ce consent est obliqatoire dans le system britannique de doctorales).

Votre assistance serait très appréciable. N'hésitez pas à me contacter si vous nécessitez d'autres informations. En vous remerciant d'avance, veuillez agréer, Madame/Monsieur l'expression de mes considérations distinguées.

Détails du contact

ANNEX 4: POTENTIAL QUESTIONS (FRENCH AND ENGLISH)

The general themes for the questions envisaged at this stage cover the following areas, although these are draft and subject to change following the outcomes of the research and as the interviews progress. The questions will be tailored to the specific job role and remain flexible throughout the conversation.

Background: the City context, its Administration, Political Party in office, population changes, societal changes, and the cultural and urban policies in place).

Contexte : le contexte de la ville, son administration, le parti politique en place, les changements démographiques, les changements sociétaux et les politiques culturelles et urbaines en place).

POTENTIAL INTERVIEWEE – CITY COUNCILLOR/CONSEILLER(E) MÉTROPOLITAIN(E)

What was the decision-making process and who were the key decision-makers?

Quel a été le processus de prise de décision et qui étaient les principaux décideurs?

Was the decision to build an arena part of a regeneration and/or cultural plan for the city?

La décision de construire une arène faisait-elle partie d'un plan de régénération et/ou d'un plan culturel pour la ville?

Were the policies or plans influenced by central government policy or more regional/local based (city plan/council business plan/)?

Les politiques ou les plans ont-ils été influencés par la politique du gouvernement central ou par une approche plus régionale/locale (plan de la ville/plan d'affaires du conseil municipal)?

Was it a priority for the city in terms of the city plan?

S'agissait-il d'une priorité pour la ville dans le cadre du plan municipal?

Why was it important to have an arena within the city?

Pourquoi était-il important d'avoir un aréna dans la ville?

What were the drivers behind the arena's creation?

Quels étaient les moteurs de la création de l'arène ?

Did you see this as a flagship building or part of the regeneration plan for the specific area?

L'avez-vous considéré comme un bâtiment phare ou comme un élément du plan de régénération de la zone concernée ?

Is the arena a significant part of a creative/cultural quarter?

L'arène est-elle une partie importante d'un quartier créatif/culturel ?

Planning history of the site: location, influences of national policies such as: The Regional Spatial Strategy (RSS), Unitary Development Plan (UDP), Local Plans.

Historique de l'aménagement du site : emplacement, influences des politiques nationales telles que les suivantes : Directive Territoriale d'Aménagement et de Développement Durables (DTADD), Plan Local d'Urbanisme (PLU), Zone d'Aménagement Concertée (ZAC).

POTENTIAL INTERVIEWEE – PLANNING DEPARTMENT/ DÉPARTEMENT DE PLANIFICATION

How was the location chosen?

Comment l'emplacement a-t-il été choisi ?

Was the land part of certain land zone/change use/public/private ownership?

Le terrain faisait-il partie d'une certaine zone/changement d'utilisation/propriété publique/privée ?

How was it purchased?

Comment a-t-il été acheté ?

What kind of constraints was there?

Quel type de contraintes existait-il?

Was there a consultation process? If so who was consulted: the public, public/private businesses?

Y a-t-il eu un processus de consultation ? Si oui, qui a été consulté : le public, les entreprises publiques/privées?

The development: who initiated and why, was there any research done to evidence the need, how was it organised, what were the constraints, how was the design approved.)

Le développement : qui l'a initié et pourquoi, des recherches ont-elles été menées pour mettre en évidence le besoin, comment a-t-il été organisé, quelles étaient les contraintes, comment la conception a-t-elle été approuvée).

POTENTIAL INTERVIEWEE: THE DEVELOPERS, COUNCIL, OWNERS OF THE ARENA, ARCHITECT? LES PROMOTEURS, CONSEILS, PROPRIÉTAIRES DE L'ARÈNE, ARCHITECTE?

What was the process for the development?

Quel a été le processus de développement ?

Who were the major players?

Qui étaient les principaux acteurs?

Were there any constraints with the design/space/location?

Y a-t-il eu des contraintes liées à la conception, à l'espace ou à l'emplacement ?

Where there any agreed number of events per year?

Y a-t-il un nombre convenu d'événements par an?

Funding: who funded it – what type of investor(s), sustainability (who pays for upkeep)

Financement : qui l'a financé - quel type d'investisseur(s), durabilité (qui paie pour l'entretien)

Who are the major funders?

Qui sont les principaux bailleurs de fonds?

Public/private partnerships:– what percentage of funding did each invest over what period?

Partenariats public/privé: - quel pourcentage de financement chacun a-t-il investi sur quelle période?

What was the final cost?

Quel a été le coût final?

Who pays for the continued upkeep?

Qui paie pour l'entretien continu?

Process: when did it start, how long did it take, which architect/developer)

Processus: quand a-t-il commencé, combien de temps a-t-il pris, quel architecte/développeur)

Who decided on the architect – was it a competition?

Qui a choisi l'architecte - y a-t-il eu un concours ?

How was the actual planning process undertaken – how long did it take

Comment s'est déroulé le processus de planification proprement dit - combien de temps a-t-il duré?

Was there any changes to the original design

Des modifications ont-elles été apportées au projet initial?

Impact: on urban development and regeneration, local economy, the cultural offer

Impact : sur le développement et la régénération urbains, l'économie locale, l'offre culturelle.

What in your view has been the impact of the arena on the surrounding areas?

Quel a été, selon vous, l'impact de l'arène sur les zones environnantes?

Are there any negatives as well as positives?

Y a-t-il des points négatifs et des points positifs?

ANNEX 5: SPECIFICATIONS FOR A ZENITH

Cahier des Charges (En brief)

Une collectivité qui souhaite construire un Zénith, doit réaliser au préalable une étude de faisabilité générale à l'issue de laquelle le ministère de la Culture et de la Communication, après avis du CNV, se prononce sur l'attribution du label. Le respect du cahier des charges, outre l'autorisation d'utiliser la marque Zénith, permet l'attribution d'une subvention de l'Etat pour la réalisation des travaux de construction de la salle. La collectivité, maître d'ouvrage de l'équipement, organisera une consultation de concepteurs (concours d'architectes), puis elle choisira un exploitant dans le cadre d'une délégation de service public, selon les termes du cahier des charges.

Le cahier des charges comporte deux parties essentielles qui imposent aux collectivités :

- Le respect d'un certain nombre de dispositions techniques et fonctionnelles.
- Le respect de modalités d'exploitation de l'établissement, garantissant la priorité et la pérennité de son objet de salle de spectacles ainsi que la neutralité de l'exploitant vis-à-vis des utilisateurs (producteurs de spectacles).

Ce sont ces points essentiels de l'application du cahier de charges qui font le succès des salles Zénith :

- La performance, le confort des salles (accès, parkings, confort, acoustique, visibilité...) et leur modularité ont contribué à l'augmentation du nombre de spectateurs par spectacle.
- La neutralité d'exploitation garantissant un accès identique à chaque producteur a permis d'augmenter le nombre de propositions de spectacles.
- La spécialisation (le cahier des charges impose un pourcentage maximum d'utilisation hors spectacles de 30%). Cette répartition entre les spectacles vivants et les autres activités, donne aux Zénith une image très forte qui renvoie aux "Grands Spectacles" (ce qui n'est pas le cas des salles multifonctions mal identifiables). Aujourd'hui, dans la plupart des salles Zénith, la part du "spectacle" dans l'ensemble des activités est de l'ordre de 80%.

Le cahier des charges est actuellement en cours d'aménagement en concertation étroite avec les professionnels, les collectivités territoriales et le ministère de la Culture, mais ses dispositions principales, qui font que la France dispose de salles de grande capacité pour l'accueil de spectacles de musiques et de variétés sans équivalent dans le monde, seront confortées.

Specifications (Summary)

A community wishing to build a Zenith must first carry out a general feasibility study after which the Ministry of Culture and Communication, after consulting the CNV (Le centre national de la chanson, des variétés et du jazz), decides on the award of the label. Compliance with the specifications, in addition to the authorization to use the Zénith brand, allows the allocation of a State subsidy for the construction of the hall. The community, owner of the equipment, will organize a consultation of designers (architectural competition), then it will choose an operator within the framework of a public service delegation, according to the terms of the specifications.

The specifications include two essential parts which require communities:

- Compliance with a certain number of technical and functional provisions.
- Compliance with the establishment's operating procedures, guaranteeing the priority and sustainability of its performance hall purpose as well as the operator's neutrality vis-à-vis users (show producers).

These are the essential points of the application of the specifications that make the success of the Zenith rooms:

- The performance and comfort of the rooms (access, parking, comfort, acoustics, visibility, etc.) and their modularity have contributed to the increase in the number of spectators per show.
- Operational neutrality guaranteeing identical access to each producer has made it possible to increase the number of show proposals.
- Specialization (the specifications impose a maximum percentage of use excluding shows of 30%). This distribution between live shows and other activities gives the Zénith a very strong image that refers to "Great Shows" (which is not the case with poorly identifiable multifunction


rooms). Today, in most Zenith rooms, the share of the "show" in all activities is around 80%.

The specifications are currently being developed in close consultation with professionals, local authorities and the Ministry of Culture, but its main provisions, which mean that France has large capacity venues for hosting shows music and variety unparalleled in the world, will be consolidated.

The partnership under the name of la Société COKER, a specialist association that comprised the Minister of Culture, architects, Philippe Chaix and Jean Paul Morel and music and performance professionals, Daniel Colling and Daniel Keravec, created the concept of 'le Zenith'. The first Zenith, located in the Parc de la Villette, in the 19th arrondissement of Paris was inaugurated in 1984. This 'prototype temporaire' was supposed to be used only for a period of three years before being replaced (Maillard, 2010, p. 5). It's success however, among the public, artists and professionals saw this model adopted across the French regions with a further 16 Zeniths (Image 1.2) built over the period between 1984 and 2008. This systematic approach has provided many of the regions a winning formula from a tried and tested model since the first Zenith appeared in Paris in 1984.

The Zenith has to add to the built environment through the regeneration of the site and its surroundings and place an emphasis on a community programme involving artist and groups of musicians. Thus creating a landmark status and cultural importance in the planning process. Each Zenith interior has to be in amphitheatre form and seat at least 6,000, while the external architecture can be independent and decided by the town or city to reflect regional identities.

Image 1: les Zeniths



Source: Alphaville, 2008, p.3

Whilst initially the State contributed to the cost of the Zenith, this subsequently changed in 2010⁵³ and is now the responsibility of the city councils that often engage private and public partnerships (Société d'économie mixte SEM) or solely private operators (VEGA and COKER) to manage and operate the individual Zeniths.

It is difficult to confirm that the restrictive nature of the programming has hindered the openness of France towards international touring bands. At the colloque national Zenith held in 2013, the question of 'these specifications are constantly evolving. We have been discussing this for several years. We still can't come to an agreement' (Bloche⁵⁴, 2013, p.13). The decision to alter the specifications is still contentious

⁵³ COKER became an independent company and no longer attracted state subsidies

⁵⁴ Député de Paris et Président de la Commission des affaires culturelles et de l'éducation de l'Assemblée nationale.

ANNEX 6: LIST OF COMMUNES OF THE BORDEAUX MÉTROPOLE AND PRESIDENTS OF THE CUB / BORDEAUX MÉTROPOLE

List of communes of the Bordeaux Métropole

Ambarès-et-Lagrave	Ambès	Artigues-près-Bordeaux	Bassens
Bègles	Blanquefort	Bordeaux	Bouliac
Bruges	Carbon-White	Cenon	Eysines
Floirac	Gradignan	Le Bouscat	Le Haillan
Le Taillan-Médoc	Lormont	Martignas-sur-Jalle	Mérignac
Parempuyre	Pessac	Saint-Aubin-de-Médoc	Saint-Louis-de-Montferrand
Saint-Médard-en-Jalles	Saint-Vincent-de-Paul	Talence	Villeneuve-d'Ornon

Presidents of the CUB/Bordeaux Métropole

President	Duration of terms	Political party	<i>Cumal de madat</i> (other positions held during the period)
Jacques Chaban-Delmas	1967-1977	UDR	Mayor of Bordeaux (1947-1995), President of the National Assembly (1958-1969/1978-1981/1986-1988) President Regional Council of Aquitaine Deputy for Gironde in the National Assembly, Prime minister (1969-1972)
Michel Sainte-Marie	1977-1983	PS	Mayor of Mérignac (1974-2014) Member of the Gironde in the National Assembly (1973-2012)
Jacques Chaban-Delmas	1983-1995	RPR	As above
Alain Juppé	1995-2004	UMP	Mayor of Bordeaux (1995-2004) Prime Minister (1995-1997)
Alain Rousset	2004-2007	PS	Mayor of Pessac (1989-2001) President of the Aquitaine Regional Council (1998-2015) Deputy of the Gironde (2007-2017)
Vincent Feltesse	2007-2014	PS	Mayor of Blanquefort (2001-2012) Deputy for Gironde (2012-2014)
Alain Juppé	2014-2019	UMP	Mayor of Bordeaux (2006-2019) As above
Patrick Bobet	2019-2020	LR	Mayor of Bouscat (2001-)
Alain Anziani	2020	PS	Mayor of Mérignac (2014-)

ANNEX 7: LIST OF URBAN PROJECTS

Year	Project status
1986	Chaban-Delmas sets up <i>Cercle de la riviere</i> to advise on development of the two banks
1987	ARDEUR (Amenagement et renovation pour le developpement de l'environnement urbain rive droite) Project managed by Ricardo Boffill. Abandoned in 1993 because too ambitious
1989	International consultation 'Bordeaux – Port de la lune initiated by Chaban-Delmas.
1990	Public presentation of the many submitted projects
1991	Committee des Deux Rives Chaired by Chaban-Delmas established to review previous work and establish why nothing seemed to be done
1991	Designation of ZAC des Quais de Floirac by the CUB
1992	Dominique Perrault commissioned to prepare strategy for 400 hectares of derelict land on both banks
1994	Perrault presents his plan d'orientation urbain
1995	Alain Juppe elected mayor of Bordeaux
1996	Juppe presents his projet urbain
1996	1Revision of the Schema Directeur
2000	Plan Garonne approved

ANNEX 8: PACTE DE RELANCE POUR LA VILLE

There are three levels of zones (outlined below) dependent on the needs of the particular areas. All are implemented to create through policy better social and economic development. Each has its own specific criteria based on the circumstances of that particular zone but all encompass, population, unemployment and health issues.

Zones Franches Urbaines (ZFU),	A key part of the new national strategy. Created in 1996 under Chirac's Government, 44 Zones were initially designated. Located in the poorest neighbourhoods with high levels of unemployment special urban policies were introduced to combat social and economic deprivation. Revamped in 2003 the now Urban Empowerment Zones aim to reduce unemployment, poor housing and encourage business
Zone urbaines sensibles (ZUS)	Have five-year action plans and are a combination of central, local government and communes. To improve social, health and economic conditions.
Zone de revitalisation urbaine (ZRU)	Are located within a ZUS and have more acute needs.

Source: (*Ministère des affaires étrangères* 2006, p.64)

ANNEX 9: TYPES OF VENUES BORDEAUX

Examples of music venues (Salles des spectacles – Concert halls and stadium)

Venue	Location	Commune	Capacity
Stade Matmut Atlantique	Cours Jules-Ladoumègue	Bordeaux	42,115
Patinoire Mériadeck	Cr Maréchal Juin	Bordeaux	4,800
Rocher de Palmer	Rue Aristide Braind	Cenon	1,850
Auditorium	Georges Clemenceau	Bordeaux	1,440
Pin Galant	Av. du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny	Mérignac	1,410
Théâtre Femina	Rue de Grassi	Bordeaux	1,125
Grand Théâtre	Place de la Comedie	Bordeaux	1,100
Rock School Barbey	Cours Barbey	Bordeaux	700
Le Théâtre L'Inox	Rue Fernand Philippart	Bordeaux	75
L'Anitirouille	Rue Francois Boucher	Bordeaux	No data
Krakatoa	Avenue Victor Hugo	Mérignac	No data
Le Caillou du Jardin Botanique	Esplande Linné	Bordeaux	No data
L'Athénée Libertaire	Rue du Muguet,	Bordeaux	No data
Halles des Chartrons	Place du Marché Chartrons	Bordeaux	No data
Void	Rue du Mirail	Bordeaux	No data

Source: Bordeaux Métropole, n.d.

Examples of Café bars/Pub with live music (no data on capacity)

Venue	Location	Commune
Thelonious Café Jazz Club	Rue Bourbon	Bordeaux
Le Fiacre	Rue Cheverus	Bordeaux
Apollo Bar	Place Fernand-Lafargue	Bordeaux
Bistro des Bouchons	Cours Gametta	Talence
Café Brun	Rue Saint Remi	Bordeaux
BT59	Rue des terres neuves	Bègles
Café des Moines	Rue des menus	Bordeaux
Café Pompier	Place Pierre Renaudel,	Bordeaux
L'Antidote	Rue Elie Gintrac	Bordeaux
La Guinguette, Chez Alriq	Quai des Queyries	Bordeaux
Le Poisson Rouge	Rue Saumenuide	Bordeaux
Quartier Libre	Rue des Vignes	Bordeaux
Casa Latina	Quai des Chartrons,	Bordeaux

Source: Bordeaux Métropole, n.d.

ANNEX 10: KEY ACTORS IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS FOR THE ARENA

Name	Role and political party
Christine Bost	Mayor of Eysines PS (Parti Socialist) Vice president of CUB and delegate for Urbanisme and aménagement in 2008
Francois Cartron	Mayor of Antignes pres Bordeaux (part of CUB and commune east of Cenon), PS (Parti Socialist)
Serge Lamaison	Mayor of St Medard en Jalles to March 2014, PS (Parti Socialist)
Jean-Charles Bron	Local councillor (Juppe put him in charge of a new department <i>Mediation</i> , in 2008 dealing with resolving problems across the CUB
Alain Juppé	Mayor of Bordeaux, L'Union pour un mouvement populaire (UMP)
Conchia Lacuey	Mayor of Floirac [18 March 2001 – 18 February 2013, Parti Socialist (PS)
Bernard Seurot	Mayor of Bruges L'Union pour un mouvement populaire (UMP)
Vincent Feltesse	Mayor of Blaneufort [25 March 2001 – 6th July 2012] President of CUB [13th July 2007 – 18th April 2014], Régional Councillor. Parti Socialist (PS)
Alain Guichard	Municipal Councillor, Floirac L'Union pour un mouvement populaire (UMP)
Alain Cazabonnem	Mayor of Talence [2 nd September 1993 – 18th Octobre 2017] (UC) (Centrist Union)
Max Guichard	Member of the Parti Coummunist (PCF)
Agnes Versepuy	Metropolitan councillor, Union de la Driote et du Centre (UMP)

**ANNEX 11: DOCUMENT DE TRAVAIL 12 DECEMBER 2012 MM CARTRON,
(ANNEXE 1)
GRANDE SALLE DE SPECTACLES ORIENTATIONS POUR LE
PROGRAMME DE LA SALLE**

Le présent document a pour objet de présenter les premières orientations d'une définition synthétique de la grande salle de spectacles de 10000 places que souhaite faire construire la Communauté urbaine de Bordeaux sur la Commune de Floirac.

1 - Le site mis à disposition

Le site mis à disposition est situé quai de la Souys à Floirac. Il s'inscrit dans la ZAC des Quais, au débouché du futur Pont Jean-Jacques Bosc.^[1] Il est défini par la parcelle 127, îlot M1, d'une superficie de 25 000m².

2 - Les aménagements globaux sur le site mis à disposition

La parcelle mise à disposition sera entièrement aménagée dans le respect des règles du PLU.

L'aménagement intégrera la grande salle et ses annexes, les aménagements extérieurs comprenant le parvis, l'espace technique composé des accès techniques et parkings privés non accessibles au public, les raccordements aux différents accès, les espaces paysagers.

3 - Les grandes orientations d'aménagement de la salle

Quatre grandes orientations devront définir la conception de la salle : la qualité

- l'accessibilité
- l'optimisation financière
- la performance environnementale.

Ces quatre orientations se déclinent au minimum de la manière suivante :

Qualité esthétique de la salle ^[1]_{SEP}

La salle est positionnée dans un espace aéré, contre la Garonne. Hormis éventuellement les accès au pont, peu d'effets de masque apparaissent. Ainsi, la salle devrait s'apercevoir depuis l'autre rive de la Garonne.

L'effet signal pourra être ainsi recherché par une recherche architecturale ambitieuse ou audacieuse. Ce parti architectural fort devra financièrement être

maîtrisé. Il ne doit pas générer de surcoût inacceptable. Une mise en lumière extérieure de la salle sera prise en compte.

Qualité acoustique de la salle

La salle devra assurer une protection acoustique optimale vis-à-vis de l'extérieur et notamment des logements situés à proximité de cette dernière.

La salle devra par ailleurs disposer d'une qualité acoustique intérieure irréprochable, notamment vis-à-vis des concerts. Cette qualité devra être un des points forts de la salle. Une étude acoustique poussée sera à prendre en considération.

Qualité de confort d'assise

Le confort d'assise sera particulièrement soigné en travaillant sur la nature des matériaux et la dimension des places. L'écartement entre sièges sera au minimum de 50 cm entre axes, la distance entre les rangées sera de l'ordre de 80 à 85 cm en fonction de la pente et de la courbe de visibilité.

Qualité visuelle

La visibilité des places sera particulièrement étudiée de manière à offrir la meilleure qualité visuelle pour le plus grand nombre de spectateurs. Les courbes de visibilité horizontale et verticale seront analysées et schématisées en fonction des types de manifestations. La qualité visuelle sera renforcée par un ou des écrans géants de report de la scène et du spectacle.

L'accessibilité par tous et pour tous

Le projet inclura une étude poussée d'accessibilité de 3 catégories de spectateurs :

- les enfants
- les personnes âgées/femmes enceintes
- les personnes handicapées et leurs accompagnants.

Le projet doit aller au-delà de la réglementation pour ces catégories là et tout mettre en œuvre pour que l'accessibilité à la salle, l'accès aux locaux annexes (sanitaires, buvettes...), ou encore la visibilité de la scène soient exemplaires.

Pour illustration, les personnes handicapées devront pouvoir avoir accès à plusieurs zones de place et éviter ainsi le regroupement unique.

La maîtrise des coûts complets L'optimisation financière dans la construction de la salle sera recherchée. Pour cela, tous les espaces seront rationalisés, la superposition de fonctions pour le même espace sera systématiquement étudiée. Ex : une loge d'artiste pourra servir de bureau d'arbitre, les vestiaires serviront autant pour les artistes que pour les équipes sportives... Les matériaux utilisés devront générer peu d'entretien (ex : métal galvanisé, bois sans entretien), les techniques devront générer peu de maintenance.

La performance environnementale La performance énergétique sera recherchée, notamment au niveau du rafraîchissement de la salle. Le traitement énergétique de la salle devra aller au-delà de la réglementation. La salle devra obtenir la certification HQE (Haute Qualité Environnementale). D'autres certifications permettant d'accentuer les performances de la salle pourront être proposées.

4 - Types de manifestations accueillies dans la salle

La grande salle de spectacles sera une salle polyvalente à dominante spectacle.

Elle accueillera ainsi les manifestations suivantes :

Spectacles musicaux (concerts, variétés, chansons, lyrique, rock, jazz, musiques électroniques...) sauf jauges ou dispositifs scéniques exceptionnels ou hors normes, tous les spectacles disponibles sur le marché national ou international devront pouvoir y être accueillis.

Spectacles divers : danse, opéra, cabaret, projection, cirque (la hauteur d'un chapiteau ne doit pas configurer la hauteur de la salle), spectacle équestre.

Manifestations sportives ponctuelles : hand ball, tennis, basket, volley ball, catch...Autres manifestations : dancing, conférences, expositions, spectacles familiaux, congrès, séminaires, d'entreprises.

Concernant le sport, les grandes options suivantes ont été retenues :

- La salle n'a pas vocation à accueillir un club résident. Cependant, elle devra pouvoir accueillir dans de bonnes conditions les

événements sportifs (rencontres amicales, démonstrations, match isolé ou tournoi...)

- Les dimensions des espaces d'évolution et des locaux sportifs devront permettre d'accueillir des événements sportifs de niveau européen dans les principales disciplines de sport en salle, handball notamment.
- Par contre et en raison de leur coût, les prescriptions minimales relatives aux locaux annexes non sportifs (locaux de réception, salles médias, loges spectateurs...) ne reprendront pas toutes les dispositions des cahiers des charges des fédérations sportives pour les manifestations les plus rares. La mutualisation maximale sera recherchée et la possibilité de variantes sera ouverte sur ce point.

5 - Les jauges de la salle


En base, la salle aura une jauge maximale de 10000 spectateurs (assis debout) avec une tolérance de +/-3%. Elle devra bénéficier d'un minimum de 6500 places assises en configuration spectacle. La jauge sera modulable et s'échelonnera pour accueillir des spectacles de taille différente. Des variantes de jauge maximale seront autorisées dans la fourchette de 8000 à 12 000 spectateurs.

6 - Organisation de la salle


Il n'est pas imposé de configuration type de la salle. Sous réserve du respect des conditions de modularité, jauges et polyvalences d'usages, les candidats pourront être amenés à présenter des projets s'organisant autour de salles en arène, en U, ou en scène frontale.

**ANNEX 12: CONSTRUCTION DE LA GRANDE SALLE DE SPECTACLES DE
FLOIRAC BORDEAUX METROPOLE ARENA FLOIRAC – ZAC DES QUAIS**


Configuration spectacles Scene frontale petite jauge



Configuration spectacles Scene frontale




Configuration spectacles Scene centrale



Versepuy 2017, Annex number 156

Project Plan for the Arena



Source: Versepuy, 2016, Annex 217

ANNEX 13: LCC COUNCIL WARDS (AS OF 2021)

Adel and Wharfdale	Alwoodley	Ardsley and Robin Hood
Armley	Beeston and Holbeck	Bramley and Stanningley
Burmantofts and Richmond Hill	Calverly and Farsley	Chapel Allerton
Crossgates and Whinmoor	Farnley and Wortley	Garforth and Swillington
Gipton and Harehills	Guisseley and Rawdon	Harewood
Headingley and Hyde Park	Horsforth	Hunslet and Riverside
Killingbeck and Seacroft	Kippax and Methley	Kirkstall
Little London and Woodhouse	Middleton Park	Moortown
Morley North	Morley South	Otley and Yeadon
Pudsey	Rothwell	Roundhay
Temple Newsam	Weetwood	Wetherby

Source: LCC, 2021, n.pag.

ANNEX 14: COMPLETED CULTURAL FACILITIES

A	A new City Museum
B	The Carriageworks Theatre
C	Refurbished Grand Theatre and Howard Assembly Rooms
D	John Charles Centre for Sport, a world-class Olympic-standard facility
E	New Carnegie Rugby Stand
F	Cricket Pavilion at Headingley Stadium
G	New BBC Studios at Quarry Hill

Source: The Leeds initiative 2009 (Vision for Leeds 2011-2030) p. 12.

ANNEX 15: TYPES OF VENUES LEEDS

Examples of music venues with a capacity over 1,000

Venue	Location	Capacity
Elland Road		38,000
O2 Academy	55 Cookridge Street	2,300
Leeds University Union	Lifton Place	2,100
Leeds Town Hall	The Headrow	1,550
Leeds Grand Theatre	New Briggate	1,550
Leeds Beckett Students' Union	City Campus	1,100

Source: Sheerin, 2019.

Examples of music venues with a capacity from 100 - 800

Venue	Location	Capacity
Leeds Irish Centre	York Road	800
Church Leeds	Woodhouse Lane	500
City Varieties Music Hall	Swan Street	467
The Wardrobe	6 St Peter's Square, Quarry Hill	450
Brudenell Social Club	33 Queen's Road	400
Eiger Studios	New Craven Gate	400
The HiFi Club	2 Central Road	350
Belgrave Music Hall	1-1a Cross Belgrave Street	300
Temple of Boom	Byron Street Mills	80-250
Chunk	Meanwood Road	200
The Lending Room	Woodhouse Lane	200
Wharf Chambers	23-25 Wharf Street	180
Headrow House	Bramley's Yard	150
Santiago	1-3 Grand Arcade	150
Howard Assembly Room	46 New Briggate	150
Leeds College of Music	3 Quarry House	120

Source: Sheerin, 2019.

ANNEX 16: EXAMPLES OF OBJECTIONS CONCERNING THE INCREASED CAPACITY FOR THE ED SHEERAN CONCERT

20 objections received from residents some of which are detailed here:

As a resident of West Avenue in Roundhay, which faces and is adjacent to Soldier Field, I was appalled to read your notice regarding the proposal to increase the capacity of large-scale events in Roundhay Park by a factor of four from 19,999 to 79,999.

I have noted the proposal to increase the permitted audience numbers from 19,999 to 79,999, a fourfold increase It would be useful to know how the Council proposes to deal with the increased traffic for the concert.

I love that Leeds City Council are looking for more large events to feature in Roundhay Park but I fear that it could become disruptive to those who live near to and use the park if made too frequent.

We are writing to strongly object to the proposal put forward by the Council to change the events licence condition to allow large scale events to take place at Roundhay Park for up to 79,999. The park and the existing infrastructure are not suited for such large scale events. (Raper, 2019, Report Item 118, Appendix E)

ANNEX 17: MATTERS FOR DISCUSSION/DECISION FOLLOWING THE FEASIBILITY STUDIES

RESOLVED	
a	That the findings of the Cultural Facilities Feasibility Study into the future provision of concert, arena and other music related facilities in the City be noted.
b	That the recommendations of the Cultural Facilities Task Group on the conclusions of the Cultural Facilities Feasibility Study and the proposed way forward be endorsed.
c	That consultants be appointed to advise the City Council on the development of a delivery strategy for a proposed new arena and associated related facilities.
d	That an initial feasibility study be prepared to identify the potential options available to future improve the Leeds Town Hall, such that it may become a major concert venue of international standing.
e	That the incurring of expenditure of £200,000 be authorised for the appointment of consultants to prepare a feasibility study on the Town Hall and to prepare a delivery strategy for the proposed new arena and associated related facilities.
f	That officers report back on the outcome of the public consultation exercise into the key findings and recommendations of the Cultural Facilities Feasibility Study and, on the outcome of the studies on the Town Hall and arena and conference/exhibition facilities

Source: The Directors of Learning and Leisure and Development, 2005, p. 5.

ANNEX 18: RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE FEASIBILITY REPORT

R1	The procurement exercise should be structured to maximise competition and promote value for money.
R2	The procurement competition should invite bids from developers/landowners on their own sites, whilst also providing a publicly owned site (namely Elland Road) for those participant what either do not have land interests or believe that the public land available offers the best solution.
R3	The Council should follow a 'split' procurement route, selecting the operator separately from the development consortium.
R4	The Council should undertake a delivery study (at the appropriate time) into the implications of forming a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)* to operate the facility, should the operator procurement fail.
R5	The project should be procured in accordance with EU regulations, advertised in the OJEU and be basked on the Competitive Dialogue process.
R6	The Council and its public sector partners should set a 'Public Sector Investment limit' for the project. The bidding consortia could use the sum in whole or in part, however through competition bidders may not necessarily seek to use the total funds available.
R7	The Council should seek to apply for/put in pace the public sector funding pot.
R8	Investigate further the temporary venue options available and the associated benefits to the Council and City.
R9	The Council should seek to work with the selected operator to build up the City's event profile using the venue(s) and develop a portfolio of events/audience to transfer to the arena on completion.
R10	Procurement documentation to set out to operators/bidders that inclusion of conferencing/exhibition capabilities should be determined by the financial/operating benefit associated with this flexibility.

Source: PMP/Donaldson/Arup, 2006.


ANNEX 19: ITCD DEVELOPER EVALUATION CRITERIA AND WEIGHTINGS

Criteria	% Weight
Technical (20%)	
Site and Location	4
Development Proposal-Scheme Master Plan and Arena Design	6
Accessibility	4
Neighbourhood and Amenity	2
Environmental	4
Deliverability (20%)	
Land Assembly	4
Arena Facilities and Services Requirement	4
Contractual Terms	4
Scheme Deliverability and Project Risk	6
Programme	2
Financial and Economic (60%)	
Financial Appraisal	25
Arena and Associated Cost Plan	10
Funding	5
Cashflow	5
Economic Impact	10
Social Impact	5
Total	100%

Source: Director of City Development, 2008, p. 339.


ANNEX 20: ELEVATIONS FOR THE ARENA

North East Elevations



Source: Reserved Planning 10/04022/RM Design and Elevations (17/3/11)

West and South Elevations



Source: Reserved Planning 10/04022/RM Design and Elevations (17/3/11)

ANNEX 21: TRANSLATIONS

French	English
Chapter 4	
La réforme territorial	Territorial Reforms
Le déséquilibre entre les deux rives a toujours existé	The imbalances of the two banks has always existed
à la réalité et aux difficultés des grands agglomérations d'aujourd'hui, à cette articulation compliquée entre ville et campagne, centre et périphérie, commune et métropole	a reality and the difficulties of today's large cities, of the complicated articulation between city and countryside, centre and periphery, municipality and metropolis.
'impulsion nécessaire à la renaissance de Bordeaux	turning the city into a beautiful place
je suis le premier à vanter les mérites du projet urbain d'Alain Juppé et à reconnaître qu'il est un grand succès ... and avec a l'époque le soutien d'Alain Rousset	I am the first to praise the merits of Alain Juppé's urban project and to recognize that it was a great success ... and with the support of Alain Rousset at the time
une vraie fenêtre d'opportunité	a real window of opportunity
Les milieux dirigeants continuaient à vivre dans le souvenir de l'opulence coloniale du XVIII ^e siècle et donnaient tous leurs soins à une fonction portuaire dont l'avenir est limité. Bref, la ville regardait vers l'atlantique plutôt que vers l'Aquitaine	The ruling circles continued to live in the memory of the colonial opulence of the 18th century and gave all their care to a port function whose future is limited. In short, the city was looking towards the Atlantic rather than Aquitaine
Le rapport de la ville Bordeaux avec son fleuve a été modifié à de nombreuses reprises au cours des siècles jusqu'à parfois un désintérêt total laissant place à d'importantes friches portuaires	The relationship of the city of Bordeaux with its river has been changed many times over the centuries but sometimes a total lack of interest has given way to ports becoming large wastelands' (
the 'rapports marqués par des périodes de forte symbiose, d'ignorance ou de mépris	relationships marked by periods of strong symbiosis, ignorance and contempt'
'Bordeaux acquiert ... un rayonnement à la mesure de son histoire, de son prestige architectural et de son patrimoine culturel'	Bordeaux ... acquired an influence commensurate with its history, its architectural prestige and its cultural heritage
('pour la première fois, l'urbanisme est abordé sous un angle pluridisciplinaire'	for the first time, town planning is viewed from a multi-disciplinary angle'
'rendre les quais aux Bordelais'	to return the quays to the Bordelais]
Il s'agit du plus grand projet urbain de France, hors région parisienne	It was an operation of national interest and is the largest urban project in France outside the Paris region
bouchon ferroviaire de Bordeaux'	a bottleneck of a railway station
de même que le tramway a été le symbole du projet urbain de 1996, je pense vraiment que le TGV peut être l'ambassadeur de la décennie	just as the tramway was the symbolic urban project of 1996, I think that the TGV can be the ambassador of the decade for Bordeaux

bordelaise'	
Les deux rives de la Garonne s'ignorent depuis deux cent ans'	the two banks of the Garonne have ignored each other for two hundred years
Si l'on veut que l'agglomération ne soit pas une vaste conurbation rejoignant Arcachon, il faut recentrer, et le centre c'est le fleuve'	If we don't want the agglomeration to be a vast conurbation joining Arcachon, we have to refocus, and the centre is the river.
la Rive Droite n'est pas un « problème », mais bien un atout essentiel pour l'agglomération entire	the Right Bank is not a "problem", but an essential asset for the entire agglomeration] (Parin, 2000, p.16).
pour cette population périurbaine la plus éloignée de la ville et de ses services, la vie quotidienne est loin d'être facile	for this peri-urban population - the furthest from the city and its services, daily life is far from easy] (Feltesse, 2021, p.16).
Elle s'exerce sur l'architecture, la décoration des bâtiments dans une sorte de tradition monarchique à la française'	it focuses on architecture, the decoration of buildings in a sort of French monarchical tradition] (Talano-Garets, 2010, p.5).
Si le patrimoine est ainsi transmis aux générations futures, le maire [Marquet] entend bien laisser sa marque dans le paysage bordelaise	If patrimony is thus bequeathed to future generation, the Mayor understood very well how to leave his mark on the landscape of Bordeaux
<chabanisme> [qui] s'est forge grace a l'identification affective des Bordelais a leur maire, et a l'identification de celui-ci a sa ville	chabanism [which] was forged due to the emotional identification of the Bordelaise with their mayor, and the identification of the latter with his city'(Talano-des Garets, 1999, p.44).
et surtout il aimait séduire. Et sa plus grande conquête fut Bordeaux, sa ville et ses habitants'	Above all, he loved to 'seduce'. And his greatest conquest was Bordeaux, the town and its townsfolk.
Chapter 5	
Un grand équipement de spectacle vivant sur l'agglomération bordelaise : Données comparatives au plan national et local	Towards the building of a liver concert venue in the Bordeaux city region: Comparative Issues for the National and Local Plan
Cette étude [2007] s'appuie effectivement sur une première analyse effectuée en 2005 ("Potentialités d'implantation d'un équipement culturel et de spectacles sur le site du campus et ses abords. Rapport de synthèse"), mais nous ne possédons qu'une version papier à l'agence d'urbanisme'	This study is actually based on a first analysis carried out in 2005 ("The Potential to establish cultural venues and shows on the campus site and its surroundings. Summary report"), but there is only one version of the paper at the town planning agency. (Participant A)
Les réxions menées à l'époque avaient montré une incompatibilité du site universitaire pour l'accueil d'un tel équipement d'agglomération'	Discussions at the time showed that the university site was incompatible with the hosting of such urban facilities' (a'urba, 2007, p.2).
hypothèse qui n' pas été retenue dans le projet Campus'	the assumption was that it was not retained in the Campus Project (Cartron, 2008, p.2 DOA66).
Bordeaux souffre, en effet aujourd'hui, de la comparaison avec les	Bordeaux suffers today from the comparison with French conurbations

agglomérations française de taille comparable'	of a comparable size] (a'urba, 2007, p.5).
consensus: 'les élus des principales collectivités semblent d'accord sur la nécessité d'un tel équipement dans l'agglomération	the elected representatives seem to agree on the need for an arena in the conurbation (Par, 2008, n.pag.).
Depuis janvier 1982, la grande salle de spectacles de Bordeaux était... une patinoire. L'équipement sportif a servi pendant 35 ans à accueillir les concerts avec une capacité de 7000 personnes, mais dans des conditions techniques inadaptées, malgré les travaux acoustiques réguliers.	Since January 1982, the great performance hall in Bordeaux has been... an ice rink. The sports venue was used for 35 years to host concerts with a capacity of 7,000 people, but in unsuitable technical conditions, despite regular improving acoustics. (Participant E)
Alain Juppé soit plus ambitieux, même quand certains projets ne concernent pas sa ville	Alain Juppé should be more ambitious, even when certain projects do not concern his city] (Laucey qut. Sud Ouest 2007, p.3).
Je ne pense pas qu'un nouveau centre commercial de 50 000 m2 soit une bonne chose'	I don't think a new 50,000 m2 shopping centre would be a good thing' (Alain Juppe qut. Arrivé, 20 Minutes, 2007, n.pag.).
Juppé's claims : 'Je n'ai pas à prendre en compte les intentions d'Alain Juppé. Nous avons fait une proposition et elle sera débattue'	Juppé's claims: 'I don't have to take into account Alain Juppé's intentions. We have made a proposal and it will be debated'.
un projet ambitieux et fédérateur au niveau local mais [qui] doit aussi dépasser les frontières des territoires: la ville de Bordeaux entend ainsi associer à l'évènement l'ensemble du territoire régional élargi à l'euro - région franco-espagnole	An ambitious and unifying project at the local level but [which] must also go beyond the borders of the territories: the city of Bordeaux thus intends to involve in the event the whole of the regional territory enlarged to the euro - Franco-Spanish region' (Bron, 2007, D093X)
'L'association Bordeaux 2013 [in charge of the bid] répond que "rien n'est figé". "Certains projets seront intégrés après", assure-t-on'	The Bordeaux 2013 Association indicated that nothing is set in stone. Some projects will be integrated afterwards, we can assure you] (Courtois, C. 2008, np).
Le passage victorieux de cette première étape est la reconnaissance du foisonnement culturel de Bordeaux, de son agglomération et de sa région'	success in this first stage was in recognition of the proliferation of culture of Bordeaux, its agglomeration and its region.] (Bron, 2008, p.2).
Hypothèse 1 : Un équipement de rayonnement régional de type zénith, d'une capacité maximale de 9 000 places.	Hypothesis 1: A regional beacon venue linked to the Zenith style with a capacity of 9,000 seats'
Hypothèse 2 : Un équipement de rayonnement national appartenant au label Européen Arenas Association, d'une capacité maximale de 12 000 places.	Hypothesis 2: A national beacon venue belonging to the European Arenas Associations label with a maximum capacity of 12,000 seats'. (a'urba, 2007, p.19)

le maire de Bruges, Bernard Seurot, va créer sensation ce midi. Il convie en effet la presse pour annoncer la candidature de sa ville à l'accueil du future Zénith'	the Mayor of Bruges, Bernard Seurot, will create a sensation this lunchtime. He is holding a press conference to announce his city's candidacy to host the future' Zénith
il [Seurot] proposera aujourd'hui d'accueillir sur le territoire de sa commune le projet de Zénith'	he will today propose to welcome a Zénith project to his commune] (Gilles, 2008, p.9).
sur la même longueur d'ondes'	on the same wavelength
[je] ne voulait pas prendre la responsabilité de faire capoter ce projet, qui demeurerait dans les limbes depuis quinze ans	[[I] did not want to take responsibility for derailing the project which had been in limbo for fifteen years' (Darfay and Mathurn, 2008, p.2/3)
La cinquième agglomération de France s'est privée d'une salle de spectacle de qualité au profit d'un équipement sportif que l'on transformera en salle de variétés, dont la capacité sera de 8 500 places, dont 1500 à visibilité réduite.	The 5th largest agglomeration in France has deprived itself of a quality performance hall in favour of sports space that will be transformed into a variety hall, including the capacities of 8,500 places including 1,500 with reduced visibility. (Darfay and Mathrun, 2008, p.3)
Je suis déçu par la décision des élus de l'agglomération bordelaise. Le programme Zénith a été construit par les professionnels du spectacle avec l'État, et il porte le label du ministère de la Culture.	I am disappointed with the decision of elected representatives of the Bordeaux agglomeration. The Zénith program was built by entertainment professionals with the government, and it bears the label of the Department of Culture
l'excès de pouvoir du président de la CUB Vincent Feltesse, les irrégularités dans le vote et ses conditions, et l'absence de compétences de la collectivité en la matière	the excess power of the President of the CUB Vincent Feltesse, the irregularities in the vote and its conditions, and the lack of skills of the community in the matter (Monteil, 2008, p.2)
le fait d'être dans l'European Arena association [qui] nous apporte la force d'un réseau'	the fact of being a member of the European Arena Association [which] would strengthen the network'
l'avant-dernier projet prévoyant un grand centre commercial autour de la salle, mais faute de commercialisation, là encore un échec.	the penultimate element of the project which envisioned a large shopping centre around the arena, failed because the commercial space could not be sold. (Participant E)
un projet porté par un groupement privé (aréna + centre commercial) n'a pas abouti pour des raisons économiques, le porteur de projet n'ayant pas trouvé suffisamment de commerces pour équilibrer son opération	a project led by a private group (arena + shopping center) was not successful for economic reasons, the project leader not having sold enough commercial spaces to balance its operation' (Participant B)
C'était un pari, nous ne l'avons pas gagné'	it was a gamble, and we did not win it (Lherm, 2012, p.1)
élément important dans le rééquilibrage rive gauche-rive droite)	an important element in rebalancing the left bank-right bank – the Arena

...La salle doit rester à Floirac'	must stay in Floirac
'contribue de façon exceptionnelle à la reconquête du fleuve, constituant un nouvel élément de ponctuation, un pas de plus au sud par rapport au futur pôle de la culture et de l'économie creative'	make an exceptional contribution to the regeneration of the river, constitutes a new facility, a step further south in relation to a future pole of cultural and creative economy
Aménagement de la ZAC des quais (Floirac), lieu où s'est implanté l'Aréna.	The arena facility will be located within the ZAC des Quais (Floirac) development] (Participant B)
créer et exploiter une grande salle de spectacle de 10 000 places environ, localisée sur la ZAC des quais de Floirac'	to create and operate a 10,000 capacity large venue for events, located within the ZAC des Quais] (Cartron, 2012a, p.2).
La métropole de Bordeaux souhaitait une salle orientée spectacles, mais avec la capacité d'accueillir des événements sportifs indoor, jusqu'à un terrain de Handball. Le cahier des charges Zenith n'étant pas adapté à cette volonté, une salle sur mesure a été conçue	The Bordeaux métropole wanted a venue geared towards shows, but with the capacity to host indoor sporting events, such as Handball. The Zénith specifications could not be adapted to this need, a tailor-made room was required. (Participant C)
'Il s'agit d'une Aréna pas d'un Zénith	This is an arena not a Zénith (Participant B)
la marque Zénith demande à respecter un cahier des charges strict	The Zénith label requires strict criteria (Participant B)
Standardisation, ce qui n'était pas le souhait sur ce projet. Caractéristiques spécifiques à la localisation de la salle et à ses usages attendus	Standardization was not the aim of this project. The characteristics for the type of venue and expected uses was too specific (Participant C)
Un an plus tard, la CUB peut se vanter d'avoir assez vite rebondi avec trois groupements candidats pour concevoir, bâtir et exploiter pendant vingt ans (durée de la concession) une salle de 8 à 10000 personnes dédiée prioritairement aux spectacles mais pouvant aussi accueillir ponctuellement des événements sportifs.	A year later, the CUB can boast about having bounced back fairly quickly with three candidate groups for the design, build and operation of a 8 – 10,000 capacity arena (with a 20 years lease) dedicated primarily to shows but also able to host occasional sporting events.(Feltesse in Deneste, 2013, p.6).
Pour l'ouverture, Lagardère voulait justement un groupe international, connu dans le monde entier. Un groupe ou artiste français aurait été moins... amazing!	For the opening, Lagardère really wanted an international group, known the world over. A French group or artist would have been less ... amazing! (Participant E)
'Vincent Feltesse signait son dernier acte administratif en tant que président de la CUB, Jérôme Langlet, directeur général de Lagardère Unlimited son premier contrat en province'	Vincent Feltesse signed his last administrative act as president of the CUB, his first contract for the province between Jérôme Langlet, managing director of Lagardère Unlimited (Delneste, 2014, n.pag.).
l'homme ...unaniment reconnu comme l'un des grands bâtisseurs de	The man ... unanimously recognized as one of the great builders of his

son temps, à l'instar de Jean Nouvel ou de Frank Gehry'	time, like Jean Nouvel or Frank Gehry ' (Giraud, 2018, n.pag.)
gigantesque galet serait sorti de la Garonne attenante pour venir se poser avec élégance sur la rive'	a gigantic pebble that would come out the Garonne and land elegantly on the shore] (Giraud, 2018, n.pag).
sa forme de beau galet poli et fermé n'invite pas à l'ouverture vers le quartier et vers la ville, contrairement au Grand Théâtre de Bordeaux dont, à l'époque, la colonnade était de plain pied avec la ville et participait à la déambulation urbaine.	its beautiful, polished and closed pebble shape does not invite openness towards the neighborhood and the city, unlike the Grand Théâtre de Bordeaux, when, at the time, the colonnade was on a level with the city to promote public engagement in the urban environment (Participant F)
Bel objet, certes, mais posé tel un monolithe, sur un sol qui ne l'installe pas dans l'urbain.	Beautiful object, for sure, but placed like a monolith, situated on the ground but not integrated with the city. (Participant F)
même si l'Aréna est implantée à Floirac, commune qui jouxte Bordeaux, les gens pensent qu'elle est à Bordeaux. Cette salle de spectacle apporte une bonne image à Bordeaux.	Even if the Arena is located in Floirac, a town which adjoins Bordeaux, people think that it is in Bordeaux (Participant B)
Bordeaux Métropole Arena s'annonce comme "la salle du XXI ^e siècle	[Bordeaux Métropole Arena is shaping up to be "the venue for the 21st Century"] (Jonathan, 2018, p.5).
janvier à décembre 2018) Arkéa Arena a accueilli 70 évènements et plus de 347,612 spectateurs s'imposant ainsi comme une vitrine du spectacle vivant en Europe et la première salle de province en termes de fréquentation	Between January and December 2018, Arkea Arena hosted 70 events and more than 347,612 spectators, thus establishing itself as a showcase for performing arts in Europe and the most popular provincial arena in terms of attendance (Versepuy, 2019, p.4).
l'Aréna est ouverte depuis 2 ans, les spectateurs et les artistes sont ravis de la qualité acoustique de la salle, ce qui permet de la classer en 1 ^{ère} salle de province en terme de fréquentations.	The arena has been open for 2 years, spectators and artists are delighted with the acoustic quality of the hall, which allows it to be ranked first in the provinces in terms of attendance. (Participant B)
En 2019 également, l'Arena est la 1 ^{ère} salle de France en termes d'affluence derrière Paris, pour la 2 ^{ème} année consécutive.	In 2019, the Arena is the 1st venue in France in terms of attendance behind only Paris, for the 2nd year in a row.] (Participant C)